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Three book-length publications are arguably the foundational contri-
butions to the study of physical disability representations in the aes-
thetic realm: Martin Norden’s Cinema of Isolation: A History of Physical 
Disabilities in the Movies (1994), which traces the centrality of disabled 
characters in one hundred years of American film; David Mitchell and 
Sharon Snyder’s innovative and foundational Narrative Prosthesis: 
Disability and the Dependencies of Discourse (2000), which privileges the 
nuances of literary disability representation; and Tobin Siebers’s 
Disability Aesthetics (2010), which brought a similarly innovative thesis 
to bear on visual art forms, prioritizing painting and sculpture. Norden 
writes that “the history of physical disability images in the movies has 
mostly been a history of distortion in the name of maintaining an able-
ist society” (1994: 314). Mitchell and Snyder’s book “argues that images 
of disabled people abound in history” (2000: 52) and that “once a reader 
begins to seek out representations of disability in our literatures, it is 
difficult to avoid their proliferation in texts with which one believed 
oneself to be utterly familiar” (2000: 52). Siebers’s argument asserts that 
in painting and sculpture, the presence of disability is the element that 
has allowed “the beauty of an artwork to endure over time” (2010: 5). 
The representation of disability is, each text argues in its own way, thus 
central to the aesthetic histories of these directions in human cultural 
production. Often under-acknowledged as such in both literary and 
visual art, physical disability has long been clothed in the normative 
trappings of an able-bodied society and mobilized to suit a range of 
symbolic, metaphorical, and perhaps even purportedly transcendent 
artistic purposes.
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This direction in disability studies research has proven essential to an 
interdisciplinary field that is at once an academic and a political project 
(Davis 1997: 1). In launching a powerful critique of what Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson (1997) termed the normate, it has extended the force 
of disability rights movements into aesthetic arenas where systems 
of  social power and their consequences for bodily difference can be 
 rendered visible, dissected, and critiqued – with implications for the 
extra-textual world, of course. In prioritizing aesthetics and cultural 
production, disability studies research has not only called attention to 
the value of textual analysis and humanistic work more generally, but 
also reasserted the materiality of culture and highlighted the imbri-
cation of thought and action. Nonetheless, to the extent that such high-
profile previous studies have privileged physical over cognitive 
disabilities, these invaluable contributions have left part of the picture 
unclear. To date, and speaking broadly, a certain invocation of the visi-
ble world has driven the study of both literary and visual representa-
tions of disability. That is, the concept of the visible in existing disability 
studies research is largely synonymous with the physical in a simple 
sense. The critique of able-bodied bias in film, literature, and visual art 
has tended to centre on the way in which the physical or material body 
– again, in a sense that largely marginalizes the cognitive – has been 
mobilized for another purpose. A visible trait, a mark, a scar, a missing 
limb, a deformity, a limp, a physical impairment … in ableist cultural 
production, historically speaking, these are taken to be signs of evil, 
of corruption, of moral decline, and so on. Or, on the other hand, the 
 exceptional body is problematically taken to be a vehicle to salvation 
or redemption in a process that symbolically others the extraordinary 
body in order to reaffirm the centrality of myths associated with 
 able-bodied norms.
It is important to note that to date, in scholarship exploring the aes-
thetic realm, the physically disabled body in literature has been seen as 
a form or shape relating to a symbolic experience. Mitchell and Snyder 
write of disability in a range of specific works in which “the meaning of 
the relationship between having a physical disability and the nature of 
a character’s identity come under scrutiny. Disability recurs in these 
works as a potent force that challenges cultural ideals of the ‘normal’ or 
‘whole’ body” (2000: 50). The books and essay-length studies that have 
directed similar insights towards specific instances of Anglophone lit-
erary and cultural production are too numerous to mention here. This 
research is important in its own right. It is equally important, however, 
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to recognize that the social and political need for such academic work 
centred on the physical – and also its power and potential – stems from 
the need to respond to a very specific form of bodily oppression, one 
that is more visible in society than that involving embodied cognitive 
disability. The point is to understand the power and potential of this 
research on physically oriented disability while recognizing that it is an 
academic and political reaction to very specific social circumstances – 
and not necessarily an attempt to address all constructions of disability 
that obtain in society. That is, in seeking to combat able-bodied society’s 
highly visible and historical marginalization and oppression of physi-
cal disability in particular, this strain of disability studies has largely 
focused on the appearance of physical disability throughout social his-
tory and in the aesthetic realm. The interplay between inner reality 
and outward appearance has been a key part of physical disability 
representations – as Norden, Mitchell and Snyder, and Siebers illus-
trate with reference to work by numerous authors and critics – and 
thus it makes sense that analysis of this particular interplay would be 
so essential to the social and political critique launched by disability 
studies in the period I refer to as the first wave of disability studies in 
the humanities.
Readers of this book may find it to be provocative on many counts. In 
identifying the need to pay more attention to cognitive disabilities as 
the defining characteristic of a second wave of disability studies, I join 
a growing group of scholars who in one way or another have called for 
a move beyond the physical orientation of much disability studies re-
search. In addition, some readers may conclude that in underscoring 
the material reality of cognitive impairment as I do here – in seeing 
cognitive impairment not solely as a cultural construction but also as a 
material experience connected with biological or developmental factors 
– I sacrifice the strong constructivist tradition of disability studies. 
Moreover, my suggestion that an acknowledgment of the material real-
ity of severe cognitive impairments can connect the social model of 
 disability so strongly embraced in the humanities with the medical, 
clinical, and health sciences, may seem a betrayal to some. From the 
outset, I admit a friction and even a sharp divergence between the goals 
of a social model of disability and a medical model of disability. I none-
theless assert that a clean break between social and medical paradigms 
is neither possible nor entirely desirable when approaching the topic of 
cognitive disability, in particular regarding those experiences of cogni-
tive disability that tend to be considered severe.
xii Preface
As I am myself a cognitively abled scholar, this perspective may in-
vite certain criticisms. Anticipating those criticisms, let me say that I 
can imagine a society in which it is not necessary for some to speak on 
behalf of those with severe cognitive disabilities, but that such a society 
is not the one in which we find ourselves. In this society there are popu-
lations who experience severe cognitive impairment and who are not 
able to communicate their needs in the way required by normative 
ableist power structures. While some members of these populations 
may have advocates and allies at the small scale, or at the larger scale in 
disability movements, there are many who do not. It is important to 
recognize that disability scholars in the humanities have not tradition-
ally explored the social realities or cultural representations relevant to 
those with cognitive disabilities. Neither have they explored the dis-
tinct needs these populations may have related to severe cognitive im-
pairments. My hope is that these provocations do not prove too much 
of an obstacle for readers. I believe that considering these issues through 
their appearance in social and cultural disability representations is nec-
essary if we are to expand the scope and impact of disability studies in 
the humanities.
It is important in this preface to take a moment to disclose my inter-
est in and connection to disability studies. In the twenty-first century, 
the push to bring academic disability work in line with practices from 
the disability rights movement has evoked much discussion. An arti-
cle in Disability Studies Quarterly (33[2], 2013) by Corbett Joan O’Toole, 
former president of the Society of Disability Studies (SDS), explores 
how practices of disclosure have differed across community and 
scholarly contexts, stating that “not to locate oneself is considered im-
polite – as if one’s relationship to disability is unimportant. Within 
disability communities, acknowledging one’s relationship provides 
valuable information to others in similar situations. It also shapes 
how people receive the presenter’s information.”1 O’Toole explores 
how scholars reacted adversely when they were invited to promote a 
culture of disclosure in the context of the SDS conference, and she 
warns that non-disclosure ends by affirming the marginalizing struc-
tures of ableism. Here I will take the opportunity to state that I am not 
disabled. I do so for two reasons: as a response to O’Toole’s call; and 
because this allows me to suggest that our perspective on impairment 
discourse delimits which material experiences of disability fall under 
the purview of the humanities and which are ceded to the health and 
medical sciences.
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My current interest in disability studies can be traced to two sets of 
circumstances that, taken together, reveal what I consider to be a pro-
ductive ambivalence about the role of impairment in disability studies. 
First, I became interested in American Sign Language (ASL) and Deaf 
culture while completing an undergraduate double-major in cultural 
anthropology and Spanish as a BA student at the University of Virginia. 
I pursued this interest post-graduation as a non-degree-seeking student 
at Virginia, and then again, more intensively, during my MA and PhD 
work in Hispanic Language and Literature at the University of Arizona. 
During my time at Arizona, I took graduate courses that were conduct-
ed in ASL outside of my major area, with Dr Samuel Supalla, and – with 
the help of the Department of Spanish and Portuguese graduate direc-
tor, who was a knowledgeable linguist – applied those classes as proof 
of the additional language proficiency required by my PhD program. I 
was also fortunate to work as a graduate assistant on a grant studying 
language acquisition in a comparative Spanish–ASL–English educa-
tional context. This all led to my first book publication, which was not 
my dissertation in the field of Spanish Language and Literature (later 
published as Fraser 2010c), but rather an edited and translated anthol-
ogy of documents titled Deaf History and Culture in Spain (Gallaudet 
University Press, 2009). I conducted research for the book in Madrid 
with access to the archives of the Confederación Nacional de Sordos de 
España (Spanish National Confederation of the Deaf; CNSE) and also 
those housed in the Biblioteca Nacional de España (Spanish National 
Library). My intent was for the introduction and contents to reflect 
the values of the strong Deaf culture that existed in the United States 
and that I had come to know through coursework but also through 
Dr  Supalla, other instructors of ASL, and culturally Deaf people (in-
cluding children of Deaf adults or CODA) I met while in Tucson. This 
was a culture that differentiated between lower-case-d deafness, under-
stood as an impairment, and capital-D Deafness, understood as a mi-
nority identity grounded in a shared visual language and cultural 
identity. On account of my exposure to ASL and Deaf culture, I did not 
think to apply a disability studies framework to this interest. Influenced 
by the values of a strong Deaf culture, I tended to separate a culturally 
Deaf identity from the issue of impairment entirely. I would say that I 
adopted the point of view that approached lower-case-d deafness 
through a hearing-centred paradigm emphasizing impairment and that 
approached capital-D Deafness through the paradigm of a minority 
culture possessing a distinct political identity.
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Second, my previous books Disability Studies and Spanish Culture: 
Films, Novels, the Comic and the Public Exhibition (Liverpool University 
Press, 2013) and Cultures of Representation: Disability in World Cinema 
Contexts (Wallflower/Columbia University Press, 2016) centred largely 
but not exclusively on cognitive disability because my brother in-law is 
a person with Down syndrome, intellectual disability, and epilepsy. He 
attends an adult day program, loves dancing, colouring, coffee, and 
flirting, and takes medications that are crucial to his well-being. He is 
healthy and able-bodied, quite strong when he wants to be, and capable 
of quick fine-motor movements that have earned him a playful reputa-
tion. He is minimally non-verbal, and because his intellectual disability 
is considered severe, it is difficult for him to communicate his needs to 
others. He also requires assistance with basic everyday tasks. It is be-
cause of my brother in-law’s experiences that my previous work in the 
field has tended to focus on intellectual and developmental disabilities 
(IDD). In publishing articles and book chapters on IDD/Down syn-
drome representations in particular I have found there to be discon-
nects between the strong social model of disability studies, to which I 
have aspired in my scholarship, and its application to the realities faced 
by people with severe intellectual disabilities. As presented in the 
Spanish-made documentary film ¿Qué tienes debajo del sombrero? (What’s 
Under Your Hat; 2006), the case of renowned American fibre artist 
Judith Scott (who was deaf and had Down syndrome) also suggested to 
me that it was more difficult to apply the strong social model to severe 
cognitive disabilities. This does nothing to mitigate one of the disability 
movement’s slogans “Nothing About Us Without Us” – italicized here 
because it is also the title of James Charlton’s important book; nor the 
spirit of the volume by Paul Williams and Bonnie Shoultz titled We Can 
Speak For Ourselves: Self-Advocacy by Mentally Handicapped People. Put 
simply, however, the more I engaged in disability studies research the 
more I became convinced that those who cannot communicate their 
mind to others in concise, precise, or socially conventional ways due to 
issues of cognition – those like my brother in-law – were often being left 
out of the discourse of disability studies research and of scholarship in 
the humanities in particular. Accordingly, I am acutely aware of how 
infrequently humanities research speaks to my brother-in-law’s life ex-
perience and needs. For this reason, when I look at the landscape of 
disability studies I see a field that might be more comfortable with dis-
cussing impairment and – perhaps more notably – a field that might 
become more interested in cognition. In this context, I will not adopt 
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the point of view that fully separates impairment from cognitive dis-
ability – the latter understood as a label for a political identity or even a 
cultural minority identity – for such a view in practice excludes my 
brother in-law from consideration.
The two contexts I have related above have more in common than I 
fully realized. In point of fact, impairment is an important but compli-
cated issue for both deaf/Deaf studies and disability studies, although 
historically it has been easy and perhaps even appropriate to ignore it 
(see Burch and Kafer 2010; Scully 2014). The risk in both cases has been 
to see impairment in terms that essentialize disability in a specific body, 
thus reaffirming the values of an ableist society and its marking of the 
non-normate. In deaf/Deaf studies, it is easy to see there is a connection 
between the discourse of bodily impairment and certain bodily modifi-
cation procedures. The case of the cochlear implant is the clearest and 
perhaps the most significant example of the ills of such impairment 
discourse, and it may be easy for readers to see why the medical para-
digm that at present disproportionately informs such impairment dis-
course is widely held to be suspect. The wider capital-D Deaf community 
takes cochlear implants to be dismissive of ASL’s status as a natural 
language, harmful and invasive both physically and psychologically, 
and to be the final act of a hearing society’s colonization of the indi-
vidual body (see Lane 1993). Similarly, an overindulgence in impair-
ment discourse related to experiences of cognitive disability may 
suggest to some that cognitive difference needs to be “corrected” in the 
individual by encouraging the use of prenatal testing, surgeries, debili-
tating dependence on pharmaceuticals, or other invasive measures and 
colonializing attitudes. In both contexts, however, the practice of avoid-
ing impairment discourse in humanities analysis produces an exclu-
sion – and is in fact only made possible by way of that exclusion. That 
is, it may be easier to ignore the issue of impairment and advocate for 
a  strong capital-D Deaf position when one excludes hard-of-hearing 
populations from consideration. Similarly, it may be easier to ignore the 
issue of impairment and focus on the disabling condition of the physi-
cal and social environment when one excludes cognitively disabled 
populations with severe impairments from consideration.
If we are able to sustain an encounter between the strong social 
 constructivist model of disability and the medical, clinical, and psy-
chosocial needs of populations with severe cognitive disabilities, I be-
lieve that the tenets of the social model of disability may in the end 
positively impact the way disability is discussed in the health and 
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medical sciences. I take the position that in largely ignoring the nuances 
of severe cognitive disabilities, humanities scholars have ceded discur-
sive control over cognitive difference to the medical and clinical fields. 
Bridging this epistemological gap requires a different way of thinking 
than has prevailed until now in the field of disability studies in the hu-
manities. I do not believe that it will require a sacrifice. Some will un-
doubtedly disagree. As evident in the early portions of this book, 
however, I find encouragement in recent work by David T. Mitchell 
with Sharon L. Snyder (2015) and Lennard J. Davis (2013), as well as an 
earlier essay by Mark Jeffreys (2002), all of which push disability schol-
ars to reconsider the material experience, if not also the material reality, 
of impairment.
This book also seeks to bridge another gap – that is, the distance that 
persists between Anglophone disability studies, on one hand, and dis-
ability studies in the Hispanic world, on the other. Although there has 
been much talk in recent years about the need to globalize disability 
studies, insufficient attention has been given to attempts by scholars in 
language and literature departments other than English to engage and 
influence the wider interdisciplinary field of disability studies. While 
this was not the case with my previous book on disability representa-
tions in Spanish cultural production – published in the Representations 
series by Liverpool University Press alongside titles focusing on the 
Anglophone world – my experience has been that academic publishers 
in general, unfairly I think, tend to see book projects focused on the 
Hispanic world as a niche market of their own. This viewpoint encour-
ages some to pass on publishing opportunities even when those books 
connect with interdisciplinary fields. This may be changing as produc-
tive developments in Hispanic studies have seen a rapidly increasing 
spate of book-length texts explicitly engaging disability studies per-
spectives. The publication of monographs, edited volumes, and special 
sections by Susan Antebi (2009), Encarnación Juárez Almendros (2013), 
Matthew Marr (2013), Julie Avril Minich (2014), and Susan Antebi 
and  Beth Jörgensen (2016), has been particularly inspiring for me in 
this regard. 
My hope in the present book project is that readers from all fields will 
connect with the historical literature review and the theoretical chap-
ters in Part I of this book, and that they will continue through the chap-
ters in Part II that focus on Spanish cultural production but speak more 
broadly to questions important to the wider field. Parts of this work 
have been based on my previous article-length publications, although 
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in their present form they have been greatly revised and elaborated. 
Half of chapter 4 includes material from the article “Disability Art, 
Visibility, and the Right to the City: The Trazos Singulares (Singular 
Strokes) (2011) Exhibit at Madrid’s Nuevos Ministerios Metro Station,” 
published in the Arizona Journal of Hispanic Cultural Studies 17 (2013): 
245–61. Half of chapter 6 includes material from the article “Battling 
Voices: Schizophrenia as Social Relation in Abel García Roure’s Una 
cierta verdad (A Certain Truth) (2008),” published by Disability Studies 
Quarterly 36, no. 2 (2016), n.pag. (http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/5007). 
The material republished from these article-length publications has 
been significantly recast, recontextualized, and further elaborated upon 
for the current purposes, and I thank those publishers for allowing the 
appearance in this book of that revised material. I also thank the three 
anonymous reviewers of this manuscript for their close reading of the 
text and suggestions for revision, which have led to a more polished 
final product. Last but not least, I am grateful to the Toronto Iberic se-
ries, and to its co-editors Robert Davidson and Frederick A. de Armas, 
as well as Mark Thompson and the production team at UTP, for valuing 
this discipline-spanning book project.

COGNITIVE DISABILITY AESTHETICS 
Visual Culture, Disability Representations,  
and the (In)Visibility of Cognitive Difference

Introduction
“While most of the work in the humanities to date has centered upon physi-
cal disability as its grounding object of study, one of the major new areas of 
research in disability studies will need to be that of cognitive disabilities.”
“Perhaps it is time to return to the scholarly suppressed topic of impairment.”
 – David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder (2000: 39; 2015: 160)
A move is already under way to shift from a first-wave disability stud-
ies, focused above all else on the physical body and constructions of 
able-bodiedness, to what might be called a second-wave disability 
studies more willing to explore cognition and constructions of able-
mindedness. Cognitive Disability Aesthetics seeks to outline this shift and 
underscore its potential – pushing this second wave of disability stud-
ies further by documenting the (in)visibility of cognitive disability in 
the theoretical, historical, and cultural realms. It provides a theoretical 
context for approaching representations of cognitive disability in hu-
manities texts, and it analyses selected works of visual cultural produc-
tion from Spain – namely, the documentary film, the graphic novel, and 
visual art in urban space. As this concise introduction makes clear, this 
effort necessarily brings readers into contact with certain tensions im-
plicit in the histories of academic disability work and disability move-
ments alike, tensions that are now reasserting themselves productively 
in disability studies scholarship.
Among the key questions that have not yet been resolved in disabil-
ity studies are these: Are the insights produced by disability work em-
phasizing physical disabilities transferrable to work foregrounding 
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cognitive disabilities? Are social models of disability compatible with 
explorations of impairment and medication? Do theoretical arguments 
that disability is a universal or a fundamental basis for human experi-
ence weaken the political force of disability advocacy and the potency 
of disability identity politics? Are struggles for inclusion over the short 
term compatible with a more radical agenda for social change over the 
long term? How might attending to cognition more explicitly change 
the tenor of intersectionality theory? Do studies of disability repre-
sentations in the humanities require the development of different ap-
proaches to prose literature, on one hand, and visual media, on the 
other? Is it fair to expect studies of disability in global contexts – be-
yond the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, for example 
– to replicate (or, for that matter, to distinguish themselves entirely 
from) Anglophone disability studies? That is, to what extent should ex-
pectations vary according to regional, linguistic, cultural, national and 
disciplinary contexts?
These interlinked questions are addressed briefly in this introduction 
but do not figure as explicitly in the chapters that follow. This book does 
not aim to provide definitive resolution on such matters; instead it  is 
content to chart out new sets of questions. Cognitive Disability Aesthetics 
asks readers to consider how a consistent focus on cognition has the po-
tential to change the way in which disability representations operate and 
are analysed by research in the humanities. It also prioritizes visual rep-
resentations as a way of connecting aesthetics with material experiences 
of cognitive disability. The sections that follow serve as concise snap-
shots of the key issues that motivate this book. They focus, in turn, on the 
return of impairment discourse in disability studies, the nuanced role of 
inclusion under neoliberalism, the impact and potential of intersection-
ality and approaches from gender, sexuality, and queer studies, and the 
arguable universality/specificity of disability. The treatments these top-
ics receive are intentionally brief, and as readers will see, it is difficult to 
untangle each of these matters from the others. Before turning to chapter 
summaries, a final section asserts the value of humanities scholarship 
that crosses disciplinary as well as  national, linguistic, and cultural bor-
ders as part of a global turn in disability studies.
The Return to Impairment
A concise history of disability studies would suggest that in both the 
academic and political realms the social model of disability has been 
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asserted against the medical model of disability. This has been a power-
ful way of exploring the social constructedness of disability and there-
by wresting discursive control over the experience of disability from 
ableist power structures. The social model of disability has long been 
synonymous with a strong suspicion of impairment discourse. After 
all, to focus on bodily impairment is to risk holding individuals respon-
sible for adapting to a physical and social environment, when the push 
of disability studies should be to change the entrenched ableism that 
produces that same physical and social environment in the image of the 
constructed idea of the normate.
As two recent books have illustrated, there is a persistent ambiva-
lence in the field surrounding the matter of impairment – not only its 
relationship to social difference but also its links to material experiences 
of disability. Reading disability studies monographs such as Lennard J. 
Davis’s The End of Normal: Identity in a Biocultural Era (2013) and David 
T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder’s The Biopolitics of Disability: Neoliber-
alism, Ablenationalism, and Peripheral Embodiment (2015), one can observe 
that the notion of impairment is once again reasserting itself as a ques-
tion to be explored. I focus on the work of Mitchell and Snyder in the 
earlier portions of this introduction and deal with the comments made 
by Davis towards its conclusion.
It is necessary to make an observation and an assertion: I observe that 
impairment has not yet been considered specifically in terms of cogni-
tion by scholars in the humanities, and I assert that such consideration 
can be productive. The truth is that the issue of impairment – be it phys-
ical or cognitive – has been systematically neglected in disability stud-
ies research. The aura of suspicion surrounding it suggests that to 
invoke impairment is to obscure the social constructedness of disability. 
The reasons for this are well documented and familiar to disability 
studies scholars and disability activists. As Mitchell and Snyder point 
out directly as they reflect on the history of disability studies, the issue 
of impairment was distinguished from the issue of barrier removal ear-
ly on precisely as a way to assert the social nature of disability (2015: 1). 
As the tradition of humanities work on disability experiences bears out, 
rather than risk essentializing disability within a body, it was important 
for academic work and disability movements alike to locate disability 
in the environment.1 As disability scholars in the humanities know very 
well, of course, this push has gained force by focusing on the body 
as the site where ableist social and political structures become socially 
visible. This has frequently meant directing attention towards the 
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appearance of bodies in humanities work: their shape, contour, outline, 
form, and so on. Nevertheless I would state that this primary focus on 
the shape and appearance of bodies, while playing a significant role 
that should neither be ignored nor be ceased, has tended to cast aside 
issues of impairment that might otherwise prove instrumental to a 
more capacious view of disability.2
This issue is important precisely because in opting to focus on the 
presence and appearance of physical bodies at the expense of a more 
thorough consideration of impairment, disability studies has cast aside 
the issue of cognition. Cognitive impairment, in the realm of cognitive 
disabilities, may not be merely an extension of the issue of bodily im-
pairment, historically understood in relationship to physical disabili-
ties. Returning to discussions of cognitive impairment today – in the 
context of a robust, decades-long, political and academic commitment 
to dismantling the structures of ableist society – need not indicate a 
move away from the strong social model of disability. In ignoring this 
issue, however, we risk condemning cognitive disability to a condition 
of both social and academic (in)visibility, and we risk ceding discursive 
control over experiences of cognitive disability from the humanities to 
the health and medical sciences. I contend that this is the very situation 
that one encounters today.
In the absence of a sustained consideration of how issues of cognitive 
difference impact existing disability studies methods in the humanities, 
cognitive disabilities are primarily a matter for the health and medical 
sciences to document, describe, and define.3 Consider Mitchell and 
Snyder’s assessment that “disability studies as a field of inquiry has 
broadly come to agreement on issues of impairment. Whether through 
the assignment of interventions to embodied incapacities and inade-
quacies writ large, or by the application of ‘medical model’ diagnoses 
of pathologized states, impairment is left on the other side of the bound-
ary” (2015: 158). They specifically mention that “this strategic walling 
off of impairment from scholarly examination in disability studies has 
been largely accomplished through the excise of medical terminology” 
(2015: 158). If the humanities are to reclaim the discursive power to 
document, describe, and define cognitive disability representations 
within a sociocultural – and not a medicalizing – context, humanities 
scholars must become more comfortable, at the least, with the topic of 
impairment.4 This need not present a challenge to the core principles of 
disability studies in the humanities, which tend to take “the very mean-
ings of ‘disability,’ ‘impairment’ and disabled’ as contested terrain,” 
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and which see “disability as a site of questions rather than firm defini-
tions” (Kafer 2013: 10, 11). Acknowledging the material realities of 
 cognitive impairment in particular, however, does indeed change the 
way we interrogate disability as a site of questions: first, because it ar-
guably changes how we approach the definition, limitations, and po-
tential benefits of inclusion in neoliberal frameworks; and second, 
because it problematizes existing pathways to intersectional coalition 
building in both the academic and political realms.
Neoliberalism and Inclusion
The material experience of disability cannot be separated from the ac-
cumulative strategies of neoliberal capitalism that unfold unevenly 
across and within national contexts. Robert McRuer puts it quite well 
in Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability when he states 
concisely, “I take neoliberal capitalism to be the dominant economic 
and cultural system in which, and also against which, embodied and 
sexual identities have been imagined and composed over the past quar-
ter century” (2006: 2). This approach identifies and also takes a critical 
stance on the reality that minoritized groups must in practice organize 
as such in order to engage in rights-based claims to inclusion. The 
claims of populations that do not organize as defined minoritized and 
politicized identities are otherwise ignored by a normative constella-
tion of social, economic, cultural, and state influences. Tobin Siebers 
directly acknowledges the concrete value of such politicized organiza-
tional practice when he writes in Disability Theory that “disability is not 
a physical or mental defect but a cultural and minority identity” (2008: 
4).5 As recent work in disability studies has explored, however, gains 
targeting inclusion that are made through the rights-based claims of 
minoritized identity groups tend to come at a price.
When groups position themselves for recognition by normative insti-
tutions and practices, their disruptive potential can become weakened. 
Jasbir Puar’s exploration of “homonationalism” in Terrorist Assemblages 
(2007) and Mitchell and Snyder’s interrogation of “ablenationalism” 
(2015) both draw attention to the complex way in which capitalist neo-
liberalism intersects with and can impact or co-opt minoritized identity 
politics. This occurs, for example, when nation-states require the as-
similation of minoritized identities via a rights-based discourse that 
ultimately reaffirms the normative logic of that economic and cultural 
neoliberal system.6 Mitchell and Snyder’s critique calls into question 
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“the degree to which neoliberalism holds out a false promise of inclu-
sion” (2015: 62). Equally, the authors “insist that something within the 
social/minority models of disability is also amiss, and perhaps unwit-
tingly fueling neoliberal strategies of inclusion on a more superficial 
level than has been acknowledged to date” (2015: 63).7
There is no doubt that the potential gains made through inclusion 
may be continually weakened by neoliberal capitalism, but I believe 
there are few willing to write them off completely.8 In the essay 
“Disability Nationalism in Crip Times,” for instance, McRuer com-
ments rather ambivalently on the potential of “identity and state-based 
appeals (appeals that may, of course, nonetheless remain indispensable 
– necessary but simply and always insufficient)” (2010: 173). More im-
portant, invoking the work of Siebers, he also asks a question that is 
pertinent, I think, for the consideration of cognitive disabilities: “How 
does ‘the group’ grapple with those figures who do not, or cannot, or 
will never ‘constitute themselves as a minority identity’?” (McRuer 
2010: 174). While issues of inclusion may have been thoroughly consid-
ered and perhaps even set aside by a critical disability studies that his-
torically has been focused on the physical body, I am not convinced that 
inclusion has been seriously explored as it relates to cognitive disabili-
ties. The need to reach “more meaningful levels of participation by dis-
abled people” (Mitchell and Snyder 2015: 36) is certainly relevant to a 
wide range of disability experiences, but what participation means for 
populations with severe intellectual, developmental, and psychiatric 
disabilities may differ somewhat substantially from what it means for 
those with physical disabilities. We do indeed need to “ask difficult 
questions of the minority group model and about the ways that model 
moves through history and through authoritative institutions” (McRuer 
and Mollow 2012: 7).
It is crucial to understand that the discourse of inclusion can be limit-
ing in the following sense: it can function as a way for power structures 
to superficially integrate one or more specific constructions of differ-
ence without substantially changing wider patterns of exploitation or 
disempowerment, which persist largely unchanged (Titchkosky 2011: 
ix). For example, in their discussion of education Mitchell and Snyder 
write of “inclusionism as a neoliberal gloss on diversity initiatives that 
get some disabled students in the door while leaving the vast majority 
of crip/queer students behind” (2015: 80). Under neoliberalism, there is 
no doubt that inclusionism systematically enjoys a spectacular pres-
ence that works against more substantial efforts at diversity. I would 
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argue, however, that the flaw lies in the way inclusion has been sought 
and promoted, in the way it has been co-opted by neoliberal designs, 
rather than in the goal of prioritizing inclusion itself. The fact that dis-
ability may be “a limited form of inclusionism within late liberal capital-
ism” (Mitchell and Snyder 2015: 37) should not suggest the elimination 
of attempts at inclusion, but rather a two-pronged approach.
The question is whether it is possible to advocate for inclusionism in 
the short term and also to support a more radical and long-term course 
for the dismantling of ableist power structures. Some may feel that a 
short-term perspective risks reifying disability and delaying more radi-
cal political change; others may feel that a long-term perspective fails to 
produce the more tangible results that identity politics can reasonably 
achieve in the short term. There is no real reason these two perspectives 
need be taken as polarized, for in truth they might be seen in terms of a 
short revolution and a long revolution, a near goal and a far goal. I be-
lieve that these are complementary rather than divisive efforts. As the 
above question asked by McRuer (2010: 174) expresses quite plainly, in 
the end inclusionism is neither sufficient on its own nor incompatible 
with more radical social change. My response to those who see this as a 
renunciation of critical disability studies is to state that the field has not 
dealt systematically either with the issue of severe cognitive impair-
ment or with the question of what inclusion really means for the full 
range of populations experiencing cognitive disability.
Gender/Sexuality Studies, Queer Studies, Intersectionality
The more disability studies turns towards issues of cognition, the more 
it may encounter opportunities to re-examine the nature and value of 
inclusion discourse. Cognition arguably also makes it possible to rein-
vest in the connections that disability studies already enjoys with gen-
der and sexuality studies, queer studies, and intersectionality theory 
more generally. Disability can be seen “as an expression of intersec-
tional identity wherein devalued social characteristics compound 
 stigma” (Erevelles and Minear 2013: 354). Moreover, advances in inter-
sectionality theory recognize the mutually constitutive nature of sys-
tems of oppression, and present the opportunity for a coalition building 
whose impact might grow beyond what are sometimes seen as limited 
gains within more restricted contexts of identity politics. Consider, for 
example, Mitchell and Snyder’s statement that “gender, sexuality and 
racial liberation movements have all pursued a rights-based rhetoric 
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that opts to normalize differences across populations” and that in this 
process “civil rights-grounded arguments for social inclusion based on 
universal human similarities have strategically promoted normatively 
oriented assimilationist models” (2015: 43). Intersectional perspectives 
can certainly reinforce solidarity across minoritized identities in order 
to denounce a common normate as well as an exclusionary structure 
that constructs not merely disability identities but also the sociopoliti-
cal identities of women, LGBTQ, and racialized populations as mi-
noritzed subjects (see Kafer 2013; McRuer 2006; Siebers 2010).
Disability studies as an academic area corresponding to a political 
commitment owes a great debt to gender/sexuality and queer studies 
approaches and thus also to the departments in humanities disciplines 
that have historically served as homes for these programs. It follows in 
the footsteps of these fields at the same time that it pushes each of them 
onward. As Rosemarie Garland-Thomson recounts, feminist disability 
studies itself sought to constitute the female body as the object of hu-
manities critique, reclaiming it from medical analysis (2013: 339). It is 
precisely this sort of shift carried out by feminist disability scholars that 
can serve as a model for scholars of cognitive disability experiences. 
Recent assessments by prominent disability scholars indicate, however, 
that the current state of queer theory may offer a less robust set of con-
nections. In Mitchell and Snyder’s estimation, “a more direct engage-
ment with disability has been slow in coming within queer studies” 
(2015: 79), and as Anna Mollow and McRuer assert, “the major texts in 
the much larger field of sexuality studies, including those in queer the-
ory, rarely mention disability” (2012: 3).
Here the work of Alison Kafer deserves particular recognition. Kafer 
is one of a number of disability scholars who have charted a course for 
intersectionality, as reflected in the statement that her book Feminist 
Queer Crip is “a fundamentally coalitional text” (2013: 17). While she 
embraces the potential relevance of crip theory to other academic 
fields and political struggles in her work, she also points to the way in 
which it tends to privilege physical disabilities, writing that “this po-
tential flexibility is precisely what excites me about crip theory, but ... 
this inclusiveness is often more hope than reality. Many expressions of 
crip pride or crip politics often explicitly address only physical impair-
ments, thereby ignoring or marginalizing the experiences of those 
with sensory or mental impairments” (2013: 15–16). It is notable that 
Kafer draws attention to the wider field’s avoidance of cognitive im-
pairment and that the scholar routinely mentions “able-bodiedness/
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able-mindedness” (e.g., 2013: 20) together as a pair in her intersection-
al disability studies work.
It is clear that the collective push of intersectionality theory encour-
ages disability studies theorists to seek the common ground from which 
all might work together to denounce normative ableist paradigms, 
whether related to physical or cognitive disabilities. If disability theory 
is able to sustain conversations related to intellectual, developmental, 
and psychiatric disabilities, this will certainly open new pathways 
for  global inclusion that focus not merely on bodies but on minds.9 
Intersectional work drawing from gender and sexuality studies and 
queer studies should prove instrumental to this push, given that the 
focus on corporeal embodiment has always necessarily implied the 
connection of body and mind (as in Mitchell and Snyder 1997: 13). 
Making this connection more explicit, however, can open up a discur-
sive space in which to interrogate the notion of cognitive impairment. 
The opportunity moving forward is to value the investigation of cogni-
tive disability for its potential resonance with the hallmark inquiries of 
these fields and even to appreciate the productive friction it may dem-
onstrate with respect to overlapping themes of identity politics.
But while physical disabilities have been constituted as political 
identities in similar terms, cognitive disabilities have not enjoyed the 
same levels of collective and politicized identity. Extending the com-
ments of Joseph N. Straus in his essay “Autism as Culture,” it can be 
said that populations with cognitive disabilities tend to face two inter-
twined problems that impact their ability to constitute themselves as a 
political identity in the way required by neoliberalism and representa-
tional democracy. Straus underscores “the problem of narration: the 
member of the minoritized social group should be able to resist 
 medicalized discourse by speaking for him or herself,” as well as “the 
problem of community: a group of people who have problems 
with  communication and social relatedness may find it difficult to 
forge a social group, and may thus be difficult to constitute as a self-
aware community within a social model of disability” (2013: 462). 
Consideration of these problems of narration and community suggests 
that the experience of cognitive disabilities is not easily mapped onto 
rights-based discourse. This presents an obstacle to minority culture 
approaches to cognitive disability; it also problematizes some aspects 
of existing critical theorizations of the neoliberal exploitation of cogni-
tively disabled people. In the end, the question of how cognitive dis-
ability experiences map onto intersectional approaches may depend on 
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how far we move towards valuing collaboration across multiple dis-
courses: political, institutional, scholarly, and aesthetic.
The Universality/Specificity of Disability
Intersectional approaches and the notion of coalition building ultimate-
ly bring to mind the fundamental idea of moving from minoritized and 
politicized identities towards a common experience. It is relevant that 
scholarship has often addressed the degree to which disability is a uni-
versal experience. Thus McRuer writes of “the oft-repeated invocation 
of what we might call the spectral disability yet to come: ‘If we live long 
enough, disability is the one identity we will all inhabit’” (2006: 200; see 
also Siebers 2008: 71). The kind of thinking expressed through the latter 
embedded quotation is undoubtedly a commonplace of much disabili-
ty studies scholarship. Its appearance is particularly conspicuous dur-
ing those moments when scholars engage in the reporting of fractions 
and/or percentages – that is, statements that a given percentage of the 
population is, or at one time will be considered, disabled. There is, 
however, a much larger debate underlying the character of such dis-
course. I contend that this debate is of interest not merely because it 
speaks to the purported universality of disability or how it is that defi-
nitions of disability are socially constructed, but moreover because it is 
a sign that discomfort over the notion of impairment persists. In explor-
ing this argument, we may come to consider the reality of impairment 
and recognize its relevance to contemporary debates.
The recent interest in biology and culture expressed in the subtitle of 
Lennard J. Davis’s book – The End of Normal: Identity in a Biocultural Era 
– ultimately squares with Mitchell and Snyder’s interest in returning to 
impairment and indicates that a more nuanced disability studies criti-
cism may now be possible in a way it has not been before. As a way of 
setting up discussion of Davis’s comments, I want to make some gen-
eral observations on the juxtaposition of the presumed universality ver-
sus the presumed specificity of disability by thinking through two 
distinguishable viewpoints.
The first point of view is one that I take to be the canonical view char-
acterizing the strong social model of disability developed over the 
course of decades in tandem with disability rights movements. This 
view holds that, as Tanya Titchkosky puts it quite concisely, “one can-
not be disabled alone” (2011: 5). Thus disability is not a trait that an in-
dividual possesses but rather a way of seeing things that implicates the 
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whole of society. Consider the concise and instructive example she 
gives in The Question of Access: Disability, Space, Meaning: “without mass 
literacy demands there is no dyslexia; with dyslexia, there arises some-
thing other than a person fully at one with literate culture” (Titchkosky 
2011: 21). Disability is indeed a social relationship that appears as such 
only in a society constructed by ableist understandings of the normate 
(Garland-Thomson 2005). This is the point of view that has been mar-
shalled by an entire tradition of disability studies research in the hu-
manities, to great effect. With good cause, such scholarship has warned 
against essentializing disability in the individual body. It has staked a 
claim to the need for substantial social changes, changes that should be 
implemented over both the short and the long term. It has sought to 
encourage more people to think more deeply about the social origins 
of  disability – but not necessarily the biological or developmental 
 components of the disability experience, a topic that has been seen as 
controversial. To wit, Titchkosky writes that “a further issue with indi-
vidualizing disability is that this perception can act as a barrier to re-
flection on who and what is considered disabled” (2011: 5). I do not 
dispute the value of this essential kernel of disability studies. I do won-
der, however, whether the supposition that the social model might be 
wholly incompatible with issues that have formerly been the purview 
of the health fields leaves much more to be said about the material ex-
perience of cognitive impairment.
The second point of view is one that has received at least growing 
attention – though certainly not growing acceptance – and involves an 
extension of the motivation behind the strong social model of disability. 
In this view, disability is said to be universal. The idea is that all human 
beings are disabled or, at the very least, interdependent. The former 
point of view has been attributed to Davis despite his insistence it is not 
a fair charge (Mitchell with Snyder 2015: 164; cf. Davis 2013). The latter 
view has perhaps been expressed most effectively by scholars such as 
Eva Feder Kittay. Supporters of the interdependency argument appeal 
to universality through a call for recognition that all human beings pass 
through periods when we are “inevitably dependent” (Kittay, Jennings, 
and Wasunna 2005). Kittay has put the spirit of this appeal – which 
some readers will consider to be obvious – quite clearly by asking the 
following rhetorical question: “But who in any complex society is not 
dependent on others, for the production of our food, for our mobility, 
for a multitude of tasks that make it possible for each of us to function 
in our work and daily living?” (2001: 570). The work synthesizing 
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disability, dependence, and care, along with the work on intellectual 
disability by Licia Carlson (The Faces of Intellectual Disability, 2010), 
with whom Kittay has co-edited Cognitive Disability and its Challenge 
to Moral Philosophy (2010), deserves much wider recognition than it 
has received to date in disability studies contexts. I do think, however, 
that to make an argument about disability that is similar to the argu-
ment about dependence would be to resort to hyperbole as a way of 
echoing arguments that disability exists in the social environment, 
not the individual. If such an argument is not in fact merely hyper-
bole, then it risks rendering disability a meaningless term. The ques-
tion of disability certainly raises the question of difference, and even 
if disability is not universal, difference indeed is. Not all differences 
are historically, culturally, or socially visible in the same way or to the 
same degree, however. 
When one puts these two points of view in extremely reductive ways, 
they appear to be markedly similar in the priority they give to society. 
The first suggests that no individual person is disabled, that we need to 
recognize that disability is purely the product of an ableist social envi-
ronment. The second suggests that everyone is disabled (or at least in-
terdependent), that we need to recognize that interdependence is the 
basis of the human experience. I suggest that thinking through these 
somewhat crude reductions is helpful because it can explain why some 
discomfort persists in the field surrounding the issue of impairment. 
That is, neither point of view explains what can be done to address the 
social invisibility of different kinds of impairment. Both points of view 
encourage an all-or-nothing approach to disability that, frankly, is inad-
equate when considering cognitive difference. Moreover, this approach 
is inadequate because it fails to address the materiality of severe cogni-
tive disability as experienced in society.
Thinking through these issues by way of the discussions in The End of 
Normal can help outline what I would refer to as a newly emerging 
third point of view. This third viewpoint is nimble enough to recognize 
both the social nature of cognitive disability, on one hand, and the ma-
terial experience of cognitive difference, on the other. It reaffirms both 
the material and the immaterial conditions of the experience of disabil-
ity, and it suggests that it is important to see disability in terms of a so-
cially uneven geography. It does not, in my view, indicate that disability 
is not social in nature. Like other twenty-first-century approaches, 
Davis’s text folds the biological, the material, and the concrete together 
with the cultural, the immaterial, and the social. This is a nuanced 
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 operation, to be sure, but it is important to understand that this is a 
general premise shared also by Mitchell and Snyder.10
The End of Normal strongly embraces a fusion of concerns, which 
Davis denotes through the notion of the biocultural, a term he employs 
“to describe the intersection among the cultural, social, political, tech-
nological, medical and biological” (2013: 1).11 Davis wonders “whether 
diversity can ever encompass disability,” over which “the older concept 
of normal still holds sway” (2013: 6), and interestingly, he imagines di-
versity by employing terms such as “celebration and choice” (2013: 8) 
that in effect reflect the discourse of late-capitalist consumerism. He is 
not unaware of these connotations; his point is that disability reaffirms 
the notion of diversity as a celebration of choice due to the fact that it is 
the exception that proves the rule. “Disabled bodies are,” he writes, “in 
the current imaginary, constructed as fixed identities. Outside of the 
hothouse of disability studies and science studies, impairments are 
commonly seen as abnormal, medically determined, and certainly not 
socially constructed” (2013: 7). He further offers an explanation: “This 
may be because disability is not seen as an identity in the same way as 
many see race, gender and other embodied identities. And the reason 
for that is that disability is largely perceived as a medical problem and 
not a way of life involving choice” (2013: 7). Following from these com-
ments, I read what Davis refers to as “kicking the stone” (2013: 15; also, 
“kicking the rock”) as a call to recognize the limits of social construction 
discourse. The phrase itself uses a metaphor of physical solidity, mate-
rial mass, and space to underscore the materiality of disability experi-
ence.12 Here, what seems to ground the argument concerning the “fixed 
identities” of disability is a notion that disability is material in the sim-
ple sense – that disability is about bodies and, implicitly, also about the 
concreteness or physicality of bodies in particular.
A largely physical understanding of disability leads Davis simultane-
ously towards an unsatisfying parallel drawn between disability and 
neoliberal consumer choice rhetoric on one hand and a largely unmal-
leable understanding of disability identity on the other. He writes that 
“ultimately what I am arguing is that disability is an identity that is 
unlike all the others in that it resists change and cure” (2013: 14).13 What 
is most interesting given the present effort, however, is that in raising 
the issue of the materiality of impairment in general as he does (2013: 
7), Davis finds himself turning to Down syndrome as an example and 
writing: “It is patently not possible to be born a person with Down 
 syndrome and become someone who does not have Down syndrome 
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(though some cosmetic surgeries to normalize the faces of people with 
Down syndrome are available, and now drug therapies are being re-
searched to improve cognitive skills) … Why is it that disability is often 
the identity that is left out – not choosable?” (2013: 11).14 What I read in 
this statement is that Davis believes that the stubborn materiality of dis-
ability is best expressed, in fact, by IDD or cognitive disability. Is it a 
contradiction to think that disability best engages with materiality by 
moving towards issues of cognition? If so, I regard this contradiction as 
a fundamentally productive one.
It should be recognized that Mitchell and Snyder’s The Biopolitics of 
Disability takes direct issue with Davis’s purported premise, but also 
that the authors simultaneously reaffirm disability as “a nuanced expe-
riential condition” (2015: 30). It is also reasonable to compare the recog-
nition of materiality suggested in Davis’s phrase “kicking the stone” 
with Mitchell and Snyder’s recognition of impairment in their ques-
tion, “If we are all effectively ‘disabled,’ then what is to mark disability 
as a nuanced experiential condition?” (2015: 30).15 This represents, in 
my view, a practical turn towards the promise of “new materialist ap-
proaches” (2015: 7).16 The scholars describe their work as part of a push 
that “dares to name diagnoses or conditions as something other than 
forms of medical false consciousness” and state quite boldly that “per-
haps it is time to return to the scholarly suppressed topic of impair-
ment” (2015: 160).17 At its root, what both books reveal is a continuing 
preoccupation with fleshing out the role of materiality and biology in a 
field that has for so long focused on barrier removal at the expense of 
impairment. In doing so, each text in its own way asks important ques-
tions about the deep schism that exists between medical and social 
models of disability. In this sense, the books by Mitchell/Snyder and 
Davis share a common goal – they both want to assess what the social 
model has left out as a result of its focus on barrier removal and strong 
constructivism.
There has to be room in disability studies – despite its trenchant cri-
tiques of simplistic inclusionism and neoliberal forms of diversity that 
are held to be suspect because they reify normative power structures18 
– for recognizing the materiality of impairment without assuming the 
inherently able-bodied bias pointing to rehabilitation as a sufficient or 
even appropriate response.19 A pertinent question is posed by the after-
word in Mitchell with Snyder: “What, ask politicized disabled people, 
bodily capabilities does one need in order to actively participate in so-
cial democracies?” (2015: 210). Here I read the same slippage identified 
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by Stuart Murray in his book Representing Autism: Culture, Narrative, 
Fascination (2008), a slippage whereby the general term “disability” is 
frequently used to mean “physical disability,” specifically.20 If disability 
studies is to consider more deliberately how cognition impacts active 
participation in society, the issue of impairment must be addressed 
more thoroughly than it has been until now. If we want to go beyond 
mere inclusionism to address pernicious and pervasive structural and 
ideological forms of ableism – as The Biopolitics of Disability encourages 
us to do – the field would be helped by turning to those issues of cogni-
tion, impairment, and medication that are currently located largely at 
the margins of humanities work if not ignored altogether. Directing our 
attention to severe cognitive disabilities in particular can help us think 
through the current limitations of disability studies approaches that 
frame the health sciences and the social sciences/humanities as mutu-
ally exclusive.
The Varieties of Humanities Scholarship
Readers should understand that my work throughout this book – and 
in the applied chapters centred on visual cultural products from Spain 
in particular – reflects the engagement of a particular kind of humanist. 
The fact that interest in visual representations of cognitive disability – 
as opposed to disability representations in prose literature – has been 
relatively slow to emerge can be attributed in part, in my estimation, to 
matters of discipline. That is, study of traditional print literature has 
continued to dominate Departments of English and Departments of 
Languages and Literatures in the United States – and is still dominant 
in American programs of graduate study. Notably, this has been the 
case even well into a twenty-first century characterized by the effects 
of  the disciplinary shifts brought about by cultural studies methods. 
In  my home discipline of Hispanic studies (Spanish Language and 
Literature), for example, recent publications on the subject of literary 
canon have made clear just how persistent the traditional definition of 
culture in terms of prose literature really is (see Brown 2010; cf. Fraser, 
Larson, Compitello 2014).21 (And while study of film by language and 
literature scholars may still be proportionally rare, the study of comics/
graphic novels is even more rare.) It is clear, however, that the upsurge 
in cultural representations of cognitive disability – not only in prose 
literature but also in cinema and even the comic/graphic novel – in-
creasingly requires humanistic interpretation. There is a risk to such 
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work in that readers interested in the broad theme of disability are not 
always interested in the formal or artistic dimensions of specific expres-
sions of visual culture, nor are they fully aware of how the nuances of 
artistic genre impact the disability representations discussed.
In addition, readers from Anglophone fields often have diverse and 
conflicting expectations regarding work covering other global areas. I 
have found, for example, that scholars of Hispanic studies who engage 
in disability research seeking a broader interdisciplinary audience are 
often asked to recapitulate the insights of a specific Anglophone corpus 
of disability work. They may also be expected to outline formulations 
of disability studies from other global traditions that may be under-
developed, and/or that effectively tropicalize cultural difference of a 
given location in a form easily digested by non-specialists. Such non-
specialists frequently are, after all, eager to read encyclopedic introduc-
tions to an exceptional foreign land rather than jump into the analysis 
of specific humanities texts in a non-Anglophone cultural context.22
It is necessary to underscore that even in Anglophone contexts the 
number of humanities studies seeking to correct for the relative invisi-
bility of cognitive disabilities in theoretical, historical, and/or represen-
tational fields is small. I wrote my previous book Disability Studies and 
Spanish Culture: Films, Novels, the Comic, and the Public Exhibition (2013a) 
precisely to address the need for further studies of cognitive disabili-
ties. There I focused on Down syndrome, autism, and agnosia/alexia 
but also included discussion of other intellectual disabilities, cerebral 
paralysis, deafness, and more. Though I analysed prose literature as 
well as cinema and the graphic novel in that publication, in every case 
I used a cultural studies method to give equal weight to both the artistic 
form of each product and the social context in which it was produced 
(see Williams 2007). As a way of continuing that move, here I turn also 
to issues of Alzheimer’s dementia and schizophrenia, while maintain-
ing an interest in Down syndrome and autism. Though the examples 
from cultural production that I explore later in this book may come 
from Hispanic studies – the field in which I have been working for more 
than a decade – I am more interested in the general principle of visibil-
ity they illustrate rather than in making the claim that disability repre-
sentations are uniquely framed by contested constructs of nationhood 
or by inadequate models that homogenize experiences of language 
or culture.
Given the surging interest in the “global turn” in disability studies 
(see Mitchell and Snyder 2010; Murray and Barker 2010; Fraser 2013a, 
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2016a), my hope is that the structure of this book will bring Anglophone 
readers exposure to the Spanish context, and that it will similarly push 
readers from Hispanic literary and cultural studies to find a balance 
between issues of embodiment and issues of cognition as they continue 
to explore disability studies as a specialized discipline on its own terms. 
The interest in disability evidenced by scholars situated within the dis-
ciplinary moorings of Iberian and Latin American literature and culture 
has been relatively slow to develop when compared with Anglophone 
work on disability. For scholars in Anglophone fields, it may even be 
difficult to understand that book-length texts specifically and directly 
engaging the topic of disability (and not just embodiment) in Hispanic 
studies only first appeared in 2009. Recent editions by Hispanic studies 
scholars have attempted to broaden the global scope of Anglophone 
study of disability: Susan Antebi’s Carnal Inscriptions: Spanish American 
Narratives of Corporeal Difference and Disability (2009), Matthew Marr’s 
The Politics of Age and Disability in Contemporary Spanish Film (2013), 
Encarnación Juárez-Almendros’s special section of the Arizona Journal 
of Hispanic Cultural Studies titled “Disability Studies in the Hispanic 
World: Proposals and Methodologies” (2013), Julie Avril Minich’s 
Accessible Citizenships: Disability, Nation, and the Cultural Politics of 
Greater Mexico (2014), and Susan Antebi and Beth Jörgensen’s Libre 
Acceso: Latin American Literature and Film through Disability Studies 
(2016), for example. Such editions have of course built on a range 
of  pioneering essay-length contributions in Hispanic studies (e.g., 
Conway 2000, 2001; Gámez Fuentes 2005; Juárez Almendros 2010; 
Marr 2009; Minich 2010; Prout 2008; Rivera-Cordero 2009, 2013a, 
2013b) – a tradition I hope will receive greater attention within dis-
ability studies proper.
The tensions explored in this introduction are complicated issues to 
be sure, but it seems that now is the time for a book that returns to im-
pairment precisely as a way of taking another look at cognition. At the 
risk of repetition, I affirm once again that this does not need to mean 
that we shift away from a social model to a medical model of disability, 
but it may mean that some articulation between these polarized ap-
proaches can be beneficial. I hope to speak from my disciplinary posi-
tioning to an issue around which studies of disability – taken in the 
broadest sense – might take steps to reorganize. I want to broaden the 
academic understanding of cognitive disability to include intellectual 
disabilities, developmental disabilities, and psychiatric disabilities. At 
the same time, I hope to reduce the theoretical and cultural distance 
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between cognitive disability and physical disability. The fulcrum for 
closing this gap is the concept of the visible world. Exploring the inter-
section of visual culture, signification, cognition, representational prac-
tices, material experiences of impairment, and social constructions of 
disability can bring more attention to how attention to severe cognitive 
difference can potentially inform a more capacious disability studies.
Book Structure and Chapter Summaries
Cognitive Disability Aesthetics has two parts. Part 1 consists of historical 
and theoretical chapters, written for a wide Anglophone readership in-
terested in cognitive disability no matter their global area of expertise. 
Part 2 consists of applied chapters focusing on individual expressions 
of recent cultural production in Spain, with translations to accommo-
date all readers of English. In this book I prioritize issues of cognition as 
a way of outlining what a more inclusive disability studies might be 
like. I admit that in recent years, the largely physical orientation of the 
academic field has been changing to include cognitive disabilities – as 
documented more thoroughly in chapter 1 – but I stress that this move 
has only just begun. That is, key foundational texts of disability studies 
have responded specifically to the social circumstances regarding phys-
ical disabilities and have not been historically focused on the specific 
social dimensions of constructions of cognitive disability. As explored 
in chapters 2 and 3, we need to reflect on how this bias may have shaped 
approaches to disability representations in traditionally literary fields, 
and how giving more attention to visual disability representations can 
simultaneously benefit exploration of the material experiences of cog-
nitive disability. Thus the first half of this book serves as a call to think 
through the friction that exists between a long tradition of work on 
physical disability and more recent advances in the field that focus on 
cognitive disability. To analyse and understand visual disability repre-
sentations, I argue, the field will need to create different conceptual 
tools. In the same way, if disability studies is to approach cognitive dis-
ability representations on their own terms, it may even need to recon-
sider the long-held assumptions that were forged in traditions of 
academic work focusing primarily on physical disabilities. Readers 
should note that while I refer on occasion to Spanish-language exam-
ples in the body text or accompanying notes, in the chapters making up 
Part 1 of the book I am more interested in exploring the theoretical and 
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methodological ground that can be applied more broadly to visual dis-
ability representations in a range of international contexts.
“On the (In)Visibility of Cognitive Disability” – the first chapter of 
the book – explores the largely physical orientation of disability studies 
from historical, theoretical, and cultural perspectives. I explain why 
readers in the field tend to encounter deafness, blindness, and excep-
tional bodies much more frequently than persons who embody cogni-
tive exceptionality, how this may be changing, and what humanities 
scholarship can contribute to the increased visibility of cognitive dis-
abilities within the interdisciplinary field of disability studies. This 
chapter also serves to ground more general readers in previous disabil-
ity studies work, mentioning canonical books from the close of the 
twentieth century (Davis 1995, [1997]2013; Wendell 1996; Garland-
Thomson 1996, 1997; Mitchell and Snyder 1997, 2000; Brueggemann 
1999), as well as earlier work (Fiedler 1978; Bogdan 1988; Stiker 
[1982]1997), more recent theoretical texts (Murray 2008; McDonagh 
2008; Siebers 2008, 2010) and a continuing tradition of scholarship on 
photography and film (Norden 1994; Enns and Smit 2001a; Chivers 
2011; Chivers and Markotić 2010; Mogk 2013).
Chapter 2, “Signification and Staring: Icon, Index, and Symbol in 
Visual Media,” shines a theoretical light directly on the links between 
the social and cultural/artistic representations of disability. While 
much has been written on the social representation of disability (e.g. 
Siebers 2008, 2010; Davis 1995; 2013), and while much has been written 
on the cinematic representation of disability (e.g. Chivers 2011; Chivers 
and Markotić 2010; Enns and Smit 2001a; Fraser 2013a, 2016a; Marr 
2013; Mogk 2013; Norden 1994; Riley 2005; Smith 2011; Wijdicks 2015), 
there have been very few attempts to bridge discussions of both repre-
sentational processes explicitly. I contend, however, that what is com-
mon to both is the visual bias that underlies our thinking and our 
construction of socially negotiated representations of disability. To 
make this argument I draw inspiration from a specific line of cinema 
criticism throughout the twentieth century – expressed concisely in 
the work of film theorist Peter Wollen (1972) – that prioritizes the inter-
relation of indexical, iconic, and symbolic forms of representation. 
Filmmaker and theorist Pier Paolo Pasolini (1988), who was himself a 
part of this undervalued yet continuing critical tradition, once wrote 
that the cinema expressed the “cognitive code of reality.” This semiotic 
premise borrowed from the discourse of art is of significant interest to 
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disability studies scholars precisely because it reveals the way in 
which our social constructions of normalcy are mediated by images, 
by a presence in the visual field, even in non-artistic contexts. Moreover, 
the emphasis Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (2009) places on the “vi-
sual work” of staring (2009) and the identification of the “new disabil-
ity documentary cinema” by Snyder and Mitchell (2010) suggest that 
the iconic/indexical forms of signification that predominate in visual 
media have great potential to impact social relationships through the 
connections they provide with material experiences of cognitive 
 disability off-screen, and by extension when considering the graphic 
novel, off-page.
Chapter 3, “Disability Scholarship at the Seam: The Materiality of 
Visual Narrative,” adapts Mark Jeffreys’s use of the phrase “the seam 
where body joins culture” (2002: 33) to describe the methodological 
premise of a disability studies scholarship focused on visual culture. 
Jeffreys points to the limitations of social constructivism in disability 
studies and asserts the importance of attending to matters of biology 
and impairment. While I believe that a certain amount of social con-
structivism was necessary in order for first-wave disability studies 
scholarship to advance some strong claims to autonomy for disabled 
populations, the consequence has been a focus on bodies at the expense 
of minds. Therefore, in Jeffreys’s claim I find reason to tread carefully: 
“Outright hostility to biology and to the natural history of our flesh,” 
he warns, “all too easily plays into mind-body, theory-matter dualism 
and may turn out to be just another effort at the erasure of the body by 
culture” (2002: 33). As this quotation itself suggests, Jeffreys’s insight is 
just as applicable to the needs of those disabled by a cognitively abled 
society. This chapter explores in depth the distinction between how 
prose literary representations and visual representations of disability 
operate with reference to Mitchell and Snyder’s Narrative Prosthesis 
(2000) and Ato Quayson’s Aesthetic Nervousness (2007). It also builds on 
the iconic/indexical basis of film and comics art to suggest that visual 
narrative expresses a material connection with extra-artistic matters 
of  biology and impairment and renders cognitive difference visible 
through the ontological assertion of iconic redundancy (Groensteen 
2007; Postema 2013). It thus advocates for a strain of disability studies 
in the humanities that operates “at the seam” where biology and cul-
ture are joined. By conceiving of visual representations as a bridge to 
the material disability experiences of real people, criticism can comple-
ment the metaphorical/metacognitive concerns articulated by literary 
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scholarship (Bérubé 2005) and a mode of critique developed for physi-
cal disability studies (Garland-Thomson 2005) with an exploration of 
the role of cognition in a second-wave disability studies.
Part 2 of this book applies insights from earlier chapters to the visi-
bility of cognitive disability representations in three areas of cultural 
production in Spain: visual art in urban space, graphic novels, and 
 documentary cinema. The representation of severe cognitive disability 
figures prominently here. One of the things that comes from acknowl-
edging the material reality of severe cognitive impairment is the need 
to consistently recognize the potential of collaboration. From this recog-
nition there may come, possibly, a stronger commitment to fostering 
collaborative critique of cognitive ableism. I am particularly interested 
in collaboration that involves the spheres of art and culture, but heed-
ing the call of cultural studies method this interest extends beyond the 
border of the text to approach the way in which culture intersects with 
social formations and institutions. This is to embrace a focus on repre-
sentation that involves both artistic and social modes and that admits 
the necessarily collective nature of all representation.
Chapter 4, “Visualizing Down Syndrome and Autism: The Trazos 
Singulares (Singular Strokes; 2011) Exhibition and María cumple 20 años 
(María Turns Twenty; 2015),” looks at a public event and at a graphic 
novel as collaborative representations of developmental disability. The 
exhibition was held in Madrid during May 2011 at a metro station in the 
north-central area of the city and comprised some sixty works by artists 
with developmental disabilities. Significantly, the work of artistic pro-
duction was itself performed on site between 5 and 8 April of that year. 
Thus, although the issues of art, advocacy, and embodiment expressed 
in this exhibit are far from simple and receive their own consideration, 
ultimately I argue that the novel character of this exhibition demon-
strates a somewhat more sophisticated understanding of the historical 
legacy of the paradoxical visibility/invisibility of cognitive disability 
than would be reflected in the decision to showcase the artistic prod-
ucts alone. Disability philosopher Licia Carlson compellingly writes in 
her work The Faces of Intellectual Disability of the way in which “intel-
lectual disability … has been made both socially visible and invisible” 
(2010: 46). Historically speaking, then, the institutionalized classifica-
tion/codification of people with intellectual disabilities made them 
highly visible from a clinical (and social) standpoint just as their incar-
ceration in “institutions far from public view” was intended to render 
them seemingly invisible to the public at large (Carlson 2010: 46; see 
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also Davis 1995: 73, 94–5, 173; Siebers 2008: 99–109). Trazos Singulares 
thus arguably succeeds in that it renders the contributing artists as so-
cially visible (momentarily – a fact not without its own problems), in 
the process drawing attention to the embodied nature of all artistic pro-
duction. The second half of this chapter looks at the representation of 
autism in María cumple 20 años (2015), itself a follow-up to the earlier 
graphic novel María y yo (2007). Graphic artist Miguel Gallardo here 
collaborates with his daughter María Gallardo to create a shared auto-
biographical portrait that builds on the representational strategies of 
the pair’s earlier comic, pushing readers beyond neurotypical under-
standings of cognition. In particular, this sequel incorporates María’s 
own artistic work to create a fusion of voices and focuses more on is-
sues related to the autonomy and support she might enjoy as an adult. 
The end result is an artistic work that implicitly recognizes the materi-
ality of cognitive impairment, celebrates neurodiversity, and presents a 
collaborative model for approaching autism representations.
Chapter 5, “Sequencing Alzheimer’s Dementia: Paco Roca’s Graphic 
Novel Arrugas (Wrinkles; 2008),” explores an acclaimed graphic novel 
that was later turned into a film directed by Ignacio Ferreras. First pub-
lished by the French publishing house Guy Delcourt as Rides, Arrugas 
was subsequently edited by Astiberri Ediciones in Bilbao, País Vasco, to 
critical acclaim. Its debut in France had earned it recognition as one of 
the top twenty of the year, and in Spain it subsequently received two 
awards in the prestigious Salón del Cómic de Barcelona: the prize 
for  Best Script and the prize for the Best Work by a Spanish Author. 
Significantly, it has since been translated into Japanese, Dutch, Finnish, 
and Italian, winning awards also for Best Album at Expo Cómic, Madrid, 
the Premio Nacional de Cómic 2008, the award for Best Album in the 
festivals of Lucca and Rome, and the prize of the Ministry of Culture in 
Japan. Arrugas is not only an award-winning graphic novel, however; it 
is also a moving portrait of aging and of the effects of Alzheimer’s-
related dementia. The graphic novel emphasizes the everyday lives and 
frustrations of residents in a transitional care facility through its central 
protagonist – the recent arrival Emilio. Arrugas describes not only his 
blossoming friendships and newfound hardships, but also a range of 
characters and everyday situations. Building on recent scholarship on 
senescence and intellectual disability in Spanish film, cultural studies of 
Alzheimer’s dementia, and work on inter dependency within disability 
studies approaches more broadly, this chapter explores key formal as-
pects of the graphic novel’s iconic representation.
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Chapter 6, “Screening Schizophrenia: Documentary Cinema, Cogni-
tive Disability, and Abel García Roure’s Una cierta verdad (A Certain 
Truth; 2008),” chronicles the distance between conceptions of psychiat-
ric disabilities as theorized by two distinct groups: health care provid-
ers and patients. The work of Michel Foucault is mobilized to connect 
explicitly with the contemporary disability studies frameworks that his 
work in many ways inspired. In particular, this chapter interrogates the 
way his works The Birth of the Clinic (1994) and History of Madness (2006) 
both focus on the visibility of infirmity and the role of vision in the 
 contemporary clinical gaze. The case of the informational documentary 
1% esquizofrenia (1% Schizophrenia; 2006) here illustrates how cultural 
representations of schizophrenia are likely to be portrayed as spectacu-
lar. By contrast, the second half of the chapter explores the representa-
tion of schizophrenia that obtains in Una cierta verdad (A Certain Truth; 
2008), directed by Abel García Roure. García Roure studied filmmaking 
with noted cineaste Joaquim Jordà at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra de 
Barcelona, and his film is at once a compelling portrayal of the every-
day individual experience of schizophrenia, a denunciation of the 
 brutality that systematically accompanies its medical treatment, and 
perhaps something of an apology for our collective failure to bridge the 
distance between the cognitively abled and those living with this ill-
ness. The battle of voices we watch unfold on-screen, then, is not con-
stituted by the medicalized self-talk of the person with schizophrenia, 
but is instead a social dialogue between two polarized groups of actors: 
providers and patients. Ultimately, the film suggests that it is the clini-
cal paradigm’s low tolerance for nuance and lack of precise tools that in 
fact perpetuates this ongoing battle of voices. 

PART ONE 
Theorizing Visual Disability  
Representations

1 On the (In)Visibility  
of Cognitive Disability
 “Are we justified, however, in historically separating rehabilitation from the 
treatment of madness? … and separating the physically disabled from the men-
tally deficient? Today, when the same legislation affects them all together, when 
institutions are so similar to one another, when the boundaries are often indis-
tinct, how are we to speak of this century that is about to close, which from a 
divorce made a union?”
 – Henri-Jacques Stiker ([1982]1997: 139)
This book is motivated by a simple premise: cognitive disabilities, when 
juxtaposed with the increased theoretical, social, and cultural visibility 
of physical disabilities, have tended to remain disproportionately un-
seen. That is, those disabilities that might be classified as intellectual 
disabilities, developmental disabilities, and psychiatric disabilities 
have not enjoyed as much critical attention by humanities scholars. 
They have not been as visible in society, historically speaking, or as 
frequently represented in cultural and artistic products, as have those 
disabilities judged to be physical in nature. In theoretical monographs, 
in the wider social environment, and in all manner of artistic texts it has 
historically been the case that one encounters deafness, blindness, and 
exceptional bodies much more frequently than one does persons who 
embody cognitive exceptionality. This chapter explains why this has 
been so, how this may be changing, and what humanities scholarship 
can contribute to the increased visibility of cognitive disabilities within 
the interdisciplinary field of disability studies.
The fact that cognitive disabilities today enjoy less theoretical, so-
cial, and cultural attention than do physical disabilities is a barrier to 
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disability studies, understood “as both an academic discipline and as 
an area of political struggle” (Davis [1997]2013: 1). My starting point is 
to affirm that, to date, much attention has been placed on the need to 
correct a normative and able-bodied social gaze, and not enough atten-
tion has been given to its complementarily normative and “cognitively 
abled” gaze (a term employed by Carlson 2001, 2010; see also Kafer 
2013: 16). Following from this assertion, this chapter explores the rela-
tionship between visibility and cognitive disability at three levels: the 
theoretical or discursive, the historical or social, and the representation-
al or cultural. It is important to note that each of these levels is also a 
window into the others. For example, how disability is theorized – 
what we write about it, what categories or divisions we employ, 
whether we distinguish between physical disabilities and cognitive 
disabilities in a given context – all of this informs how disabilities are 
seen in society, literally and figuratively speaking. At the same time, 
the images of disability that appear in art, culture, and various media 
routinely consumed can also have a significant impact on spectators. 
These representations – which are never neutral – render disabilities 
in visible form. Throughout this work I am particularly concerned 
with those disabilities that tend to be invisible in society just as I am 
also concerned primarily with their visible representation in cultural 
production.
Readers will note that the titles of both this book and this chapter 
highlight the terms “cognitive disability/cognitive difference.” By us-
ing this umbrella term, I hope to capture a range of experiences that 
might alternatively be labelled as intellectual disabilities, developmen-
tal disabilities, and psychiatric disabilities. Because these groupings 
share the simultaneously social and aesthetic condition of relative in-
visibility on which I focus throughout this volume, there are some more 
nuanced discussions implicit in the use of this umbrella term to which 
I have intentionally avoided contributing. Chief among them is the 
philosophical question of how, if at all, we are justified in separating the 
mind from the body. This separation points to a limiting and dualistic 
classification with much deeper roots in the history of Western thought 
and philosophy than can be explored here.1 It may seem that the at-
tempt to isolate cognitive disabilities on their own terms in this book 
elides the more complicated relationship between the body and the 
mind, one that, I would say, is certainly recognized by disability studies 
scholarship. I emphasize, too, that this work is a corrective; treating 
cognitive disabilities alone, as I do here, is a necessary step if we are to 
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foreground cognitive disabilities in the humanities. These discussions 
will necessarily complicate the existing political and academic work 
on disability, which emphasizes the physical. Although this chapter 
concisely describes the persisting effects of this differential mind–
body classification, which can be observed generally as a residue in 
modern theory, society, and culture, it is more interested in matters of 
representation than in questions of ontology. After the work of this 
chapter is completed, rather than explain the philosophical or histori-
cal motivations for the persistent theoretical, social, and cultural mar-
ginalization of cognitive difference, I argue that a focus on visuality 
changes the tools we use to explore cognitive disability representa-
tions in the humanities.
Another important discussion implicit in my use of the umbrella 
term “cognitive disability” involves what are nonetheless important 
distinctions and possibly nuanced overlaps between intellectual dis-
abilities, developmental disabilities, and psychiatric disabilities. Of 
course, readers should be aware that these terms clearly reflect a wide 
range of cognitive experiences and that these experiences themselves 
are not always without a physical component or coexisting disabilities 
that are seen as physical. Of the three categories of cognitive disabili-
ties that are the focus of this book, the inclusion of psychiatric dis-
abilities here may perhaps seem the most out of place to some readers. 
But attending to this group – precisely because it may seem out of place 
– is perhaps the most essential component of this project, for it speaks 
to the way in which disabilities related to cognition are more likely to 
be seen through a medical rather than a social lens.
Historically, the distinctions between what are today termed intel-
lectual disabilities, developmental disabilities, and psychiatric disabili-
ties were neither clearly observed nor recorded as such – as is suggested 
in Patrick McDonagh’s wonderful book Idiocy: A Cultural History (2008). 
Mark Rapley’s The Social Construction of Intellectual Disability (2004) also 
signals the way in which the boundaries established between each of 
these categories may be negotiated differently in certain contexts. Here 
it is of interest that even today use of the term “psychiatric disability” is 
extremely rare in disability scholarship in the humanities. In Hispanic 
studies, for example, I consider Candace Skibba’s use of the term in 
her  book chapter “The Other Body: Psychiatric Disability and Pedro 
Almodóvar (1988–2011)” (2016) to be highly significant. Following her 
lead, I employ this term here as an attempt to stake claim to humanities 
study of the representation of psychiatric disabilities among disability 
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studies scholars; schizophrenia is the psychiatric disability that per-
haps most frequently captures the public imagination and is discussed 
in chapter 6. While disability studies theorists, with much success, have 
worked to wrest discursive control of those disabilities taken to be 
physical – such as blindness, deafness, and missing limbs – from the 
clinical gaze, medicalized discourse has continued to be a predominant 
theoretical voice speaking on issues related to Down syndrome, autism, 
Alzheimer’s disease, and schizophrenia, for example. It is currently 
the case that intellectual disabilities, developmental disabilities, and 
what goes by the name of madness or mental disorder continue to be 
disproportionately explained by health field practitioners and not by 
humanists, even given the rise of humanities interest in the subfield of 
Mad Studies.2
A time of opportunity has arrived. The same humanistic inquiry that 
has invigorated the study of physical disabilities through the lens of a 
social model can now similarly reclaim cognitive disabilities from the 
medicalizing gaze. What makes this a time of great opportunity is the 
increased attention given to cognitive disabilities in cultural produc-
tion. In the last decade, intellectual, developmental, and psychiatric 
disabilities have enjoyed a relatively high level of cultural representa-
tion that humanities scholars are in a unique position to explore. I men-
tion a range of examples from the Spanish context in chapters 4, 5 and 
6, but this trend can arguably be observed also in Anglophone contexts 
– consider the spectacular representation of Down syndrome in A&E’s 
reality show Born This Way (2015–16, currently in its second season), 
Alzheimer’s in the Hollywood film Still Alice (2014), starring Julianne 
Moore, and possibly schizophrenia in Shutter Island (2010), with the 
protagonist role played by Leonard DiCaprio. Scholarship in the hu-
manities can comment on the way disability representations operate in 
artistic texts and simultaneously on their greater resonance within 
 social discourse. Here I apply the somewhat broad notion of cultural 
production as an approach to discussing how cognitive disability is 
represented in artistic products such as the comic/graphic novel and 
the feature-length documentary film, as well as in the staged and em-
bodied production of paintings by cognitively disabled artists in the 
urban environment itself. As will be revealed in this book’s exploration 
of these and other examples, I am particularly interested in visual 
 representations of cognitive disability. Apart from some considerations 
addressed in chapter 3 – which are necessary as a contrast to fore-
ground the characteristic aspects of visual representations – here I do 
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not engage prose literature at length. Instead I seek to blend a humani-
ties approach to visual culture with disability studies method, in every 
case prioritizing the need to attend to those artistic properties particu-
lar to the form of cultural production under study. In addition, I want 
to push disability studies scholars to embrace a dual emphasis on em-
bodiment and cognition. Although it is beyond the scope of this book 
to explore the insights towards which this dual emphasis might lead, 
acknowledging the commonalities and distinctions between physical 
and  cognitive disability representations will be an important step in 
strengthening academic and political discourse related to disability.
Before moving forward, I draw the reader’s attention to the question 
that serves as the epigraph for this chapter. In his foundational A History 
of Disability ([1982]1997, translated from the French by William Sayers), 
Henri-Jacques Stiker asked whether we are justified in “separating 
the physically disabled from the mentally deficient” ([1982]1997: 139). 
Although his remark may have been intended as a comment on par-
ticular historical circumstances, which I explore briefly below, readers 
may sense correctly that it has an even greater resonance. Stiker’s ques-
tion works on all three of the levels with which the present book dia-
logues (the theoretical, the social, and the cultural). It is clear to me – as 
I believe it was to Stiker – that these two populations have been sepa-
rated in historical reality – that is, that the modern histories of the phys-
ically disabled and the cognitively disabled are not the same. Of the fact 
that this uneven history has resulted in an uneven contemporary mo-
ment there can be no doubt. Echoing Stiker, the next three sections of 
this chapter briefly illustrate how the “physically disabled” and the 
“mentally deficient” have been approached theoretically, socially, and 
culturally through very different and very uneven levels of attention.
The Theoretical or Discursive Field
In their book Narrative Prosthesis – a text that since its publication in 
2000 has become a touchstone for the field of disability studies – David 
T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder (2000: 39) wrote of the need for work 
on cognitive disabilities. It is helpful here to briefly contextualize 
Mitchell and Snyder’s remark for contemporary readers. When we look 
at some of the canonical texts in the humanities that launched disability 
studies scholarship in its contemporary form, we find that mention of 
cognitive disabilities is extremely rare. Out of the twenty-seven chap-
ters in the first edition of the Disability Studies Reader (1997, edited by 
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Lennard J. Davis) and the twenty-six numbered chapters in Freakery: 
Cultural Spectacles of the Extraordinary Body (1996, edited by Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson), for example, cognitive disability is not central to a 
single one. The Disability Studies Reader’s first edition mentioned audism 
(1997: 286), but not autism; dwarfism (1997: 336), but not Down syn-
drome; stigma as cognitive processing (1997: 221–3), but not schizophre-
nia. Garland-Thomson’s volume, focused as it is on spectacles made of 
the exceptional body, pushed no further into cognitive terrain, although 
it is valuable on its own terms. Simply put, cognitive disability did not 
appear in these foundational scholarly approaches to disability.
Lingering, for a moment, on Davis’s brief introduction to that first 
edition of the Disability Studies Reader, readers will note that the text 
consistently emphasizes the body at the expense of cognition. Drawing 
attention to ableist misperceptions, it risks reducing disability to an 
identifiable physical trait: “a missing limb, blindness, deafness. What 
could be simpler to understand?” (1997: 2). Davis there critiques writ-
ing that “tended to be written so that ‘normal’ people might know what 
it is like to be blind, crippled, deaf, and so on” (1997: 4, emphasis added). 
In the passage that leads up to mention of the passing of the ADA 
(Americans with Disabilities Act) in 1990, the text reads: “there have 
been people with disabilities throughout history, but it has only been in 
the last twenty years that one-armed people, quadriplegics, the blind, 
people with chronic diseases, and so on, have seen themselves as a 
 single, allied, united physical minority” (1997: 3, emphasis added). 
Culminating on the last page of the introduction, references to “re-
ceived truths of culture and the body,” “able-bodied writing,” and a 
“grand unified theory of the body” transparently reflect the physical 
emphasis of the chapters to follow (1997: 5). His final sentence in that 
first edition points towards a future when “the marginalized being in 
the wheelchair or using sign language, the person with disabilities will be-
come the ultimate example, the universal image, the modality through 
whose knowing the postmodern subject can theorize and act” (1997: 5, 
emphasis added). Nowhere in this account is any intellectual, develop-
mental, or psychiatric disability mentioned, except perhaps as an im-
plicit echo in the “and so on” that repeats in the material quoted above. 
Rather than being seen as a failing of that individual publication, the 
lack of interest in cognitive disability on display in the first edition of 
Davis’s nonetheless valuable edited volume should be taken as an ex-
pression of the kind of disability studies scholarship that humanists 
were engaged in at the time. If that edition of the Disability Studies 
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Reader was indeed the culmination of a decades-long first wave of hu-
manities interest in disability studies, as I take it to be, its approach 
spoke specifically – and, as the present view would have it, in a some-
what limited fashion – to the high degree of visibility of physical dis-
abilities in areas as divergent as the Disability Rights Movement, 
government legislation such as the ADA, popular culture and media 
representations, and the wider social realm itself.3
Another revealing case in point concerns the publication of book-
length monographs focusing on disability and emphasizing the physical 
over the cognitive. Those titles appearing on a short list of what were 
arguably the most important humanities books in the interdisciplinary 
field of disability studies prior to the year 2000 would reveal how wide-
spread was this emphasis on the physical. The predominance of physi-
cal disability can be gleaned merely from glancing at these  titles, which 
should surely figure near the top, if not at the top, of any such list: 
Lennard J. Davis’s Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness, and the Body 
(1995), Susan Wendell’s The Rejected Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections 
on Disability (1996), Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s Extraordinary Bodies: 
Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature (1997), 
David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder’s The Body and Physical Difference: 
Discourses of Disability (1997), and Brenda Jo Brueggemann’s Lend Me 
Your Ear: Rhetorical Constructions of Deafness (1999). Unfortunately, de-
spite its undeniable value, the volume Disability Studies: Enabling the 
Humanities (2002), published by the Modern Language Association and 
edited by Sharon Snyder, Brenda Jo Brueggemann, and Rosemarie 
Garland-Thomson, included no sustained conversations regarding cog-
nitive disabilities.
It would be unfair, however, to say that the field has not opened up 
quite a bit since the year 2000. Developments in intersectionality and 
queer studies have led disability studies scholars to reinvest in the rela-
tionships among physical, psychological, social, and political forces in 
the process of negotiating subjectivity as constructed within normative 
power structures. These developments have been particularly signifi-
cant over the past decade. In addition to Robert McRuer’s already clas-
sic Crip Theory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability (2006), more 
recent books like Julie Avril Minich’s Accessible Citizenships: Disability, 
Nation and the Cultural Politics of Greater Mexico (2014) have addressed 
humanities texts through a synthesis of approaches (in Minich’s text: 
prose literature, film, and theatre via LGBTQ studies, Chican@ Studies, 
and disability studies).4 It is also promising that more and more studies 
36 One Theorizing Visual Disability Representations
on cognitive disability have been published in article form in the 
 twenty-first century. One need only look at the essays published in two 
of the field’s top-tier journals: Disability Studies Quarterly (DSQ) and 
Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies (JLCDS). The special 
sections appearing therein – for example, on cognitive impairment, ed-
ited by Lucy Burke (JLCDS 2.1 [2008]); on emotion and disability, edited 
by Elizabeth Donaldson and Catherine Prendergast (JLCDS 5.2 [2011]]); 
on disability and madness, edited by Noam Ostrander and Bruce 
Henderson (DSQ 33.1 [2013]); on autism and neurodiversity, edited by 
Emily Thornton Savarese and Ralph James Savarese (DSQ 30.1 [2010]); 
and on learning disabilities, edited by David J. Connor and Beth A. 
Ferri (DSQ 30.2 [2010]) – are significant contributions that precede the 
present book in the attention they place on intellectual, developmental, 
and psychiatric disabilities.
Moreover, the differences between the first edition of The Disability 
Studies Reader published in 1997 and its fourth edition published in 
2013 are significant. The fourth edition expanded its contents from 
twenty-seven to forty-two contributions and included a number of new 
selections perhaps solicited precisely to push beyond a purely physical 
understanding of disability. Five of the newly included chapters are 
particularly poignant additions in this sense: Bradley Lewis’s “A Mad 
Fight: Psychiatry and Disability Activism” (ch. 9), Liat Ben-Moshe’s 
“‘The Institution Yet to Come’: Analyzing Incarceration through a 
Disability Lens” (ch. 10), Catherine Prendergast’s “The Unexceptional 
Schizophrenic: A Post-Postmodern Introduction” (ch. 18), Margaret 
Price’s “Defining Mental Disability” (ch. 22), and Joseph N. Straus’s 
“Autism as Culture” (ch. 34).
Yet even with these productive and inclusive shifts, in the main cog-
nitive disability remains a secondary interest in contrast to the much 
more widely appreciated intersection between physical disability and 
– as Davis put it in the first edition – “the differences implied in gender, 
nationality, ethnicity, race and sexual preferences” (1997: 5). It is still the 
case, for example, that many of the outstanding disability studies 
monographs published since 2000 have continued the primacy of the 
visual (i.e., physical disability) in disability studies work. Garland-
Thomson’s Staring: How We Look (2009), while a wonderful and power-
ful “anatomy of staring” (2009: 9), tends to emphasize corporeal over 
cognitive exceptionality.5 Tobin Siebers’s masterful Disability Aesthetics 
(2010) is also a path-breaking humanities analysis of the body in visual 
art, but is no less physical in orientation.
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Stuart Murray’s Representing Autism: Culture, Narrative, Fascination 
(2008), however, is an important exception and as such is essential read-
ing for a second wave of disability studies research focused on cogni-
tive difference. Although it focuses on autism specifically, the book’s 
introduction speaks broadly to the invisibility of cognitive difference 
within disability theory. It is easy to agree with his characterizations 
there: that Snyder and Mitchell’s Cultural Locations of Disability (2006), 
for example, “has little to say about cognitive exceptionality generally,” 
that the “centrality that the body occupies in contemporary disability 
studies that focus on narrative is nearly ubiquitous,” and that otherwise 
impressive contributions to the field by significant scholars “often make 
the linguistic slip whereby ‘disability’ in their writing comes to mean 
physical impairment” (Murray 2008: 8, original emphasis).6 Murray 
suggests that the notion of visibility may figure into the tendency by 
disability scholars to avoid autism in particular (2008: 8-9), and one 
might extend this point more generally to explain avoidance of the topic 
of cognitive disabilities. Simply put, disability studies theory avoids ex-
ploring those disabilities that are less visible in society. The problem 
with this evasion is, as Murray explains, that “of course, seen in these 
terms the brain is as physical if not as markedly visible, as part of the 
body as a limb” (2008: 8). Those with cognitive disabilities are less visi-
ble in theoretical inquiries, and those same inquiries tend to theorize the 
social marginalization of people with physical disabilities as represen-
tative of people with all manner of disabilities. As Murray points out 
(with his reference to the autistic body in particular, of course), the bod-
ies of those with cognitive disabilities are also subjected to physical con-
trol by social, political, and cultural forces. This cannot and should not 
be disputed. In this sense, theory and academic discourse hide nuances 
related to cognitive disabilities from theoretical consideration and 
thereby obscure the ideologies that are particular to the cognitively 
abled gaze. It is possible, then, that disability scholarship has – inadver-
tently, perhaps – aided in constructing a homogenized view of disabled 
populations by prioritizing the exceptional physical body.
The question that disability studies scholars should be asking is 
whether cognitive disabilities merit their own attention, and if so, how 
this attention impacts the wider field. This question is decidedly not 
meant to take authors of previous works in disability studies to task; 
rather, it points to a way of accounting for difference in what would 
otherwise be imagined as an undifferentiated physically disabled pop-
ulation. Elevating cognitive disability to the same level of theoretical 
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interest as that enjoyed by physical disabilities is a crucial step towards 
recognizing that the social environment is disabling in both a physical 
and a cognitive sense. Focusing sufficient critical attention on the mind, 
and not merely on the body, will surely strengthen disability studies 
critique. This is, of course, a field that due to its historical links with 
programs in gender and sexuality studies has long underscored the sig-
nificant relationships between sociopolitical formations and subjectivity. 
How is it that a field so aware of the physical, social, and psychological 
dimensions of identity has neglected, almost wholesale, those popula-
tions experiencing cognitive disability? As indicated by the title of this 
chapter – “On the (In)Visibility of Cognitive Disability” – this neglect 
makes sense only if we are willing to recognize the visual moorings of 
the able-bodied gaze to which the vast majority of disability studies 
scholars speak. This gaze is a social and political power that has har-
nessed the visible world towards its own ends. Scholars working in dis-
ability studies have done well in combatting this visual mechanism of 
subjugation, discrimination, and marginalization on its own terms – on 
its home terrain of the visible world. (This way of combatting power is 
not unique to disability studies.) To the able-bodied colonization of the 
visual field, disability studies opposes the cult of the visual; yet in privi-
leging the notion that social power is anchored purely in the visual, 
much of the theoretical work on disability has limited the field’s scope 
to what is visible in the  simplest sense.
The above is intended as a concise snapshot of the history of physical 
bias in disability theory. I do not want to question the value of work in 
disability studies either pre-2000 or post-2000, but merely to call atten-
tion to what is being left out. Once this bias is acknowledged it cannot 
come as a surprise that the medical and health fields continue to domi-
nate discussions of cognitive disabilities. Yet if we are to understand 
those disabling power structures that are less visible in society, another 
complementary approach is needed. This approach will need to be 
more inclusive of the cultural locations of cognitive disabilities, specifi-
cally. It will have to grapple more thoroughly not merely with the lack 
of demonstrated interest in developmental, intellectual, and psychiatric 
disabilities among humanities theorists but also with the blurry and 
insufficiently recorded history of how those with cognitive disabilities 
have been marginalized within cognitively abled societies. The concise 
account I provide as introductory context in the next section should in 
no way be seen as a substitute for carrying out more thorough historical 
work on cognitive disabilities from a disability studies perspective.
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The Historical or Social Field
If disability studies has for decades been about confronting and inves-
tigating the disabling conditions experienced by “exceptional bodies,” 
we must understand that this emphasis recapitulates the prehistory of 
a majority able-bodied society’s understanding of disability. Previous 
disability studies research reveals that this prehistory was driven by 
visual forms, chief among them the photograph and the freak show. (I 
save discussion of the cinema for the next section focusing on cultural 
or artistic representation, though I admit it is not possible to fully sepa-
rate the historical or social from the cultural or artistic realms or even to 
clearly define these.) Although both of these forms necessarily draw 
upon what Elizabeth Stephens has called “the culture of public specta-
cles emergent during the mid-eighteenth century,” which was itself re-
lated to “the rise of modern medicine over the same period” (2011: 5), 
the photograph and the freak show are relatively distinct visual forms 
of cultural representation that reached their apogee during the nine-
teenth century.7 As such they unfolded in a historical context in which 
able-bodied encounters with physical disability and cognitive dis ability 
were defined by the trope of (in)visibility in specific ways. Through the 
social power invested in institutions and the proper conduct  continually 
reproduced through adherence to everyday able-bodied norms, dis-
abled populations were frequently kept from the view of the able- 
bodied majority; and through the alienated forms of visible spectacle 
made possible by photography and the freak show, disability was ex-
posed for visual consumption by able-bodied publics. As scholars have 
noted, the visible representation of disability functioned as a distilla-
tion of “otherness” intended to reaffirm the produced notion of nor-
malcy for able-bodied audiences.
With research drawing on thousands of photographs, Robert Bogdan’s 
Picturing Disability: Beggar, Freak, Citizen, and Other Photographic Rhetoric 
(2012, with Martin Elks and James A. Knoll) provides a comprehensive 
look into how the photograph represented disability for public visual 
consumption in various forms (e.g., sideshow souvenirs, begging cards, 
poster children, advertisements, art photography, personal keepsakes, 
and more). The chapter in that volume authored solely by Martin Elks, 
“Clinical Photographs” (ch. 6), looks specifically at the way “feeble-
mindedness” was represented through photography in order to vali-
date the agendas of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century 
eugenicists in the United States, but it is fair to say that overall the 
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book’s contents emphasize physical disability. This book, along with 
David Hevey’s foundational text The Creatures Time Forgot: Photography 
and Disability Imagery (1992), helps readers understand a principle 
 inherent in the social practice underlying disability photography. 
Contextualizing photographic representation within an ableist society 
reveals how visual consumption of disability is always tied to the extra-
artistic oppression of disabled people (Hevey 1997: 345).8 It is clear from 
these and other studies that photography of disability in both its clinical 
and commercial forms since the nineteenth century has been exploit-
ative, and furthermore, the visual form of exploitation in question has 
largely centred on the representation of physical disability.
Inspired by the pioneering work of Leslie Fiedler (Freaks: Myths and 
Images of the Secret Self, 1978) and Robert Bogdan (Freak Show: Presenting 
Human Oddities for Amusement and Profit, 1988) – and tying in to earlier 
work on stigma by Erving Goffman (1963) and more recent theoriza-
tions of performativity by Judith Butler (1993) – Garland-Thomson’s 
edited volume Freakery (1996) invigorated academic interest in investi-
gating the cultural resonance of freak shows. These shows, which 
reached their peak between 1840 and 1940 (Garland-Thomson 1996: 
23), found widespread resonance through the efforts of P.T. Barnum. 
Photographs could be viewed privately by individuals or smaller 
groups; the freak show entailed a much more public performance of 
normalcy. Through such performance, staged and spectacular encoun-
ters with visible disabilities – most frequently those of a physical nature 
– worked to produce what Garland-Thomson calls the “common” and 
“indistinguishable” bodies of able-bodied observers:
The exaggerated, sensationalized discourse that is the freak show’s es-
sence ranged over the seemingly singular bodies that we would now call 
either “physically disabled” or “exotic ethnics,” framing them and height-
ening their differences from viewers, who were rendered comfortably 
common and safely standard by the exchange … A freak show’s cultural 
work is to make the physical particularity of the freak into a hypervisible 
text against which the viewer’s indistinguishable body fades into a seem-
ingly neutral, tractable, and invulnerable instrument of the autonomous 
will, suitable to the uniform abstract citizenry democracy institutes. 
(Garland-Thomson 1996: 5, 10)
The nineteenth-century popularization of both photography and freak 
shows, however, was largely directed towards sensationalizing the 
 exceptional body, not the exceptional mind. These display practices 
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reaffirmed the power of the able-bodied gaze, while the cognitively 
abled gaze was relegated to a secondary role. These earlier visual prac-
tices were engaged in the act of producing a persisting rift between 
physically disabled and able-bodied people, actively heightening pub-
lic interest in physical disability as spectacle while, simultaneously, 
cognitive disability remained hidden from view.
It is important to note that even while the photograph and the freak 
show were being harnessed to reaffirm able-bodied normalcy through 
the vehicle of the exceptional body, populations with physical and cog-
nitive disabilities were isolated from each other. Henri-Jacques Stiker 
suggests a historical explanation for the distance between the relative 
social visibility of physical disabilities and the relative social invisibility 
of cognitive disabilities that is worthy of our consideration.9 The physi-
cally disabled and the mentally ill – as the text’s author puts it – were 
historically subjected to social power in two distinct ways. As a result, 
these populations were confined in two distinct social environments: 
the asylum for those with mental disorders, and the rehabilitation cen-
tre for those with bodily impairments:
Before the war of 1914–18, and this will confirm the rupture as our refer-
ence point, there existed only the psychiatric institutions on one side and 
some establishments for those with sensory impairment on the other. The 
latter were not connected with the asylum. They sprang up beside it, even 
in opposition to it. For someone aware of the history of the treatment of 
insanity, this is not surprising at first glance: the “mad” were isolated, both 
on the level of the knowledge that was available (or that was projected) of 
mental disorder and on the level of institutions. By the end of the nine-
teenth century the Asylum was firmly in place. Alienation was the ruling 
concept: medicalization would be added to this moral and social action; 
internment is henceforth the preferred and single form of intervention; the 
expert psychiatrist, absolute master of the rationalized space of the asy-
lum where all madness ends up, the benevolent leader of the phalanxes of 
citizens without rights, is one of the quintessentially important personag-
es of society. The physically disabled are not in the asylum and the seques-
tration of the mentally ill puts an end to the mixture of the two categories. 
Establishments for the bodily deficient will not be born of the asylum sys-
tem. ([1982]1997: 138–9)
Stiker prefers to use the term sequestration rather than write of social 
invisibility explicitly, but it is clear that internment in the asylum 
 removed the mentally ill from the cognitively abled gaze more 
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completely than the physically disabled were sequestered from the 
able-bodied gaze (see also Carlson 2010).
The result of this historical shift was a split between two different 
ways of seeing: each gaze – the cognitively abled and the able-bodied 
– rationalized and justified itself by defining and arguably producing a 
distinct population in its own image. Inside the asylum, the underpin-
nings of a psychiatric specialization were introduced, complete with a 
corresponding spatial environment. The clinical gaze exercised its do-
minion in the sheltered and relatively autonomous institution, where 
both its activity and the objects of its attention remained largely unseen 
by the wider society. By contrast, people with physical disabilities, who 
in this account remained outside of the asylum, were progressively dis-
tinguished as a social group in and of themselves.10 Subsequently, as 
Stiker’s text captures, the physically disabled gradually emerged from 
the ranks of the poor and began to be seen by the public eye as a distinct 
population (Stiker [1982]1997: 139). It is to this historical circumstance 
that the word “handicap” refers, as physically disabled populations 
were habitually associated with beggars by the able-bodied gaze.11 In a 
double-move, then, those who were seen as physically disabled were 
left out of the total institution of the asylum and progressively distin-
guished from the poor and thus became historically and socially visible 
in a way that those with cognitive disabilities did not. This is not to 
downplay the new oppressions faced by the physically disabled due to 
their social visibility, nor is it to suggest that the institution/asylum 
was a place of refuge from ableism for those with cognitive disabilities. 
Instead, it is important to understand that rehearsing this history can 
help readers glimpse a historical precedent for the differential treat-
ment of two groupings of persons disabled, arguably, by a single ableist 
power structure.12
Much as with the point elucidated by Stiker’s work on the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, part of the reason for the sustained pre-
dominance of attention given to physical disabilities over cognitive 
 disabilities in contemporary critical theory, quite plausibly, lies in his-
torical circumstances that predate the nineteenth century. Margaret A. 
Winzer’s contribution to the first edition of the Disability Studies Reader 
– a chapter titled “Disability and Society before the Eighteenth Century: 
Dread and Despair” (1997) – prompts readers to trace this generalized 
differentiation even further into the past. She points out that “until the 
close of the eighteenth century those who fell under the broad, elastic 
categories labelled as insane or blind or deaf and dumb commanded 
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most notice. Madness particularly attracted attention, although ‘idiocy’ 
(mental retardation) as a discrete and separate condition was rarely 
mentioned” (1997: 80).13 As Patrick McDonagh concurs in the introduc-
tion to Idiocy: A Cultural History (2008), historically speaking, general-
izations have abounded “that muddied the idea of idiocy – and for that 
matter, continue to muddy the contemporary concepts of intellectual 
disability, or mental retardation, or cognitive impairment, or develop-
mental delay, or learning disability” (2008: 5; see also discussion over 
5–6). This insight is supported by Winzer’s account, in which she notes 
that historically there was no “consistent, sound means of discriminat-
ing between those who had physical disabilities (i.e. were crippled, 
dwarfed, epileptic, or deaf) and those who were intellectually impaired 
or mentally ill. All were considered to form one, all-encompassing cat-
egory” (1997: 80).14
Physical disabilities in particular have progressively become more 
socially visible to an able-bodied majority population, which makes it 
possible to trace their historical documentation even as shifts in the so-
ciological imagination, patterns of knowledge. and political power 
have changed how they are viewed by an able-bodied majority. This 
can be seen quite clearly, for example, in the case of deaf populations 
throughout history – it is possible to trace a recorded history of the deaf 
through time and place even though understandings of deafness have 
changed significantly.15 What should be clear from even this cursory 
and comparative exploration of the social and historical visibility of 
physical and cognitive disabilities is that from the nineteenth through 
the twenty-first centuries, an able-bodied majority has consistently 
found reason to distinguish physical or sensory disabilities from cogni-
tive disabilities that would have been classified as madness or mental 
disorder in a general sense. Moreover, as the next section explores in 
broad strokes, the investigation of both physical and cognitive disabili-
ties in cultural or artistic representations has demonstrated similarly 
unequal levels of attention.
The Representational or Cultural Field
As Tobin Siebers convincingly explores in Disability Aesthetics (2010), 
visual art has long portrayed and even depended on disabilities even 
while rendering them invisible. He writes that disability has been pres-
ent even if “rarely recognized as such” throughout the history of mod-
ern art; the presence of disability – of “strangeness” and the “convulsive,” 
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of “misshapen and twisted bodies” – has allowed “the beauty of an 
artwork to endure over time” (2010: 4–5; see also Siebers 1998, 2000, 
2008, 2013). Of course, Siebers focused in his 2010 text mostly on sculp-
ture and painting, not on cinema. Nevertheless, Martin F. Norden’s ear-
lier book Cinema of Isolation: A History of Physical Disabilities in the Movies 
(1994) should be seen not only as anticipating Siebers’s book but also as 
a precursor that traces a comparable thesis through a popular art form.16
As the subtitle of his book indicates, Norden – like Siebers after him 
– had no intention to address cognitive disabilities. He writes that “as 
powerful cultural tools, the movies have played a major role in per-
petuating mainstream society’s regard for people with disabilities, and 
more often than not the images borne in those movies have differed 
sharply from the realities of the physically disabled experience” (1994: 
1). Norden’s is a valuable study in its own right and deserves no criti-
cism other than to suggest that his focus on physical disability is – as 
with Siebers’s own much more recent book – consistent with the high 
levels of interest regarding the exceptional body that predominate in 
what I am calling first-wave disability studies work. What is interesting 
in relation to the present study is not merely the way in which Norden 
captures cinematic representation’s recapitulation of the presence and 
presumed enduring artistic value of physical disability previously ren-
dered visible in sculpture and painting. Readers of his text will note 
that cinema spectatorship also reinvigorates the performance of able-
bodied normalcy through visual consumption found in social practices 
involving nineteenth-century cultural forms such as the photograph 
and the freak show.
Norden’s thesis, expressed concisely in his main title Cinema of 
Isolation, is that “most movies have tended to isolate disabled charac-
ters from their able-bodied peers as well as from each other” (1994: 1). 
He traces this thesis over approximately one hundred years of US cin-
ema, from silent film to talkies, through the postwar era and into the 
late 1980s. His conclusion, titled “Reel Life after the Americans with 
Disabilities Act,” takes on even early-1990s American films and contin-
ues to critique “Hollywood’s deep equivocation on physical disability 
concerns” (1994: 311). This critique – which in my view is appropriate 
and accurate – is consistent throughout the book.17 Readers may find 
that Norden is ultimately ambivalent about the value of these images. 
This ambivalence is evident in his suggestion that one can talk about 
some degree of “progress” in cinematic representation of disability. He 
even remains hopeful about the future of cinema:
On the (In)Visibility of Cognitive Disability 45
Progress has been particularly evident in independently produced and of-
ten modestly budgeted works … In addition, more positive depictions 
have surfaced in other mainstream media, particularly television commer-
cials and print advertising. As people with disabilities continue to make 
gains in our society (gains that a majority of U.S. citizens will learn of 
through mainstream news media, of course), their movie images will pre-
sumably begin to reflect the lives of people with physical disabilities with 
a greater degree of accuracy and sensitivity. (1994: 314)
Given the likelihood of intense debate surrounding what constitute 
“positive depictions” of disability, I suspect that not all readers from 
disability studies will see this hope as realistic. Nevertheless, it is im-
portant to understand that Norden’s ambivalence regarding both the 
distortion and the potential of cinematic representations – an ambiva-
lence that echoes sentiments expressed in an earlier 1985 essay by Paul 
K. Longmore18 – is also evident in an increasing number of publications 
by disability scholars.19
Screening Disability (2001a), edited by Anthony Enns and Christopher 
R. Smit, published seven years after Norden’s monograph, is an impor-
tant further step forward in recognizing the importance of cinematic 
representations of disability. The book follows up on an event in March 
1999, “when scholars in both Film Studies and Disability Studies gath-
ered at the University of Iowa for the first conference on cinema and 
disability” (Enns and Smit 2001b: xi). Its collected essays deal largely 
with physical disability at the expense of cognitive disability;20 however, 
the chapter titled “The Fusion of Film Studies and Disability Studies” by 
Thomas B. Hoeksema and Christopher R. Smit marks what I consider to 
be a significant and still underappreciated advance in theorizing disabil-
ity on-screen. Hoeksema and Smit write that
cinematic depictions of people who live with disability have been enor-
mously diverse. Sometimes they contain negative and erroneous images; 
at other times their portrayals of disability are accurate and positive. 
Sometimes they respond to or reflect societal attitudes and beliefs; at other 
times they influence society’s perceptions. We believe that it is inaccurate 
and insufficient to characterize cinematic depictions of disability as pri-
marily negative and stereotypic. (2001: 35)
The claim that follows this statement is the one I regard as significant 
and underappreciated: “We also think that taking an activist, advocacy 
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perspective when critiquing disability cinema risks missing insights 
that may be obtained by reviewing films using additional tools from 
the field of Film Studies” (2001: 35). One must understand this state-
ment in the context of the entirety of the authors’ chapter, which pushes 
disability studies scholars to grapple with the unique artistic and for-
mal properties of film. Well into the twenty-first century, the complaint 
made by Hoeksema and Smit remains a familiar one to film studies 
scholars working in traditionally literary departments, even where dis-
ability is not considered. I note a general tendency for humanities 
scholars not specifically trained in cinema to reduce films to their ar-
ranged content – events, dialogue, plot, for example. This practice thus 
strips cultural products of their artistic specificity and meaning and re-
duces them to narrative documents in a simple sense. The authors call 
for disability studies scholars to go further and pay close attention to 
the formal attributes of a unique artistic medium – such elements of 
cinematic form as shots, angles, sound, the mobile frame, and the con-
ventions of cinematic genre – when making sense of portrayals of dis-
ability on-screen (2001: 35, 39). I read their warning not as confirmation 
that activism, advocacy, and “political agency” (2001: 41) are incompat-
ible with cinematic criticism, but rather as pointing to their frustration 
with how disability studies perspectives at the time tended to produce 
“bland and one-dimensional” interpretations (2001: 35) instead of 
 attending to and exploring in depth the formal properties of specific 
visual art forms.21
Almost a decade after Screening Disability (2001a), The Problem Body 
(2010), edited by Sally Chivers and Nicole Markotić, was published. 
The book implicitly privileges the cinema’s place in a social history of 
the visual exhibition of exceptional bodies, as when the editors note 
that “before the screen lies a place where many people can take an 
 extended look at the disabled body and live comfortably or even un-
comfortably with their reactions, be they to shudder, to desire, to iden-
tify, to pity, to turn away” (2010: 4). A valuable contribution, the book 
nonetheless focuses overwhelmingly on the representation of physical 
disability.22 Similarly, in Different Bodies (2013), published three years 
later and edited by Marja Evelyn Mogk, only two out of nineteen 
 essays centre on cognitive disability: “Seeing the Apricot: A Disability 
Perspective on Alzheimer’s in Lee Chang-dong’s Poetry” by Sally 
Chivers, and “Chocolate’s Ass-Kicking Autistic Savant: Disability, 
Globalization, and the Action Cinema” by Russell Meeuf. As Mogk’s 
introduction makes clear, books such as these are carrying out 
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important work, especially so when disability on-screen is not “seen” 
as such (2013: 2) and when curricula “continue to address disability 
predominantly or exclusively in applied fields as a category of medi-
cine, rehabilitation services, or educational specialization” (2013: 3). 
Nevertheless, more work is needed if we are to foreground cognitive 
disabilities along with physical disabilities in a critique carried out in 
the humanities.23
In conclusion, by tracing how cognitive disabilities have historically 
been invisible in the theoretical, social, and cultural realms, this chapter 
has paved the way for those that follow. Subsequent chapters continue 
to dialogue with the themes established from the introduction up until 
now. These themes include not only the invisibility of cognitive disabil-
ity but also the need to consider issues of impairment when addressing 
cognition and the need to pay attention to the specific formal and artis-
tic aspects of a given medium of visual representation. The wider argu-
ment to which chapters 2 and 3 contribute involves the notion that 
visual representations require a different approach than has been mar-
shalled in disability studies up until now. Chapter 2 underscores the 
unique properties of visual media, emphasizing the need to attend to 
the primary functions of iconic and indexical signification. These as-
pects of visual media, in particular, have tended to be underappreciat-
ed, ignored altogether, or overshadowed by the routine transposition to 
film of a literary model of disability research relying on metaphor, sym-
bol, plot device, and disability as the foil for an ableist norm. This ap-
proach can continue to shed light on how disability representations 
work in mainstream film, but it often misses the opportunity to value 
the ontological assertion of visual media regarding cognitive disability 
– an assertion that can be particularly important in culture at the mar-
gins of mainstream discourse such as independent film and comics. 
What Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (2009) writes about the “generative 
potential” of staring reinforces the value of these representations. 
Chapter 3 builds on the importance of attending to iconic and indexical 
signification in visual media as a material connection between artistic 
representations and social representations of disability. It explores care-
fully the ways in which disability representations operate in prose 
 literature, explicitly distinguishing the function of visual disability rep-
resentations in film and comics from this prose narrative model. I use 
film theory and, briefly, comics theory to establish this distinction be-
tween prose and visual representations in order to prepare the ground 
for analyses of painting and the graphic novel in chapter 4, the graphic 
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novel in chapter 5, and documentary film in chapter 6. In each case 
I attend to the potential value of cultural representations that make 
 cognitive disability visible; I also assert the materiality of disability 
 experience as made up of both biology/impairment on one hand and 
aesthetics/culture on the other.
2 Signification and Staring: Icon, Index, 
and Symbol in Visual Media
 “Thus it should be observed that the object which becomes a film image is 
characterized by a degree of unity and determinism. And it is natural that it 
be so, because the lin-sign used by the writer has already been refined by an 
entire grammatical, popular, and cultural history, while the im-sign employed 
by the filmmaker ideally has been extracted – by the filmmaker himself, and 
no one else – from the insensitive chaos of objects in a process analogous to the 
borrowing of images from a dictionary intended for a community able to com-
municate only through images … [The filmmaker] chooses a series of objects, or 
things, or landscapes, or persons as syntagmas (signs of a symbolic language) 
which while they have a grammatical history invented in that moment – as in a sort 
of happening dominated by montage – do, however, have an already lengthy and 
intense pregrammatical history … This is probably the principal difference be-
tween literary and cinematographic works (if such a comparison matters). The 
linguistic or grammatical world of the filmmaker is composed of images, and 
[filmic] images are always concrete, never abstract.”
 – Pier Paolo Pasolini (1988: 171, original emphasis)
Film theorist and noted director Pier Paolo Pasolini wrote an intriguing 
essay titled “The ‘Cinema of Poetry,’” reprinted in the anthology 
Heretical Empiricism (1988, trans. Ben Lawton and Louise K. Barnett). In 
it, he compares literary and filmic forms of representation through a 
basic semiotic vocabulary inspired by the work of Charles Sanders 
Peirce and reflected in the above epigraph’s use of lin-signs (or linguis-
tic signs) and im-signs (or image signs). After discussing the key ele-
ments of this basic lin-sign and im-sign terminology, this chapter calls 
for greater awareness regarding the unique properties of visual media 
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and their potential for disability studies. It also sets up chapter 3’s con-
tinued exploration of distinctions between literary and visual (filmic/
comics) representation. To understand how the im-sign functions, 
scholars must balance what Pasolini calls the grammatical and pre-
grammatical aspects of filmic signification. Grammatical aspects are the 
structural and compositional decisions conveyed in art linearly, wheth-
er in prose narrative or film; pre-grammatical aspects are the existential 
or perhaps even ontological properties of signs, which are rendered 
concrete in the visual forms of signification commonly encountered in 
films and graphic novels.1 As developed by film theorist Peter Wollen, 
the notions of icon, index, and symbol are fundamental to understand-
ing the weight of the im-sign’s concreteness when compared with 
the  more abstract signification that characterizes the lin-sign. Visual 
disability representations derive both their risk and their reward from 
the concreteness and materiality that iconic and indexical forms of 
 signification provide.
Disability approaches have tended to undervalue the concreteness of 
the visual image. The indexical (in film) and the iconic (in both film and 
graphic novels) are forms of signification that have great power to con-
nect with material experiences of disability. It should be recognized 
that, just as with literary narratives of disability, visual media represen-
tations can either essentialize normative disability constructions or dis-
rupt entrenched perspectives on disability. As happens with all cultural 
products – novels, memoirs, theatrical productions, popular music, and 
so on – films and graphic novels are frequently the bearers of contradic-
tory meanings that stem from the holistic assessment of factors related 
to artistic construction and composition, authorial intention, and audi-
ence reception. Nevertheless, visual representations of disability are 
intimately connected with embodied experience in ways that prose lit-
erary art forms are not due to a reliance on these iconic and sometimes 
indexical forms of signification. This chapter affirms the unique nature 
of these visual representations using a basic semiotic vocabulary and 
explores the ways in which viewers interact with these disability im-
ages. It also links these discussions to the potential value of what schol-
ars have identified as a “new disability documentary cinema” (Snyder 
and Mitchell 2010: 193).
The first step carried out below is to explore the notions of im-sign 
and lin-sign addressed by Pasolini, and the iconic and indexical aspects 
of filmic signification theorized by Wollen, to assert “The Concreteness 
of the Filmic Image.” While mainstream representations of experiences 
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of disability have arguably been widely and historically normative 
and thus negative, there are reasons to look more carefully at screen 
images of disability in the twenty-first century. In particular, Sharon 
Snyder and David Mitchell’s notion of a “new disability documentary 
cinema” supports the potentially transgressive properties of visual 
disability representations. This approach can underscore how sym-
bolic approaches build on the fundamentally iconic/indexical links 
between textual (or aesthetic/cultural) representation and extra- 
textual (or more properly social) representation of material experi-
ences of disability.
In order to theorize how the study of cognitive disability in film 
might begin to move forward on its own terms, the second section of 
this chapter, “Pre-Grammatical and Grammatical Disability Represen-
tations,” begins with a discussion of director Jaco van Dormael’s short 
film The Kiss (1995). Framing the aesthetic realm of cinema as one in 
which the “cognitive code of reality” identified by Pasolini continues 
to operate, this section illustrates how filmic disability representations 
rely on iconic/indexical signification to constitute an ontological as-
sertion that need not conflict with the strong social model of disability. 
Also integrated are the productive aspects of staring as identified by 
Garland-Thomson in her book Staring: How We Look (2009), aspects 
that are relevant to how the meaning of visual media hinges on mate-
rial links between artistic and social representation. While visual me-
dia have the potential to bring greater social visibility to cognitive 
disabilities, their messages risk being conditioned by normative codes 
of ableism. Acknowledging this nuanced tension between the poten-
tially disruptive and normative poles of visual representation, using 
the cinema as a primary example, is necessary if we are to move be-
yond the somewhat reductive approach that has seen visual disability 
representations as largely negative. Overall, this account allows for a 
twenty-first-century disability cinema to actually induce new forms of 
thinking in viewers, thinking that is in principle transferrable to other 
visual art forms and social situations outside of the work of art. In this 
paradigm the issue of cognition is thus doubly important. Cognitive 
disabilities are increasingly rendered visible on-screen, thus poten-
tially correcting for a legacy of historical invisibility in the social realm; 
in addition, cognition is implicated in the way film viewers convert 
what Garland-Thomson calls the “visual work” of staring into new 
knowledge about the social origin of disability and its non-spectacular, 
material experience in everyday life. 
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The Concreteness of the Filmic Image
As asserted in this chapter’s epigraph, the im-signs encountered in film 
“are always concrete and never abstract.” Due to their concreteness, 
filmic images possess and necessarily communicate immediately “an 
already lengthy and intense pregrammatical history” – that is, a history that 
exists prior to, and thus predates, their incorporation into the gram-
matical and thus linear “language” of cinema. By contrast, the verbal 
and necessarily abstract lin-signs used in prose narrative are condi-
tioned more by their immersion in grammatical webs of meaning or in 
the organizational structures of novelistic form. To illustrate Pasolini’s 
point about the cinema, let us use a purposely simple and concrete 
 example. Consider the possibility that in a given prose narrative writ-
ten in English, readers encounter the lin-sign “tree.” There is no ques-
tion that – in the context of literary representation – this “tree” exists. 
Readers will likely immediately picture this “tree” visually, or said an-
other way, they will give form to this tree “in their mind’s eye.” But 
consider for a moment that there is not, in fact, any such material object 
outside of the text that corresponds to this “tree” – for “tree” is a verbal 
moniker that refers to a general conceptual category of objects, and not 
to a specific object. Note that this lin-sign, the word “tree,” is culturally 
and socially defined. Its imagined existence is highly dependent on 
readers’ experiences. The visualization of this lin-sign by readers in the 
context of an imagined scene prompted by the text is not likely to be 
completely abstract – it is necessary to point out that some readers may 
supply layers of definition and concreteness to their imagined referent. 
That is, some may visualize a “pine tree,” others a “pecan tree,” others 
still perhaps even a “quince tree.” Thus, as this example shows, much if 
not almost all of the concreteness that arises with such a visualization is 
lacking in the literary text itself and is necessarily produced through 
the reader’s encounter with it. This itself is evidence of the abstraction 
characteristic of what Pasolini calls the lin-sign, and of what are the 
primarily arbitrary and symbolic dimensions of signification as en-
countered in prose narrative.
Let us substitute “quince tree” for “tree.” Here we will note that not 
much has changed regarding the abstractness of the literary sign. The 
lin-sign “quince tree” is still an arbitrary sign whose full attributes 
readers are called upon to supply in their mind’s eye. The size and 
shape of the tree, its height, its branches, its attributes in general, are not 
completely and thoroughly specified in literary signification. Even in 
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the most exacting description of a referent by a literary text there are, 
unavoidably and necessarily, gaps of a certain nature. Neither do we 
see, concretely, what surrounds the “quince tree” in the collectively 
imagined space of prose narrative. We do not see the sun’s rays cast 
against it producing a shadow; nor do we see it moving with the breeze. 
The pre-grammatical history of this lin-sign is thus limited and condi-
tioned – but also made possible, it is important to point out – by the 
reader’s experience or lack of experience with the presumed referent. 
By its very nature, any such lin-sign in prose narrative is from this per-
spective an incomplete or half-drawn signifier.
Furthermore, there are wider cultural forces at play that must be ad-
dressed. Does the “quince tree” function as a symbol conditioned by 
social convention? Does it evoke a certain socially determined mood? Is 
it received differently across global readerships or in specific cultural 
contexts? Does it remind contemporary readers in Madrid, for exam-
ple, of the various quince tree images painted by Madrid-based artist 
Antonio López García or of images from filmmaker Víctor Érice’s 
Madrid-based cinematic essay El sol del membrillo (The Quince-Tree 
Sun) (1992)?2 In brief, whether the example is “tree,” or “quince tree,” 
or any other lin-sign whatsoever, the premise is the same. Readers of 
prose narrative are immersed in a realm of relatively abstract significa-
tion – all the more so when compared with the visual signification of 
the cinema. Adopting the perspective of a reader of literary narrative 
entails being thrust into a signifying arena where meaning is primarily 
and heavily impacted by social convention and everyday experience.
All of this background is necessary to make a simple point: in visual 
representations one will never encounter an im-sign possessing the 
sheer weight of abstractness evidenced by the lin-sign “tree.” A filmic 
image, for instance, is always concrete and never abstract, as Pasolini 
asserts. That is, a “tree” in film is always necessarily and unavoidably a 
“pine tree” or a “pecan tree” or a “quince tree.” More than that, since 
film is both a spatial and a temporal medium, we will see the object’s 
contour, shape, outline, texture, and so on clearly and concretely repre-
sented on the screen. This is true whether the object is cropped extreme-
ly close or shot at a distance, whether is it captured in a long take or 
barely visible on account of a quick edit. The object in film necessarily 
always appears in a spatial context (fictional or not) that is explicit or 
implicit – admitting, that is, the continual existence of off-screen space 
as a necessary, unavoidable, and pervasive element of the cinema. 
Taking into account the temporality of cinema, we may in all likelihood 
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see the sun’s rays cast a shadow upon the im-sign “tree”; we may see its 
leaves and branches move with the breeze. On film, as viewers we will 
bear witness to the spatial and temporal existence of the tree. This gen-
eral premise is one that can be described here in terms of the ontological 
quality of photography or in terms of cinema’s commitment to material 
or physical reality.3
As an entire counter-tradition of film theory has worked to establish 
throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, it is possi-
ble to separate out three different aspects of filmic signification that di-
rectly inform our discussion of filmic disability representations and 
that are of relevance, too, in discussions of the visual representations 
found in comics/graphic novels. (1) The indexical aspect of the im-sign 
derives from the fact that, in celluloid film, the impression of light upon 
sensitive material directly supplies the image that viewers of cinema 
perceive. (2) The iconic aspect of this im-sign is defined as the simili-
tude between the form, outline, shape, or contour of the concrete image 
and the form, outline, shape, or contour of its material referent. (3) The 
symbolic aspect of this im-sign would be layered onto this iconic aspect 
and also heavily conditioned by social convention. The example of the 
“quince tree” given above broached the topic of artistic convention – as 
evinced by the potential links to the work of painter Antonio López 
García or director Víctor Érice. Links with a more historically rooted 
and conventionalized cultural symbolism are also operative, however 
– for example, the fact that the “quince tree” might evoke love, fertility, 
and even health when viewed in Japanese contexts.4
Film theorist Peter Wollen’s main thesis, in the underappreciated but 
nonetheless classic work Signs and Meaning in the Cinema (1972), is that 
meaning in the cinema is constructed simultaneously through these 
three modes of signification: icon, index, and symbol. It is important to 
note that this general thesis has been continued by a somewhat mar-
ginal line of theorizations that continue into the twenty-first century, 
even as it has also been widely ignored by more mainstream traditions 
of film theory (as Stephen Prince [1999] details). Wollen elaborates on 
the coexistence of these aspects of filmic signification thus: “The cinema 
contains all three modes of the sign: indexical, iconic and symbolic. 
What has always happened is that theorists of the cinema have seized 
on one or more of these dimensions and used it as the ground for an 
aesthetic firman” (1972: 125).5 His insight has been a touchstone for ar-
guments sustained since the late 1960s and 1970s that the iconic and 
indexical aspects of cinema need to be reasserted in film theory as 
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complements to the arbitrary and symbolic aspects of film “language.”6 
This move to restore iconicity and indexicality to film theory, to which 
Wollen contributes, is one that can be productive for disability studies, 
and for studies of cognitive disability in particular, as this chapter ex-
plores. Complicating this move, however, are the current contradic-
tions inherent in existing studies of filmic disability representations. 
Current approaches to the filmic representation of disability largely 
take the material experience of disability to be self-evident while at the 
same time leaving the iconic and indexical aspects of that disability rep-
resentation undertheorized.
With this context in mind, we can transition towards two central 
points. The first of these is that the medium-specific aspects of filmic 
signification outlined briefly above have not been sufficiently articu-
lated with disability studies scholarship. Broadly speaking, the hu-
manities have emphasized literary disability representations at the 
expense of filmic disability representations, and prose narrative over 
visual narrative. This is because the MLA disciplines have been some-
what slow to break with their own (i.e., literary) traditions. Rapidly 
evolving and high-profile methodological innovations are gaining 
ground in the field, and newer generations of researchers are pursuing 
other forms of cultural production such as film, graphic novels, popu-
lar music, and video games; yet English departments and top-tier 
 journals continue to prize traditional studies of print literature – dis-
proportionately so. In a high number of MLA departments, including 
but not limited to those in my own field of Hispanic studies, faculty 
researching cultural products beyond prose literature frequently opt to 
present their work in non-MLA-field conferences and to publish it in 
journal venues grounded outside of or at the margins of MLA fields.7 
It is also significant that existing interest in the humanities in the topic 
of disability on film has often entailed merely transposing a literary 
model onto the realm of cinema, without a full appreciation of the nu-
ances of visual signification.
The impact of this traditionalism has been that, on the whole, disabil-
ity representations in film have been seen as operating in the same way 
as disability representations in literature. By this I mean that analyses 
have most frequently paid attention to notions of artistic structure, lit-
erary device, plot, metaphor, and symbolism in terms relevant to prose 
literature, but have not specifically addressed those elements of film 
that distinguish the cinema from literature. In studies of disability 
 representations, this literary emphasis is, of course, testament to the 
56 One Theorizing Visual Disability Representations
enduring value of the way that Mitchell and Snyder explored disability 
narrative in their foundational book Narrative Prosthesis (2000). The 
 approach outlined in that foundational text is generally applicable to 
sociocultural representations in the broadest sense, including those ap-
pearing in film contexts, and it continues to have an effect on the field’s 
current directions. In the introduction to their edited volume The 
Problem Body: Projecting Disability on Film (2010), in fact, Sally Chivers 
and Nicole Markotić directly establish a link with Snyder and Mitchell’s 
concept:
As David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder point out in Narrative Prosthesis, dis-
ability in narrative is both excessively visible and conversely invisible (15). 
Rather than absent, as other stigmatized social identities can be (for exam-
ple, films can entirely avoid lead female or racialized roles), disability is 
highly and continuously present on-screen. However, it is not always agen-
tial. Often disabled bodies appear in order to shore up a sense of normalcy 
and strength in a presumed-to-be able-bodied audience. In this book we 
follow this argument into narrative film, noting the contradiction between 
how many characters in films display disabilities and how seldom review-
ers and audiences “notice” disability as a feature within the film.
The editors’ intention to focus on “filmic narrative” (Chivers and 
Markotić 2010: 1) is productive from a disability studies perspective, as 
is their focus on how viewers “project” disability in their interaction 
with the screen. But it is important to point out that this twin focus does 
not in any sense exhaust analysis of the nuances specific to filmic dis-
ability representation.8 Emphasizing what happens in the film’s action 
– with the question of who says what to whom, for example, often fig-
uring prominently in such accounts – can be a meaningful way of dia-
loguing with able-bodied viewers’ attitudes and reactions. Critiquing 
disability films from a perspective grounded in literary conventions 
can certainly help expose the normative social codes and the metanar-
ratives embedded in visual storytelling; nonetheless, visual storytelling 
by its very nature overflows these explanations in its reliance on iconic 
and indexical signification and the concrete character of its visual 
representations.
The second point is that the physical orientation of disability studies 
has largely been continued in the study of filmic disability and that 
more work on cinematic representations of cognitive disability is sorely 
needed. I adopt a dual perspective on cognition that emphasizes its 
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crucial role both in the lives represented on-screen in disability cinema 
and in the imaginative thought processes by which viewers connect 
with disability representations. Snyder and Mitchell in their own co-
authored contribution to The Problem Body make some intriguing and 
relevant points in the section titled “New Disability Documentary 
Cinema” (2010: 193–201) on which this chapter seeks to build. This term 
underscores the gradual emergence of films that push back against the 
ableist tropes of disability commonly found in big-budget cinema. 
These films are generally screened and circulated outside of established 
and ableist (inter)national circuits, and it might be fair to say that they 
achieve their greatest recognition at “in(ter)depedent” disability film 
festivals (see Mitchell and Snyder 2015, 2016).
One could argue that the primary convention of the new documentary 
genre is the effort to turn disability into a chorus of perspectives that deep-
en and multiply narrow cultural labels that often imprison disabled peo-
ple within taxonomic medical categories … While disability documentary 
films do not seek to repress, suppress, or erase the fact of differing biological 
capacities and appearances (as is sometimes charged in critiques of dis-
ability studies), they do seek to refute pathological classifications that 
prove too narrow and limiting to encompass an entire human life lived. 
(Snyder and Mitchell 2010: 198; original emphasis)
I agree with Snyder and Mitchell that too little attention has been paid 
to the potentially positive contributions of new disability documentary 
cinema. There are ontological and critical aspects to the point that 
Snyder and Mitchell are making here: this new documentary cinema 
testifies to the existence of a life and asserts this life lived against the 
limitations of medical paradigms. Importantly, they leave room in their 
assessment for “differing biological capacities and appearances.” Their 
phrase “a chorus of perspectives” is equally significant, in that it reso-
nates with their insistence on “the portrayal of disability ensembles” 
(2010: 198, original emphasis). Using these phrases, Mitchell and Snyder 
implicitly recuperate Norden’s critique, in Cinema of Isolation (1994), of 
the “lone figure” disability representation – a “staple and contrivance 
of popular genre filmmaking” (2010: 198).
Part of the potential power of this reconfigured disability cinema 
comes from how film can present the biological or material experience 
of disability through iconic/indexical signification while embedding 
that experience in a specifically social context. This category of new 
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disability documentary cinema certainly should not include all docu-
mentaries or fiction films containing disability representations or em-
phasizing the theme of disability. A great number of films depicting 
disability undoubtedly continue to do so from a normative perspective, 
expressing a harmful reliance on the personal tragedy model, the figure 
of the supercrip, or other ableist attitudes and stereotypes. Yet as Snyder 
and Mitchell seem to indicate, new disability documentary cinema may 
prove to be significant because of the potential balance such films estab-
lish between biological or experiential impairment and social context. 
As they assert, “the point of the new disability documentary cinema is 
not to refuse impairment (as many contend even in disability studies)” 
(2010: 199).9 What is significant is not merely that impairment is not 
refused in such new disability documentary films, but that it is pre-
sented more directly via the concreteness of iconic and indexical signi-
fication. This does not mean there are no metaphorical, symbolic, or 
socially/culturally constructed aspects of disability representation in 
documentary cinema, but it does mean – contrary to what happens in 
the arbitrary, metaphorical, symbolic, and highly socially conditioned 
signification that pervades literary narrative (see chapter 3) – that dis-
ability on film is not solely a discursive construction. This does not mean 
that we mistake cinema for reality and essentialize disability, locating it 
in bodies. It does mean that disability studies has more reason to pay 
attention to the way in which icon, index, and symbolic modes of sig-
nification all interact to produce complex cinematic texts. The return 
to  biology and impairment can thus reinvigorate the study of visual 
art in general and documentary cinema in particular. A focus on cog-
nition in film can help expand on the physical orientation of much work 
in disability studies and bring visibility to socially and historically 
 invisible populations.
Pre-Grammatical and Grammatical Aspects  
of Disability Representations
It is important to understand what occurs when viewers interact with 
visual disability representations. There is a great difference between 
those representations that may be normative or ableist in construction 
and the more progressive depiction that Snyder and Mitchell allow for 
in their discussion of the new disability documentary cinema. For the 
moment, however, it is necessary to attend to the mechanism of viewer-
ship itself, and to continue to do so within a comparative approach 
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outlined by Pasolini, one that juxtaposes the lin-sign and the im-sign. 
The concept of “the gaze” has been a central component of a whole 
tradition of critical film theory – expressed perhaps most famously in 
Laura Mulvey’s essay “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” (1975). 
Nevertheless, though this tradition is still very much applicable to the 
study of disability representations, I believe that Garland-Thomson’s 
notion of “staring,” which she explicitly contrasts with “the gaze,” bet-
ter elucidates the potentially transformative aspects of new disability 
documentary cinema. I underscore here Garland-Thomson’s assertion 
that visual work is cognitive work (Garland-Thomson 2009: ch. 5), but 
I am also interested in how cognition applies to represented material as 
well as what makes the act of representation possible or knowable. I 
believe that what she calls “staring’s generative potential” in the social 
realm can be adapted also to the artistic realm – to filmic disability rep-
resentations directly and to other visual disability representations (e.g., 
those in comics/graphic novels) as well.
This section is grounded in a simple but underappreciated idea: at 
the level of signification in literature (Pasolini’s “lin-sign”), it is possible 
to suggest constellations of disability that are not concrete or specific – 
imprecise hints of bodily exceptionality/cognitive capacity, tropes of 
presence and lack, and a disembodied, discursive resonance with dis-
ability carried out via an author’s style. Such representations do not 
have to reflect the specificities of biology or impairment or the material 
experience of disability. Even when we are discussing realism in liter-
ary production – whether understood as trope, stylistic mode, or move-
ment – at the level of signification, literary disability representations are 
not required to be, for lack of a better term, realistic. Michael Bérubé’s 
book The Secret Life of Stories: From Don Quixote to Harry Potter: How 
Understanding Intellectual Disability Transforms the Way We Read (2016) 
engages this aspect of literary disability representations from a nu-
anced critical perspective that allows for both ableist and disruptive, 
non-normative literary treatments of disability. He even notes the pos-
sibility that readers may “find in fictional modes of intellectual disabil-
ity a way of imagining other ways of being human that expose and 
transcend the limitations of our own space and time” (2016: 116).10 
Bérubé’s argument, however, remains relatively contained within prose 
literature and is not easily extended to the analysis of visual forms of 
representation. This is because in visual media, and especially so in the 
concreteness of the filmic image, disability representations are unlikely 
to be diffuse. This is all due to the iconic and indexical aspects of film. 
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In filmic representations, the material experience of disability has the 
potential not simply to mean – a process of primarily symbolic significa-
tion structurally informed by the normate – but also to merely be.
Belgian filmmaker Jaco van Dormael’s intriguing short film The Kiss 
(1995) can shed light on how the iconic/indexical aspects of filmic sig-
nification unavoidably exploit the ontological qualities of photogra-
phy that are reorganized in the cinema. Made to commemorate the 
hundredth anniversary of the first Lumière screening, The Kiss was 
included in the collection Lumière et compagnie (Lumière and Company, 
1995), a project in which forty directors from around the world were 
asked to shoot a short film using a model of the original cinemato-
graph machine employed by the Lumière brothers a century earlier. 
Van Dormael’s fifty-two-second black-and-white film opens with ac-
tors Pascal Duquenne and Michele Maes in an outdoor environment 
and looking directly at the camera in a mid-close-up.11 Although not 
much of the background can be seen, the presence of a building and 
the movement of passers-by clearly demonstrate the publicness of the 
space in which they are captured. From a perspective that acknowl-
edges the relevance of the same cognitive code of reality to both film 
and life, it is significant that viewers will note that both actors have the 
physical (biological/material) traits associated with Down syndrome. 
After eight seconds, they turn toward each other, smile, and kiss. Their 
kissing becomes more passionate and, between caresses, they once 
again smile and look at the camera.
There are many ways to view this short film, and two may jump 
 immediately to mind. Viewers may see it, for example, as part of a tra-
dition of “objectifying ethnography.”12 Alternatively, it may be a sub-
version of the way disabled bodies more routinely serve as a “vehicle of 
sensation” related to trauma and threats to able-bodiedness (Snyder 
and Mitchell 2006: 163). We should not overlook the way that disability 
has been harnessed for exploitation by narratives – literary, filmic, or 
otherwise – that reaffirm the denigrating discourse of disability as lack 
from the perspective of a medical model or as a product of an ableist 
imaginary. Nor should we ignore that disability has been systematical-
ly differentiated from a socially and politically constructed able-bodied 
or neurotypical norm. It may be relevant to keep in mind, too, that nar-
ratives of disability – filmed or otherwise – rarely incorporate sexuality, 
preferring a sanitized image of platonic or amorous love instead.13 
Neither should we forget, more generally, the problematic on-screen 
portrayal of disability by able-bodied actors, a topic that has rightly 
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received much attention in disability studies scholarship, as well as a 
continuing historical tendency that is seemingly counteracted here. 
Nor still, however, should we ignore the risks of categorizing van 
Dormael’s production as a “disability film,” given advances in intersec-
tionality theory that warn of the dangers of adhering too closely to 
identity politics, narrowly defined (see Siebers 2008: 27–30).
Cinematic representation is not just about the indexical or iconic 
meaning of images, of course; these meanings themselves provide the 
basis for viewer engagement with cinema’s metaphorical and symbolic 
value. Thus another perspective on this particular film might tie The 
Kiss to cinema’s oft-cited ability to turn images into metaphors. This is 
cinema as a form of thinking, and specifically as a form of thinking 
through, via, by way of, representations. From this perspective, cinema 
serves as a visual form that stages for us the way we think through, via, 
by way of, concepts. Pasolini’s notion of cinema as the “cognitive code 
of reality” (1988: 250) is relevant here. Informed by this perspective, 
cinema becomes a reflective mirror, a productive expression or a theo-
retical ground for the integration of perception and concepts that in-
forms our socially negotiated understanding of disability. Due to the 
way indexical, iconic, and symbolic/arbitrary signification are layered 
over one another in the cinematic sign, film becomes, like reality, a cog-
nitive code that requires active questioning and complex understand-
ing. This might of course be said of all art, or of all artistic representation 
and engaged spectatorship. To deal with film’s symbolic signification 
is always to deal with social convention/social history on one hand, 
and individual consciousness/individual interpretation on the other. 
Viewers are perhaps encouraged to assess where van Dormael’s film – 
considered as represented thought, images as socially mediated con-
cepts – coincides with their own thinking.
For some viewers, the significance of The Kiss may seem to come from 
the way it reconciles two times as well as the perceived distance 
 between the “real” and the “reel.” Restaging the material conditions 
(equipment), limitations, and stylistic conventions of 1895 for contem-
porary audiences, the short film boasts an organic simplicity – a black-
and-white image, length of approximately one minute, static camera, 
no apparent editing or postproduction, unity of time and place, every-
day topic, situated in public space, natural lighting, no sound. With the 
knowledge of when The Kiss was filmed assured, however, the images 
it captures speak to a more contemporary moment. Van Dormael’s film 
seems to take on greater meaning in light of the growing awareness of 
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disability in Europe towards the end of the twentieth century. Given 
the metaphorical value of cinema stemming from the symbolic signi-
fication of the filmic image, one might see the film as a vehicle for 
 abstraction. From the stark reality of the couple’s filmed moment, 
viewers can easily move towards consideration of the abstract and 
embattled concepts through which they make sense of this image: 
Publicness? Emotions? Relationships? Love? Nationhood? Progress? 
Rights? Humanity? But such abstraction is always held in tension 
with the concrete (i.e., the indexical and iconic) aspects of film, which 
assure that such a moment is not abstract but embodied. From this 
perspective, one might suggest that the question posed by Van 
Dormael’s film is precisely how far the socially mediated concept of 
disability – perceived through the ontological assertion of material 
bodies represented through the iconic and indexical aspects of cinema 
– intertwines with other concepts such as community, nation, and 
human-ness.
To ask this question is to explicitly consider the imbrication of indexi-
cal, iconic, and symbolic modes of signification in the filmic image. 
Even in the more casual practice of spectatorship, however, viewers 
necessarily draw upon their own experiences with the “cognitive code 
of reality” to fuse together notions of existence and interpretation, bio-
logical or material experience and social and cultural representation – 
notions that, of course, can never fully be pulled apart. The application 
of Pasolini’s “cognitive code of reality” to disability film should not be 
seen in limited terms as an essentialization of disability, but rather as 
a call to recognize that viewers call upon the same socially mediated 
concepts, categories, and representations in analysing van Dormael’s 
screen images as they do in making sense of extra-filmic perceptions. It 
is to recognize that, whether in the realm of art or in social life, thought 
influences perception and vision affects knowledge. Through film, 
viewers may confront their own socially mediated perceptions of dis-
ability in other cultures, and they may potentially form knowledge of 
how concepts of disability are embedded in social environments. The 
vehicle for this engagement with disability on film is the notion of rep-
resentations as a presence. The individual and social forces that con-
struct and shape the presence of disability on film draw their power 
– whether seen as pernicious, progressive, neutral, or some combina-
tion thereof – from those forces that construct and shape the presence of 
disability in an extra-filmic, embodied everyday life. In dismissing the 
power of this on-screen presence – however problematic it may be – we 
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risk dismissing the presence of disability in arguably less artistic, but 
similarly sociopolitical, contexts off-screen. 
When audiences view filmic disability representations, such as those 
found in The Kiss, there are arguably two distinct analytical levels of the 
viewing experience that can be parsed out, levels that Pasolini identi-
fies as the pre-grammatical and the grammatical. The one I would say 
is more immediate in film, and the one that interests us in this section, 
involves the ontological or existential experience of disability outside 
of film. This is the level Pasolini terms the pre-grammatical (1988: 171). 
This level is heavily conditioned by the material connections between 
art and social life that iconic and indexical aspects of film sustain. As a 
result, the visual act of staring is key for an engagement with the pre-
grammatical in film. Though staring at filmic images may be somewhat 
different from other forms of staring that do not involve artistic produc-
tion, attending to the insights explored by Rosemarie Garland-Thomson 
in her book Staring: How We Look (2009) can nevertheless be productive 
here as well. Staring, she suggests is intimately tied to knowledge, and 
“staring that leads to knowing thus requires the arduous visual work of 
reconciling the curious with the common” (2009: 49). It is extremely 
important to understand how Garland-Thomson distinguishes the act 
of staring from the gaze:
The stare is distinct from the gaze, which has been extensively defined as 
an oppressive act of disciplinary looking that subordinates its victim ... 
Starers engage in several variations of intense looking: among them are 
the blank stare, the baroque stare, the separated stare, the engaged stare, 
the stimulus-driven stare, the goal-driven stare and the dominating stare. 
At the heart of this anatomy is the matter of appearance, of the ways we 
see each other and the ways we are seen. It unsettles common understand-
ings that staring is rudeness, voyeurism, or surveillance or that starers are 
perpetrators and starees victims. Instead, this vivisection lays bare star-
ing’s generative potential. (Garland-Thomson 2009: 9–10)
With regard to the way in which cognitive disabilities have been his-
torically invisible in society (see chapter 1), film constitutes an opportu-
nity to visually engage material experiences of disability that do not 
figure routinely in the everyday lives of many able-bodied and cogni-
tively abled people. Thus when certain conditions are favourable in the 
realm of the cinema, staring can be an opportunity to disrupt habits or 
at the very least, potentially and not necessarily, to revisit assumptions 
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and misunderstandings surrounding cognitive difference. In disability 
film the notion of the stare is thus complementary to the gaze – taken 
together, they help us adopt a productively ambivalent perspective on 
the value of twenty-first-century filmic representations of disability.
In Garland-Thomson’s words, “because we come to expect one an-
other to have certain kinds of bodies and behaviors, stares flare up 
when we glimpse people who look or act in ways that contradict our 
expectations. Seeing startlingly stare-able people challenges our as-
sumptions by interrupting complacent visual business-as-usual. Staring 
offers an occasion to rethink the status quo” (2009: 6). Thus, while star-
ing may have a “generative potential” in visual social arenas or in vi-
sual media, its disruptive effects may not transfer to literary disability 
representations. The visual world, with its immediacy, is quite distinct 
from the discursive world encountered in prose precisely, as Pasolini 
writes, “because the lin-sign used by the writer has already been re-
fined by an entire grammatical, popular, and cultural history” (1988: 
171). The im-sign, on the other hand, enjoys a “lengthy and intense 
 pre-grammatical history” (1988: 171). To put this another way, the pre-
grammatical (iconic and indexical) aspects of visual disability represen-
tation in documentary contexts – those aspects that testify to a “human 
life lived” (Snyder and Mitchell 2010: 198, original emphasis) – are cru-
cial to the generative potential of visual images.
It must be acknowledged that in the cinema, just as in social environ-
ments more broadly, “starees, of course, are sometimes reluctant par-
ticipants in their starers’ visual search for something new” and “have 
their own lives to live” (Garland-Thomson 2009: 7). Filmic representa-
tions complicate the social consequences of staring through the dis-
placement and hidden machinations of the production process, but also 
mitigate some of these consequences by introducing a certain kind of 
representational distance between starer and staree that only aesthetic 
representations can offer. Certainly the potential for genuine spatio-
temporal audience interaction with the filmic image, in a way that 
would be possible in a social encounter at least, is sacrificed. It cannot 
be ignored that Garland-Thomson’s book consistently emphasizes the 
active role of starees, who are “subjects not objects” (2009: 11; see also 
33). Yet the inclusion and analysis of still images, photographs, and 
paintings as well as individual films in her book indicates that even 
where interaction is not possible in real time in a given social context, 
the act of staring at static representations still potentially “makes mean-
ing” (2009: 9). Contributing to the book’s more extensive exploration of 
Signification and Staring 65
curiosity, Garland-Thomson suggests that the perceived “strangeness” 
(2009: 82) of visual disability representations in the context of familiar 
artistic genres can be productive and meaningful.
It is worth asking whether film – in the same way as the portraits by 
Doug Auld and Chris Rush discussed in Staring’s chapter 7 (Garland-
Thomson 2009: 80–3) – holds the potential to give us what the critic 
calls “permission to stare,” potentially “gratifying our ‘deep curiosity’ 
while at the same time inviting ‘empathy’ and ‘sensitivity’” (2009: 81). 
Regarding the represented woman with Down syndrome in Chris 
Rush’s portrait titled “Swim II,” Garland-Thomson describes the sub-
ject’s stately features in the context of the “familiar commemorative 
portraits of the Italian Renaissance” (2009: 82). She affirms that “the 
portrait invites us to stare, engrossed perhaps less with the ‘strange-
ness’ of this woman’s disability and more with the strangeness of wit-
nessing such dignity in a face that marks a life we have learned to 
imagine as unliveable and unworthy, as the kind of person we rou-
tinely detect in advance through medical technology and eliminate 
from our human community” (2009: 83). The specific biological/mate-
rial traits of Down syndrome figure prominently in her discussion of 
the iconic aspects of Rush’s painting, just as they do in the cinematic 
example from The Kiss explored above.14 Due to the visual nature of the 
disability representation, it is not the prosthetic function of disability in 
the artistic representation that is primary. Instead, the biological links of 
Down syndrome with the material and social experience of a specific 
disability provide the basis for Garland-Thomson’s discussion of the 
piece’s symbolic meaning.15
It is underappreciated that literary representations do not, in fact, 
render (cognitive) disabilities visible. Whereas in long-form cinema in 
particular, the generative potential of staring – evident, too, in still im-
ages – can become even more productive. To put the matter somewhat 
more crudely, what Garland-Thomson calls the “generative potential” 
of staring is made possible by the mere fact that visual art renders dis-
ability visible. It is relevant that Pasolini writes the following of the 
pre-grammatical dimension of film:
And so it will be immediately necessary to make a parenthetical observa-
tion: while the instrumental communication which lies at the basis of po-
etic or philosophical communication is already extremely elaborate – it is, 
in other words, a real, historically complex and mature system – the visual 
communication which is the basis of film language is, on the contrary, 
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extremely crude, almost animal-like. As with gestures and brute reality, so 
dreams and the processes of our memory are almost prehuman events, or 
on the border of what is human. In any case, they are pregrammatical and 
even premorphological (dreams take place on the level of the unconscious, 
as do the mnemonic processes; gestures are an indication of an extremely 
elementary stage of civilization, etc.). The linguistic instrument on which film 
is predicated is, therefore, of an irrational type: and this explains the deeply 
oneiric quality of the cinema, and also its concreteness as, let us say, object, 
which is both absolute and impossible to overlook. (1988: 169).
The material experience of disability displayed in film has the potential 
to correct the pervasive and historical effects of the normative stigmati-
zation of cognitive disabilities in particular. In her book, Garland-
Thomson writes that “avowing disability as tragic or shameful, we 
have hidden away disabled people in asylums, segregated schools, 
hospitals, and nursing homes … This hiding of disability has made it 
seem unusual or foreign rather than fundamental to our human em-
bodiedness … When we do see the usually concealed sight of disability 
writ boldly on others, we stare in fascinated disbelief and uneasy iden-
tification” (2009: 19–20; see also Stiker [1982]1997). It is thus the pre-
grammatical dimension of film – whether this is understood as the 
ontological, existential, properties of photographic representation in 
general or in terms of the iconic and indexical aspects of cinematic 
 signification (especially in the new disability documentary cinema) that 
testify to a material experience, a social relationship as actually lived – 
that is primarily responsible for making possible cinema’s generative 
potential. This pre-grammatical dimension, of course, must be anal-
ysed subsequently in relation to the grammatical dimension of disabil-
ity representation. If the pre-grammatical dimension of film engages 
the director’s selection of images, prioritizing the medium’s iconic and 
indexical relationships, then the grammatical dimension of film builds 
on these relationships through the medium’s temporal and symbolic 
properties.
As Snyder and Mitchell have written, “the analysis of film images of 
disability provides an opportune location of critical intervention – a 
form of discursive rehab upon the site of our deepest psychic structures 
mediating our reception of human differences” (2010: 182). If film anal-
ysis of disability is to become a critical intervention, however, it must 
blend the cinema’s pre-grammatical dimension with its grammatical 
dimension. Disability studies scholars approaching film have not 
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always paid close attention to the grammatical, formal, structural, sty-
listic, and artistic dimensions of film that unfold over time – that is, 
those aspects of film that make it a unique artistic discourse (see Enns 
and Smit 2001b). If the pre-grammatical dimension of film emphasizes 
the link between representation and referent, the grammatical dimen-
sion of film tends to reflect the construction of film narrative in tem-
poral terms.
Garland-Thomson is similarly attentive to temporality. She suggests 
that if the productive aspects of staring are allowed to unfold over time, 
potentially “converting the impulse to stare into attention” (2009: 22), 
viewers can be prompted to think much more deeply about disability 
as a social relation. This does not merely mean that analysis must pay 
attention to the action of narration – what happens, who says what to 
whom, and so on. Perhaps more importantly, disability scholars ap-
proaching cinema need also to pay more attention to artistic form as it 
is produced over the length of the film product. While film form has not 
been entirely absent from previous disability studies approaches, schol-
ars have been more likely to privilege insights that draw implicitly 
from semiotic theories centred on actors emplotted in a narrative. Such 
“actantial” theories (Vladimir Propp 1968, A.J. Greimas) were made 
fashionable in traditional literary analysis over the course of the twen-
tieth century and were arguably derived from if not also supported by 
studies of the role of narrative in epic traditions, as evidenced in the 
anthropological approach to symbol and ritual. When the role or the 
function of disability is privileged in a certain artistic emplotment (be it 
in literature or film) – the notion of disability as a plot device would be 
a rough equivalent (Mitchell and Snyder 2000) – the story of a disability 
narrative is isolated from its formal presentation. There is nothing in-
herently wrong with analysing how disability figures into narrative at 
the level of story; indeed, such work has yielded valuable insights into 
the pervasive nature of ableist paradigms of disability. That said, the 
limitation of actantial theories of filmic disability representation, or 
theories that centre on the role or function of disability relative to the 
actions of other actors in the story, is that they necessarily prioritize the 
symbolic or grammatical value of disability within an art form whose 
most  immediate and powerful dimension is pre-grammatical. This 
model separates iconicity and indexicality from symbolism in the cin-
ema. That scholars have tended to use this model when studying dis-
ability  representations in film is not surprising, given the way in which 
semiotic theories of film throughout the twentieth century themselves 
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prioritized the arbitrary nature of the filmic sign over its iconic and in-
dexical qualities.16 The contradiction within this approach has been that 
such scholarship in practice actually assumes the disabled character as 
im-sign without putting that im-sign into a relationship with an extra-
filmic referent through awareness of the iconic and indexical dimen-
sions of filmic signification. It is perhaps most important to ask whether 
this model for studying disability representations is adequate for inde-
pendent, small-budget films that might belong to the category of a new 
disability documentary cinema.
Viewers of film must understand that the meaning of cinematic rep-
resentation comes from the way in which it folds iconic/indexical sig-
nification into symbolic signification. If cinema is a language, it is one 
in which the pre-grammatical im-sign of disability, referring to an ex-
tra-filmic referent, is rendered grammatical through the formal deci-
sions embedded in the film as an artistic product.17 There is nothing 
about the artistic genre of film itself that would ever ensure a positive 
or negative representation of disability; even so, cinema arguably al-
lows disability representations to serve a non-normative purpose in a 
way that prose literature and even static images cannot because of the 
way in which disabled characters are seen to move on-screen. Here I am 
referencing the way that disabled characters act and/or are situated 
in relation to their environment and the way they interact and commu-
nicate – whether verbally, non-verbally or both – with others in their 
environment over time. This perspective emphasizes the power of pres-
ence, the potential for action to convey thought and for movement to 
render cognition visible. Consider that the cinema actually shows 
thought through visible actions, and cognition through visible move-
ments and not merely through spoken language. 
An example can prove helpful here. Take the case of American fibre 
artist Judith Scott (1943–2005), who appears on film as the protagonist 
of an intriguing documentary from Spain titled ¿Qué tienes debajo del 
sombrero? (What’s Under Your Hat?) (2006).18 Profoundly deaf, with 
Down syndrome, and having dealt with a long history of undiagnosed 
impairment and institutional isolation, Scott became recognized around 
the world for her enigmatic mixed-media sculptures, which she created 
at the Center for Creative Growth in Oakland, California. As Lola 
Barrera and Iñaki Peñafiel – the directors of ¿Qué tienes …? – certainly 
seem to understand, it is not easy to explain either Scott’s artistic cre-
ativity or the significance and meaning of her artistic production with-
out first understanding her connections with others. These involved the 
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opportunities forged through her relationship with her sister Joyce and 
the supportive connections she enjoyed with staff and other artists at 
Creative Growth. Due to severe impairments, Scott could not commu-
nicate her needs to others verbally, nor could she reflect on her position 
within the world of art. She could not critique society’s disabling condi-
tions in the same way as cognitively abled populations. The visibility 
she brought to experiences of cognitive disability through her fibre art 
cannot be discussed without mention of her collaborations: with her 
sibling, with an organization, with art scholars and others, and even 
with documentary directors from Spain. Viewers of ¿Qué tienes …? will 
not hear Scott communicate in verbal language; but they will neverthe-
less see her communicate through her actions, her bodily movements, 
and ultimately also her visual art as showcased on-screen. This exam-
ple illustrates the opportunities that visual media provide for viewers 
to widen their understanding of what cognition actually looks like in 
the social (and artistic) relationships of non-verbal people with severe 
cognitive disabilities.
There is no inherent reason why film would be immune from the 
pervasive ableism evidenced in historical practices of disability pho-
tography and the freak show. Disability representations in the cinema 
can be just as ableist and spectacular as disability representations in 
prose literature, and the number of valuable analyses that look at dis-
ability and film in this way is growing.19 Yet I contend that in cinema’s 
representation of time, in the work of committed directors and actors, 
and perhaps most frequently in non-mainstream circuits of cultural 
production, it is possible also to represent disability as something other 
than a spectacle or an exception. The transgressive potential of film 
comes from the fact that it can represent the material experience of dis-
ability in terms that are quite ordinary and decidedly unspectacular. In 
the right circumstances, viewers can spend time with these represented 
experiences of disability, dwelling with characters, doing the visual 
work of engaging with their material experience through the act of star-
ing, and thus potentially also confronting their own internalization of 
ableist norms and expectations. If staring has a generative potential in 
social life as Garland-Thomson suggests, then staring in the cinema 
may be equally productive when disability is contextualized within ev-
eryday social relationships unfolding over time. If we allow for art/
aesthetics in general to draw from and influence/reinforce our collec-
tive thought and social practice, we must also allow for the potential 
value of staring in film.
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This potential arises from cinema’s relationship with the everyday. 
Even outside the context of disability studies, everydayness has been a 
potentially transformative aspect of different world cinemas at particu-
lar moments – the French new wave, Italian neorealism, and the New 
Latin American Cinema, for example. Regarding the latter, Susan 
Antebi and Beth Jörgensen’s edited volume Libre Acceso (2016) contains 
a number of film analyses that reveal the potential of filmic im-signs to 
reorient consciousness through disability representation, emphasizing 
everyday activities through the temporal aspect of cinema. For exam-
ple, Ryan Prout’s chapter titled “Otras competencias: Ethnobotany, the 
Badianus codex, and Metaphors of Mexican Memory Loss and Disability 
in Las buenas hierbas (2010)” illustrates how the cinematic representation 
of Alzheimer’s disease can be approached simultaneously at the con-
crete level of iconic/indexical signification and the abstract level of sym-
bolic signification, preserving a notion of disability “in its own right” 
(2016: 92) and avoiding the use of “Alzheimer’s as a metaphorical vehi-
cle” (2016: 93). Susan Antebi’s chapter in that same volume, “Cripping 
the Camera: Disability and the Filmic Interval in Carlos Reygadas’s 
Japón,” argues that the 2002 film “disrupts the viewer’s expectations … 
by splintering the visual continuity it at first appears to offer, and hence 
releasing bodies into unpredicted patterns of affective continuity and 
symbolic circulation” (2016: 105). As these and other essays seem to sug-
gest,20 the power of the everyday in cinema, the filmic image’s potential 
for disruption, comes from the cinema’s reliance on icon and index. 
Film’s power comes from its unique mixture of the ontological and exis-
tential qualities of photography and how these qualities intertwine with 
the symbolic meaning woven into the cinema’s artistic form.
Filmic disability representations have evolved in certain respects 
during the twenty-first century that are worth recognizing. It is intrigu-
ing that it has become somewhat more common to represent disabled 
characters as embedded in social contexts and not as isolated outsiders 
(compare Norden 1994 and Snyder and Mitchell 2010). For all their 
 potential faults, there are a number of contemporary global films that 
explore disabled characters in the everyday contexts of familial rela-
tionships, working relationships, and sexual relationships – a signifi-
cant change from the characteristic isolation that Norden investigated 
in American Hollywood cinema. In the Spanish context, for example, 
the film Yo, también (Me Too) (Pastor and Naharro, 2009) featured not 
only a protagonist with Down syndrome but also a number of second-
ary characters with intellectual disability.21 I do not intend this as an 
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apology either for the current spate of ableist screen images of disabil-
ity or for the paucity of disabled directors and actors one can still find 
in mainstream film cultures. Instead, I believe that the continued rise of 
disability film festivals (see Mitchell and Snyder 2015, 2016) as well as 
the still infrequent but nonetheless visible presence of disabled charac-
ter protagonists and disabled directors in selected mainstream and in-
dependent films are important shifts that will require a more nuanced 
form of disability film criticism.22 Garland-Thomson notes that “the 
modern world, in our particular era, is ocularcentric; it depends on 
sight as the primary sensory conduit to the world” (2009: 25). In seeing 
disabled characters embedded in social relationships on-screen, film 
viewers can be prompted to do some visual work and, potentially, 
reach a new understanding about the social nature of disability. Such 
representations potentially go beyond the way in which “disabled bodies 
have been constructed cinematically and socially to function as delivery vehi-
cles in the transfer of extreme sensation to audiences” (Snyder and Mitchell 
2010: 186, original emphasis). Such films, if viewed by spectators who 
are open to what Garland-Thomson calls the “generative potential” of 
staring and who are willing to engage in visual work, may actually 
work to counteract the sensationalism habitually attached to filmic 
 disability representations.
Though it may not have been intended in this way, Garland-
Thomson’s comment that “the extraordinary excites but alarms us; the 
ordinary assures but bores us” (2009: 19) can be tied to the power of 
cinematic representations of the everyday. Such representations can be 
seen as a reaction to the history of disability as narrative prosthesis in 
ableist cinema. Prosthetic disability narrative in the cinema has un-
doubtedly served a function similar to that of prosthetic disability nar-
rative in literature. In both cases, it has been relatively common to tell 
stories in which “persons with disabilities somehow manage to over-
come their difficulties and live a happy life within the realm of art” 
(Quayson 2007: 25). Such a representation “serves a pragmatic/ 
cathartic function for the audience and the reader” (Quayson 2007: 25). 
It is precisely the lack of such catharsis in cinema privileging the every-
day material experience of disability, however, that makes new ap-
proaches to representing disability in cinema potentially transgressive. 
Non-prosthetic, everyday disability narrative in film tends to focus 
on unresolved, everyday, and even adverse consequences of the nor-
mate, on the experience of disability within a normative, able-bodied, 
cognitively abled culture.
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Film’s temporal flow and its representation of the everyday allow 
viewers to see not merely a physical dimension but more importantly a 
cognitive dimension to disability representation. It is important to un-
derstand that both the pre-grammatical and grammatical levels of film-
ic disability representations are deeply intertwined with cognition.23 
Films that represent intellectual disabilities, developmental disabilities, 
and psychiatric disabilities render cognition visible. This may be a sim-
ple point, but it is one to which disability studies should pay careful 
attention in the twenty-first century. In the next chapter, I build on this 
simple premise by continuing to explore the opportunities presented 
by visual media representations in direct contrast to literary representa-
tions. Visual media provide a particularly appropriate arena in which 
disability scholarship can work to connect issues of biology/impair-
ment with matters of aesthetics/culture. Borrowing a term from Mark 
Jeffreys (2002: 33), I refer to this scholarly activity as embracing a meth-
odological premise to work “at the seam where body joins culture.”
3 Disability Scholarship at the Seam:  
The Materiality of Visual Narrative
 “At the seam where body joins culture every construction of the body begins 
and ends. On the efforts of cultures to hide that seam, every oppression ends.”
 – Mark Jeffreys (2002: 33)
The investigation of cognitive disability in the realm of aesthetics re-
quires a completely new approach, different from the one that has been 
already articulated in pioneering work on first-wave studies of physi-
cal disability representations. Questions of materiality and biology are 
at the core of one of the contradictions in humanities scholarship on 
disability – a contradiction that remains unresolved. In asserting a 
strong social model for disability, scholars have pushed material and 
biological matters to the side. Somewhat paradoxically, this has been 
the case even despite the field’s persistent focus on physical bodies. 
Here I make the case – one that may itself seem paradoxical – that in 
foregrounding issues of biology and impairment in disability studies, 
we also foreground issues of consciousness; that in returning to mate-
riality, we actually move beyond the field’s physical focus to embrace 
cognition. This does not require that we release the strong social model 
of disability, merely that we broaden it to include cognition more 
intentionally.
The notion of visual culture allows for stronger connections between 
the cognitive and the physical. The previous chapter used a basic semi-
otic vocabulary to assert iconicity and indexicality as the defining prop-
erties of visual signification through Pier Paolo Pasolini’s discussion 
of  the “im-sign”; this chapter builds on that discussion to explore in 
greater depth the distance between prose disability representations and 
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visual disability representations. Drawing from that discussion of the 
unique aspects of signification in visual representations, here I focus on 
the opportunity offered by the material aspects of narrative in visual 
media. I argue that visual narrative offers disability studies in the 
 humanities the chance to investigate the seam between the material 
and immaterial forces that impact disability representations. Disability 
scholarship operating at the seam between biology and culture can re-
affirm disability as a material experience at the same time that it recog-
nizes the way in which this materiality is impacted by discursive 
constructions and symbolic meanings organized by an ableist society. 
This endeavour is particularly important if disability studies is to tackle 
the topic of severe cognitive disability.
The present discussion of biology, impairment, and culture is in-
spired directly by Mark Jeffreys’s chapter titled “The Visible Cripple” 
included in the landmark volume Disability Studies: Enabling the 
Humanities (2002, edited by Brueggemann, Garland-Thomson, and 
Snyder). As I usually do when reading disability studies scholarship, I 
was thinking of my brother in-law when I read Jeffreys’s essay.1 In it he 
uses the phrase “the seam where body joins culture” to point out the 
limitations of social constructivism in disability studies. “At the seam 
where body joins culture,” he writes, “every construction of the body 
begins and ends. On the efforts of cultures to hide that seam, every op-
pression ends” (2002: 33).
Now however, the constructivist epistemology that has powered disabili-
ty studies thus far needs to be more critically examined. Outright hostility 
to biology and to the natural history of our flesh all too easily plays into 
mind–body, theory–matter dualism and may turn out to be just another 
effort at the erasure of the body by culture. Just as society needs to learn 
how to accommodate rather than stigmatize those of us with unusual and 
extraordinary bodies, so too humanist cultural theory needs to learn how 
to accommodate rather than demonize the study of the biological aspects 
of our bodies. (2002: 39)
As should be clear given this book’s focus, I see Jeffreys’s point from a 
perspective that acknowledges the links between cognitive disability 
and biology/materiality. In my reading, he concisely expresses the 
need for disability studies in the humanities to pay attention to both 
body and mind. For this reason, when I read the phrase “the biological 
aspects of our bodies” in his essay, I take the word “biological” as 
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incorporating both physical and cognitive disability. I understand his 
insistence on joining biology and culture more intentionally as a call to 
think of materiality in terms of culture, and to think of culture in terms 
of materiality. Just as culture has the ability to erase the body – as 
Jeffreys suggests above – it similarly has the ability to erase the mind. 
Still, it also has the power to bring connections between body and mind 
into sharp focus. My understanding of culture acknowledges the con-
nections between material cultural production and immaterial cultural 
codes, as well as the dialectical relationship between these two. Culture 
is productive in this sense: it can induce alienation or assert ontological 
primacy, cleave body from mind or reflect the complicated imbrication 
of cognition and the physical body. Taken in the artistic sense, culture 
can both reflect and impact social practice, either enforcing normalcy 
and the status quo (acting as a conditioning or norming force), or 
prompting hesitation, sustained reflection, and criticism and ultimately 
even disrupting normative practice (thus acting as a re-norming or 
counter-norming force). Visual culture also has the potential to draw 
attention to the materiality of cognitive disability experiences in unique 
ways, as explored in this chapter.
It is significant that Jeffreys challenges the traditionally accepted con-
structivist approach of disability studies research in the humanities by 
asserting the materiality of disability. His is one of a handful of clear 
and significant attempts to warn against the pitfalls of a position that 
uncritically accepts an un-nuanced perspective on the social construct-
edness of disability. The full recognition of the reality of biological or 
material impairment as a part of disability experience is key to his es-
say, just as I believe it is key to any approach that acknowledges the 
reality of severe cognitive disability. Whether they are looking at physi-
cal or cognitive disabilities, disability studies scholars might follow 
Jeffreys’s lead in seeking to bridge the hallmark social critique of a 
strong constructivist position with the reality that addressing biology 
and impairment can extend that social critique further into health 
 sciences territory.2
In borrowing Jeffreys’s term to signal the potential of carrying out 
disability studies scholarship positioned “at the seam” of biology and 
culture, I address two concerns. This notion of the seam is both a tool 
for disability studies and a tool for humanities method. In disability 
studies, this term calls on us to reconsider the significance of attending 
to notions of impairment. I believe this can be done in a way that does 
not sacrifice the gains made by the historical focus (in both the 
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academic field and the political realm) on barrier removal, a focus that 
emphasizes disability as a product of the ableist social environment. 
Regarding humanities method, this notion of the seam also suggests to 
me, perhaps indirectly, a methodology for linking aesthetics/cultural 
production and the material experience of disability.
The first section of this chapter, “On the Surface: Literary Disability 
Representations,” assesses the primacy established in prose narrative 
between literary conveyances of form, shape, and appearance on one 
hand, and symbolic, socially grounded meaning on the other. Insights 
from Mitchell and Snyder’s Narrative Prosthesis: Disability and the Depen-
dencies of Discourse (2000) and Ato Quayson’s Aesthetic Nervousness: Dis-
ability and the Crisis of Representation (2007) reveal how an able-bodied 
society frames the disabled body as a question whose ontological proof 
seemingly resides in the contour that society itself has outlined by dis-
tinguishing able-bodied constructions from disabled bodily construc-
tions. In the process of the social construction of disability, this contour, 
this outline, this shape, this form – this physical, material, and visible 
reality – is imbued with a signifying power that points elsewhere, to-
wards a social or cultural meaning over which the body and mind so 
delineated itself has no control. It is in this sense that the literary dis-
ability representation is a signifying surface – just as the social con-
struction of disability is also itself a signifying surface. I assert that the 
trope of the surface has been mobilized in practice in the humanities by 
way of reinforcing the perceived distance between the physical and 
the cognitive. What is needed instead is an approach to disability rep-
resentation situated at the seam of biology/impairment and aesthetics/
culture that condenses the physical and the cognitive from the outset as 
part of a material experience of disability. If we content ourselves with 
the study of literary disability representations as a surface, instead of 
combining this direction with newer work on disability representations 
carried out at the seam, in the context of visual media studies, then dis-
ability studies in the humanities will miss out on a great deal.
In the second section, “Materiality, Visual Narrative, and Cognition,” 
I assert that visual disability representations insistently and simultane-
ously render cognitive disability visible in both the aesthetic and social 
worlds. Here I emphasize the materiality of iconic and indexical forms 
of signification as visible links with extra-artistic experiences of disabil-
ity, and investigate how visual narrative allows the force of these visible 
links to accumulate. The concept of “iconic redundancy” – borrowed 
from comics theory and applied here both to graphic novels and to film 
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– is crucial to this effort. Visual narratives present an opportunity to 
recognize being over meaning, an opportunity that is crucial for repre-
senting populations with severe cognitive disabilities, as explored 
through the examples of María in chapter 4, Emilio in chapter 5, and 
Javier and Rosario in chapter 6. Relying on iconic/indexical significa-
tion, visual narratives acknowledge the existence of cognitive impair-
ments without strongly correlating that existence with webs of social 
signification. As such, representations of cognitive disability experi-
ences in visual narratives can sidestep the persistent problems of self-
representation in community and mindedness in narration as described 
by Joseph N. Straus (2013) and Michael Bérubé (2005, 2016). The value 
of visual representations of cognitive disabilities, in particular, is that 
they can express the cognition of disabled characters through move-
ment and action, rather than literary discourse, thus avoiding the polar-
ized extremes whereby cognitive difference is either rendered as a 
stigmatized spectacle or avoided entirely. The brief conclusion of this 
chapter outlines in broad terms how these insights inform the analyses 
of visual cultural production in part 2 of the book.
On the Surface: Literary Disability Representations
In Narrative Prosthesis, Mitchell and Snyder ask a series of compelling 
questions: “Why does the ‘visual’ spectacle of so many disabilities be-
come a predominating trope in the nonvisual textual mediums of liter-
ary narratives? … What is the significance of disability as a pervasive 
category of narrative interest? Why do convolutions, distortions, and 
ruptures that mark the disabled body’s surface prove seductive to liter-
ary representation?” (2000: 53, 57). It is easy and of course valuable to 
see this questioning as part of the authors’ larger move to denounce the 
ideology of ableism, to expose the foundational role it plays in the 
structuring of prose disability representations. There is also, however, 
another sense in which these questions can be taken, and that is as a 
provocation to investigate more thoroughly the semiotics of disability 
representation in the aesthetic realm. Mitchell and Snyder investigate 
the way entrenched social constructions of disability impact literary 
narrative, but they do not explore in great depth the functioning of the 
literary construction of disability itself, that is, the semiotic and imagi-
native process by which authors and readers themselves participate in 
visualizing literary disability representations. Their perspective is best 
positioned to account for ideology’s role in the production of literary 
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narrative (the act of creation or composition), but they do not necessar-
ily explain how literary narrative operates (how readers actively par-
ticipate in it, how it is received). This process is important to investigate 
for two reasons: first, as a way of marking the distinction between how 
literary and visual narratives function, and second, as a way of assert-
ing the materiality of disability experiences, and also the materiality of 
visual narrative, as a corrective to historical patterns of the social (in)
visibility of cognitive difference.
It can be productive to contrast literary with visual disability repre-
sentations. Doing so can help us understand further the potential of 
visual media to represent cognitive difference while sidestepping the 
pitfalls of how these representations have been mobilized in prose. 
Those pitfalls have been somewhat extensively documented by disabil-
ity scholarship, with the focus usually on physical disabilities. Thus, for 
example, the disabled body of Richard III in Shakespeare’s play is mobi-
lized symbolically as “a social burden; metaphysical sign of divine dis-
favor; evidence of the machinations of a divine plan in history, that a 
disabled child is retribution for parental weakness; that a disabled child 
follows a deterministic trajectory in life,” and so on (Mitchell and 
Snyder 1997: 14; see also Williams 2009).3 In this way, countless dis-
abled characters in prose have long functioned as charged symbols 
whose presence does not point outside the text towards the material 
experiences of disability in society but is instead designed to reaffirm 
normative social constructions of ability, capacity, and health. This has 
also been the case with literary characters whose appearance in narra-
tive spectacularizes the experience of cognitive difference, as Alice Hall 
suggests in Literature and Disability (2016). In “Cognitive Difference and 
Narrative,” for example, chapter 7 of Hall’s extensive scholarly over-
view, she writes of William Faulkner’s “struggle to represent cognitive 
difference” (2016: 105) in his novel The Sound and the Fury.4 It is particu-
larly interesting that Hall’s discussion of the representation of cognitive 
difference in literature broaches the topic of diagnosis (2016: 109–10).5 
That is, while the topic of diagnosis can unnecessarily introduce the 
dehumanization that accompanies a medical paradigm when discuss-
ing the physical disability experiences that have been obsessively rep-
resented in ableist society and aesthetics, in the case of cognitive 
difference the lack of a diagnosis can actually obfuscate the materiality 
of a disability representation.
Prose narrative may allude to cognitive capacity or ability without 
having to illustrate clear dimensions of the material experience of 
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cognitive difference. It may seem counter-intuitive, but in the context of 
written literature, the fact that matters of cognition are not named, de-
fined, or medicalized may indicate that authors are dealing with cogni-
tive disability merely as a literary spectacle and ableist symbol. Because 
it need not clearly illustrate its referent, literary representation of cogni-
tive disability can more easily turn on normative and harmful misun-
derstandings of material experiences, and it can do so in a way that 
misrepresents the textures of these experiences, exploiting them for an 
ableist audience. By contrast – and especially so given the concreteness 
of the filmic image as discussed in chapter 2 – visual disability repre-
sentations are unlikely to be as diffuse as they are allowed to be in lit-
erary texts. Such diffuse visual images of disability would only be 
possible in cinema under certain unlikely conditions – for example, if 
a film were of an experimental genre, if disabled characters were to 
appear very sporadically, in undeveloped form, at the margins of the 
filmic narrative, at a distance in the frame, solely in the film’s audio or 
otherwise formally obscured or minimized. In documentary films cen-
tring on disabled characters played by disabled actors, for example, 
disability representations are going to trend towards a more specific 
range of material experiences of disability. This will be true unless the 
disability representation is faulty, questionable, overly creative, or, in 
other words, not “realistic.”6 This is all due to the iconic and indexical 
aspects of film, which can represent the material experience of disabil-
ity without relying predominantly on the forms signification that are 
prioritized in written language and that I consider with a degree of 
scepticism below.
Visual depictions of disability in cinema or comics may tend towards 
the iconic and indexical poles of representation, whereas prose litera-
ture effects a curious distancing that must be accounted for in theories 
of disability representation. This is because it relies on the written word 
and thus on a preponderance of arbitrary signification directed by so-
cial convention. The distancing of prose literature’s characteristically 
arbitrary signification is effected by a foundational reliance on the sym-
bolic, by a privileging of symbol/metaphor over icon and index. As a 
whole corpus of linguistic study has indicated, iconicity is present even 
in spoken language (whether written or oral).7 It remains, however, that 
arbitrary signification predominates in the spoken or written word, and 
it follows that in an ableist society this social convention is going to tend 
to be dominated by normative understandings. Compared explicitly 
with visual texts, the meaning of literary prose is highly conditioned by 
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a hermeneutic excess shaped by collectively negotiated understandings 
and enforced (and/or contested) social and cultural norms. Individual 
readers necessarily bring their own experience to bear on the malleable 
grouping of collective understandings with which an author and a 
prose narrative play, just as they bring their own experience to bear on 
visual disability representations. Still, there is an immediacy and a con-
creteness to the iconic and indexical properties of visual media whose 
contrast with the signifying processes characterizing prose literature 
can prove meaningful.8
This does not mean that literary prose representation lacks a visual 
component. As readers visualize the disabled characters appearing in 
prose literature in their mind’s eye, this more or less diffuse visual im-
age is necessarily linked with a more or less diffuse constellation of ava-
tars of the normate that permeate able-bodied culture. This image is not 
a purely visual one, by which I mean it is not physical in the simple 
sense. That is, it is not an iconic representation of a material body as 
would occur in comics or in visual media generally, nor is it a reference 
or an index to a material body outside of the text, as would occur in 
filmic signification specifically. Instead, this prose literary representa-
tion presumes a higher degree of mediation through arbitrary signifi-
cation than would images of disability rendered in visual media. As 
literary representations are not concrete but rather fragmented or half-
drawn – they are neither iconic nor indexical in the way that images 
from visual media are – readers must necessarily supply their own in-
formation to complete the basic outlines of literary representations of 
disability. In the process, they draw extensively on their own experi-
ence or lack of experience with disability, on their own visual memories 
or lack of visual memories. From a visual perspective, the result of this 
necessary interaction with the prose literary text depends on a number 
of factors that lack a clear hermeneutic hierarchy. As a result, the impact 
of literary disability representations varies considerably from reader to 
reader; semiotically speaking, readers lack a material basis for connect-
ing disability representations in prose with disability experiences out-
side of the literary text.
Two important issues are addressed both by Mitchell and Snyder in 
Narrative Prosthesis (2000) and by Quayson in Aesthetic Nervousness 
(2007) whose exploration can shed light on the contrast between dis-
ability representations as they appear in prose and as they appear in 
visual media. The first involves a critique of the way in which prose 
disability representations function within the literary text. In both 
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cases, critique attends to the practical benefits these representations 
seem to offer authors – either the false promise or illusion of material-
ity (Mitchell and Snyder) or a complex and nuanced connection to 
ethical content (Quayson). The second issue raised by these books in-
volves the connection of literary disability representations with dis-
ability representations in the social sphere. Because they necessarily 
draw from extra-literary social constructions of disability, literary 
 authors unavoidably reflect the normative presumptions of those con-
structions. Exploring these arguments makes clear that literary dis-
ability representations are distanced from material experiences of 
disability precisely because they are discursive products. As such, their 
meaning is more subject to the hermeneutic variability of reader en-
gagements with arbitrary, metaphorical, and symbolic language than 
would occur in visual media.9
Narrative Prosthesis emphasizes how literary disability representations 
offer literary authors the illusion of materiality. Mitchell and Snyder as-
sert the constructed nature of both the literary representation of disabil-
ity and the social representation of disability from which it draws. Thus 
they are able to develop the compelling metaphor of the notion of sur-
face as a way of denoting what might be described as the relative au-
tonomy, the malleability, and even the normative co-optation of disability 
representations. They write that “the narration of the disabled body al-
lows a textual body to mean through its long-standing historical repre-
sentation as an overdetermined symbolic surface” (2000: 64). Put another 
way, the process governing the literary representation of disability can 
be taken as an echo of the process governing the discursive construction 
of disability outside the literary text in our wider social world.10 The 
 notion of the surface mobilized here conveys a certain inadequacy of 
literary representation to represent material experiences of disability un-
folding in society. It connotes a superficiality or lack of depth, and it 
seems to denounce an ableist contentment with the depthless appropria-
tion of symbol for another purpose. In even simpler terms, Mitchell and 
Snyder are suggesting that disability operates as a symbol in literary 
narrative because it is already a symbol outside of literary narrative. It is 
a surface within literature because it is a surface outside of literature in 
the wider social world. And in this sense, literary disability representa-
tion it is not, strictly speaking, a metaphor or symbol but more of an 
aesthetic re-rendering of pre-existing metaphorical, symbolic, conven-
tional social practice. To return to Mitchell and Snyder, “textual bodies” 
mean because extra-textual bodies themselves also mean.11
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In asserting the disabled body in prose literature as a construction 
whose signifying practice ties it to social signifying practices outside of 
the text, Mitchell and Snyder also call attention to the ways in which 
authors exploit the presumed materiality of disability representation. 
They suggest that authors are tempted by the thought that disability 
might bring concreteness to literary metaphor: “the corporeal meta-
phor offers narrative the one thing it cannot possess – an anchor in 
materiality” (2000: 63). (As we will see below, Quayson advances a re-
lated but somewhat more nuanced argument, suggesting that the dis-
ability representation offers prose authors not materiality but instead 
an ethical content added to literary narrative). The implication is that 
the representation of disability in literature involves the textual act of 
cloaking a material body in symbolic trappings: “the extreme examples 
of those with physical disabilities and deformities invited the armchair 
psychology of the literary practitioner to participate in the symbolic 
manipulation of bodily exteriors”; “the disabled body also offers narra-
tive the illusion of grounding abstract knowledge within a bodily ma-
teriality” (Mitchell and Snyder 2000: 59, 64). Their point is that prose 
literature frequently and even obsessively mobilizes the disabled body 
as a symbol of materiality in order to reaffirm the constructed norm of 
ableism: “the materiality of metaphor via disabled bodies gives all bod-
ies a tangible essence in that the ‘healthy’ corporeal surface fails to 
achieve its symbolic effect without its disabled counterpart” (2000: 64). 
Their text makes clear that the materiality of disability exercises a basic 
function in the ableist literary text, in that it can serve as one of many 
literary strategies to imbue the literary world with an immediacy and a 
corporeality that it lacks due to its semiotic and compositional reliance 
on the forms of arbitrary signification predominant in the written 
word.12 This perspective pinpoints prose literature’s anxiety regarding 
the material world; it also allows literary narrative to turn to disability 
for at least one specific reason that would not apply to visual texts, 
whose reliance on iconic/indexical signification preserves materiality 
and immediacy to a degree impossible in prose.
Ato Quayson’s Aesthetic Nervousness (2007) advances a focus on the 
ethical that allows the critic to discern the imbrication of social views 
and aesthetic structures without presupposing the existence of a mate-
rial or “stable disability ‘reality’ that lies out there” (2007: 19). Regarding 
this issue of concreteness or materiality, there is a key distinction to be 
made with Narrative Prosthesis: instead of focusing on physical bodies 
as a way of critiquing the appearance of disability in literary narrative, 
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Quayson emphasizes social views. This in itself illustrates how, in con-
necting textual representations with extra-textual representations, 
room can be made for cognition. This approach prioritizes the social 
realm as an arena of contesting interpretations in which the notion of 
disability is itself constructed and negotiated, and for that reason, as an 
arena in which the division between the physical and the cognitive, the 
form and the content, the surface and the meaning, the text and the 
world, is not as clear as it might otherwise seem:
Disability returns the aesthetic domain to an active ethical core that serves 
to disrupt the surface of representation. Read from a perspective of dis-
ability studies, this active ethical core becomes manifest because the dis-
ability representation is seen as having a direct effect on social views of 
people with disability in a way that representations of other literary de-
tails, tropes and motifs do not offer. In other words, the representation of 
disability has an efficaciousness that ultimately transcends the literary do-
main and refuses to be assimilated to it. This does not mean that disability 
in literature can be read solely via an instrumentalist dimension of inter-
pretation; any intervention that might be adduced for it is not inserted into 
an inert and stable disability “reality” that lies out there. For, as we have 
noted, disability in the real world already incites interpretations in and of 
itself. Nevertheless, an instrumentalist dimension cannot easily be sus-
pended either. To put the matter somewhat formulaically: the representa-
tion of disability oscillates uneasily between the aesthetic and the ethical 
domains, in such a way as to force a reading of the aesthetic fields in which 
the disabled are represented as always having an ethical dimension that 
cannot be easily subsumed under the aesthetic structure. Ultimately, aes-
thetic nervousness has to be seen as coextensive with the nervousness re-
garding the disabled in the real world. The embarrassment, fear and con-
fusion that attend the disabled in their everyday reality is translated in 
literature and the aesthetic field into a series of structural devices that be-
tray themselves when the disability representation is seen predominantly 
from the perspective of the disabled rather than from the normative posi-
tion of the nondisabled. (2007: 19)
The notion of aesthetic nervousness in the literary realm is one, as not-
ed in the above quotation, with a direct complement in the “real world.” 
In Quayson’s account, disability thus appears in literary narrative not 
as a referent but from the very beginning as a symbol whose meaning 
interacts with conceptions of the normate (Garland-Thomson 1997). 
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The indexical or referential link between text and world is here not fo-
cused on the materiality of the body but rather on an embodied and, 
most importantly, mental experience of the construction of disability in 
able-bodied society. In short, this is a cognitive reference. Here the sym-
bolic, the arbitrary, and the metaphorical – and not the iconic and/or 
indexical – unite the appearance and construction of disability in both 
text and world. The use of the words “perspective” and “position” in 
the extended quotation above is of great significance. Quayson is em-
phasizing the inherent malleability or variation of disability representa-
tions (“when the disability representation is seen predominantly from 
the perspective of the disabled rather than from the normative position 
of the nondisabled”). The matter of perspective is crucial when not 
merely the meaning but also the nature of a disability representation is 
so highly dependent on the experiences of individual readers. 
Instead of emphasizing the materiality of disability in a simple sense, 
Quayson’s framing makes more room for the cohabitation of the cogni-
tive and material realms. While Mitchell and Snyder frame materiality 
as an illusion mobilized by authors in literary narrative, here the notion 
of aesthetic nervousness accounts more capaciously for the materiality 
of disability outside of the text. Quayson writes of disability’s “oscilla-
tion between a pure abstraction and a set of material circumstances and 
conditions” (2007: 23), explaining that generally speaking, “disability 
oscillates between a pure process of abstraction (via a series of discur-
sive framings, metaphysical transpositions, and socially constituted mo-
dalities of [non]response, and so forth) and a set of material conditions 
(such as impairment, accessibility and mobility difficulties, and econom-
ic considerations)” (2007: 24). Instead of suggesting a purely arbitrary 
signifying chain where the literary disability representation “points to” 
or references disability representations in the real world, he emphasizes 
that “disability serves then to close the gap between representation and 
ethics, making visible the aesthetic field’s relationship to the social situ-
ation of persons with disability in the real world” (2007: 24).13 
One can make the argument, based on Quayson’s text and on the 
nature of the signifying processes that undergird the literary text (iden-
tified above), that the presence of disability in literary representations 
has the effect of a suture: it ties the text world to the extra-textual world. 
Aesthetic Nervousness captures that there is a reciprocal energy sur-
rounding the functioning of disability. Disability is a symbol in the 
 literary domain that, though a symbol, resists signification through its 
ethical qualities, which call readers back to the materiality of the 
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extra-textual world. This is why he writes that it “transcends the liter-
ary domain and refuses to be assimilated to it” (2007: 19).14 Here it is 
ethics – a realm infused with cognition and not with the materiality 
suggested by the body in Mitchell and Snyder’s analysis – that returns 
us to an extra-textual world where disability is itself awash in symbolic 
and signifying meanings, meanings built up over time and subject to 
able-bodied constructions and ableist discourse but potentially subject 
also to crip/queer challenges to ableism and the normate. In brief, 
Quayson’s work allows us to be more intentional about how we imag-
ine cognition to condition the surface appearance of disability in both 
literary and non-literary contexts.
The two books discussed here differ greatly in their perspectives on 
materiality. Quayson’s account emphasizes, much more so than 
Mitchell and Snyder’s, the nuanced way in which literary prose repre-
sentations reference or interact with material practices. I want to make 
clear that materiality is a concept that is relevant to both areas of aes-
thetic production – both visual and prose media. That said, my concern 
is with the way in which materiality operates at the semiotic level of 
artistic production and the way it is prioritized in a certain way in 
 visual media. Specifically, the material correspondence suggested be-
tween the body as literary representation and the body as material, so-
cial reality deserves closer consideration. One can say that in prose the 
connection, the index, the reference, the relation, comes after the sym-
bolic and the metaphorical, and not before it; and that the literary refer-
ence to bodies in the external world is predicated and made possible by 
the primary productive and representational activity of literary symbol 
and metaphor. It is not that literary representation references an extra-
textual body; instead, it is that the bodily literary representation is from 
the outset a symbol or metaphor, already mediated and constructed by 
extra-textual social forces. It is because the body in literary representa-
tion functions as a symbol that it may be then, in a second pass, linked 
with bodily representations and material practices outside of the text. 
While in literature the arbitrary/symbolic serves as the basis for the 
referential/indexical, in visual media the referential (iconic/indexical) 
serves as the material basis for the arbitrary or symbolic. This may seem 
like a minor distinction to some, but it is crucial, for it opens up visual 
media as a way of representing cognitive disability without explicit (or 
total) conditioning by discursive bias and normative social convention. 
It also underscores the potentially transformative path by which dis-
ability studies in the humanities can feel comfortable about carrying 
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out analyses of cultural products (visual texts, but not literary texts per 
se) that, as in the new disability documentary cinema, may indeed be 
seen to deal with “real people” (Bérubé 2005: 570). The next section 
continues to emphasize the material connections with disability expe-
riences offered by visual media while addressing the value of seeing 
visual texts as representations of human lives lived off-screen or 
off-page.
Materiality, Visual Narrative, and Cognition
Visual representations of disability require a more distinct theoretical 
apparatus than has been developed up until now. They necessitate that 
we shed many of the methodological priorities that have been built up 
in the development of a predominantly literary engagement of disabil-
ity studies in the humanities. The previous section explored what it 
means for disability in literature to be considered a signifying surface, 
focusing on how this surface operates to connect literary texts and ex-
tra-literary worlds, and noting the limitations of asserting such mate-
rial correspondences. Embedded in this exploration, however – and 
particularly in the transition from Mitchell and Snyder’s to Quayson’s 
work effected above – is the important question of how we understand 
materiality and culture in relation to disability representations. If the 
literary disability representation may be a dubious “anchor in material-
ity” (Mitchell and Snyder 2000: 63) and promise the “illusion” of mate-
riality (2000: 64), disability representations in films and graphic novels 
offer a way of connecting aesthetics with social representations through 
a more immediate and perhaps less consistently dubious form of mate-
riality. The iconic/indexical basis of visual media constitutes its signi-
fying ground, but it is the way in which this iconic/indexical basis 
acquires accumulative force through narrative that is most important. 
The deceptively simple principle referred to as iconic redundancy is a 
way of highlighting the generative potential and accumulative onto-
logical force of visual narrative with respect to cognitive disabilities.
The notion of iconic redundancy has been introduced and explored 
as a hallmark element of comics theory (and is relevant also to the cin-
ematic image). In his influential work The System of Comics (1999, trans-
lated into English in 2007), Thierry Groensteen distinguishes between 
the way characters are referenced, in the semiotic sense of the term, in 
prose literature and visual media: “the insistent character of the pro-
tagonist finds itself in all narrative forms, comprised in the novel where 
Disability Scholarship at the Seam 87
it is a proper noun, or the pronoun that takes its place, and which is 
tirelessly repeated (‘I,’ ‘he,’ or ‘she,’ depending on whether the narra-
tion is effectuated in the first or third person). It is only conspicuous 
when it is a matter of a story in images” (Groensteen 2007: 115).15 As he 
remarks, it is significant that what we call character “description” in 
prose literature is generally introduced infrequently, and perhaps it is 
not an overstatement to say only once – when the character in ques-
tion is initially introduced to readers, for example.16 In comics, how-
ever, and in visual narrative more broadly (so as to include cinema), 
this basic form of character description is a narrative process “infi-
nitely restarted” (2007: 124) with each visual appearance of the char-
acter.17 The in sistent character of this visual representation amounts 
to a strong ontological assertion. In the case of characters with cogni-
tive disability, this assertion repeatedly renders the existence of cogni-
tive difference visible, an act that can be particularly powerful given 
the historical invisibility of corresponding populations with cognitive 
disabilities.
Iconic redundancy is important in visual media not just because of 
the way it foregrounds the visibility of characters through strong onto-
logical assertion but also because of the role this assertion takes on in a 
narrative in which iconic and indexical forms of signification predomi-
nate. As Barbara Postema explains in her monograph Narrative Structure 
in Comics: Making Sense of Fragments, where she compares comics to 
other (prose literary) narrative forms, “somewhat less common in com-
ics are symbolic representations, where an image represents or stands 
for something else based on arbitrary or conventional signification” 
(2013: xvi). Given the predominance of icon and index in visual nar-
rative, and the concomitant relegation of symbol and metaphor to a 
secondary (though not insignificant) position in semiotic processes of 
meaning-making, the ontological assertion of character arguably as-
sumes a greater portion of the narrative impact. That is, in practice, 
 visual narrative actually relies heavily on the repetition of visual infor-
mation to advance itself. “Though panels create narrative, they need a 
point of reference to create the cohesion between the separate images,” 
writes Postema (2013: 57). Description, in this sense, becomes in visual 
media a generative mechanism for plot advancement. Its intimate 
 involvement with iconic/indexical signification ensures the continual 
reactivation of material connections with those same cognitive codes 
that structure our experience of social embodiment. By contrast, in 
prose literature description is routine, easily forgotten, necessarily 
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incomplete, and more susceptible to the normative social convention 
that pervades the arbitrary character of linguistic signification and liter-
ary discourse.
On the basis of these relatively simple observations regarding iconic 
redundancy and its role in visual narrative we can articulate the value 
of attending to visual disability representations in disability studies in 
the humanities. Specifically, the nature of these visual representations 
suggests a new perspective on two long-standing problems that dispro-
portionately affect populations with severe cognitive disabilities. In the 
introduction to this book I cited Joseph N. Straus’s essay “Autism as 
Culture,” in which he outlined two ways in which cognitive difference 
can constitute a barrier to constructing a political identity (2013: 462). 
The “problem of narration” highlights how neoliberal capitalism re-
quires those engaging in rights-based discourse to speak for them-
selves and narrate their own experiences. The “problem of community” 
highlights the expectation that social groups frame themselves as 
 minoritized identities through self-aware communication and self- 
organization. If we acknowledge that material experiences of disabil-
ity involve not just social constructions but also biological factors and 
issues of impairment – if we acknowledge the materiality of cognitive 
impairment along with socially constructed barriers to full participa-
tion in neoliberal society – we must understand that populations with 
severe cognitive disabilities face material barriers to resolving these 
matters of narration and community.
In order to consider material barriers to narration and community 
while acknowledging biological factors and cognitive impairment, dis-
ability studies scholars need to reassess the way in which the notion of 
the disabling social environment responds to the questions raised by 
cognitive difference. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson expresses this no-
tion, which has proved powerful for populations with physical disabili-
ties, quite well in her essay “Disability and Representation”:
Disability studies points out that ability and disability are not so much a 
matter of the capacities and limitations of bodies but more about what we 
expect from a body at a particular moment and place. Stairs disable people 
who need to use wheelchairs to get around, but ramps let them go places 
freely. Reading the print in a phone book or deciphering the patterns on a 
computer screen is an ability that our moment demands. So if our minds 
can’t make sense of the pattern or our eyes can’t register the print, we be-
come disabled. In other words, we are expected to look, act, and move in 
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certain ways so we’ll fit into the built and attitudinal environment. If we 
don’t, we become disabled. (2005: 524)
The question is whether the needs of populations with severe cognitive 
disabilities can be fully addressed by a model that was conceived to ad-
dress “what we expect from a body at a particular moment and place.” 
This argument denouncing a disabling social environment is in effect a 
situational or task-based one that, while valuable, assumes a certain 
degree of able-mindedness. Is it sufficient to address the situational 
needs of populations with severe cognitive disabilities? Or is a more 
collaborative model needed?
For populations that cannot represent themselves or that cannot orga-
nize themselves as a political identity under the individualistic para-
digm of neoliberal and representational democracy, visual narratives 
potentially offer a collaborative model for addressing the need for soci-
etal changes in response to the material experience of cognitive differ-
ence. I do not claim that visual culture is a panacea. There is nothing 
inherent in visual media that ensures transgressive or counter-normative 
representations of disability. Nevertheless, I believe that more can be 
done to understand what visual media do in fact make possible. In the 
chapters comprising part 2 of this book, I implicitly revisit what 
has been a traditional point of contention in disability studies work in 
the humanities – namely, the question of whether representations of 
cognitive disability by cognitively abled producers are by this very fact 
of their creation flawed, colonizing, and therefore easily dismissed.18 
There are those scholars, for example, who would suggest that “any 
narrative involving a character who cannot narrate themselves is some-
how exploitative” (commented upon in Bérubé 2005: 572; see also Hall 
2016: 107). In “Disability and Narrative,” Michael Bérubé does not in-
clude himself in that group of scholars, but neither does he address the 
unique properties of non-literary representations of cognitive disabili-
ties. Discussion there focuses on the textual representation of cognitive 
disability as a device,19 and in that essay Bérubé simultaneously uses 
cognition as a way for criticism to return its focus to the representa-
tional strategies of literary narrative in general. He is ultimately con-
cerned with the intersection of literary narrative and cognitive disability, 
and he affirms that characters in literary texts should not be “read sim-
ply as representations of real people” (2005: 570) – a call to which he 
returns in The Secret Life of Stories (2016: 29).20 Yet if disability studies 
wants to move away from metaphorical use of disability, we might also 
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pursue further how to complement the work on disability as metaphor 
in scholarly criticism with work that does indeed address the needs of 
real people. I ultimately see this as a complementary move, in the con-
text of visual media, to the method advocated by Bérubé, in the context 
of literature – a move he describes as finding “a way to talk about func-
tion without repudiating the key insight into the social character of dis-
ability … The point is not to try to pretend that all disabilities are purely 
a matter of social stigma; the point, rather, is to insist that ‘function’ can 
never be a meaningful measure of human worth” (2016: 57). 
Given the historical invisibility of cognitive disability representations, 
I wonder if it might actually be beneficial to reinvest in the material con-
nections between artistic representations of cognition and the existence 
of cognitively disabled populations outside of the artistic text. Visual 
media in particular offer disability scholars in the humanities a way of 
balancing both sides of this connection without feeling they have to sac-
rifice nuances related to questions of aesthetics. Put most simply, if pop-
ulations with severe cognitive disability cannot self-narrate the subject 
position required by representational democracies and neoliberal capi-
talism in prose literature, then perhaps it is time for scholars in the hu-
manities to turn more towards visual aesthetic forms, which arguably 
offer greater potential for collaborative forms of representation. Visual 
portrayals of cognitive disability – particularly so in the case of what 
Snyder and Mitchell call the new disability documentary cinema, and 
also in the biographical strain of comics art that lends priority to non-
spectacular everyday experiences – offer the opportunity to recuperate 
the value of reading screen and page images of disability as representa-
tions of real people. Importantly, Bérubé’s own words contain the seed 
for conceiving of disability studies as a collaborative project, even though 
this point may be clothed in the language of literary analysis:
In one world, cognitive disability remains irreducibly alien, and self-rep-
resentation depends on one’s capacity to distinguish oneself from those 
incapable of self-representation; in another world, cognitive disability is 
part of a larger narrative that includes an indeterminable number of char-
acters, only some of whom have the capacity to narrate but all of whom 
shed light on the mechanics of narrative and narration. (2005: 576)
What the critic refers to as “another world” might as well be taken as 
the world that awaits humanists in what I take to be the richly collab-
orative potential of visual media analysis.
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In the next three chapters I explore the collaborative potential of 
 cognitive disability aesthetics and in one case the limitations of that col-
laboration. Perhaps by necessity, these chapters analyse cultural pro-
duction at the margins of ableist society. It should not be surprising that 
with few exceptions, cognitive difference remains a topic that main-
stream visual media either ignores entirely or else presents through a 
normative lens. Currently it may be that it is only at the margins of 
(inter)national circuits of cultural production that material experiences 
of cognitive disability are explored in art with a greater degree of social 
critique. Even these endeavours are not wholly unproblematic, of 
course. For instance, as evident in chapter 4’s exploration of an art in-
stallation produced by artists with intellectual disabilities at the Nuevos 
Ministerios Metro Station organized by the Metro de Madrid company, 
the (in)visibility of cognitive difference in society is still subject to the 
desires of powerful corporations. Nonetheless, the reality is that popu-
lations with severe cognitive disabilities necessarily rely on forms of 
social collaboration to assert themselves as a community if not a mi-
noritized group, and for that reason, scholarship in the humanities 
should pay close attention to the way in which art is mobilized as a 
vehicle for inclusion. As the second half of chapter 4 explores, the com-
plicated issue of collaboration for populations with severe cognitive 
disability can also be analysed on a more intimate scale. There I con-
sider the case of María cumple 20 años, a graphic novel composed by a 
noted artist with the collaboration of his daughter, who has autism, as 
another pathway to rendering cognitive difference visible. In both cases 
it is important to note that each of these discussions of cultural produc-
tion involves the existence of real people with cognitive disability, in-
stead of focusing on cognitive difference as a metaphor, symbol, or 
vehicle for constructed normalcy.
The ontological assertion conveyed in comics form through iconic 
redundancy is implicitly a part of chapter 5’s exploration of another 
graphic novel, Arrugas, which focuses on the experience of Alzheimer’s-
related dementia. Here I adopt the perspective that the artist’s fictional-
ized representation of his visits with specific residents living in a 
skilled-care facility should be seen through the lens of collaborative 
narration. Since I intend to recognize the reality of severe impairment, I 
do not shy away from portraying Alzheimer’s as cognitive decline. 
Some readers will surely find this objectionable.21 I think, however, that 
the graphic novel, and also my analysis of it, acknowledges cognitive 
impairment as a material experience of Alzheimer’s-related dementia. 
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This does not mean that Alzheimer’s disease is not overmedicalized in 
ableist society, only that it is also important to attend to the material 
experience of Alzheimer’s. An additional aspect of the comic worth 
highlighting is that it embraces the ensemble thinking that Snyder and 
Mitchell attribute to the new disability documentary cinema (2010: 
198), in that it presents multiple characters with cognitive disability. In 
prioritizing the textures of everyday experience, in focusing on the re-
lational aspects of its characters’ lives, and in the end also by not avoid-
ing the topic of diagnosis, it resists the spectacularization of cognitive 
difference that so often obtains in mass-marketed cultural products.
The ontological assertion of iconic redundancy is also a significant 
factor in the filmic representations of schizophrenia analysed in chap-
ter 6. The documentary Una cierta verdad by Abel García Roure also 
 employs ensemble thinking, rendering visible for audiences the experi-
ences of multiple persons living with schizophrenia. It explicitly fore-
grounds the question of a patient’s right to live autonomously from the 
violence of the medical paradigm’s imprecise doses of medication and 
forced hospitalizations while grappling with the material reality of se-
vere impairment in some cases and with a more pervasive lack of com-
munity support for cognitive disabilities. Through iconic and indexical 
signification, the film allows the voices and the actions of its characters 
to communicate on their own terms to a degree impossible in prose 
narrative. In this case it is the sophistication of the film’s aesthetic en-
gagement with its topic that sets it apart from other, more instrumen-
talist and informational documentary projects. I read the earlier film 
1% esquizifrenia, which takes its title from the percentage of the popu-
lation identified as living with this form of psychiatric disability, as a 
counter-example in precisely this sense.
Whether the chapters that follow explore representations of Down 
syndrome, autism, Alzheimer’s disease, or schizophrenia, in every case 
they recognize the seam between culture/aesthetics and biology/im-
pairment. They address and problematize this seam, refusing to reduce 
cognitive disability representation to a symbol, metaphor or discursive 
formation in the simple sense, and focusing on the opportunities of-
fered by visual media. These are chapters about representation that 
purposely adopt a naive view on the connection between representa-
tion and referent – this is a way of recognizing that art loses none of its 
aesthetic complexity when it addresses the experiences of “real peo-
ple.” We need to recognize that this is possible in visual media to a de-
gree that it may not be in literary narrative and also that this is important 
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for populations with cognitive disabilities in a way it may not be for 
populations with physical disabilities. In the end, disability scholarship 
in the humanities carried out “at the seam where body joins culture” 
(Jeffreys 2002: 33) fully assumes neither the constructivist argument 
that disability is solely a social relationship nor the essentializing prem-
ise that disability is located purely in the individual body or the indi-
vidual mind. Instead it inhabits that persistently uncomfortable middle 
ground where cognition and embodiment, material experience and 
normative social convention, intertwine.

PART TWO  
Cognition, Collaboration, Community

4 Visualizing Down Syndrome  
and Autism: The Trazos Singulares  
(Singular Strokes) (2011) Exhibition  
and María cumple 20 años  
(Maria Turns Twenty) (2015)
“Inclusion and equity are mighty tasks that require artful social imagination 
and the commitment of material resources.”
 – Leslie Roman (2009a: 61)
“The dynamics of disability compel us to recognize that there will always be 
among us people who cannot represent themselves and must be represented.”
 – Michael Bérubé (2005: 572)
This is the first of three chapters in part 2 of Cognitive Disability Aesthetics 
that analyse specific examples of representations of cognitive disabili-
ties in contemporary Spanish culture. The twin purpose of these explo-
rations is to correct for the invisibility of cognitive difference in society 
and in scholarship and to acknowledge the value of attending to the 
notion of impairment when approaching cognitive disabilities in par-
ticular. Both of the examples discussed in this chapter explore the social 
(in)visibility of cognitive disability and situate the question of impair-
ment in a decidedly collaborative context. I am interested here in the 
way that the artistic production of disability representations can rein-
force collaborations between those who experience cognitive disability 
in an ableist society and those who do not. A focus on collaboration af-
firms that all in human societies are interdependent (Kittay, Jennings, 
and Wasunna 2005; Carlson 2010) and that all artistic production, re-
ception, and connection is a necessarily social activity. Discussions of 
the value of collaboration are particularly significant when those col-
laborations involve populations with severe cognitive impairments, for 
98 Two Cognition, Collaboration, Community
the disability experiences of these populations tend to be among the 
least visible. This is true whether we think of visibility in terms relevant 
to historical documentation, social supports, cultural representations, 
or all three at once.
Arguing for inclusion and equity in the field of cognitive disability 
aesthetics does not mean affirming the theories of dependency that 
align ableism with the individualistic myth of contemporary capital-
ism. The individual artist is never a monad, but is instead always part 
of a larger social web of artistic traditions, motivations, supports, and 
opportunities. Moreover, to expect that those experiencing severe cog-
nitive disabilities have the social power to communicate their needs or 
to critique society’s disabling conditions individually or as a group – 
without the assistance of others – may be another form of affirming in-
dividualism and the myth of independence, both of which are, in truth, 
forms of ableism.1 What this means for disability studies in the humani-
ties is that we must more thoroughly investigate the pathways and 
limitations of collaborative modes of critique.
In this chapter I look at two ways in which collaborative modes of 
cultural production can help render cognitive disabilities visible. The 
first centres on an attempt to use the discourse of art to lend greater 
visibility to developmental disabilities in the urban space of Madrid. 
This is a large-scale endeavour that exposes the limitations, but also 
the  potential, of organizational (and, perhaps more controversially, 
even corporate) outreach. The Trazos Singulares exhibit involved the 
participation of a large number of artists with developmental dis-
abilities, who created art at a metro station in Madrid during 2011. 
Sponsored by the Metro de Madrid company, the art focused on im-
ages of transportation. Symbolically, it posed basic questions about 
the visibility of developmental disabilities such as Down syndrome 
and autism in society, about access and mobility, and about the con-
tested value of art both in and beyond corporate projects.2 These are 
not simple questions. Consideration of the issues involved in this ex-
hibition reveals the ableist dimensions of a necessarily shared collec-
tive imaginary that permits visibility of cognitive difference in public 
spaces only in an uneven and inconsistent fashion. I hope that readers 
do not dismiss the exhibition wholesale or, on the other hand, tout it 
unequivocally as a success. Instead, I see Trazos Singulares as an 
imaginative prompt to help us all think through what more might 
be done at the urban scale to return “the right to the city” to popula-
tions with cognitive disabilities in theory and in practice: through 
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imagination, access, community supports, and the potentially radical 
power of artistic discourse.3 
The second collaborative mode of artistic production unfolds at the 
much more intimate scale of the family. The graphic novel María cumple 
20 años (2015) – a sequel to the earlier graphic novel María y yo (2007) – 
brings a father and daughter together in the collaborative representa-
tion of a shared everyday life foregrounding the social experience of 
autism.4 Here, just as in that previous work, María and Miguel Gallardo 
deliver an autobiographical comic centring on their shared experience 
of María’s autism. This work continues several strategies used in María 
y yo – such as two-tone print, innovative panel transitions, and intrigu-
ing whole-page layouts – and returns to core themes of travel, behav-
iours, the everyday value of pictograms, social marginalization, and 
the strength of relationships with friends and family. To the degree that 
the work invests in the iconic signification particular to the visual form 
of the graphic novel, its depictions of María and its other characters 
connect with matters addressed in chapters 2 and 3 of this book. Here a 
preponderance of iconically motivated representations connect readers 
with specific human beings outside of the artistic text and testify to real 
experiences of cognitive disability. The original comics text from 2007 
was in spirit already a collaborative venture, as signalled there in the 
byline that provided the names of its co-creators: “María Gallardo y 
Miguel Gallardo.” In the sequel María cumple 20 años this tradition of 
co-authorship is continued, but also evident is the significant decision 
to include images drawn by María herself. In particular, the comic high-
lights the shared activity of drawing as a form of human connection 
and as a social and artistic collaboration. Through the practice of draw-
ing, an inclusive community is formed at the scale of the family; that 
community is subsequently sustained and expanded – through publi-
cation – at the level of the graphic novel’s readerly reception.
A close examination of these two divergent contexts – a collaborative 
public exhibition and a collaborative graphic novel – can help us think 
through the nature and potential of cognitive disability representations. 
An understanding of cognitive difference that attends to the question of 
impairment requires us to think differently about the fundamental in-
terdependence of all who live in human societies. Whatever limitations 
readers may attribute to them, both the exhibition and the graphic nov-
el discussed here have the potential, in the long term, to speak to issues 
of access, inclusion, and visibility for populations with cognitive dis-
abilities. More than that, sustained scholarly exploration of these issues 
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may help dismantle the pervasive ableism that thrives in the clear 
 absence of such representations.
The Trazos Singulares Exhibition (2011)
During May 2011 (ending 15 May) an intriguing exhibition titled 
 “Trazos Singulares [Singular Strokes]” was on display at Madrid’s 
north-central metro station Nuevos Ministerios (New Ministries). The 
exhibition comprised some sixty works by thirty artists with develop-
mental disabilities, and significantly, the work of artistic production 
was performed in situ between 5 and 8 April.5 Very often, of course, the 
public appearance of the artistic work is separated in space and time 
from the moment of its production so that the artistic product takes 
on  an existence separated from the producer. Those who appreciate 
art tend to become accustomed to this sort of disembodiment. Contem-
porary criticism thus tends to eschew the so-called biographical fallacy 
of interpretation whereby the meaning of a work of art is reduced to the 
life experience of its creator. Trazos Singulares, however, arguably not 
only recognizes the difficulty of separating artistic producer from artis-
tic product but also underscores the artist’s immersion in a decidedly 
social context. If we are to take to heart the somewhat predictably rhe-
torical spirit of the speech with which José Ignacio Echeverría inaugu-
rated the exhibition at the Nuevos Ministerios station – “El arte no 
entiende diferencias ni conoce barreras sino que promueve la integración 
y la autonomía de las personas” (Art recognizes neither differences nor 
barriers. Instead, it promotes the integration and autonomy of people) 
(“Inauguración” 2011; my emphasis) – the artistic producers of the Tra-
zos Singulares exhibition are not merely being integrated symbolically 
through the inclusion and integration of their artwork into the daily 
fabric of Madrid’s transportation system. They are also being integrat-
ed physically, even if ephemerally.
While there clearly exists a certain kind of sporadic and somewhat 
showy form of outreach by companies using disabled populations for 
causes that have just as much to do with their own public relations 
plans as they do with the notion of “accommodating” such marginal-
ized communities – one that certainly cannot abrogate the need for 
 sustainable and lasting financial and institutional support from govern-
ments as well as the need to resituate the disabled/able-bodied di-
chotomy – there is something unconventional and intriguing about 
this particular event. Although it may admittedly be a far cry from 
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sustainable and unconditional support for disabled populations, this 
small-scale decision to have the artists paint in the Madrid metro sta-
tion nonetheless reflects a somewhat more sophisticated understand-
ing of the historical legacy of the paradoxical visibility/invisibility of 
disability than would be reflected in the decision merely to showcase 
their works. Disability philosopher Licia Carlson compellingly writes 
in her work The Faces of Intellectual Disability of the way in which “intel-
lectual disability … has been made both socially visible and invisible” 
(2010: 46). Historically speaking, the institutionalized classification/
codification of people with intellectual disabilities made them highly 
visible from a clinical (and social) standpoint just as their incarceration 
in “institutions far from public view” was intended to render them 
seemingly invisible to the public at large (Carlson 2010: 46; see also 
Davis 1995: 73, 94–5, 173; Siebers 2008: 99–109). For all its potential limi-
tations, then, Trazos Singulares does render the contributing artists as 
(momentarily) socially visible, in the process drawing attention to the 
embodied nature of all artistic production.
This section uses the social context of the exhibition and the subject 
matter of the artists’ paintings as a way of asking more provocative 
questions about the “right to the city” (Lefebvre 1996) experienced 
by disabled populations in Madrid, specifically. The fact that the artistic 
products overwhelmingly represented themes of transportation and 
tended to depict scenes of various landmarks and public spaces in 
Madrid, including various specific buildings and metro stations, makes 
this an appropriate approach. Analysis draws equally from both dis-
ability studies scholars and Henri Lefebvre’s urban theory while 
grounding the reader in the material conditions faced by disabled resi-
dents of Madrid. It highlights the insufficient public recognition of de-
velopmental disabilities in particular (as in the recent 2010 documentary 
Capacitados) as well as outreach efforts and televised spots supported 
by other agencies such as Down España, and even articles of the recent 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
Generally speaking, disability studies has long signalled the impor-
tance of embodiment. To the extent that “the political unconscious up-
holds a delicious ideal of social perfection by insisting that any public 
body be flawless,” this unconscious also “displaces manifestations of 
disability from collective consciousness … through concealment, cos-
metic action, motivated forgetting, and rituals of sympathy and pity” 
(Siebers 2010: 62). Underscoring embodiment can serve to render these 
processes as visible if not also as susceptible to critique. Understanding 
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that creative processes are necessarily embodied is particularly impor-
tant when those producing bodies are marginalized through the nor-
malizing discourse of “able-bodiedness” (see Carlson 2001, 2010). 
Tobin Siebers – who reminds us that “embodiment is, of course, cen-
tral to the field of disability studies” (Siebers 2008: 23) – writes against 
the development of “a nonmaterialist aesthetics that devalues the role 
of the body and limits the definition of art” (Siebers 2010: 1), a critique 
we might extend also to the production of art and not merely to the 
“textual” result of creative process or to a detached hermeneutics seek-
ing to explain artistic representation.6 Thus bodies are important not 
merely because they are represented implicitly or explicitly through 
the discourse of art – a premise Siebers traces throughout his masterful 
work – they are also important because they actually do or perform 
the representing. 
Dealing with the issue of embodiment from too general a perspective 
has its potential drawbacks. For example, scholars have pointed to the 
problems associated with viewing “disability culture” as more than 
merely an entry point into a syncretic and non-monolithic or non- 
homogeneous culture (see discussion in Johnston 2009: 155–6). It fol-
lows that if “disability cultures must be understood in the light of their 
artistic contributions” (Johnston 2009: 157),7 and if the resulting under-
standing is to be productive, we must get specific. So in this section, I 
do not want to address generalities associated with the creative work of 
disabled populations. I refuse, for example, to engage debates sur-
rounding whether disability affects the “ability to make art” in a posi-
tive or a negative way (commented on in Boeltzig et al. 2009: 753). 
Instead I seek to explore artistic production by a specific disabled (artis-
tic) community (the artists with intellectual disabilities who produced 
the exhibit) in a given location (Madrid) at a given time (the spring of 
2011). My implicit mobilization of the notion of embodiment suggests 
that we cannot avoid properly contextualizing the work of these artists 
socially, politically, or culturally. Furthermore, the necessarily urban 
context of the city of Madrid is important in terms of both form and 
content – both at the individual scale read through the represented con-
tent of the artistic products themselves and also at the broader social 
scale of artistic production.
Understanding the specific social and cultural context in which peo-
ple with intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDD) live and 
work is an important first step in interpreting their artistic works. 
Zeroing in on the necessarily heterogeneous community of people with 
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Down syndrome living in Spain, we see that there have been strong 
advances in the form of public campaigns directed towards securing 
the rights of people with IDD as well as filmic representations of dis-
ability that challenge entrenched misunderstandings of IDD. Even so, 
many problems persist. The 2006 Convention on the Rights of People 
with Disabilities (“Convención” 2010) carefully articulated what re-
mains to be done if populations with IDD are to live in society as equals 
with their cognitively abled counterparts. In fact, a series of televised 
spots broadcast on Spanish channels and reproduced on the Internet 
has drawn attention to specific articles of the convention through 
 innovative dramatized clips as a way of challenging the public’s 
misperceptions of IDD. These spots launch from specific articles of the 
UN Convention – such as Article 27, “Trabajo y empleo [Work and 
Employment]” (Campaña [1]), Article 19, “Derecho a vivir de forma 
independiente y a ser incluido en la comunidad [The Right to Live 
Independently and to Be Included in the Community]” (Campaña [2]), 
and Article 5, “Igualdad y no discriminación [Equality without 
Discrimination]” (Campaña [3]) – to dramatize how the rights of peo-
ple with IDD might be better secured in Spanish society. These three 
spots feature a young woman with IDD whose employment shifts from 
temporary to permanent after her supervisor speaks to his boss on her 
behalf, a young man who moves out of his mother’s house to live inde-
pendently, and a bouncer who allows another young man with IDD to 
enter a club without being discriminated against.8
Such visual representations of IDD in televised spots are, of course, a 
welcome response to persisting inequalities suffered by and even with-
in disabled populations. First, populations with IDD in Spain (and else-
where) often face a form of social invisibility in that those disabilities 
that tend to be more publicly recognized tend to be more physical and 
less cognitive in nature. In her essay “Representing Disability in 90’s 
Spain: The Case of ONCE,” which takes on “the institution which has 
pioneered the integration of blind people in Spain,” María José Gámez 
Fuentes informs the general reader of something that is well known 
among people in Spain – the fact that “the scope of the organization’s 
activities has expanded in order to include groups dealing with other 
disabilities, such as hearing impairments or slight mental handicaps” 
(2005: 305). ONCE is undeniably the most widely recognized organiza-
tion advocating for the rights of people with disability in Spain, and 
Gámez Fuentes makes sure to stress that, nevertheless, it “has been piv-
otal in the process of making a particular image of disabled people 
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visible in the audience’s mind since the beginning of its advertising 
campaigns in the eighties” (2005: 305). Traditionally and generally 
speaking (in Spain, just as elsewhere), “the media do not tend to offer 
unpleasant images of disability” but instead tend to show “people 
whose disabilities can be disguised or easily adapted to society. 
Therefore, audiences mainly encounter disabilities such as hearing, or 
visual impairments and wheelchair users” (Gámez Fuentes 2005: 306; 
cf. the video Capacitados9). Gámez Fuentes in fact takes many of Spain’s 
disability organizations to task, contending that they base their dis-
course “on the idea that disability is the origin of the integration prob-
lem” (2005: 306). While I do not rush to apply this statement to other 
disability advocacy organizations too broadly – in particular, I think 
that major steps forward have been made since 2006, as shown by the 
Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities and the work of 
DOWN ESPAÑA – it is nonetheless true that disabled Spaniards still 
face many obstacles to true social integration and that at the large scale, 
disability has not yet been sufficiently approached in Spain as an envi-
ronmental/social (and not an individual) problem. A recent documen-
tary produced by ONCE titled Capacitados, though a welcome invitation 
to the general Spanish public to view people with physical disabilities 
differently, confirms that intellectual disabilities in particular continue 
to be underrepresented, if not completely invisible, in mainstream dis-
courses on disability in Spain. Nonetheless, it is reassuring that there 
are a growing number of academic studies on intellectual disability 
both within Spain and beyond. Research to gauge the quality of life and 
the satisfaction levels of people with intellectual disability living in 
Spain has only begun quite recently (Mirón Canelo et al. 2008), and, of 
course, people with disabilities continue to be disproportionately af-
fected by unemployment both in and outside of Spain.10 
I have addressed the issue of work for disabled populations more 
generally elsewhere.11 Here I would like to focus on the realities of artis-
tic production with an implicit nod also towards the possibility of ca-
reers/employment in the arts. As Heike Boeltzig and colleagues point 
out, “such careers are likely to be a viable and even desirable option for 
several reasons” – that is, the arts are a growing field that offers flexible 
employment options as well as arenas for self-expression/affirmation 
(2009: 753–4). The authors also emphasize the benefits of “art as a me-
dium for communication and for sharing messages,” art “as a coping 
mechanism,” and art as “an escape from disability-related stigma” 
(Boeltzig et al. 2009: 758–9). While artistic production certainly offers 
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benefits like these when viewed at the scale of the individual for both 
disabled and able-bodied/cognitively abled populations alike, there 
is undoubtedly a more profoundly discursive or social, even political 
value to be ascribed to the production and reception of artistic work 
by artists with cognitive disabilities specifically, given that heteroge-
neous population’s relative social invisibility. Below, I use the Trazos 
Singulares exposition by Madrileño artists with IDD not only as a 
way of showing how important it is for artists with cognitive disabili-
ties to “[find] opportunities to show their art” (Boeltzig et al. 2009: 
765) but also as a way of looking at the question of integration from a 
perspective that is simultaneously artistic and urban, both social and 
political. I view this endeavour as a complement to existing work on 
the self-representation of people with disabilities rather than as a re-
examination of that valuable critical tradition. David Hevey, for one, 
signals a core tenet of disability studies when he writes: “In the his-
tory of disability representation or ‘arts and disability,’ we find a his-
tory of representation that was not done by us but done to us”; and we 
must indeed take note of “the historical fact that disabled people have 
not had an input, let alone a controlling interest, in culture and repre-
sentation done in our name” (Hevey 1993: 423).12 Nevertheless, he also 
asks how we might “shift disability representation off from the body 
and into the interface between people with impairments and socially 
disabling conditions” (Hevey 1993: 426). While this comment is best 
understood as a call – so common and important for disability studies 
– to resituate the discourse of disability, to view disability not as a per-
sonal/individual trait but rather as a widely environmental and inher-
ently social condition, I believe this move might also signal possible 
connections with other disciplines – here, with urban studies in particu-
lar. That is, understood in broad terms, the political fight (Davis 1997: 1) 
to socially and culturally include people with cognitive disabilities in 
today’s urban environments presents commonalities with the more 
broadly defined urban struggles where urban dwellers must work to 
assure their voices are heard.
First among these is what urban theorist Henri Lefebvre has called 
“the right to the city” (Lefebvre 1996). I offer that this reconciliation of 
disability studies with urban studies in essence responds to what Kirsty 
Johnston has identified as “opportunities to engage with disability as 
an important identity rubric akin to race, class and gender” (Johnston 
2009: 154). That is, while Lefebvrian thought has been applied to politi-
cal (and cultural/artistic) struggles to reclaim city-space in the interests 
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of specific formations of race, class, and gender, to my knowledge it has 
not yet been harnessed for disability studies critique. If it is valuable to 
critique “the notion that impaired bodies are disempowered by their 
own corporeality rather than by the conditions in which they find 
themselves” (Counsell and Stanley 2005: 91), then disability studies 
might seek out connections with other established traditions of social 
critique that speak to how the city is conceived and (re)produced, 
(re)imagined, and (re)shaped in certain interests. As an urban theory 
that from the outset admits the complex interaction between how 
space is “conceived, perceived and lived” (Lefebvre 1991a: 33) – that 
underscores the dialectical interaction between cultural and social 
imaginaries (mental space) on one hand and the materiality of urban 
built environments (physical space) on the other – Lefebvre’s oeuvre 
provides a wonderful starting point for analysing the production of 
artistic works in urban space and about urban spaces by people with 
IDD in Madrid.
Urban studies may at first appear to be a discourse orthogonal to the 
contemporary debates at the heart of disability studies; even so, there is 
sufficient cause for us to understand some of the social/environmental 
problems faced by disabled populations living in cities also as urban 
problems. This is not at all to vitiate the insights offered by the wider 
field of disability studies, which have rightly focused on a number of 
problems that operate under a certain relative autonomy with regard to 
the urban problematic. For example, disability theorists in a variety of 
contexts have worked hard to unmask the ways in which the struggles 
disabled populations face on a daily basis are dependent on and reflec-
tive of harmful institutions and ideologies such as the medical model of 
disability (e.g., Brosco 2010; Lane 1993), the persistence of patriarchal 
and gender-biased discourses that have also historically marginalized 
women and LGBTQ populations (Butler 1993; Garland-Thomson 2002a; 
McRuer 2006; Mitchell and Snyder 2000), and the frequently flawed 
media presentation of people with disabilities (Enns and Smit 2001b; 
Riley 2005). Such relatively recent work has also argued strongly for 
the economic inclusion (Morris 2002), self-representation (Charlton 
1998), and autonomy (Francis 2009) of disabled populations – in a word, 
for their rights (Carey 2009; Herr et al. 2003). Put plainly, disabled pop-
ulations have a right to the city – that is, a right to the use of its specific 
sites just as to the material and social conditions governing its produc-
tion and reproduction, both as a physical built environment and an 
imagined space – in the same way as do other urbanites.
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The urban critique of Henri Lefebvre – though it was not conceived 
with disabled populations in mind – is compatible with disability stud-
ies on at least two levels. First, it is clear that the construction of cities has 
historically been carried out by way of the exclusion of such populations, 
in terms of both the planning and the execution of urban design. This 
fact can be partly explained by Lefebvre’s understanding of the contem-
porary science of urban planning (in such works as The Right to the City 
and The Urban Revolution). For the urban theorist, modern urban design 
is a class project rooted in a (historically) bourgeois vision of the city not 
as a lived space but rather as a conceived space whose construction is 
heavily dictated by the interests of a small group of speculators and capi-
talists instead of being governed by a truly democratic process. An effect 
of the historical circumstances governing the rise of modern urban plan-
ning in the nineteenth century has been the creation of a (physical) built 
environment shaped by the interests of able-bodied people alone – a 
legacy that legislation such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 (to cite one example) has sought to correct. This fact, moreover, re-
flects the historical legacy of the exclusion of disabled populations from 
social dialogue as a whole – the lack of access to and control over space 
accompanies a lack of access to and control over social (and political) 
processes. The second way in which Lefebvre’s work in urban geogra-
phy is relevant to the struggles faced by disabled populations living in 
the city – generally speaking – is that he articulates a vision of space as 
social, as embodied, and as actually lived that is at odds with this disem-
bodied and geometrical legacy of urban planning (see also Sennett 1992. 
We do not have to look too far to see how his work has been applied to 
more specific struggles of marginalized urban populations,13 and we 
would be wise to see the relevance of his work to disability studies, even 
if this may not have been his original intent.
The central premise of Henri Lefebvre’s approach to urban realities 
involves a notion of space that, though variegated and multidimen-
sional, is nonetheless cohesive once seen through the lens of dialectical 
thinking.14 In The Production of Space he writes of his intent to forge a 
“unitary theory of physical, mental and social space” (Lefebvre 1991a: 
21), seeking to correct a static model of space as a physical built envi-
ronment alone by recognizing how mental conceptions and social per-
ceptions of space interact with urban environments over time. From 
this Lefebvrian perspective – one pursued by a number of other geog-
raphers who follow explicitly in the French theorist’s footsteps (among 
them David Harvey and Edward Soja; see Harvey 1990; Soja 1989) 
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– space is a social process and not a mere static container for experi-
ence.15 What this process model of space means is not necessarily that 
our contemporary cities are increasingly mobile places where the flow 
of modern urban life is accelerating (a thesis advanced in the early 
twentieth century by Georg Simmel 2000) – although that much is also 
true. Instead, the understanding of space as a process means that there 
is an evolving and dialectical relationship through which our mental 
conceptions of space and place are negotiated socially and then reflect-
ed in the static structures of the city, coming to reciprocally influence 
our understanding of the city and also our notions of ourselves and 
so on. Understanding space as a process – city-space as a process  deeply 
entwined with social discourse – allows for a social critique. Further-
more, as Lefebvre highlights, this process has been, since its modern 
origins, inherently non-inclusive. City planning could easily be de-
scribed also as ableist.
Throughout The Right to the City, Lefebvre privileges the nineteenth 
century as a key moment during which an understanding of the city as 
exchange-value trumped the use-value of the city (Lefebvre 1996: 167–
8). The triumph of the notion of the city as exchange-value – which has 
persisted through the twentieth century and into the twenty-first – has 
thus led to a city produced in the interests and image of “capitalist 
spectators, builders and technicians” (Lefebvre 1996: 168). This process 
has traditionally failed to create an “urban reality for ‘users’” (Lefebvre 
1996: 168), with the result that those who inhabit the city are in effect 
alienated from input regarding the production of the very spaces in 
which they live. This is, for Lefebvre, further testament to the power of 
the various alienating forces of modernity that he describes from a mul-
tidimensional point of view. Alienation is for the French theorist simul-
taneously economic, social, political, ideological, and philosophical.16 
In the end, despite these pervasive modern forces of alienation, which 
affect all urban dwellers – both able-bodied and disabled – and despite 
the historical legacy of a planning culture that has concentrated control 
over the production of urban space in a few hands (Lefebvre 1996: 83–5; 
2003), Lefebvre underscores that “the right to the city is like a cry and a 
demand” (Lefebvre 1996: 158). To realize a revitalized urban life we 
must recapture the city from the limitations of exchange value – that is, 
that cities are bought and sold, as are their images, and shaped purely 
in the interests of capital. 
In “What Kind of Right Is the Right to the City,” geographer Kafui A. 
Attoh writes that “the right to the city for Lefebvre thus signifies a great 
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deal. It signifies the right to inhabit the city, the right to produce urban 
life on new terms (unfettered by the demands of exchange value), and 
the right of inhabitants to remain unalienated from urban life” (2011: 
674). Nevertheless, as Attoh’s essay also underscores throughout, the 
precise notion of what is meant by “rights” has varied considerably 
among geographers and even among Lefebvrian geographers. I view 
this not as a problem but as an opportunity to explore potential connec-
tions with disability studies. If, as Kirsten Simonsen argues, Lefebvre’s 
pathblazing understanding of space as social and as lived might be ap-
plied fortuitously to feminist approaches grounded in notions of em-
bodiment and performance (2005: 1), it might be equally important for 
disability scholars to do the same. Returning to Lefebvre’s own The 
Right to the City, one of his many important remarks is the following 
one, which relates both to the topic at hand (disability art) and, more 
generally, to a set of needs that have not been addressed by modern 
urban planning and that thus constitute one of the key methods of dis-
rupting the spatial logic of contemporary capitalist planning culture:
The human being has the need to accumulate energies and to spend them, 
even waste them in play. He has a need to see, to hear, to touch and to taste 
and the need to gather these perceptions in a “world.” To these anthropo-
logical needs which are socially elaborated (that is, sometimes separated, 
sometimes joined together, here compressed and there hypertrophied), 
can be added specific needs which are not satisfied by those commercial 
and cultural infrastructures which are somewhat parsimoniously taken 
into account by planners. This refers to the need for creative activity, for 
the oeuvre (not only of products and consumable material goods), of the 
need for information, symbolism, the imaginary and play. Through these 
specified needs lives and survives a fundamental desire of which play, 
sexuality, physical activities such as sport, creative activity, art and knowl-
edge are particular expressions and moments. (Lefebvre 1996: 147, original 
emphasis)
“Creative activity, art and knowledge”; “symbolism, the imaginary and 
play”; for Lefebvre these are some of the privileged tools through which 
the city may be taken back by those who have been alienated from it. 
Lefebvre intends these measures as a disruptive response to the univo-
cal logic and reductive notion of capitalist spatiality – such that festi-
vals (la fête), protests or events that “take back the streets,” and other, 
perhaps more playful expressions or reappropriations of city-space (for 
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uses other than consumerism) come to symbolize if not actually enact 
(ephemerally) an oppositional, countercultural, and by nature neces-
sarily inclusive understanding of the right to the city.
In this Lefebvrian context, I want to return to the 2011 Trazos 
Singulares art exhibition as a way of pointing to both its limitations and 
its potential. On one hand, the exhibit was in a sense limited by its con-
nections with Metro de Madrid corporation, which perhaps sought 
self-aggrandizement through the use of disabled artists – a use that 
some may have seen through the objectionable lens of “charity” and 
that without a doubt was promotional. On the other hand, however, the 
event – through the symbolic weight of the nature of the art produced 
as well as the performance itself, which counteracted the perennial so-
cial invisibility of disabled populations in the city – points to the future 
possibility and potential of forging a more intimate relationship be-
tween people with cognitive disabilities and the city in which these 
populations live, work, and create. As the company sponsoring this ex-
hibit was Metro de Madrid, it is not surprising that many (but not all) 
of the images feature trains, depictions (including signage) of specific 
metro stations (e.g., Nuevos Ministerios, Delicias, Chamberi, Miguel de 
Vergara), or even street-level metro entrances (e.g. Plaza de España, 
Banco de España, Callao, Cartagena), focusing also on elements of the 
built environment such as staircases, escalators, elevators, doors, turn-
stiles, and ticket machines. On one level, the prevalence of such images 
points somewhat directly to the extent to which the social meaning of 
the exhibition has been structured from the outset and later limited by 
the involvement of Metro de Madrid. From this point of view, the art-
works function merely as illustrations of the image that Metro would 
like Madrid’s citizens to have of their corporation. This perspective em-
phasizes the exhibit as a collection of (embodied) representations of 
perceived values such as creativity, inclusivity, accessibility, and – go-
ing back to the words from the speech cited earlier (“Inauguración” 
2011) – the lack of barriers and (specifically) the notion of integration. 
Yet there is a symbolic dimension both to the process of creating the 
works of art within the Nuevos Ministerios station and to the content of 
the paintings themselves – a dimension that exists independently of (or 
co-dependently/relatively autonomously with) the material fact of cor-
porate sponsorship. In any case, the fact that Metro de Madrid may 
have taken the initiative and even sponsored this cannot fully deter-
mine the significance of Trazos Singulares either as public display (the 
social process of artistic production) or as completed exhibition (the 
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paintings as finished artistic products). In the gap between sponsorship 
and artistic product, and in the gaps between the existence of that 
which is represented, the act of representation itself, and the apparently 
reified, finished image, there is a liminal (and oppositional) space re-
served for “creative activity, art and knowledge … symbolism, the 
imaginary and play” (Lefebvre 1996: 147). This space may be shaped in 
part by corporate sponsorship, but it is the nature of art and of significa-
tion to resist any one systematic determination of its meaning.
What happens when the Trazos Singulares exhibit is viewed as more 
than just a showy form of corporate outreach? What happens if we ad-
mit that, as Leslie G. Roman puts so well in the essay “Disability Arts 
and Culture as Public Pedagogy,” “inclusion and equity are mighty tasks 
that require artful social imagination and the commitment of material 
resources” (2009a: 61)? That is, what exactly is the opportunity for which 
the material resources of Metro de Madrid have provided? First, Trazos 
Singulares reflects an intent to disalienate people with disabilities from 
the urban landscape over which they have little control, in that it encour-
ages their presence in a specific station (Nuevos Ministerios) and en-
courages also, through the discourse of art, their perspective on a range 
of Madrid’s most traversed urban spaces. Second (in content and in ar-
tistic form), the exhibit’s paintings allude symbolically to a world in 
which people with disabilities play a role in (re)imagining those spaces. 
As per Lefebvre, creative activity, art, symbolism, the imaginary, and 
play are important ways of responding to capital’s entrenched control 
over city-space, even if such activities may not currently influence the 
decisions made by city planners, architects, and the “bourgeois science” 
(Lefebvre 2003) of urban design.
What is so intriguing about the paintings included in the exhibit is 
that many of them incorporate both photographs of the existing spaces 
(train stations and their constituent parts: trains, elevators, staircases, 
ticket machines …) and paper drawings made by the artists themselves. 
Such mixed-media images highlight plurality through their strongly 
“mixed” construction, but more importantly, they effect a curious fu-
sion of “objective” and “subjective” views of the city and its built envi-
ronment for transportation through the materiality of iconic/indexical 
signification. In effect, these iconic/indexical representations of the city 
as imagined by disabled producers (photographs, drawings, tracings, 
colourings, elaborations) symbolically enter into dialogue with the city 
as it has been historically conceived and produced by urban planners 
and architects. Some of the most intriguing examples of this type of 
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mixed image show, respectively, the drawn Banco de España station 
sign with a ground-level low-angle photograph of a nearby building, a 
low-angle shot/drawing situated in the Plaza de España, and a number 
of metro station interiors. In many of the mixed-media images included 
in the exhibit, it is difficult to see where the photographs end and where 
the drawings/paintings begin – such that, symbolically and artistically, 
the city as iconically imagined by disabled producers is as important 
in  the artwork as the city infrastructure as it has been designed and 
built. In other images in the exhibit, the artists have included no such 
photographic images (or collages of photos) and instead have elabo-
rated a completely subjective vision of the train-car itself – as a moving 
organism, or as a malleable/expanding space depicted simultaneously 
from both objective and subjective viewpoints. Still others highlight the 
power of subjective visions of the city through clear appropriations of 
Cubist style that present the city as fragmented and necessarily depen-
dent on an active act of viewing that might suture together its disparate 
parts. For individuals within the discourse of art, these images are a 
means to reimagine the city and its transportation infrastructure – the 
artists with cognitive disabilities participating in the exhibit are artisti-
cally and symbolically exercising their right to the city. This includes 
their right to represent the city, to (re)imagine its spaces, and, symboli-
cally, to contribute to the future development of urban infrastructures.
Overall, throughout the exhibit aesthetic representation mixes sub-
jective and objective perspectives, iconic/indexical and symbolic signi-
fication, to fashion a vision of the city that is collective in design. It must 
not be overlooked that, as Siebers notes, “aesthetics is pertinent to the 
struggle to create a built environment accessible to people with disabili-
ties” (2010: 58). Although this notion of the importance of aesthetics 
may have been explored more often in relation to aesthetic/artistic 
 images depicting people with disabilities (e.g., see Ware 2008; Siebers 
2010: 100–20, ch. 5, on “trauma art”), it might also be taken to mean the 
artistic images produced by people with disabilities whether they de-
pict disability explicitly or not. Equally, the notion of an accessible built 
environment might be taken to mean access not merely in a physical 
sense but also in a social sense, and moreover, in the sense that disabled 
and able-bodied/cognitively abled urbanites alike might have more 
control over the production of urban spaces.17
Third, however – and this is one of the most important outcomes of 
the exhibit – there is the brute fact of the visibility of the disabled artists 
themselves. The traces of importance are not the Singular Traces likely 
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referred to in the exhibit’s title – that is, they are not the two-dimensional 
products of art themselves – but rather the traces of the embodied activ-
ity of artistic production. That is, the sixty paintings produced on site 
testify not merely to a previous artistic activity but more specifically to 
the fact that this activity was carried out in the Nuevos Ministerios metro 
station by the disabled artists themselves. The visual representations pro-
duced are traces of that embodied and public performance. The impor-
tance and even the relative novelty of this event can be fully understood 
by referring to the recent UN Convention on the Rights of People with 
Disabilities (from 2006; opened for signature in 2007; entered into force 
in 2008).
Of the fifty rights detailed in the UN Convention, several are of par-
ticular relevance to the Trazos Singulares exhibit. In a general sense, 
Article 19, “Derecho a ser incluido en la comunidad” (The Right to Be 
Included in the Community) – which was also dramatized in one of the 
televised spots mentioned earlier – is also relevant here, in that the 
event has symbolically and physically provided a space for disabled 
artists in one of the most traversed areas of the city’s transportation in-
frastructure. Of arguably greater importance, however, are Article 29, 
“Participación en la vida política y pública” (Participation in Political 
and Public Life), and Article 30, “Participación en la vida cultural” 
(Participation in Cultural life). Article 29 seeks
promover activamente un entorno en el que las personas con discapacid-
ad puedan participar plena y efectivamente en la dirección de los asuntos 
públicos sin discriminación y en igualdad de condiciones con las demás, y 
fomentar su participación en los asuntos públicos. (To actively promote an 
environment in which people with disabilities might participate fully and 
effectively in the management of public matters without discrimination 
and in equal conditions to others, and foment their participation in public 
matters.) (Art. 29, “Convención” 2010: 160)
In addition, Article 30 seeks the adoption of appropriate measures
para que las personas con discapacidad puedan desarrollar y utilizar su 
potencial creativo, artístico e intelectual no sólo en su propio beneficio 
sino también para el enriquecimiento de la sociedad. (so that people with 
disabilities might develop and use their creative, artistic, and intellectual 
potential not merely for their own benefit but moreover for the betterment 
of society.) (Art. 30, “Convención” 2010: 163)
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Trazos Singulares ultimately provides a much-needed outlet for a cer-
tain degree of (symbolic) input into public matters; at the same time, it 
emphasizes the relationship between the creative potential of people 
with disabilities and the larger Spanish society for which the Metro 
functions, in this case, as a synecdoche. While the event is perhaps a far 
cry from placing people with disabilities on transportation governance 
boards or giving populations with disabilities decision-making capabil-
ity in Metro de Madrid – both of which would be welcome opportuni-
ties in line with the spirit of the UN Convention but that might not 
account for severe impairments in populations with cognitive disabili-
ties – it nonetheless might serve as a complement to such improve-
ments and most definitely invites questioning of the sort that would 
lead to those changes.
Moreover, though access to art by disabled populations is something 
that has been discussed by scholars (Taylor 2005: 325; see also Lige 
2011), what is so interesting here is that the works produced by dis-
abled artists should be so directly relevant to their own perceptions of 
city-space. Operating, in Lefebvrian terms, at the intersection of urban 
space both as perceived (photographs) and as imagined (drawing/
painting), and complemented by the embodied production of works 
carried out by artists with IDD in situ, the exhibit foregrounds the inter-
action of disabled residents of Madrid with city-space as it is lived. Here, 
importantly, the iconic nature of visual art – the iconic representations 
of specific locations in the city’s railway system, for example – is a key 
material link between the aesthetic realm and the social one. Recalling 
what Tanya Titchkosky has identified in a related context as the notion 
of “disability as a collision between imagination and desire, reflecting 
the meaningfulness of our bodies in everyday life” (Titchkosky 2009: 
83), here we see what happens when disability comes to embody yet 
another mediation – an artistic tension between the iconic, indexical, 
and symbolic city representation as it has been (re)produced over time 
by able-bodied/cognitively abled urban planners and as it has been 
(re)imagined by artists with cognitive disabilities.
Lest readers assume that this exhibit is not without its own problems, 
it is important, finally, to dwell for a moment on the extent to which it 
might be considered insufficient. As Licia Carlson notes – drawing 
upon Henri Stiker’s book The History of Disability – it is often more re-
vealing to examine the method of including or integrating disabled 
populations in society than it is to examine the fact of their exclusion 
(Carlson 2010: 3). That is, we must examine the specific conditions 
Visualizing Down Syndrome and Autism 115
under which disabled people are encouraged to take part in public dis-
course. For example, are they allowed to participate fully or only in a 
limited capacity? Are they given access to central and privileged dis-
courses of great social significance or only to spheres of peripheral im-
portance? In this case, it is tempting and indeed possible to devalue the 
exhibit – both its ephemeral integration of disabled producers and its 
enduring mixed-media images – by arguing that, for example, Metro 
de Madrid is taking an easy and showy route to merely symbolically 
integrating disabled populations into the built environment, perhaps 
even exclaiming that “Oh, but works of art will never change society.” 
Although the former response may be true, the latter is clearly mis-
guided, and reflects a curious division of contemporary daily life into 
autonomous spheres where each has little impact on the others. That is, 
there is a common tendency to see aesthetic matters as a world of their 
own, a world of little or no immediate relevance to matters of broader 
social or political importance.
Yet as Lefebvre’s urban theory articulates, particularly in The Urban 
Revolution (2003) but also in The Production of Space (1991a), this mis-
guided notion that the sphere of artistic production bears little rele-
vance to social and political struggles – a notion that is pervasive 
in today’s alienated urban environments – is surely yet another conse-
quence of an alienating view of contemporary urban life. To let the 
meaning of the exhibit be determined by the intention or mere involve-
ment of the Metro de Madrid corporation is to allow this alienated view 
to remain operational and unquestioned; in a sense, this aestheticized/
aestheticizing view of the exhibit recapitulates the contemporary view 
of urban planners who have equally approached the city as an aesthetic 
object, one somehow divorced from the political and social discourses 
that were articulated as part of urban theory’s nineteenth-century (uto-
pian) socialist history.18
Still, aesthetics and culture – even in this problematic case – provide 
an opportunity for populations with cognitive disabilities that may be 
much more difficult to replicate in other areas of social life. To see in 
Trazos Singulares the potential for a much more radical project pushing 
for the full inclusion of people with IDD into Madrid’s urban fabric and 
future decisions (political, social, and economic) is to recover the revo-
lutionary potential of all artistic production – even, and especially, if 
this potential has not yet been realized. Envisioning the event simulta-
neously from both a disability studies perspective and a Lefebvrian 
perspective on urban studies allows us to glimpse how the city is 
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ultimately a product of spaces not only as conceived but also as per-
ceived and actually lived. Lefebvre’s urban critique teaches us that art 
and creative activity may function as a key momentary disruption of 
the exclusionary logic of urban design, and also that the act of trans-
forming space – even if ephemerally – is necessary if that spatial logic is 
to be challenged. Similarly, disability scholars note that that “the art of 
theorizing, the art of telling a new story,” can be a “moment of disrup-
tive provocation” (Titchkosky 2009: 83). In the future linking of these 
two insights there may be a recipe for mobilizing aesthetics and culture 
to enact lasting social change for people with disabilities, IDD or other-
wise, who live in contemporary cities.
Setting aside the sponsorship by Metro de Madrid, Trazos Singulares 
points to the radical potential of future events that might similarly en-
courage disabled artists to occupy privileged city-spaces and to use 
those spaces as a pretext for (re)imagining both their city and the cir-
cumstances of their inclusion or exclusion in urbanized societies. In 
Disability Aesthetics, Siebers makes a prescient remark concerning the 
underappreciated connection between the need for an accessible (mate-
rial) built environment and the need for improvements regarding less 
tangible, social and political mechanisms of exclusion:
The debate in architecture has so far focused more on the fundamental 
problem of whether buildings and landscapes should be universally ac-
cessible than on the aesthetic symbolism by which the built environment 
mirrors its potential inhabitants. While universal access must remain the 
ambition of the disability community, a broad understanding of disability 
aesthetics reveals the hidden inhibitions and defense mechanisms that 
work against advances in universal design and undercut the political and 
social participation of people with disabilities. It also shows that aesthetic 
disgust with disability extends beyond individual disabled bodies to the 
symbolic presence of disability in the built environment. (Siebers 2010: 58)
Siebers’s artful transition from the question of physical access in the 
context of the built environment to the way in which aesthetic and sym-
bolic forms reflect deeply rooted social ideologies should not be over-
looked. Moreover, the implication is precisely that the built environment 
of the city reflects the social and political conditions under which it has 
been produced. In disability studies just as in the Lefebvrian tradition 
of urban studies, it is important to highlight that the production of 
space is a social process involving space as conceived, perceived, and 
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lived; as both material and mental; and that such space is a shifting ter-
ritory on which urban citizens must persistently struggle to exercise 
their right to the city. In any case, as disability scholars have pursued 
with vigour and as Lefebvre’s urban theory suggests once it has been 
applied to the themes of disability studies, art remains an accessible 
and potentially transformational discourse, certainly one of many im-
portant links between disabled populations and their greater potential 
and future influence over the larger able-bodied/cognitively abled ur-
ban society in which they live.
In conclusion, despite some clear drawbacks, Trazos Singulares con-
tains the seed of a potentially radical social and even political change. 
This artistic exhibition – which poses important questions regarding 
inclusion and the social visibility of disability, questions that are all too 
infrequently raised in this kind of a public forum – may not have suc-
ceeded as a catalyst for social change for people with cognitive disabili-
ties, and it clearly was not even designed as such. Yet it remains an 
innovative, welcome, and powerfully symbolic reminder of what might 
be accomplished in the future. Perhaps the component that was lacking 
was the inclusion of disability theorists working alongside the disabled 
artists. Leslie G. Roman writes about a series of events held in Vancouver, 
Canada, called “The Unruly Salon” where “the combination of disabil-
ity scholars and disabled artists worked!” (2009b: 6; also 2009a). Perhaps 
future collaborations can continue to emphasize how the right to the 
city might be reclaimed for populations with cognitive disabilities. 
María Gallardo and Miguel Gallardo’s María cumple 20 años (2015)
The graphic novel María cumple 20 años also helps us think more care-
fully about the benefits of collaboration when considering populations 
with severe cognitive disabilities. Born in 1955 in Lleida, Catalunya, 
Miguel Gallardo is a professional graphic artist who collaborated on a 
number of visual projects associated with La Movida. La Movida – con-
cisely defined as an explosion of cultural activity following the death 
of Spanish dictator Francisco Franco in 1975 – intensified during the 
late 1970s and 1980s and led to the international recognition of, among 
others, director Pedro Almodóvar.19 Even before the twenty-first cen-
tury began, Gallardo had produced an extensive oeuvre including se-
ries, publications, monographs, catalogues, illustrations, animations, 
and television work. It is significant that some of the work for which 
he  is  best known has involved collaborations: his co-creation of the 
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pioneering graphic magazine El Víbora, and his co-authorship of the 
comics character Makoki, for example.20 His earlier publications un-
folded in the context of a vital counterculture that embraced themes of 
sexuality, drug use, and popular music previously denigrated as trans-
gressive by the dictatorship. The publication of the comics text María y 
yo (2007), however, reflected the development of a more personal cre-
ative mode for Gallardo, in terms of both content and style. As indicat-
ed in the eponymous documentary film María y yo (2010), directed by 
Félix Fernández de Castro, Miguel found that he was beginning to 
draw different kinds of pictures for his daughter to enjoy. As he drew 
for María, he developed a visual style that was more rapid, more fluid, 
and simply more iconic than he had used in his previous professional 
work.21 He engaged in this process continually and over the years was 
able to fill notebook after notebook with iconic representations of the 
real people who were part of María’s life. As this section explores, 
Gallardo’s more recent work involving his daughter – whether one re-
gards it as personal or autobiographical – is decidedly collaborative 
both in its context and in its execution.
My point of departure, given the significant impact that María has 
had on her father’s artistic content as well as his graphic style, is to rec-
ognize María cumple 20 años as a collaboration between two co-authors 
that exposes the neurotypical misunderstandings of autism. Readers 
will note that both volumes, María y yo and María cumple 20 años, list 
their authors as “María Gallardo and Miguel Gallardo,” in that order. 
It may be tempting for readers to see this instance of co-authorship as 
a mere conceit, fashioned in response to the fact that, as Ian Hacking 
has written, “autism narrative is a boom industry” (2010: 261).22 Never-
theless, such a reaction is not appropriate in this case, for reasons I out-
line in the remainder of this chapter. That is, I do not see this instance of 
co-authorship as an intentional conceit, but instead as an organic col-
laboration. My choice to use the word collaboration is supported by 
specific stylistic and thematic aspects of the volume, discussed below. It 
is also important for readers to acknowledge the larger context of what 
collaboration may mean for populations with severe cognitive impair-
ments. That is, my previous analysis of María y yo appealed to readers 
familiar with the work of internationally known autistic celebrity pro-
fessor, speaker, and author Temple Grandin as a point of entry in order 
to emphasize the importance of visuality for her and for others like 
her.23 Here, however, it makes more sense to draw a contrast with 
 Grandin that is relevant to the present book’s focus on the invisibility of 
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cognitive difference and its concomitant acknowledgment of the topic 
of impairment. Grandin, like all academics and all authors – whether 
society sees them as able-bodied, able-minded, or disabled – has neces-
sarily benefited from the assistance of editors and from the attention 
afforded her work by the publishing industry.24 Unlike María, however, 
Grandin – being more verbal – is in more of a position to tell her own 
story in the conventional ways outlined by ableist and individualistic 
imaginaries.25 Yet while María may not be in a position to tell her own 
story with respect to these normative expectations, Miguel and María 
can in fact tell their shared story together.26
In the previous graphic novel and documentary film, readers and 
viewers alike were introduced to a young María through visual repre-
sentations of everyday experiences of autism; in contrast, María cumple 
20 años portrays its co-protagonist now as an adult. This more recent 
volume continues its forerunner’s hallmark themes and formal strate-
gies, which are once again worthy of exploration in their own right. 
Thus this section focuses first on this sequel graphic novel’s general 
depiction of the experience of autism as a visual contribution to dia-
logues on neurodiversity. Given the circumstances discussed above, I 
regard this not as María’s individual experience of autism, but rather as 
an experience of autism intimately shared by a team of father–daughter 
co-authors. Second, it traces the comic’s embrace of a more collabora-
tive model of representation than was evidenced in the original. Finally, 
it explores the wider significance of this kind of collaborative model 
of cognitive disability representations in cultural production, returning 
to this chapter’s epigraph written by Michael Bérubé. Ultimately, an 
awareness of the benefits of attending to nuances of cognitive impair-
ment, as opposed to a notion of physical impairment that has largely 
been eschewed in disability studies research in the humanities, prompts 
the need for a more collaborative approach to the production of and 
participation in cognitive disability representations. 
The shared experience of autism represented in María cumple 20 años 
functions as an autobiography of two people. Miguel purposely draws 
himself into the unnumbered pages of the story27 from the beginning 
and does not engage in the abstraction that would be required of a 
narrative purporting to focus solely on María at the expense of her 
interdependent connections with others. The comic starts with the 
page title “19 de julio de 2014” (19 July 2014) (2015: 2) and chronicles 
Miguel’s yearly trip to visit María in Canarias, with the understand-
ing that from there the pair will embark on what is routinely a 
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month-and-a-half-long vacation together (2015: 5). The text immedi-
ately draws attention to traits shared by father and daughter: “Tenemos 
un montón de manías comunes los dos” (we both have a ton of com-
mon manias), including anticipation, not wanting to get rid of any-
thing, and the need to order the world (2015: 2). The first two examples 
of these manias depict Miguel arriving early to the airport and a shirt 
he has refused to part with for fourteen years; the third is a margin-
spanning panel applying to both father and daughter. This panel high-
lights four sets of circumstances through discrete visual reference 
points under the heading “¡... Orden en el mundo!” (… Order in the 
world!): “Papelitos / Los dos iPad juntos / ¡Hay migas en el suelo! / 
Ese vaso fuera de sitio” (Scraps of paper / Our two iPads together / 
There are crumbs on the floor! That glass out of place) (2015: 2). These 
visual depictions are accompanied by the word-specific combinations 
of text and images (McCloud 1994: 153) that constitute the bulk of the 
comic’s style. Through its visual form this single panel also suggests 
that these concerns apply equally to father and daughter. In particular, 
the shift from a more traditional panel structure to a wide panel lacking 
any sort of internal partition conveys an expansiveness – and thus a 
sense of connectedness and overlap – that readers can apply to rein-
force the notion of shared traits. Also emphasizing their shared rela-
tionship, the subsequent first four panels on the next page depict 
Miguel and María sharing the panel frames (2015: 3) – looking at each 
other or talking in the same direction. Following embedded images of 
the front covers of the original Spanish and translated Russian versions 
of the comic María y yo is the statement that “En el año 2009 nos dieron 
el premio nacional de cómic de Cataluña ¡a los dos!” (In 2009 they gave 
us the national comic award – to the two of us together!). This recogni-
tion in the text that both María and Miguel received the national comic 
award is further indication that the work constitutes a collaboration 
and can be taken implicitly as a prompt to recognize how experiences 
of severe cognitive impairment cannot be considered outside of collab-
orative social relationships.
This sequel returns to the hallmark themes of María y yo: not only 
travel, but also favourite activities and behaviours, the everyday value 
of pictograms, social marginalization, and the strength of relationships 
with friends and family. In reference to a travel scene prominently situ-
ated at the beginning of both the previous graphic novel and the docu-
mentary film of the same name, the text notes that as an adult, María 
now “se comporta en el avión” (behaves herself on the plane) (2015: 6), 
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likely a result of consistent behavioural reinforcement and modification 
therapy seen in the documentary but not so visible in the earlier graph-
ic novel. After arriving in Barcelona with Miguel, María “se va flechada 
a su cuarto a comprobar si todavía están las dos cajas llenas de dibujos 
que le he ido haciendo estos años” (goes straight to her room to see if 
the two boxes of drawings I have been doing for her over the years are 
still there) (2015: 7). The fact that the image spans a full page indicates 
the importance of this event in the life of María. Since space equals time 
in the comics (see McCloud 1994: 100), the full-page panel also suggests 
the quantity of time she routinely spends looking through these draw-
ings. Evidence that this is one of her preferred behaviours can also be 
seen in the visual abundance depicted through the numerous note-
books and papers strewn across both the floor and bed of the image 
(2015: 7).
Like all of us, María at times expresses her dislike of certain situa-
tions. One of her most common reactions is to scream – a theme that 
appears numerous times in the comic (2015: 25–6, 28; see also 51). While 
it is common for neurotypical explanations to describe people with au-
tism as being easily overwhelmed by excess sensory stimulation, it is 
interesting that María cumple 20 años does not take this route. Instead, as 
noted above, it frames María’s dislike of unfamiliar situations as a trait 
she shares with her father (“anticipación” [anticipation] above, 2015: 2). 
Regarding this point, the text here prefers to represent her behaviour 
without recourse to the clinical point of view that was more common in 
Fernández de Castro’s documentary film about María. Using an every-
day explanation, a page titled “¿Qué pasará?” (What’s next?) (2015: 9) 
notes for readers that “María se pone nerviosa porque le cuestan las 
transiciones de un sitio a otro” (María gets nervous because transitions 
from one place to another are difficult for her) (2015: 10). One practice 
that can help María feel less nervous is the use of pictograms. Readers 
of the earlier comic and, especially, viewers of the documentary film 
were introduced to the value of pictograms in María’s everyday life. 
These images help María anticipate what will happen during a given 
day; they also help her shape her expectations accordingly, “para que 
no se pierda con las actividades diarias” (so that she does not become 
lost [in the sequence of] daily activities) (2015: 11).28 Pictograms were an 
increasingly prevalent part of the later parts of the earlier comic and the 
documentary film; thus the fact that readers see an example of a picto-
gram so soon in María cumple 20 años is a significant shift (2015: 11, see 
also 18–19). This is another example of how the sequel graphic novel 
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illustrates the enduring collaborative value of consistent behavioural 
reinforcement introduced in previous cultural products. Here, the for-
mat of the pictograms is used not merely to indicate María’s anticipa-
tion of the day’s events, but also to reflect on daily activities and 
preferred routines (2015: 12–13, 36) – even with the passage of time, she 
insists on repeating specific activities that she and her father enjoyed in 
the past (2015: 39).
The text suggests that one of the behaviours that can prove problem-
atic is María’s enjoyment of pinching people: something she does to 
strangers as well as people she knows. The sustained appearance of this 
behaviour on six pages of María cumple 20 años (2015: 4, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
18) conveys to readers that there has been much discussion and consid-
eration of the motivations and consequences of this activity in the life 
shared by Miguel and María. Significantly, in one of the father-and-
daughter “Preguntas y respuestas” (Questions and Answers) panel se-
quences, whose form will be familiar to readers of María y yo, the father 
asks his daughter, “¿Pero María, por qué pellizcas a las personas que te 
gustan?” (But María, why do you pinch the people you like?) (2015: 15). 
To this question, María responds, “Para que me hagan caso” (So that 
they pay attention to me) (2015: 15, see also 14). The inclusion of a nar-
rative-voice caption under this latter image – which reads “¿No es lo 
que queremos todos?” (Isn’t that what we all want?) – might be taken 
as an acknowledgment of didactic value for readers less knowledge-
able about autism. The text does not take a clinical or medical approach 
to autism, but it still attempts to deliver a message about autism to 
readers who may be less likely to acknowledge similarities between 
themselves and María (2015: 15). The next two pages make clear that 
the meaning of María’s pinching changes with the circumstances. For 
her, it is a form of communication. Thus, while she uses pinching to 
express love for her grandmother in Barcelona (2015: 14), she at times 
may pinch strangers, whose reactions may not be as welcome (2015: 
16), and she may sometimes even use pinching as a threat or a form of 
aggression (2015: 17). Consistent with the topic of behaviour modifica-
tion more generally, two pages (2015: 18–19) chart out how pictograms 
are being used to help María reduce her use of pinching – they serve as 
substitutes when she communicates, and she is rewarded for using 
them with activities she likes. Importantly, the last two of María’s pre-
ferred activities depicted are both labelled “dibujar” (drawing): in one 
panel, Miguel draws as María looks on; in the other, María draws on 
her own without Miguel sharing the frame (2015: 19).
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As included in the earlier comic and as dramatized in the documen-
tary film, María continues to be fond of music: “María cuenta además 
con un oído absoluto para la música, una vez entra una melodía en su 
cabeza, a veces de una forma obsesiva, nunca más se va” (María pos-
sesses a perfect ear for music, once a melody enters her head, some-
times in an obsessive way, it never leaves) (2015: 20). She has efficiently 
and intuitively developed an ability to use her iPad to listen to music, 
such that Miguel remarks she is a talented DJ (2015: 20). A full-page 
panel illustrates María listening to music on her iPad while sitting on 
her bed, occupying the bottom half of the image (2015: 21). The empty 
space in the top half of the image and surrounding the outline of her 
body in the bottom half contains twenty-one song titles paired with 
their corresponding artists and drawn in either black script, blue script, 
bold black script, or bold blue script. The two-tone script represents a 
barrage of music, with quick transitions from song to song,29 while the 
space occupied on the full-panel page suggests that María listens to 
songs or song fragments obsessively for extended periods of time (2015: 
21).30 Viewers of the 2010 documentary film will remember how, in a 
specific scene combining noise from various sources (the television, a 
steaming coffee pot on the stove, traffic heard through an open win-
dow …), received sound was used as a metaphor for the way in which 
autistics experience sensory stimulation as overwhelming.31 In María 
cumple 20 años, however, self-modulated, received sound is treated sim-
ply as something María enjoys, in the process testifying to her ability to 
master technology. So it is significant that this sequel shifts back to-
wards the emphasis of the original comic and away from the documen-
tary film’s tendency to represent María as isolated and alone.32 María 
cumple 20 años thus portrays María’s behaviours in everyday terms as 
practices she enjoys, instead of taking a more clinical or even didactic 
approach.33 The way the musical groups and song titles are arranged in 
the page’s empty space suggests a spatial metaphor for how María is 
able to organize her environment; this implies that she is developing an 
autonomy associated with adulthood as well as the confidence that 
comes with mastery of digital tools.
If we are attending to the notion of cognitive impairment, however, 
there are still times when María’s inability to communicate with others 
on their terms becomes frustrating, both for her and for others. An in-
teresting example of this is the enigmatic case of “Nonuyus” (2015: 22), 
which continues the theme of music as one of María’s favourite hob-
bies. Four panels narrate María’s persistent requests for May to play 
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“Nonuyus” for her, a request her mother does not understand. María 
requests this mysterious song during the day and at night, even during 
dinner – at all hours of the day (2015: 22). There is a certain humour, 
born of frustration, that builds through the sequence. This stems not 
only from the repetition of the request, but also from an image of the 
globe featured in the third panel criss-crossed by the reverberating 
sound of the word “Nonuyus,” suggesting that María’s request is echo-
ing around the world. The use of both blue and black-and-white tones 
4.1: “Nonoyus” sequence from María cumple 20 años (Gallardo and Gallardo, 
2015), 22.
Visualizing Down Syndrome and Autism 125
in the drawings here maximizes the visual contrast of the images and 
thus amplifies the scene’s persistent emotional tension.34 Also, panels 
two and four are subdivided into four mini-panels that quicken the ac-
tion, and this intensifies the reader’s engagement with the sequence. 
One day, as captured in the fourth panel, María’s mother May happens 
to put on Stevie Wonder’s song “I Just Called” – which includes the 
words “No New Year’s Day …” (a phrase that María had been voicing 
as “Nonuyus”) – and María happily borrows May’s iPad to continue 
listening to the song by herself (2015: 22). The nine-panel sequence on 
the following page features another misunderstanding, one that also 
concerns music as one of María’s preferred activities (2015: 23). In the 
case of “Nonuyus” María was expressing something her mother did 
not understand; here, another family member expresses something that 
she takes too literally. One day her grandfather says “Me voy con la 
música a otra parte” (I’m going to take the music elsewhere), which 
prompts María’s inconsolable sadness as well as frustrated speculation 
on what has caused this to happen (2015: 23).35 One way of interpreting 
this sequence is to recognize that when family members use access to 
music as a way of encouraging good behaviours in María, there can be 
a down side.
Both the earlier graphic novel and this more recent sequel critique 
patterns of social marginalization involving those who experience au-
tism in society, and once again María cumple 20 años chooses to empha-
size the ways that others look at María. In a two-page sequence titled 
“Miradas” (Looks), the comic artfully blends narrative-voice text, dia-
logue bubbles, the characteristic stare-arrows readers saw throughout 
María y yo, and strategies mobilizing the colour blue against the black-
and-white background composition for increased emotional impact. 
The narrative-voice text is worthy of citation:
Paseamos por la calle con María / y la … / gente … / mira… / Las mira-
das se concentran / A veces las siento en el mismísimo cogote / Dan ganas 
de girar la cabeza como la niña del exorcista y / … largar un discursito / 
y pasarme un poco de la raya / En las pelis queda muy bien, pero en la 
vida real no es tan fácil … / Las miradas son una asignatura pendiente que 
arrastro desde hace tiempo / Todavía es algo que me ataca y me da rabia 
/ Sé que es algo difícil de cambiar y que es más un problema mío que los 
demás / Se me hace un nudo en el estómago y no puedo desatarlo / 
Aunque a María en realidad, le importa un pimiento / Agradezco las 
 sonrisas de las abuelas de vez en cuando / y los niños descarados que 
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4.2: “Miradas” sequence from María cumple 20 años (Gallardo and Gallardo, 
2015), 30–1.
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preguntan … / Me gustaría hablarles a todos y explicarles cómo es María 
… Pero son demasiados … / Decirles las cosas sorprendentes que tiene 
María, por ejemplo, su memoria.
When we walk outside with María / the people … / stare … / at her … / 
Their looks are concentrated on her / Sometimes I feel them on the back of 
my neck / They make me want to turn my head around like the girl in The 
Exorcist and / … rattle off a speech / and even cross the line a little / In the 
movies that tends to work, but in real life it isn’t that easy … / These looks 
are an unresolved matter I have long carried with me / It is something that 
angers and infuriates me / I know it’s something difficult to change and 
that it is more of a problem for me than it is for others / I get a knot in my 
stomach and I can’t undo it … / Even though María couldn’t care less … 
/ I am grateful for the smiles of grandmothers once in a while / and for 
the impertinent questions of children … / I’d like to talk to all of them and 
explain what María is like … But there are too many of them … / To tell 
them the things about María that would surprise them, for example … her 
memory. (2015: 30–1)
The formal features employed here are significant in their own right 
and add meaning and nuance to the text. Throughout this sequence the 
strategic use of the colour blue adds a dynamic dimension to the stan-
dard black-and-white style; it also adds an emotional depth to the pan-
els in different ways. At various points, blue overlays are used to 
highlight different aspects of the visual field, including the following 
list: onlookers who are staring at María, as a reflection of their charged 
emotional state; María and the back of Miguel’s neck, as the objects of 
the questionable emotions of the onlookers who are staring; Miguel 
when he imagines crossing a line in his speech delivered to these on-
lookers, reflecting his own charged emotional response; the image of a 
smiling grandmother, suggesting a sense of warmth; and the final im-
age in the sequence, which depicts a smiling María, suggesting the out-
ward radiation of what the narration frames as her surprising qualities. 
Most of this two-page sequence employs word-specific combinations, 
but there are intriguing exceptions. A few of the panel combinations 
can be considered duo-specific, with the words and the images contrib-
uting something their complement lacks. Such is the case, for example, 
with one panel where the image depicts María walking away. Note that 
to understand the specificity of this image one needs to take into ac-
count the panel featuring the questioning child two panels later, whose 
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dialogue references María’s specific form of walking depicted here. 
Another example is the panel reading “Todavía es algo que me ataca 
y me da rabia” (It is something that angers and infuriates me), which 
expresses two distinct but complementary emotions. The words ex-
press the intensity of Miguel’s anger, while the image – the large word 
“MIRADAS” (Stares) in blue weighing down on his head and neck, 
also in blue – suggests that he is frustrated, overwhelmed, and (judging 
from the look on his face) perhaps even sad. In addition, a number of 
panels employ image-specific combinations, such as the first five pan-
els depicting the gaze of onlookers, where the image says everything 
readers need to know and the text is superfluous. What is interesting in 
this sequence is the way in which both text and image foreground 
Miguel’s experience of these stares. Note that he appears in eight pan-
els, while María appears only in four – and only in one of the panels, 
the last one mentioned above, do we see her face, which is smiling. This 
imbalance in visual presentation of course reinforces the text’s insis-
tence that this is more of a problem for Miguel than for others (perhaps 
also including María). This is a clear representation of how Miguel 
shares in the social experience of cognitive disability with his daughter 
– theirs is a collective experience of autism, and the social marginaliza-
tion of this disability experience is thus also shared.
Given that this reading of María cumple 20 años is focused on the notion 
of collaboration, its most interesting aspect is the way in which the comic 
emphasizes community and relationships through family and friends. 
The main vehicle for expressing this emphasis is the iconic representa-
tion that characterizes visual representations in particular. María y yo, in 
both its graphic novel and documentary film versions, had emphasized 
María’s prodigious memory for people she has known for even a short 
time. Readers and viewers saw how the iconic drawings that Miguel cre-
ated for María became a way not merely of documenting their shared 
relationships with others but also of communicating. A full-page panel 
titled “Dibujar” (Drawing) shows María suggesting the names of people 
she knows to Miguel, who draws them in a notebook (here: “Emilio, Biel, 
Judith, Joseluis, Pilar, Bhavna”). As the father draws for his daughter, the 
narrative text reminds readers of the significance of this activity:
Cuando empieza el verano, comienzo a dibujar para María, un trabajo que 
me llevará todas las vacaciones. Hace muchos años que dibujo para ella y 
se ha convertido en un medio de comunicación entre los dos. María me 
hace los pedidos a partir de su asombrosa memoria para las personas y los 
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sucesos. (When the summer begins, I start to draw for María, a task that I 
carry out during the entirety of our time together. I’ve been drawing for 
her for many years, and it has become a way of communicating between 
the two of us. María makes her requests of me based on her amazing mem-
ory for people and events.) (2015: 32)
As did the original comic, this sequel features a number of pages dedi-
cated to iconic representations of people as an illustration of the mate-
rial basis of the pair’s communicational method. One page features 
sixteen faces, each labelled with a name, that represent a particular 
group of related persons (2015: 34); in another full-page panel, María 
and Miguel sit at a table with eight other labelled invited guests (2015: 
35); yet another page shows six named people in bed on account of an 
accident or illness (2015: 37). These are the faces and names of people 
who constitute what the volume terms María’s “red de cariño” (net-
work of love and support) (2015: 56).36 The text specifies who these 
people are in a nine-panel-spanning narration that begins thus:
Para este camino que tenemos por delante, necesitamos a las personas que 
nos rodean … la gente que nos ha acompañado hasta aquí y la gente que 
conocerá María a partir de ahora … las personas que están en sus listas, no 
solo su familia cercana, sino también amigos y conocidos que han descu-
bierto a María y han aprendido a quererla. (For the road we have ahead of 
us, we need the people around us … the people who have accompanied us 
up until now and the people that María will meet from now on … the 
people who are on her lists, not merely her close family, but also friends 
and acquaintances who have discovered María and have learned to love 
her.) (2015: 56)
Readers will note here, too, that the subtle but important use of the first 
person plural (“we” and “us” in English translation) frames María’s 
social network as inclusive and ever-expanding. 
María cumple 20 años goes beyond the original comic in that for the 
first time it incorporates the drawings of others besides Miguel. 
Importantly, it also presents the activity of drawing as a communal ev-
eryday practice in which anyone can engage – in principle then, as a 
practice through which anyone can get to know and communicate with 
María, and through which María can get to know and communicate 
with anyone. There is a full page devoted to drawings for María made 
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by Marta, who “la acompaña casi todas las tardes en Canarias” (accom-
panies her almost every afternoon in Canarias) (2015: 40). There is an-
other full page containing the drawings for María made by Laia, who 
“la acompaña algunos días en Sa Riera en verano” (accompanies her 
some days in Sa Riera during the summer) (2015: 41). Even though the 
styles vary depending on the person doing the drawing, the basic prin-
ciples of iconic representation are present in both examples (one or more 
of the following: hair shape, hair length, height, outfit/dress), and each 
person depicted is accompanied by a written name in close proximity to 
the representation – a reference to the style of practical iconic drawing 
expressly developed by Miguel as a communication with his daughter. 
The text makes clear that María herself “ha logrado convencer a muchos 
adultos que están a su lado para que lo hagan” (has managed to con-
vince many adults around her to do it [draw for her]) (2015: 40). 
Significantly, María herself has taken up the practice of drawing (2015: 
42–3, 44–5, 47; including also the inside front and back covers). Narration 
in the comic book makes clear that over many years Miguel has engaged 
María through assisted drawing, guiding her hand and creating basic 
human figures (2015: 42). At first, Miguel’s narration indicates that he 
suspected the drawings she started to make on her own two years prior 
to María cumple 20 años were angry birds (2015: 44), but then his good 
friend Marco – “que es un aspi (síndrome de Asperger)” (who is an 
Aspy [person with Asperger’s syndrome]) – discovered that they were 
not birds but instead people with their mouths open (2015: 45). We see a 
whole page devoted to María’s artistic process (2015: 43), and on numer-
ous pages we see images actually drawn by María herself. These appear 
in the book, taking up both full pages (2015: 44, 47) and parts of pages 
(2015: 42, 45), and contribute to the book’s multivocal composition.
The story of how María began to draw is simultaneously a story of 
her active engagement with the world. It illustrates the significance of 
her relationships with other people as well as her desire to communi-
cate with others. It is an expression of her love for her father, but also of 
the bonds she has been able to form with people like Marta and Laia. It 
is an outlet that serves multiple functions. As the text puts it:
La decisión de María de ponerse a dibujar ha sido importante para ella, le 
ha dado autonomía, ya no depende tanto de mí para hacer sus listas y el 
dibujo le sirve para expresarse y delimitar las cosas que le gustan y que le 
preocupan. Ahora María tiene dos intereses en su vida que le ayudan a 
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4.3: María’s iconic drawings from María cumple 20 años (Gallardo and Gallardo, 
2015), 42−3.
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comunicarse con los demás y con el mundo exterior: el dibujo y la música. 
(María’s decision to devote herself to drawing has been important for her, 
it has given her autonomy, she no longer depends as much on me to create 
her lists and drawing allows her to express herself and to define what she 
likes and what bothers her. Now María has two interests in her life that 
help her to communicate with others and with the exterior world: draw-
ing and music.) (2015: 47)
It may be important to underscore that María has come to drawing in 
the same way as artists who may not experience cognitive disability – 
through time, opportunity, practice, support, and ultimately the benefit 
of an artistic community that connects her with others. Through the 
publication of María cumple 20 años, readers of the graphic novel can 
also form part of María’s artistic community. (Interestingly, she is al-
ready recognized as a cultural celebrity of sorts, as indicated on 2015: 
3). The inside front and back covers of the volume are key to under-
standing how this comic’s core is constituted by María’s drawing – and 
also to the interpretation of María’s drawing. The faces she draws are 
featured on the front and back inside covers, but only on the back in-
side cover do names accompany each face. In this way, the composition 
of the volume as a whole stages for readers the insight that Marco, 
above, has regarding her drawings (2015: 35). Seeing the front inside 
cover, readers may not understand what the images are; but on com-
pleting the graphic novel and seeing the back inside cover, they partici-
pate in a “reveal” that recapitulates Marco’s hermeneutic discovery of 
the meaning of the drawings. Together, these inside front and back cov-
ers convey the progression from unknown to known, or put another 
way, they present the story of the discovery of María’s engagement 
with iconic representation as both an engagement with others in a com-
mon activity and more specifically as a form of communication.
In the most recent comics text authored by María Gallardo and Miguel 
Gallardo, it is iconic drawing that serves as the explicit link  between 
people. Artistic production thus stands as a symbol of the potential of 
collaboration, as well as testament to the power of collective acts and 
collective imaginaries to bring people together. This chapter has ex-
plored two very different contexts in which cultural and artistic produc-
tion has been linked, whether more or less effectively, to deeply rooted 
patterns of social marginalization surrounding cognitive disability. One 
of these testified to the limitations and the potential of large-scale events 
to address the social and urban marginalization of developmental 
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disability, and the other explored a small-scale cultural product focused 
on the value of art as a way of building family and community connec-
tions supportive of experiences of developmental disability. Both of 
these attempts centre on the notion of visibility, and both underscore 
the value of collaboration for populations with severe cognitive impair-
ments. Returning to this chapter’s epigraph penned by Michael Bérubé, 
we must remember that “the dynamics of disability compel us to recog-
nize that there will always be among us people who cannot represent 
themselves and must be represented” (2005: 572).37 Cognitive Disability 
Aesthetics is a call for disability scholars in general to recognize some-
thing they may have been slow to acknowledge – that not all people 
with disability can represent themselves in the ways required by ableist 
norms of individualism and ability. That said, I believe that the contexts 
explored in this chapter suggest another option outside of the repre-
sent-or-be-represented binary. Understanding the collaborative poten-
tial of visual artistic representations may open a pathway towards 
understanding the experience of cognitive disability in an ableist soci-
ety, critiquing at once both the individualistic myth that requires every 
artistic producer to work “on their own” and the falsehood that disabil-
ity resides purely in the body or the mind. Both the Trazos Singulares 
exhibit and María cumple 20 años allow for the material reality of cogni-
tive impairment while mobilizing the aesthetic/cultural field as a cor-
rective to disabling social conditions. 
5 Sequencing Alzheimer’s Dementia: 
Paco Roca’s Graphic Novel Arrugas 
(Wrinkles) (2008)
“One of the most encouraging signs in recent years is that at last people with 
dementia are being recognized as having true subjectivity.”
 – Tom Kitwood (2011: 70)
Any approach to the cultural representation of Alzheimer’s must ap-
preciate the way in which “the emergence of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) 
in epidemic proportions toward the end of the twentieth century is the 
product of biomedical discourse; it is an attribution that signifies 
the biomedicalisation of dementia in the elderly” (Burke 2008a: 63). In 
the Introduction to Thinking about Dementia (2006), Lawrence Cohen 
warns of the political, cultural, and economic shifts that have prompted 
an “aging public” to consume “Alzheimer’s narratives as a form of de-
pendency anxiety”; he also signals the dangers of uncritically accepting 
the medical model of disability related to Alzheimer’s and reminds us 
of the need to go beyond the discourse of disease to understand the 
broader cultural significance of “the stigma of physical and economic 
frailty” (Cohen 2006: 7). These are crucial guidelines for any discussion 
of Alzheimer’s, and the latter comment is more broadly relevant to 
 disability studies approaches in general. With this in mind, chapter 5 
of  Cognitive Disability Aesthetics analyses the visual representation of 
Alzheimer’s disease in Arrugas, an award-winning graphic novel cre-
ated by Paco Roca (2008).
Born in 1969, Valencian artist Francisco Martínez Roca began his ar-
tistic career in the 1990s working on historically important comics proj-
ects like Comix Kiss Comix and El Víbora.1 Creating a point of contrast 
with Arrugas, the content of these earlier and more flashy publications 
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was driven by the culture of excess, sex, drugs, and rock’n’roll that 
some would equate with the legacy of the 1980s cultural movement in 
Spain called La Movida.2 The 2000s saw a clear development in Roca’s 
reputation and his production of a growing list of graphic novels show-
casing his artistic and thematic versatility: Gog (La Cúpula, 2000), El 
Faro (Astiberri, 2004), Hijos de la Alhambra (Planeta, 2007), Las calles de 
arena (Astiberri, 2009), Emotional World Tour (with Miguel Gallardo; 
Astiberri, 2009), El invierno del dibujante (Astiberri, 2010), Memorias de un 
hombre en pijama (Astiberri, 2011), La metamorphosis (texts by Franz 
Kafka, illustrated book; Astiberri, 2011) and El juego lúgubre (Astiberri, 
2012). Against this body of work, Arrugas – which by 2012 was in its 
eighth edition – stands out as a much more mature piece, as well as a 
stunning example of how the everyday experience of aging can be rep-
resented in graphic narrative.
First published by the French publishing house Guy Delcourt as 
Rides, Arrugas was subsequently printed by Astiberri Ediciones in 
Bilbao, País Vasco, to critical acclaim. In France it had been recognized 
as one of the top twenty graphic novels of the year, and in Spain it re-
ceived two awards at the prestigious Salón del Cómic de Barcelona: the 
prize for Best Script, and the prize for Best Work by a Spanish Author. 
It has since been translated into Japanese (Sohakukan Shueisha 
Productions, 2011), Dutch (Silvester, 2009), Finnish (Wsoy, 2009), and 
Italian (Tunué, 2008). It has won the award for Best Album at Expo 
Cómic, Madrid, the Premio Nacional de Cómic 2008, the award for Best 
Album at the festivals of Lucca and Rome, and the prize of the Ministry 
of Culture in Japan.
The many intriguing visual elements of Arrugas are in a way sig-
nalled by its title, which points to a visual metonym for senescence. 
Wrinkles are the most visible sign of old age, a coarse surface that ac-
companies the aging process. As such, the graphic novel’s title empha-
sizes the physical consequences of aging, a material process whose 
effects also begin to impact the brain, and through it, the mind. Arrugas 
gains its verisimilitude from being based in part on true stories. This 
visual representation of Alzheimer’s disease reflects the graphic artist’s 
own experiences. At the end of the work, in two unnumbered pages 
that function as a coda of sorts, Roca reflects on specific people he met 
who inspired the characters in his text. Readers learn that the artist 
 began the project by gathering anecdotes from friends who had elderly 
parents. Thus, Emilio was inspired by “the real Emilio” who had 
Alzheimer’s, and who was the father of a friend named Diego (2008: 
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102–3). Other characters in Arrugas were also inspired by true anec-
dotes, such as those concerning Salva’s aunt, who feared abduction by 
aliens; and Ismael and Hugo’s mother, who would stockpile mundane 
items to give as gifts to her sons when they came to visit her. Roca also 
spent time visiting residences for the elderly, where he met Pellicer, 
a medal-winning athlete; and Dolores, who always held the hand of 
her husband with Alzheimer’s – both these people inspired characters 
in Arrugas.
Locating Roca’s comic within a wider tradition of visual narrative, 
it is important to recognize that representations of intellectual dis-
abilities have enjoyed a special place in recent Spanish cinema.3 Films 
such as Yo, también (2009), León y Olvido (2004), María y yo (2010), ¿Qué 
tienes debajo del sombrero? (2006), and Más allá del espejo (2007) have 
brought representations of Down syndrome, autism, and alexia/ag-
nosia into the cinematic spotlight. This serves as a corrective for the 
observation that portrayals of physical disabilities have often over-
shadowed those of cognitive disabilities in now-classic films such as 
El cochecito (1960), Acción mutante (1993), Carne trémula (1997), and Mar 
adentro (2004).4 Moreover, Roca’s Arrugas is part of a cultural moment 
in which visual representations of Alzheimer’s dementia are exceed-
ing past patterns established in cultural production. Looking at recent 
years only, the number of films touching on this form of cognitive 
 disability has increased substantially: Volver a Villoro (2006), ¿Y tú 
quién eres? (2007), Bucarest: la memòria perduda (2008), My Way (2007), 
Amanecer de un sueño (2008), Bicicleta, cullera, poma (2010), La mitad de 
Óscar (2010), La mosquitera (2010), Cuidadores (2010), Las voces de la me-
moria (2011), and, finally, the 2011 film version of Arrugas itself (dir. 
Ignacio Ferreras). Yet whereas many of these films do indeed deserve 
to be taken as manifestations of the “dependency anxiety” identified 
by Cohen,5 I do not think it is fair to identify Roca’s original graphic 
novel as part of this trend.6
Intellectual disabilities and even Alzheimer’s itself have been increas-
ingly represented on the silver screen in Spain. It is much more rare that 
contemporary graphic novels have touched on the subject using an ev-
eryday and non-spectacular approach – in either the Spanish-language 
or the Anglophone tradition. Speaking generally, only recently have 
experiences of disability figured into analyses of comics, as evidenced 
by Margaret Fink Berman’s 2010 article on disability in the comics of 
Chris Ware, José Alaniz’s 2014 book Death, Disability, and the Superhero: 
The Silver Age and Beyond, and the 2016 volume Disability in Comic Books 
Sequencing Alzheimer’s Dementia 139
and Graphic Narratives, edited by Chris Foss, Jonathan W. Gray, and 
Zach Whalen. In addition, Spanish-language comics continue to be un-
derstudied in Anglophone contexts. While the graphic novel in Europe 
has received some significant attention (e.g., Beaty’s Unpopular Culture: 
Transforming the European Comic Book in the 1990s), graphic novels and 
comics from Spain have not enjoyed the attention in English publi-
cations that has been given to, for example, the Franco-Belgian and 
German contexts. That said, comics and graphic novels published in 
Spain are figuring into an increasing number of works published in 
Spanish (e.g., Alary; Dopico; García; Gasca; Merino), and work pub-
lished in English has built upon this tradition.
Arrugas stands out as a privileged text that speaks to the imbrication 
of comics art with wider circuits of visual art. As an artistic product the 
graphic novel should not be seen as entirely distinct from visual art in 
general; even so, it deserves special treatment as a unique genre. As this 
chapter explores, Roca’s comic masterfully exploits formal aspects of 
the medium of the graphic novel (closure, the gutter, word/image com-
binations, and more) while delivering a vision of life with Alzheimer’s-
related dementia (ADRD) that emphasizes textures of the everyday 
over the spectacle of loss. The protagonist of Arrugas is Emilio, an el-
derly man experiencing ADRD whose son and daughter-in-law feel 
they can no longer care for him at home. The story begins as they de-
cide to move him into a transitional care facility, where he meets a cast 
of characters and finds a dear friend in his new roommate, Miguel. 
Arrugas blends various types of narrative sequences in a rich visual pre-
sentation that oscillates among various points of view. Along with the 
frequent and seemingly objective presentation of everyday scenes set in 
the residents’ rooms and in the facility’s cafeteria, hallways, reading 
room, and outdoor areas, there are subjective memories, which are pre-
sented directly (e.g., flashbacks of the younger days of Emilio and of 
the facility’s other residents). Blurring the boundaries between subjec-
tive and objective viewpoints, Arrugas features semi-subjective scenes 
that fuse an individual character’s subjective experience of his or her 
present with the third-person point of view of that very same present in 
interesting ways. It goes beyond the concerns of its central character, 
addressing not only Emilio’s experiences but also those of his peers in 
the facility. Emilio is more than just the protagonist; he also provides 
a  central point around which to organize all manner of insights into 
the  subjective experience of the aging process in general and ADRD 
in particular.
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This chapter’s first section, “Senescence, (Inter)Dependency, and 
Aging,” concisely rehearses the theoretical framework of interdepen-
dence as articulated by Eva Feder Kittay and Licia Carlson. It also en-
gages with specific research in the health fields regarding the experience 
of ADRD as a means to document the viability of Roca’s visual repre-
sentations, which are analysed in subsequent sections. The second 
 section, “Diagnosis, Staging, Symptoms, and Transition,” explores the 
form and content of Roca’s original comics text in detail, focusing on 
the significance of memory, motor skills, friendship, and support sys-
tems for patients experiencing ADRD. Particularly important here is 
the image of a stairway, which appears and reappears as a metaphor for 
aging and senescence. The concluding section, “The Semi-Subjective, 
Interdependence, and Collective Narration,” turns towards narrative’s 
power to connect us all, both through the shared experience of aging 
and through the reader’s participation in sequential art. From the per-
spective of collaboration, the semi-subjective is important because it is 
inclusive of multiple points of view. Whether those points of view are 
taken to relate to different characters or to more abstract contrasts in-
volving subjective and objective data, the semi-subjective thus neces-
sarily foregrounds the social framework within which individual 
consciousness takes shape; it also provides a visual affirmation of inter-
dependency approaches to cognitive disability. To the extent that read-
ers are able to link semi-subjective formal strategies with multiple 
points of view – and thus with the notion of an interdependent shared 
collectivity – an implicit and artistic denunciation of the individualist 
ideology feeds our dependency anxiety. Throughout, the emphasis 
is on a close reading of the relationship between Arrugas’s form and 
its content.
Senescence, (Inter)Dependency, and Aging
Arrugas does not focus directly on issues related to inadequate care, 
state policies, or institutional circumstances, but rather on the subjec-
tive experience of someone living with Alzheimer’s-related dementia. 
The present chapter thus examines the subjective experience of senes-
cence and ADRD in Arrugas specifically from a perspective that is just 
as attentive to artistic form as it is to the content of disability as a repre-
sented theme.7 This requires first that we address how concerns relating 
to both senescence and disability studies overlap in the graphic novel. 
Making sense of this overlapping finds ground in previous scholarly 
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work linking dependency, care, aging, disability, and the human expe-
rience. It is also important to identify how clinical and non-clinical re-
search into Alzheimer’s disease can help us understand how Arrugas 
contributes to our understanding the effects of dementia. These effects 
need to be approached from a perspective that acknowledges the indi-
vidual symptoms of ADRD while also taking into account the way 
these effects are experienced collectively by families, friends, and loved 
ones. These explorations end by prioritizing temporality as it relates 
to  the issues that accompany ADRD and to the complex narrative 
 structure of Arrugas. The analysis of cultural production that follows 
examines the representation of temporality as a primary theme in the 
story-world of Roca’s text and also the way in which its formal strate-
gies foreground its themes through temporal processes. Arrugas’s struc-
ture destabilizes the univocal understanding of time, and in addition, 
the reader actively constructs the meaning of the visual text through an 
interactive process that unfolds over time.
Seen both in its wider context and as a pathbreaking representation 
of Alzheimer’s in comics art in Spain, Arrugas speaks to the increasing 
representation of senescence and disability in visual art more general-
ly.8 The success of this particular graphic novel in other languages con-
firms that Spain is not alone in facing the issues raised by an increasingly 
aging population: the matter of Alzheimer’s disease has global reso-
nance. But while it is devoted to representing specific effects of the dis-
ease, Arrugas is not an issue-based work. That is, it does not concern 
itself with the likely prospect that there will soon be a shortage of beds 
in transitional care facilities (see Anon 2011), nor does it explore what it 
would mean for Emilio’s family to care for him outside of an institu-
tion. It begins with the moment of Emilio’s arrival at a transitional care 
facility, glossing over the decisions that children of aging family mem-
bers must face – difficult economic, social, and familial decisions. This 
is not to say there are no institutional critiques to be made in an inter-
pretation of Arrugas – merely that the growing literature on quality of 
life in a global sense as it relates to people with intellectual disabilities 
more generally is what is relevant here.9
The value of Arrugas is that it explores, at a personal scale, how cur-
rent institutional placements come to be experienced subjectively by 
aging populations. In this way it resonates with Tom Kitwood’s re-
markable work as part of the Bradford Dementia Group, which, for 
 example, sought to affirm personhood by acknowledging the unique 
subjectivity of the person with dementia, thus validating the reality of 
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their experience and their feelings. Arrugas provides visual echoes of 
these concepts, not necessarily in the institutional setting itself but 
through the form of the graphic novel.10 Adapting the scholarship of 
Lucy Burke to the present analysis, one could say that Arrugas “departs 
from the deficit thinking that dominates medical models of disability” 
precisely by exploring “the lived and shared experience of disease” and 
emphasizing “relational models of subjectivity” (2008a: 68).11 The ap-
proach employed here has been to use the story as a starting point from 
which to emphasize the interdependency of all members of human 
 societies. This perspective necessarily contains dimensions that are so-
ciocultural, political, and economic; it also indicates the ties between 
lifelong health, aging, and general well-being.12
The analysis of Arrugas that follows draws from a theoretical frame 
that has contextualized senescence within a disability studies perspec-
tive. The theorists who have best articulated this linkage between aging 
and disability are Carlson and Kittay. In focusing specifically on issues 
of cognitive ability, they seek to establish a wide philosophical frame-
work that approaches dependency as the basis for the human experi-
ence rather than as a lack of normal functioning (see also Sedgwick 
2002: 23). In a sense, they confront more directly than some disability 
studies scholars a deeply rooted ideology – that is, an individualist ide-
ology that allows the discourse of disability, and other colonizing dis-
courses, to become to a certain degree naturalized or automatic within 
society. This pervasive social discourse that frames dependency, and 
with it disability, as a deviation from the norm is supported by what 
Kittay, Jennings, and Wasunna call “the myth of the independent, un-
embodied subject – not born, not developing, not ill, not disabled, and 
never growing old” (2005: 445). In truth, we are all dependent, or inter-
dependent. In critiquing the above myth, Kittay cites Marx, who ac-
knowledged that we are “a species being”; and she asks, “Who in any 
complex society is not dependent on others, for the production of our 
food, for our mobility, for a multitude of tasks that make it possible for 
each of us to function in our work and daily living?” (Kittay et al. 2005: 
445; Kittay 2001: 570; see also Kittay 1999). Though we might pretend 
otherwise, all human beings are “inevitably dependent” in certain 
ways throughout the course of our lives (Kittay et al., 2005: 443). For 
her part, Carlson draws attention to the prejudicial perspective of cog-
nitive ableism, itself a socially constructed and culturally negotiated 
discourse: “a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of in-
dividuals who possess certain cognitive abilities (or the potential for 
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them) against those who are believed not to actually or potentially 
possess them” (Carlson 2001: 140, original emphasis; see also Carlson 
2010). From this perspective, populations with Alzheimer’s disease or 
other forms of cognitive disability are not marginal groups but rather 
groups that express the fragile and interdependent nature of the hu-
man experience in the widest sense. The opportunity here is to see 
Alzheimer’s dementia as one point where the discourses of aging and 
disability converge.
The volume Cognitive Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy 
(2010), co-edited by Carlson and Kittay, features a number of chapters 
with the word dementia in the title and more still that are relevant to 
the questions raised by ADRD as a category of disability that arises 
with old age (see also Carlson and Kittay, “Introduction”). Hilda 
Lindemann’s “Holding One Another (Well, Wrongly, Clumsily) in a 
Time of Dementia” emphasizes the role of family members in what she 
calls “identity maintenance”: she writes that “because strangers cannot 
well provide this kind of care, I argue that family members have a spe-
cial responsibility to hold on to the person’s identity for her” (2010: 163 
and 162 respectively). In Arrugas it is the absence of stories, of family 
narratives, that is most apparent – given the relative absence of family 
members within the graphic novel’s emplotment – although Emilio’s 
new friend and roommate in the transitional care facility, Miguel, be-
comes a kind of substitute for a traditional notion of family. In addition, 
as Lindemann notes, “it’s not only other people who hold us in our 
identities. Familiar places and things, beloved objects, pets, cherished 
rituals, one’s own bed or favorite shirt, can and do help us to maintain 
our sense of self” (2010: 163). The spaces that would have been familiar 
to Emilio prior to entering the facility do not figure into the plot; how-
ever, the graphic novel replicates this distinction between familiar and 
unfamiliar spaces through a spatial contrast internal to the building. 
The first floor provides a newly familiar living space for Emilio; the 
second floor – to which residents transition as they require more regu-
larized care toward end-of-life – represents the loss of a newly acquired 
home and the loss of newly familiar things. The second floor becomes 
increasingly important in Emilio’s life, just as it will become increas-
ingly important for the analysis that follows.
Bruce Jennings’s chapter from Carlson and Kittay’s volume titled 
“Agency and Moral Relationship in Dementia” raises similar concerns 
about how individual identities are in truth not as individual as they 
may seem. Instead, our identities are always necessarily sustained by a 
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social group or a collectivity. Jennings calls for “a special conception 
that I am calling memorial personhood; ‘memorial’ because it falls to 
others to sustain continuity of the demented self over time by recalling 
the self that has been when the individual cannot do that alone. But 
then, who among us can really do that alone?” (2010: 171, also 176). Key 
to Jennings’s approach is the concept of “re-minding”: “Re-minding is 
changing the environment and the external support system that sur-
rounds the person so that different abilities do not become the absence of 
abilities. Re-minding, as the play on words suggests, is remembering 
who one is, most fundamentally – as a relational human subject, per-
son, agent – a maker and a[n] interpreter of meaning” (Jennings 2010: 
173, original emphasis). The author also stresses the importance of 
what he calls hedonic or satisfaction conceptions. In Arrugas these con-
ceptions are embodied by Emilio’s friend, Miguel, who seeks to bring 
satisfaction and pleasure to Emilio’s daily life: “These accounts identify 
quality of life with states of awareness, consciousness, or experience of 
the individual. Happiness or pleasure, however those terms are pre-
cisely to be defined, are the sine qua non of quality of life” (Jennings 
2010: 177).13 Miguel seeks out and provides adventure for Emilio on a 
daily basis, including – at the extreme – an unauthorized trip in a car 
that, sadly, ends in disaster and injuries (Roca 2008: 74–80).14 As the 
chapters by Lindemann and Jennings imply, and as Arrugas dramatiz-
es, even when the chronic or acute care necessitated by dementia is 
absent, senescence in itself is at best still a journey into infirmity that 
renders new and continuing forms of human interdependency more 
visible than they might previously have been.
Though it does not discuss graphic novels, Hispanic studies scholar 
Matthew Marr’s monograph The Politics of Age and Disability in Con-
temporary Spanish Film explores these kinds of theoretical concerns in 
the visual context of Spanish cinema specifically. The key contribution 
of his book is that it emphasizes “an ideational linkage of adolescence, 
senescence, and disability,” which “are often experienced – and cus-
tomarily screened as – subject positions linked to self-estrangement” 
(2013: 6). The chapters of his book that he devotes to the films Justino, 
un asesino de la tercera edad (1994) and Elsa y Fred (2004) draw on Simone 
de Beauvoir’s The Coming of Age and Betty Friedan’s The Fountain of Age 
in ways that tie senescence and disability together: “Old age, after all, 
stands distinctively apart from other categories of social marginaliza-
tion in view of its distinctive potential for universality, that is, its all-
inclusive eligibility as a pejoratively construed, bittersweet Other into 
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which dramatically more individuals than ever will eventually morph” 
(2013: 63). The context Marr provides of Spain’s increasing elderly pop-
ulation since 1950 is particularly valuable (2013: 68), but the topic of 
dementia is not specifically foregrounded in the films under discussion 
there. Marr does well in noting that “agedness [...] is a relative construct 
like childhood or adolescence” (2013: 69), but it is arguably in the topic 
of elderly dementia that the links between senescence and disability are 
most clearly expressed. What it is important to see is that dementia is a 
way of reconciling the potential conceptual gap between old age and 
disability by finding common ground across social and health science 
perspectives.
The subjective experience of Alzheimer’s-related dementia must be 
approached simultaneously from one perspective that is clinical and 
another that might be called qualitative or humanistic; both are key to 
understanding Arrugas. Research into the disease and its symptoms has 
pointed to a set of general characteristics that can prove instructive. 
Clinical investigators have traced “the role of global cognitive decline” 
(Amanzio et al. 2008: 2), the “breakdown in episodic memory perfor-
mance,” and the “breakdown in semantic memory structures” that ac-
company the disease (Balota et al. 1999: 361, 362); as well as the imperfect 
relationship that exists for those with Alzheimer’s between recognition 
of faces, objects, and colours, on one hand, and names and qualities on 
the other (Brennen et al. 1996; Nielsen et al. 2004). In addition to these 
issues of memory and cognition, which Alzheimer’s may share with 
other forms of dementia (Orsini 1988; Reilly et al. 2010; Saffran and 
Branch Coslett 1996; Westmacott et al. 2004), other investigators have 
assessed the links between motor skills and remembering (Masumoto 
et al. 2004: 300)15 and have identified what might be called “Alzheimer’s 
speech” (Ramanathan 2008: 1) as well as the effects of the disease as 
expressed in writing (Venneri, Pestell, and Caffarra 2002). These hall-
mark characteristics of Alzheimer’s as noted in clinical research do, in 
fact, figure into the content of Arrugas, as will be examined in greater 
detail below, though this aspect of the work is arguably complemented 
by its non-spectacular, everyday approach, which ultimately empha-
sizes the human and social dimensions of ADRD over insights provid-
ed by the clinical paradigm.
Non-clinical research is equally important in making sense of the 
represented world of Arrugas and has several contributions to make 
to  the present interpretation. Linguistic research into the speech of 
Alzheimer’s dementia patients has argued for the significance of 
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non-verbal communication, which may even come to be predominant 
“in late-stage dementia patients who have lost most or all of their abil-
ity to speak coherently” (Ridge, Makoni, and Ridge 2003: 153). The no-
tion of narrative is also important, given that it can be meaningfully 
applied both to the person living with Alzheimer’s and to family and 
friends who tell themselves stories about their loved ones and who par-
ticipate in what, as we have seen, Jennings calls “re-minding.”16 One 
researcher has even used the notion of “narrative as self-portrait” as a 
particularly convincing way of exploring what might be called the in-
completeness or implicitness of verbal narratives of Alzheimer’s. As we 
will see, Arrugas offers ample opportunity to reconsider this supposi-
tion in light of the fact that narratives can themselves be visual 
(Hamilton 2008). Moving further on to cultural and literary terrain, pre-
vious research has investigated Alzheimer’s disease as represented in 
fiction and film17 – though it is no easy task to identify previous work 
taking on graphic novels and ADRD.
The importance of narrative for understanding how Alzheimer’s de-
mentia is represented in Arrugas might be generalized further in terms 
of the importance of time – as narratives may exist only through time. 
It is significant that the themes of memory and motor skills, and of 
reading, speech, and writing as they relate to Alzheimer’s disease, all 
have a temporal aspect. As Anne Davis Basting explains,
people with ADRD lose the ability to comprehend the chronological time 
systems that orient so much of global culture that it is nearly impossible 
for them to function without someone who can translate that world for 
them. Severe short-term memory loss can bring disorientation and para-
noia: Who is this person coming into my room? What is this room? 
Gradually, the forgetting of details grows into the loss of concepts. One 
does not just forget where one put the keys. One cannot comprehend the 
meaning of a key. (Basting 2001: 79)18 
In Arrugas, then, Emilio’s fading sense of self and his accompanying 
lack of familiarity with the people and things around him raise a vari-
ety of concerns. Readers can see, in his experience as dramatized on the 
page, the marginalization and self-estrangement of senescence in gen-
eral as explored by Marr. They stand as witnesses to a social attempt 
to  sustain his personhood that squares with what is discussed by 
Lindemann and Jennings. And also evident is the expressive presenta-
tion of the disorientation and conceptual loss indicated in the quotation 
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above by Basting. What is most important is the way in which these 
losses are unified in the graphic novel’s visual and narrative presenta-
tion of ADRD, which prioritizes its social context and human dimen-
sions. This presentation translates Emilio’s experience into visual forms 
of communication that viewers will well comprehend as metaphors for 
non-visual human experiences connected with aging. In addition, the 
graphic novel’s narrative complexity – its necessary emphasis on tempo-
rality through visual narrative – emphasizes the theme of chronological 
and contemporary time, which proves to be so difficult for those with 
Alzheimer’s to grasp, as both a negative and potentially positive experi-
ence. Arrugas problematizes and humanizes the Alzheimer’s experience 
of temporality by going beyond the notion that time is simply lost to 
suggest that time is also regained in a sense. As discussed further below, 
the significance and the meaning of such regained time, in the graphic 
novel, is dependent on the individual characters, who tend to experience 
it in positive ways. The analysis of Arrugas that follows builds on the 
theoretical links between senescence, disability, and interdependence; it 
also looks at the ways in which notions of time and narrative are fore-
grounded in the graphic novel’s presentation of dementia.
Diagnosis, Staging, Symptoms, and Transition 
Importantly, the link between senescence and Alzheimer’s disease and 
old age is made directly in the text in a sequence where Roca allows a 
doctor to explain the disease to Emilio and thus simultaneously to the 
readers. Roughly halfway through the work (2008: 56–8), Emilio has 
begun to suspect that he has Alzheimer’s, and he asks the doctor 
whether he takes the same medication as another resident named 
Modesto. The doctor states things directly – “Emilio, usted sufre de 
Alzheimer [Emilio, you suffer from Alzheimer’s]” – before describing 
the disease for him:  
El Alzheimer es una forma de demencia senil. La demencia es la pérdida 
de las funciones mentales, memoria, lenguaje, capacidad de razonar ... Se 
altera la conducta y la vida social. Y lo de senil se usa porque suele ser más 
habitual en edades avanzadas. Es muy característica la pérdida de memo-
ria reciente, sin embargo, la memoria pasada sigue funcionando bien. En 
parte es por eso por lo que los mayores hablan sólo del pasado. Pero ahora 
bien ... El Alzheimer es un tipo concreto de demencia, la más frecuente. 
Alrededor del 60% de las demencias son tipo Alzheimer. Además de la 
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memoria reciente, con el tiempo se destruye la memoria pasada, la orient-
ación, el lenguaje, la capacidad del enfermo para cuidarse y dirigir sus 
actos por sí mismo ... Es duro decirlo, Emilio ... Está usted en los primeros 
pasos del Alzheimer. Es una enfermedad degenerativa, progresiva e irre-
versible. Es muy duro para quien lo padece y para su familia. 
Alzheimer’s is a form of elderly dementia. Dementia refers to the loss of 
mental functions, memory, language, the ability to reason ... One’s behav-
iour and social life are affected. The word elderly is used here because 
it tends to become more common with advanced age. The loss of recent 
memory is very characteristic, however, long-term memory continues to 
function well. In part it is for this reason that the elderly talk only about 
the past. Nonetheless ... Alzheimer’s is a specific type of dementia, and 
the most frequent. Around 60 per cent of dementias are of the Alzheimer’s 
type. Beyond recent memory, with time it also destroys long-term memo-
ry, awareness, language, the ability of patients to take care of themselves 
and accomplish what they need to on their own ... It is a difficult thing to 
say, Emilio ... You are in the first stages of Alzheimer’s. It is a degenerative, 
progressive, and irreversible disease. It is very difficult on the person who 
suffers from it and on their family. (2008: 56–7)
This clinical perspective serves a valuable instructional or educational 
purpose for readers who might not be familiar with Alzheimer’s dis-
ease. The informational definition articulated by the doctor – who, it 
must be stressed, is a minor character in Arrugas – orients readers to the 
general symptoms and effects of ADRD. Note, however, that although 
the clinical perspective is important for our understanding Emilio’s 
situation and for the graphic novel as a whole, the artist chooses not to 
construct the graphic novel around the medical understanding of the 
disease, but rather to contextualize that medical view within the every-
day lives of people living with it. In this way, even while presenting a 
health sciences perspective on the material reality of cognitive impair-
ment, he socializes and humanizes ADRD. From this perspective, per-
haps more interesting are the events that prompt Emilio’s question to 
the doctor and the visual presentation of how he receives this informa-
tion. Each of these will be discussed in turn.
Emilio’s awareness that he has Alzheimer’s develops over time; this 
is reflected in the strategic pacing and narrative structure of Arrugas. 
Once interned in the transitional care facility, he meets Dolores and 
Modesto, who are always found sitting next to each other. As did the 
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real person who inspired her character, Dolores always holds her hus-
band’s hand, even as she feeds him or gives him his pills. At the cafete-
ria table, Emilio is often in a position to watch the two interact, and at 
one point, Miguel leans over to him and says about Modesto, “Tiene 
Alzheimer [He has Alzheimer’s]” (2008: 38). Here what is most striking 
is the portrayal of this important moment within two extended frames 
that function as if they were a cinematic shot–counter shot. Also, there 
is a curious parallel construction that adds meaning to our reception of 
the scene as readers. There is a parallel between the characters of 
Modesto and Emilio that is portrayed visually. Two long panels sit one 
over the other: in the first, Emilio is on the right, his friend and helper 
Miguel on the left; below that, Modesto is on the right, his wife and 
helper Dolores on the left. The two panels simulate shot–counter shot 
from Emilio’s point of view; their parallel positioning within the frame 
suggests a parallel life trajectory.
In a later scene that returns to the familiar set of the cafeteria table, 
when Emilio and Modesto receive each other’s medicine by mistake, 
the nurse says: “Bueno. Da igual ... Modesto y tú tenéis la misma medi-
cación. [Oh well. It doesn’t matter ... Modesto and you both have the 
same medication]” (2008: 55). At this time, during a moment of clarity, 
Emilio understands what this really means – that he, like Modesto, has 
Alzheimer’s – and for two frames his eyes open more widely than has 
been their custom. There is a key difference between the two frames: in 
the second one, as his eyes look up from his medication to glance at 
Dolores giving pills to Modesto, the drab beige paint on the background 
wall of the cafeteria behind him suddenly becomes uncharacteristically 
bright yellow. This exploits the graphic property through which back-
ground environments in comics art become expressive of subjectivi-
ties.19 The sharp change in the background speaks to a sharp change in 
Emilio’s mental state. The next frame, of Dolores giving Modesto his 
medicine while they hold hands, functions as a point-of-view shot: the 
paint on the wall has returned to its original beige, as if to help contrast 
the banal, everyday nature of life as it unfolds in the facility with the 
exceptionality of Emilio’s realization.
Throughout Arrugas, Roca exploits the formal properties of sequen-
tial art in order to portray Emilio’s subjective experience and emotional 
response. In the very next sequence, in fact, we see the discussion 
 between Emilio and his doctor. The formal properties of this sequence 
– including the drastic cut or narrative transition to the doctor’s expla-
nation of Alzheimer’s – emphasize for readers the emotional weight 
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5.1: Parallel life trajectory of Emilio and Modesto from Arrugas (Roca, 2008), 23.
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5.2: Emilio at a crossroads, from Arrugas (Roca, 2008), 20.
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5.3: Iconic modulation from Arrugas (Roca, 2008), 96.
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that Emilio’s surprising realization has placed on him. His reaction to 
the news that he has Alzheimer’s is shown to us indirectly, through 
seven successive point-of-view panels spanning three rows on the 
page, in which we see only Emilio’s legs and feet against the monoto-
nous beige of the laminated floor. Roca uses seven separate panels 
(rather than an extended or single panel) to emphasize how immobi-
lized this information has made Emilio; in doing so, the graphic artist is 
maximizing a primary representational property of comics – iconic 
 redundancy – so as to underscore Emilio’s reluctance or even inability 
to accept this bad news. The position of his legs and feet remains un-
changed throughout the sequence, further communicating the moment 
of shock he is experiencing while the conversation unfolds (2008: 57–8). 
As the two panels that function as bookends for this sequence show – 
by giving us similar mid-shots of the downward tilt of his head – he is 
having a hard time accepting this diagnosis and is struggling to main-
tain his former understanding of his situation. Overall, the repetitive 
graphic presentation of the panel content and the formal strategy of 
using multiple distinct panels serve to accentuate the reader’s under-
standing that his emotional state is flat-lining. His final question to the 
doctor in this sequence – “¿Y con el tiempo acabaré en el piso de arriba? 
[And with time will I end up on the second floor?]” – is met with the 
doctor’s stunned silence. A cut then leads into a sequence where he and 
Miguel contemplate the stairs to the second floor (2008: 58–61) – a sym-
bol of the future that awaits him in the later stages of Alzheimer’s.
The development of these later stages, and Emilio’s increasing frus-
tration over them, are the motor that drives the storyline forward in 
Arrugas. Note that the graphic novel does not clearly present the pro-
gression of chronological time; instead, it shows time’s passing indi-
rectly through the change in seasons and the disappearances (presumed 
deaths) of other residents in the facility. In another sense, through the 
repetition of familiar scenes at regular intervals, time seems to stand 
still in the facility. At one point, a two-page spread (2008: 46–7) drives 
home the monotony of the facility with eleven panels whose composi-
tion is remarkably similar and devoid of words. In a few we see only 
empty chairs; but in others the residents suddenly appear to us, seated 
and seemingly napping while sitting up. They are all stationary, in 
chairs against a wall under a clock. We know intellectually that time is 
passing because of the movement of the clock’s hands from one panel 
to the next, and also because of the sunlight and eventually the dark-
ness entering the room from an unseen window off-panel to the right of 
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the frame. The only movement appears when a nurse rolls a resident in 
a wheelchair towards our left – but the clock times and appearances 
and disappearances of the residents seem to be somewhat out of joint. 
In this scene, Roca has seemingly placed us in the position of the resi-
dents: we do not experience time’s passing as a fluid movement – an 
intimation that some patients with Alzheimer’s have trouble fully 
grasping the motion of chronological time.
In a much wider sense, however, the passing of time in Arrugas is 
most clearly marked through the development of Emilio’s Alzheimer’s 
symptoms. For example, he “loses” his watch early in the novel (2008: 
25), “loses” his wallet and his money at its midpoint (2008: 51), and 
further on “loses” his black socks (2008: 87). Once Emilio has been 
transferred to the second floor for a greater level of assistance with his 
everyday activities, Miguel finds these items in a box that Emilio kept 
under his mattress (2008: 94). It seems that Emilio was keeping them 
in a safe place but, due to the progression of Alzheimer’s, was unable 
to remember where he had put them. This forgetting causes all manner 
of misunderstandings, most notably the notion that Miguel has been 
stealing items from Emilio. The regular pacing of these events through-
out the graphic novel mimics the steady progression of the disease. 
This organizational structure of the narrative is, of course, combined 
with other clues that his disease is progressing and also paired with 
parallel storylines of other characters.20
As Emilio tries to grasp the doctor’s news that he will inevitably 
progress towards the later stages of Alzheimer’s, he becomes more in-
terested in contemplating his likely future on the second floor. Earlier, 
when he had first entered the residence, during the tour Miguel gave 
him, an abrupt close-up panel showed him asking “¿Y esa escalera 
adónde va? [And where does that stairway go?]” (2008: 19). Miguel’s 
explanation distinguished between those “válidos [able-bodied resi-
dents]” living on the first floor and the “asistidos [residents requiring 
assistance]” on the second. The use of an intriguing text–image combi-
nation in the five-panel page that follows Emilio’s question (2008: 20) 
reinforces the theme of Arrugas and gives us insight into the inner expe-
rience of its protagonist. The first row on the page consists of two pan-
els that provide readers with Miguel’s explanation of the major detail of 
the facility’s floor plan, but the second and third rows are more interest-
ing, visually speaking. The second row consists of a single panel that 
spans the width of the page, depicting a span of approximately five 
steps in a stairwell in relative close-up. The effects of hallway lighting 
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create a diagonal shadow on the left side of the image that runs top to 
bottom, artistically replicating the use of chiaroscuro staging in cinema 
and thus speaking to the symbolism evoked through sharp contrast. 
Here the use of contrast summons for readers the distinctions between 
young and old, relative independence and increasing dependence, 
able-bodied and disabled; and, by logical extension, between the op-
posing forces of life and death. Superimposed on this image, in three 
connected speech bubbles that run top to bottom as they move left to 
right diagonally down the page, are the words Miguel voices to Emilio: 
“Allí arriba van a parar los que ya no pueden valerse por sí mismos … 
los que han perdido la razón, los que tienen algún tipo de demencia, 
como Alzheimer … No me gustaría acabar ahí arriba [That’s where 
those who can’t take care of themselves end up … those who have lost 
their mind, those who have some type of dementia, like Alzheimer’s … 
I wouldn’t want to end up there].” This left-to-right diagonal text place-
ment cuts across the right-to-left diagonal shadow line mentioned 
above, schematically forming an “X”.
The compositional and formal significance of this “X” pattern can be 
seen as reflecting the notion that Emilio is at a crossroads – most im-
mediately in his visual contemplation of the second floor, and also 
speaking of the trajectory of his life, given his recent placement in the 
transitional care facility. The extension of the second-row panel from 
page margin to page margin reads as the intersection point of this “X” 
or the nexus of this metaphorical crossroads. Its extended spatial width 
calls for readers to invest more time contemplating the stairs, and thus 
contemplating Emilio’s possible future as he does. After all, this sec-
ond-row image we see of the stairs is in part a point-of-view image 
from Emilio’s perspective, something that will be repeated after Emilio 
speaks with his doctor. In a simple sense, the “‘X” constituted by 
this  second row creates an interesting visual symmetry in the image 
that prompts readers to linger on and sympathize with Emilio’s inner 
doubts and concerns. In a formal sense, however, the “X” within this 
panel contrasts text-line to shadow-line, and thus word to text. In this 
way, the diagonal downward positioning of Miguel’s successive state-
ments serves an additional function. While the stairs visually lead to 
the second floor, the descending direction of the written text reminds us 
that this potential movement upward is in fact a downward marker of 
deterioration. There is, here, an interesting and inverse relationship be-
tween words and images: as language deteriorates over time as one of 
the effects of Alzheimer’s, the visual world becomes more immediate 
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and perhaps for that reason more important. This contrast is thus par-
ticularly poignant in that it represents Emilio’s material experience of 
the progression of ADRD: downward text maps to progressive issues 
regarding expressive language; stairs and shadow leading the eye up-
ward map to an uncertain future whose details are unknown.
The third row’s return from one to two panels contributes to the sym-
metrical composition of the page. Echoing the identical formal expres-
sion of the first row, it scales up the “X” figure (with an extended nexus) 
by rounding out the two feet of the letter. In this way it brings a sense 
of partial closure both to the scene and to Emilio’s unvocalized and vi-
sually implied thoughts on his own future and mortality. The page 
functions as a relatively autonomous unit, even if this encounter will 
repeat later on in the graphic novel. In contrast to the panels on the first 
row, which were drawn from a first-floor point of view, both of the 
third-row panels are drawn from a perspective rooted at the top of the 
stairway. As readers we look down at Emilio and Miguel. In the first 
third-row panel we see Miguel walking off to the left, stating “Prefiero 
no enseñártelo. Me deprime subir ahí [I’d prefer not to show it to you. 
Going up there depresses me],” and in the second Emilio is now alone. 
In contrast to Miguel’s movement, Emilio remains immobilized, brief-
case in his right hand, still as can be and still looking upward – at the 
second floor, at his future, and directly at us as readers. This time our 
point of view as readers puts us in the very same shadow that Emilio 
had contemplated from below just a moment ago, and the vertical 
downward-facing angle of each third-row panel composition makes 
him seem powerless and insignificant. In symbolic terms, we now oc-
cupy the position of Emilio’s future – a point of view that prompts us to 
anticipate both his diagnosis of Alzheimer’s and his eventual passing 
to the assisted-living floor of the transitional facility.
As mentioned earlier – and in line with the graphic novel’s narrative 
structure – this scene at the stairway reappears after Emilio has spoken 
with the doctor about his diagnosis. Given the metaphorical and sym-
bolic value of the stairway scene discussed above, this repetition 
prompts a return to those deeper forms of lucid contemplation that had 
been communicated only visually. The start of this more lengthy se-
quence (2008: 58–61) thrusts the reader back into a deeper contem-
plation of Emilio’s doubts, concerns, and future through the use of 
two page-width-spanning panels. The first depicts Emilio in close-up, 
against the beige background, with no other details save some shadows 
at the left side of the panel. The voice of Miguel, in off, asks him, “¿Estás 
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seguro que quieres subir ahí? [Are you sure that you want to go up 
there?]” (2008: 58). There is an emptiness to the image caused by a de-
liberate lack of represented detail. This lack of detail together with the 
extended width of the panel brings us closer to sympathizing with 
Emilio’s thoughts, as the few shadows at the left side of the image bring 
back the theme of aging, infirmity, and death as implied in the previous 
sequence (2008: 20). In a sense, he may as well not even be standing in 
the hallway of the facility – place is minimized and at the extreme un-
important, as the formal composition of the panel encourages identifi-
cation with the protagonist’s doubts and concerns.
The second panel (2008: 59) also spans the page and presents the 
same daunting image of the stairway as we saw before (2008: 20). Here 
the image is depicted from more of a long shot, which allows us to see 
a slightly greater number of stairs (just over six), as well as the banister 
on the left of the frame, which, along with the familiar shadow line, 
leads upward. What is different here is that, aware of what awaits 
Emilio, both he and Miguel decide to venture up to the second floor. 
The relative lack of text (2008: 59) reflects the solemnity of the occasion 
and the worry, fear, and trepidation Emilio is experiencing when faced 
with his uncertain future. Once upstairs, the two men pass through a 
set of doors into the second-floor cafeteria, where they walk through an 
overwhelming scene. An elderly woman hurriedly approaches them, 
asking whether they have seen her parents; other residents are sleep-
ing, crying, screaming, and on the whole not communicating with one 
another. The scene is all the more overwhelming for the contrast estab-
lished between the silent and prolonged approach up the stairs and the 
overuse of text once in the cafeteria. As they walk back down the stairs, 
a lone panel with no text is followed by a lucid statement from Emilio 
to Miguel: “No voy a acabar ahí, Miguel. Haré todo lo posible para no 
acabar ahí [I am not going to end up there, Miguel. I’ll do everything 
possible not to end up there]” (2008: 61). From here on, through the 
 actions of its protagonist, Arrugas gives us a valuable opportunity to 
experience the frustration some people diagnosed with Alzheimer’s 
can feel.
Now that Emilio understands that he is at risk of being moved to the 
second floor, he asks Miguel to help him. At first Miguel suggests read-
ing to maintain his mental acuity – something that Emilio finds too 
frustrating because he cannot remember what he has just read (2008: 
62). Next he suggests a more elaborate plan that involves tricking the 
nurses and the doctor (2008: 63). The pair work collaboratively to hide 
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Emilio’s growing memory problems, which on a number of occasions 
saves him from being exposed in front of the facility staff: for example, 
when Emilio mistakes a spoon for a knife in the cafeteria (2008: 65–6). 
Miguel also instructs Emilio about the value of dressing well, as staff 
members can note signs of disease progression by the way a resident is 
dressed (2008: 69). When Emilio is next scheduled for an examination 
with the doctor, Miguel makes sure he has the answers to predictable 
questions written down on his arm, even though in the end Emilio has 
problems reading them and is saved by the actions of another resident, 
whose obvious escape attempt receives urgent attention from the staff 
(2008: 70). Ultimately, of course, the material effects of the progression 
of Emilio’s Alzheimer’s are too powerful to be kept in check by Miguel’s 
suggestions. In spite of the labels Miguel affixes to his clothing to help 
him remember the names of the items he wears (2008: 86), Emilio’s 
memory and behaviour worsen: he asks to be taken to the city as he 
believes he is expected at work (2008: 81).21
Fitting with the everyday perspective of the graphic novel, Emilio’s 
unavoidable move to the second floor is not romanticized in Arrugas. In 
fact this event is not depicted at all – it just happens. The narration se-
lectively leaves this moment out of the story’s emplotment. In a touch-
ing scene, after it is more than clear that Emilio will very soon be unable 
to take care of himself, Miguel helps him button his shirt (2008: 89). The 
single-page sequence consists of eight panels and a final white blank 
space where the ninth panel should be, marking this event as one of the 
last times the two roommates will interact in the space they have shared 
for so long. The first row of panels depicts Emilio’s frustration through 
what might be compared to a series of cinematic jump-cuts. With the 
transition from each panel to the next, Roca varies the distance and fo-
cal point of each image, giving readers the disorienting sense that the 
passing of chronological time here is just as unclear for us as it likely is 
for Emilio. From a close-up of Emilio’s hands on the buttons we cut to 
a long shot of the same action, and finally to a close-up of his face look-
ing down, presumably watching the ineffective actions of his hands. An 
eyeline-match panel begins the second row and shows us Miguel as a 
witness to Emilio’s frustration: he is seated on his bed with a worried 
look on his face. Another long shot of Emilio alone, which would have 
fit in with the panels of the first row, is followed by a long shot of Miguel 
buttoning Emilio’s shirt for him, and then a close-up. The eighth panel 
is a close-up of Emilio alone, smiling, relieved that his frustration has 
passed and still looking down as if unable to fully grasp that it is Miguel 
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who has helped him. After the white non-panel, which implies Emilio’s 
transition to the second floor, we see a sequence depicting Miguel eat-
ing in the cafeteria next to an empty chair (2008: 90), and we must ac-
tively construct for ourselves that Emilio’s transition to the assisted 
living floor must have occurred in the interim. This can perhaps be 
 understood as a key choice made by the graphic artist to avoid spec-
tacularizing ADRD as loss and to instead focus on its more routine ex-
perience in everyday life.
It is necessary to point out, of course, that in charting the progressive 
effects of Alzheimer’s disease – both in Emilio and in the other charac-
ters – Arrugas also focuses on positive aspects of its characters’ lives in 
the transitional care facility. Beyond the care and treatment residents 
receive – whether on the first floor or the second – the graphic novel 
also represents tender moments between residents, friends, and family. 
Family visits are a source not only of disconnection but also of connec-
tion, and Emilio in particular seems happy when he sees his family 
(2008: 52–3). Even despite his occasional deception of other residents to 
acquire money, Miguel’s hedonic support of Emilio and others is a con-
sistent part of the storyline of Arrugas: he helps a woman make a phone 
call to her family, provides residents with everyday items they need, 
and consistently tries to keep everyone’s spirits high. In addition, the 
importance of motor skill development for patients with Alzheimer’s 
disease is foregrounded in an impressive sequence that combines activ-
ity, humour, and an interesting narrative flourish of its own.22 One of 
the most important aspects of Arrugas’s presentation of Alzheimer’s 
dementia, however, may not be the content and formal strategies men-
tioned above, but rather its use of the semi-subjective, which suggests a 
social commitment to collective responsibility for the material experi-
ence of disability.
The Semi-Subjective, Interdependence, and Collective Narration
In cinema, “semi-subjective” refers to a visual perspective that repre-
sents neither a third-person or “objective” shot nor a first-person or 
“subjective” point-of-view shot. Instead, the semi-subjective bridges 
the objective and subjective camera positions in a subtle way. One ex-
ample provided by the work of director and cinema theorist Pier Paolo 
Pasolini is that of a shot where, capturing a child in movement back 
and forth on a swing, the camera moves also from side to side with the 
motion of the swing. In this case, we are talking neither about the 
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point-of-view perspective of an identified or unidentified onlooker nor 
about an objective treatment that would be implied in a stationary cam-
era. This use of the semi-subjective thus creates a sympathy between the 
spectator and the subject of the camera, all while leaving its point of 
view in a state of indeterminacy. As a strategy of narration – perhaps 
akin to the complex strategies of shifting prose narration Mikhail 
Bakhtin identified in the nineteenth-century Russian novel – the semi-
subjective visually brings viewers’ attention to confront the existence of 
a narratological perspective and even to question its authority. What is 
so compelling about the presentation of Alzheimer’s-related dementia 
as we experience it in Arrugas is Roca’s use of this same semi-subjective 
strategy, now transposed onto the unique medium of comics art to 
prompt us to sympathize with its characters. The effect of this strategy 
is that readers appreciate the subjective experience of Alzheimer’s dis-
ease from a perspective that is more humanistic than clinical.
From the first scene – a thirteen-panel sequence that unfolds over 
two pages (2008: 7–8) – Arrugas foregrounds the way consciousness is 
affected by physical changes to the brain rooted in the progression of 
Alzheimer’s. In the first panel of the graphic novel, readers see an 
 establishing scene of a bank interior. Bank customers are lined up in 
three queues leading to teller stations on the left border of the panel. 
Unobstructed by those waiting their turn is a view of a back office 
where a man is seated behind a desk. Facing us as readers, even if he is 
only distantly visible, the man (Emilio) counsels a couple through what 
he clearly understands to be bad news. Each of the first three panels 
spans the full page width, and readers successively read the delivery 
piece by piece, first in an establishing shot as above, next in a medium 
close-up of the bank loan officer from a relatively high angle, and fi-
nally in a medium close-up of the couple from a relatively low angle. 
From this point on, as the couple reacts to the bad news, the panel 
width is reduced from one page-spanning panel to two panels, and 
subsequently two rows of three panels. This use of form quickens the 
pace of reading, inducing an emotional intensity in readers that is 
heightened by the sudden revelation that the bank officer is not at work 
at all, but instead at home in bed, experiencing a moment of spatio-
temporal confusion rooted in deep memories that are relatively discon-
nected from the present moment. The juxtaposition of high and low 
angles prefigures this shift, subtly undermining the position of social 
power from which the loan officer speaks. Notably, in the third panel of 
the sequence, the word balloon emanates from the bottom of the frame, 
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further adding to the feeling that the bank employee has a lower status 
than he realizes.
As the sequence plays out, readers witness several drastic changes in 
selected panel details that together prompt a shift from semi-subjective 
to objective reality that can be identified as such through retroactive 
determination. At first, the couple and the loan officer seem to merely 
be present in the same space of the bank building. But in truth, the 
space they share is not that of a bank office but that of a bedroom in a 
private residence. Emilio is actively remembering and even enacting 
his role at the bank, but his scenario is not shared. In the row compris-
ing panels 9–10–11, readers see that the couple are not sitting down at a 
desk in the bank office but instead are standing up over Emilio’s bed. 
Interestingly, they are wearing the same clothes in both the bank scene 
and the bedroom scene. Both before and after the shift in perspective, 
Emilio’s son wears the same red collared-shirt and white undershirt, 
and his son’s wife the same green-toned sweater. Emilio’s appearance, 
however, is quite distinct in each place. At the bank he is a younger, 
black-haired man with suit and tie, while in the private residence he 
has white hair and wears a bathrobe. As we soon realize, the scene in 
which we have been participating as readers corresponds to Emilio’s 
subjective mental world and not to the reality that the couple have been 
perceiving. It is important to recognize that we initially see the world 
from a point of view that is simultaneously his yet not solely his own. 
The consistency of the couple’s clothes and appearance, and their con-
sistent positioning within the represented space, indicate that objective 
details nonetheless find their way into the mental space that Emilio en-
acts. The fact that his appearance is the only one to change accentuates 
the notion that this is his journey alone. This visually manifests the 
emotional shock and disorientation Emilio must feel transitioning from 
the space and time he routinely imagines back to the space and time of 
the immediate present from which he is progressively distanced. This 
shock is translated into the comics medium through two punctuating 
panels (10 and 11) with a high degree of iconic redundancy whose effect 
underscores Emilio’s white hair and a close-up of his emotional reac-
tion. In the end both Emilio’s self-image and the perceived mise en scène 
are revealed to be the product of a memorialized selfhood whose con-
nection with the present has been severed.
Particularly effective in this regard is the game of representational 
presence and absence as presented through the sequence’s formal 
 properties. This game speaks immediately to the experience of ADRD 
162 Two Cognition, Collaboration, Community
as panels reveal the sudden presence of a bed tray with a glass of water, 
a bowl of soup, and a soup spoon. The sudden appearance of objects 
that have not previously been present to Emilio’s consciousness drama-
tizes the inverse of the loss described earlier by Basting.23 If this process 
of drawing Emilio back to the immediate present is a social enactment 
of the “reminding” that Jennings writes about, here it is experienced 
neither as comforting nor as reassuring by Emilio and his family. 
Instead, there is a certain violence to this transition towards lucidity, to 
this abrupt reorientation – a violence that soon manifests itself in the 
frustration Emilio expresses by throwing his soup bowl and bed-table 
tray to the floor. The return to panels of page-spanning width at the 
close of this sequence illustrates Emilio’s resigned adaptation to the ob-
jective reality he shares with his housemates. The final panel’s relative 
lack of details – it shows only his son being drenched with soup against 
a large amount of grey wall – communicates self-estrangement, and the 
fact that Emilio’s word balloon once again emanates from the bottom of 
the frame illustrates a downward turn in his feelings.
This entire sequence and its culminating image dramatize what Tom 
Kitwood, implicitly blending clinical and non-clinical perspectives, has 
called “dementia as a form of bereavement”: here, Emilio has “to face 
two kinds of loss simultaneously – the loss of mental powers, and the 
loss of a familiar way of life” (2011: 29). The strategy of semi-subjectively 
representing the internal realities of other individual characters who 
are experiencing what is plausibly also ADRD is repeated during the 
graphic novel, giving visual representation to established tenets that 
for decades have validated the unique subjectivities of each person 
with dementia (see Kitwood 2011: 70–1). While outside of art “it is im-
possible … to enter fully into the experiential frame of another person, 
simply because each person is unique” (2011: 71), in its own way 
Arrugas stages that possibility for us – it is a prompt for our empathetic 
identification with the subjective experience of dementia.24
Arrugas moves on to present other examples of the semi-subjective 
image in a range of characters. When we experience another semi- 
subjective portrayal of Emilio’s ADRD late in the graphic novel, for ex-
ample, there is a similar relative disconnection from the present, one 
that is held in tension with his incomplete awareness of his immediate 
surroundings. In a sense, the manifestation of these shared visual or 
spatial elements in Emilio’s subjective world is linked to the fact that 
his Alzheimer’s has not progressed far enough to completely discon-
nect him from the present. In this later scene (2008: 44–5), Emilio stands 
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at the bathroom mirror shaving with an electric razor. Once again his 
hair is black and his face devoid of wrinkles, intimating that his mental 
representation of himself has shifted back in time to an earlier period – 
his middle-aged years, when he worked at the bank. It is night, and in 
the contrasting panel on the left we can see Miguel asleep in the room 
(2008: 44). When Miguel wakes up and walks into the bathroom, we see 
both an elderly Miguel and a middle-aged Emilio in the same mirror 
image. Emilio states that he must go to work, to which Miguel replies 
that it is three in the morning (2008: 45). Emilio’s shock at hearing this 
is reflected in the use of an extended panel width. Having heard the 
correct time, he turns to look at his friend – and thus also at us as read-
ers – and at once becomes white-haired in both reflection and reality. In 
each of these two uses of the semi-subjective, we are seeing the world 
through Emilio’s mind’s eye, but we are never completely disconnected 
from his immediate context. And importantly, up until now, neither is 
he completely disconnected. Compared to other characters in the 
graphic novel, his is a relative disorientation that selectively incorpo-
rates aspects of the visible world around him.
This is not as strongly the case with other characters in Arrugas: Félix, 
Carmencita, or Modesto, for example. Félix’s inner mental world is re-
vealed to the readers visually even as Miguel and Emilio participate in 
it without realizing. In the comics version of Arrugas, we see a young 
Félix, perhaps twenty to thirty years old and in military garb, smoking 
a cigarette on a break while at a desert military base (2008: 33). As 
Miguel and Emilio walk by, we see them in the same military garb worn 
by Félix, who now stands up to salute. Within this semi-subjective por-
trayal of the young officer’s subjective world, the uniforms worn by the 
pair of white-haired elderly gentlemen become a visual marker of the 
power of Félix’s dementia to recast the existing world according to its 
own logic. This is a visual logic of memories rooted in the past, memo-
ries that now surge forth to change a character’s image of the present 
– and as readers we are able to participate in that change. When Miguel 
remarks to Emilio that he wonders what goes on in Félix’s head (2008: 
33), we recognize that we are participating in a memory to which not all 
characters in the story-world have access. The two friends have no idea 
how Félix sees them. We also have access, for example, to Carmencita’s 
disoriented inner world, when she hallucinates a group of aliens on the 
grounds of the residence, who lean casually against their spaceship, 
smiling. Other characters are present in the scene, but only Carmencita 
and the graphic novel’s readers know it when one of the aliens speaks, 
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saying “Ya te quedarás sola, ya … (Now you will be alone forever …)” 
(2008: 44). These examples are interesting precisely because of the way 
that iconic signification is decoupled from a single viewpoint. The rep-
resentations we witness are collective in origin, and in the case of such 
semi-subjective portrayals, the border between one perspective and an-
other is elusive.
The case of Modesto is perhaps more indicative of the possibility for 
the progression of ADRD to bring about an extreme disconnection from 
the present, but also the possibility for this temporal disconnection to 
have a positive aspect. In a sequence that unfolds within the objective 
space of the facility cafeteria, Dolores is feeding Modesto, as she cus-
tomarily does, when Antonia asks Dolores what she whispers to her 
husband that routinely makes Modesto smile (2008: 66–8; see also 24). 
Dolores responds with an answer that is later unpacked in a visual se-
quence spanning two full pages: “tramposo [tricky]” (2008: 66). The 
sequence that follows is best understood as a hybrid event. Earlier in 
the graphic novel, Roca had presented a sequence that was in truth a 
flashback, where Emilio remembered the fear and trepidation he expe-
rienced on a particular day as a child when he was overwhelmed by the 
everyday act of attending school (2008: 11). Here, the sequence in ques-
tion is, at least in part, a flashback to Modesto’s childhood. We hear the 
word “tramposo” in one panel; the next panel portrays Modesto as a 
young child, occupying the same position within the frame as in the 
previous panel. In the mini-narrative that unfolds, we are in the moun-
tain village of Modesto’s youth as he asks a younger Dolores if she will 
be his girlfriend. In front of her laughing friends she replies, “Sólo si me 
traes una nube [Only if you bring me a cloud]” (2008: 67) – a seemingly 
impossible request. He then takes her up to the church bell tower, where 
the young couple watch a cloud approaching them with the wind and 
passing over them and through the bell tower, much to their delight. In 
this intercalated story, the scene ends with the young Dolores smiling 
and calling Modesto “tramposo” (2008: 68), after which we see the 
book-end panel image of an elderly Modesto smiling. Even here there 
are parallels between the subjective world and the objective world as in 
other semi-subjective sequences – not only the use of the word “tram-
poso,” but in particular, Dolores’s positioning to Modesto’s right both 
within the subjective memory-world and in the objective cafeteria-
world. At the same time, however, this sequence potentially involves a 
shared memory – one that involves two people who met when they 
were young. The likelihood is that Dolores knows precisely that she is 
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invoking the memory of their shared childhood experience in the 
church. Even so, what the reader has witnessed here is a scene that is 
simultaneously memory and almost complete disconnection from the 
immediate present entangled with the complications of ADRD – an 
 example of Jennings’s “re-minding” that remains effective only because 
it references a memory long-established in the individual’s early life. 
What is clear is that, because of their long history, Dolores and Modesto 
can share in this re-minding activity in a way that is impossible for the 
other characters in Arrugas – a fact that evokes the emotional connec-
tions and social relationships at the heart of the graphic novel.
Though it is not an example of the semi-subjective but rather a relat-
ed example of a more subjective experience of “becoming Alzheimer’s,” 
a key sequence towards the end of Arrugas stages for us the experience 
of losing the ability to recognize faces. The simple term recognition, of 
course, is best understood as shorthand for a variety of sub-tasks that 
may not all come into play in the graphic novel.25 In a general sense, 
however, the lack of facial recognition that accompanies the progres-
sion of Emilio’s Alzheimer’s disease becomes a visual metaphor for 
 impaired cognition, which may include the simultaneous erosion of se-
mantic access and naming (Brennen et al. 1996: 106). The sequence in 
question occurs after Emilio has been transferred to the second floor. 
Miguel goes upstairs to visit him and to continue in the support role he 
has increasingly adopted while witnessing the cognitive decline of his 
roommate. The second-floor cafeteria is loud and overwhelming, just 
as it was when the two friends ventured upstairs to take a look. Now, 
however, Emilio is distanced enough from his immediate present that 
he seems to take no notice. While Miguel feeds Emilio using a spoon – 
the bib around the latter’s neck serving as a visual reminder of the ad-
vanced stage of his ADRD – we see some panels that can be seen as 
alternating point-of-view shots. First there is Miguel’s view of Emilio in 
mid-close-up; three subsequent views of Miguel follow at a similar dis-
tance, one right after the other. Tracing the development of these panels 
can clarify just how Roca immerses us in a more direct experience of the 
effects of ADRD.
In the first-panel view of Miguel the outline of his face is visible and 
part of an ear, just as is the smallest portion of white hair atop his head; 
notably, though, his face has no features – no eyes, eyebrows, nose, 
or mouth. No wrinkles. In the next panel, there is a bit more hair, part 
of a mouth, and some rudimentary hints of eyes and a nose. In the third 
panel we see Miguel as we have seen him before throughout the 
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graphic novel: all of his facial features are clearly visible, and pro-
nounced wrinkles show on his forehead, by his eyes, and near his 
mouth. Over the course of these three views, Roca modulates the level 
of iconicity of his drawing as a way of simulating Emilio’s struggle to 
make sense of this person in front of him. The last image on the page 
(2008: 95) shifts back to showing us Emilio’s face – his mouth is no lon-
ger agape, and he does not look worried, but neither does he look hap-
py. As readers, we must question whether he recognizes Miguel. On the 
next page (2008: 96), from Emilio’s point of view, Miguel’s features be-
gin to disappear and once again become more iconic than we have be-
come accustomed to in Roca’s graphic novel. The depiction of Miguel 
in the wide panel in the centre of the page is drastically without skin 
pigment and even lacks the colours of his shirt and jacket. The bottom 
third of the page extends this erosion of specificity and of colour by 
eschewing the representation of a panel altogether and relying on the 
white background of the page and gutter. This image on the verso page 
(2008: 96), which sits parallel to the image of the train smoke on the vis-
ible recto page (2008: 97), makes clear through visual metaphor that 
Emilio no longer remembers who Miguel is. In the end, Emilio cannot 
visually recognize his friend. By following Roca’s deft visual metaphor 
of his now severe Alzheimer’s symptoms, in a sense we have gained an 
appreciation of his struggle through a metaphor for cognition made 
visible on the page.
The final example of the semi-subjective in Arrugas, and perhaps the 
one that is richest with symbolism, is the recurring self-image sus-
tained by Señora Rosario. This same semi-subjective scene appears 
numerous times throughout the novel (2008: 18–19, 52, 97) and even 
on the cover of the book’s eighth edition. Our introduction to Rosario 
is prompted by a comment Emilio makes on his initial tour of the facil-
ity: “¿No hay nadie despierto en la residencia? [Is nobody awake in 
the residence?],” he asks, at once incredulous and wary of the situation 
he is being thrust into (2008: 18). As a consequence of this question, 
Miguel introduces Emilio to Rosario, who is one of the facility’s more 
disoriented residents. The next image is a panel spanning the width of 
the page that shows a train passing over a mountain bridge. Seen from 
a low angle, with clouds in the background and a tree in the fore-
ground, the composition of the train scene connotes a sense of serenity. 
We see a young woman in a chair whose surrounding mise en scène is 
that of a train compartment. The woman’s expensive fur coat, along 
with the comfortable chair, elegant curtain, and side-table lamp, gives 
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us to understand that this traveller is well-off and vacationing in the 
first-class car. When Miguel says hello, Rosario responds “¿Ustedes 
también van a Estambul? [Are you also going to Istanbul?],” and 
Miguel’s answer is no, that he and Emilio are getting off at the next stop 
(2008: 18). The elderly gentlemen Miguel and Emilio appear as they 
objectively are in the sequence, but the door Miguel touches is not the 
door of the residence but rather the French door of an expensive train 
compartment; this signals that here too we are seeing the characters 
from a point of view that approximates Rosario’s almost complete dis-
connection from her present. The final image of the sequence brings us 
out of this semi-subjective and back into the objective reality of the 
transitional care facility. From this point of view, we see an elderly 
Señora Rosario seated, not on a train in the first-class car, but in a wheel-
chair next to a window at the residence. She seemingly stares out the 
window of the residential facility, but in her reality, of course, she is still 
staring out the window of a train car – at a beautiful mountain pass that 
maps back to another time in her distant memory. It is of interest 
that  when her family comes to visit we see them once again from a 
semi-subjective perspective in her train compartment as she talks about 
visiting her husband in an Istanbul hotel (2008: 52). This use of the 
semi-subjective strategy in a sequence where all other characters’ fam-
ily visits are portrayed objectively and visually indicates to readers and 
viewers the severity of her Alzheimer’s symptoms while engaging 
iconic signification as a collective representation.
At the end of the graphic novel, Antonia uses her walker to move 
herself over to the window, where she sits down by Rosario. Here, 
Arrugas uses the semi-subjective to push us even further into Rosario’s 
world, in effect to have us see things from her point of view. In previous 
depictions of Rosario’s inner experience the characters entering her 
train car retained their own clothing; here, once Antonia sits down be-
side Rosario, we see her too at a much younger age. There is an element 
of sympathy here that works on two levels. Antonia – one of the more 
lucid elderly residents in the facility, whose frustrations are more famil-
ial and social than they are related to problems of memory or language 
loss – seems to be willingly participating in Rosario’s world. When 
Rosario asks her “¿Usted también va a Estambul? [Are you also going to 
Istanbul?],” Antonia surprisingly says, “Sí. [Yes],” clearly playing along 
(2008: 97). Yet if Antonia is playing along, it is unclear whether the 
younger version of herself that we see is her own self-representation or 
an interpretation on the part of Rosario. If it is the latter, then the visual 
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narration of the graphic novel is bringing us further than it has before 
into the inner experience of Rosario’s subjective consciousness. The im-
ages of Rosario’s train car were never portrayed in such a subjective 
style – there were always obvious indicators of the objective reality that 
escaped her perception, even if these were limited to the presence of 
newcomers. Antonia may be reliving a previous experience or at least a 
previous youthful mental state in order to sympathize and relate to her 
co-resident – but it is important that in this case we are notably seeing a 
unique fusion of two consciousnesses on the page: Antonia’s image of 
herself and Rosario’s image of herself at once. No matter the interpreta-
tion one chooses, one must admit that there has, in fact, been a collec-
tive expansion of iconic representation in our experience of these 
semi-subjective visual portrayals throughout Arrugas. We ourselves, 
as  its readers, have been able to sympathize with Roca’s characters 
throughout the novel – we have been the ones sharing their world and 
sharing in their subjective experiences visually.
To a significant degree, Arrugas has given both readers and viewers 
the opportunity to reconcile the subjective memories of various charac-
ters with the objective story-world in which they are immersed first-
hand. Awareness of this narratological layering leads us to recognize, 
also, our own reconciliation of the world Roca has represented for us 
with our own objective world as readers of his graphic novel. The 
smoke that emerges from Rosario’s train on the mountain pass (2008: 
97) and that subsequently dissolves the border between panel and gut-
ter in truth blends the panel image with the blank surrounding margin 
of the book we are reading. I prefer to consider this smoke as a cloud, in 
order to square with the intercalated story of Dolores and Modesto’s 
childhood experience in the church bell tower related above. Clouds 
are used as a recurring symbol in the graphic novel as a way of evoking 
the transitory nature of the human mind in the widest possible sense – 
and also the uncertainty engendered by the cognitive impairment as-
sociated with ADRD.26 The semi-subjective – to the extent that it is 
inclusive of multiple points of view, whether of different characters or 
of both subjective and objective data – foregrounds the social frame-
work within which the individual consciousness takes shape. As re-
gards ADRD in particular, this social framework means above all else 
that we are all interdependent: in our daily lives, in our youth, and in 
our old age. Arrugas makes clear that – able-bodied or able-minded, 
disabled physically or cognitively – in the end it is this social frame-
work and this interdependency that gives our lives meaning. 
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As a complex graphic novel that exploits the rich representational 
possibilities of sequential art in various ways, Arrugas can get us think-
ing about narrative on various levels at once. For example, we may 
begin to contemplate, more or less intensively, the notion of “narrative 
as self-portrait” (Hamilton 2008) in a way that prioritizes the visual mo-
dality of storytelling. Roca’s graphic novel is compelling not only be-
cause of the details he represents in these visual narratives, but also 
because of the gutter, which allows readers opportunities to actively 
construct the story-world through the gaps that are so crucial to the 
structure of sequential art. At an even more basic level, narrative is an-
other way of saying that we organize our experience: “Indeed, it has 
been said that life comes to us in the form of stories – we do not have 
unmediated access to our lives, but rather we know them through sto-
ries. Narrative is an integral feature of experience, not merely a conduit 
for representing it” (Gubrium 1986: 21). We use stories to tell ourselves 
who we are, to tell others who we are, and to tell others who they are. 
Arrugas shows how this process of storytelling is always a collective 
act.27 We rely on others to tell our own stories when we can no longer 
do so; but what we experience visually in Arrugas is the idea that even 
those who seem unable to tell stories are narrating themselves long af-
ter many suppose they have stopped doing so. The visual medium of 
comics art then seems apt for this purpose of portraying caregiving sto-
ries ... and it might even be said that the reader of Paco Roca’s graphic 
novel becomes a caregiver in a visual sense.28 Ultimately, the unique 
aesthetic aspects of visual narrative allow us to understand the material 
experience of ADRD within a collective and social framework that folds 
the clinical back into the non-clinical, everyday, social experience of 
cognitive disability.
6 Screening Schizophrenia: Documentary 
Cinema, Cognitive Disability, and  
Abel García Roure’s Una cierta verdad 
(A Certain Truth) (2008)
“Research on media representations of mental illness is burgeoning; however, 
the intersection of disability with mental illness is an area that has not received 
due scholarly attention … At a time when twenty-five percent of the global 
population can expect to struggle with a mental disorder in their lifetime, and 
ten percent struggle with a disability, more sophisticated and nuanced repre-
sentations are well overdue.”
 – Valerie Palmer-Mehta (2013: 362)
In the popular imagination, as in the professional judgment of many 
white-robed health care providers, a thin line separates the “mentally 
disabled” from the “mentally ill.” There may very well be a legal dis-
tinction between these terms, just as there may be a medical distinction. 
But I regard any such distinctions as a thin white line. In the present 
context of analyses of visual texts in the humanities, I employ the term 
“the thin white line” in order to animate the spirit of sceptical inquiry 
implied by the documentary and fiction films The Thin Blue Line (1988), 
directed by Erroll Morris, and The Thin Red Line (1998), directed by 
Terrence Malick. In the most general sense, this chapter’s scepticism 
regarding psychiatric/medical practice can be tied to similar critical 
judgments on law/order and war suggested by these two above films. 
This is a scepticism regarding structures of social and state power and 
their uneven and decidedly harmful impact on individual lives. Here I 
am also concerned with the blurry nature of theoretical distinctions be-
tween illness and disorder, on one hand, and disability, on the other. 
The notion of cognitive impairment discussed in earlier chapters of 
Cognitive Disability Aesthetics introduces another level of disciplinary 
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critique to this endeavour that some may find discomfiting. I believe 
this is necessary if we are to think through how disciplinary knowledge 
may itself function as a power structure that itself marginalizes certain 
material experiences of disability.
A social model of cognitive disability is sorely needed in the twenty-
first century, and I am sensitive to the fact that the present approach is 
not wholly satisfying. The effort to integrate issues of psychiatric illness 
into the social model of disability that has informed decades of human-
ities scholarship is not wholly satisfying. But I believe it has a strong 
potential. Applying a disability studies perspective to issues of cogni-
tion heretofore underexplored by the discipline allows humanists to 
reclaim the study of cognitive disabilities from the health and medical 
sciences. This in itself could be empowering. In ceding discursive con-
trol of cognitive disabilities to more quantitative and scientific fields, 
disability studies scholars in the humanities have collectively privi-
leged a cognitively abled perspective. In focusing largely on physical 
disabilities and on critiques of pervasive able-bodied norms, these 
scholars have left out many individuals and groups. In its current for-
mulation, the strong social model of disability in the humanities tends 
to ignore impairment, especially as it relates to cognition, and even as it 
engages psychiatric illness.
Some may rightly fear that the notion of psychiatric impairment is 
not cleanly compatible with such a social model. Yet ignoring it com-
pletely is just as frightening if the result is that we ignore the material 
experiences of severe cognitive disability. At the risk of repetition, I 
take very seriously the suggestion by David T. Mitchell and Sharon L. 
Snyder that it may be time for a return to impairment (2015: 1, 160; 
2010: 199; see also Bérubé 2016: 56–7). I intend this to be not the final 
word, but rather a call for others to think more intensely about cogni-
tive disability and the challenges it presents for largely physical modes 
of thinking about disability. Such modes have disproportionately dom-
inated the academic field, impeding more careful and sustained consid-
eration of cognitive difference.
The first section of this chapter, “Asylums, Community-Based Care, 
and the Clinical Gaze,” introduces readers to past scholarship on men-
tal illess and to contemporary debates over its appropriate treatment. 
Each of the terms in the section title is of great importance for under-
standing the form and content of Abel García Roure’s documentary 
film Una cierta verdad (A Certain Truth) (2008), discussed in the chap-
ter’s second section. In the first section, however, I turn to the work of 
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Michel Foucault (History of Madness and The Birth of the Clinic) to chart 
a move away from dialogic approaches to infirmity towards a modern 
clinical model that prioritizes the immediately visual world over the 
depth offered by narrative. I argue that this paradigm shift has brought 
new precision to the clinical treatment of some physical conditions 
even while simultaneously ensuring that the treatment of mental ill-
ness remain imprecise. This section closes with a brief analysis of 
 another Spanish documentary film directed by Ione Hernández and 
produced by Julio Medem – 1% esquizofrenia (1% Schizophrenia) (2006). 
Hernández’s film engages key tropes and visual metaphors of the clini-
cal gaze and thus serves as a point of contrast with García Roure’s more 
complex film.
The chapter’s second section, “Representing Schizophrenia in Una 
cierta verdad (2008),” explores a documentary filmed in Barcelona by 
García Roure, a critically acclaimed director and student of Joaquim 
Jordà. I pursue close readings that are attentive to connections between 
film form and the artistic properties of the documentary, on one hand, 
and the film’s content and message, on the other. Ultimately, the film’s 
disability representations stage encounters with schizophrenia that are 
more attentive to questions of cognitively abled power, of autonomy 
and self-management, and of the political commitment of art than they 
are to the spectacular discourse of psychiatric illness. This chapter – 
perhaps even more provocatively than in chapter 5’s discussion of 
Alzheimer’s dementia – is a call for scholars in the humanities to con-
tinue to think through how the social and medical paradigms of dis-
ability fit together.
Asylums, Community-Based Care, and the Clinical Gaze
The distance between the much-criticized asylum model or institution-
al model of psychiatric care and largely inadequate community-based 
psychiatric care is an implicit point of reference for understanding 
García Roure’s documentary film on schizophrenia. As a way of explor-
ing this distance in distilled form, I turn to a review essay titled “Under 
Lock & Key: How Long?,” published in The New York Review of Books on 
17 December 2015. Written by Aryeh Neier and David J. Rothman, that 
essay examines the legacy and the space of the asylum in general terms. 
It passes judgment both on the asylum’s generalized historical role 
and on its current place in society and in medicine. It foregrounds the 
wider inconsistency whereby some mental health issues are considered 
disabilities and others are not – an inconsistency that happens to be 
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quite relevant for scholars of disability studies in the humanities. This 
is a tall order, and one that is perhaps too complicated to explore in a 
form as concise as a NYRB review. That said, the professional standing 
of the co-authors is notable: Neier has been executive director of both 
Human Rights Watch and the American Civil Liberties Union; Rothman 
is the Bernard Schoenberg Professor of Social Medicine and History at 
the Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons and president of the 
Institute on Medicine as a Profession (2015: 5). Given their complemen-
tary blending of medical expertise and social advocacy, the pair might 
at first glance seem to represent a unified voice regarding what those 
seeking mental health services need. Such a first impression, however, 
would be misleading.
There is no question that explorations of the contemporary call for a 
“return to the asylum” (2015: 70) need to be nuanced, a position on 
which I agree with the essay’s authors. As Neier and Rothman make 
clear, asylums have a “bleak history,” one that dates back to the nine-
teenth century in the American context (2015: 70). Regarding the pro-
cesses of deinstitutionalization that have unfolded since the 1960s, they 
write that “there is no denying that despite the best efforts of lawyers 
and advocates, dollars and services have not generally followed pa-
tients released from institutions into community facilities” (2015: 71). 
What is more interesting than the data provided and the positions tak-
en by the authors – even more interesting than their final word, per-
haps1 – is how the mentally disabled and the mentally ill are regarded 
as separate populations. Statements such as the following one employ 
word choices that implicitly engage the marketplace rhetoric of compe-
tition and that overstate the distinction between these populations from 
a point of view that tacitly accepts the normative position of ableist so-
ciety and its classificatory schemes:
The mentally disabled have fared better than the mentally ill, first because 
parents have been relentless supporters of the rights and needs of their 
children. They discover the handicap of their child soon after the birth and 
become ardent advocates for programs and services. Second, Medicaid 
funding for the mentally disabled – but not for the mentally ill – is increas-
ingly available to encourage release from institutions and the phasing out 
of the institutions themselves. (2015: 71)
Here it is necessary to point out that the uncritical use of the term 
“handicap” – which appears twice on the same page of the essay – 
 conveys a lack of understanding regarding the social approaches to 
174 Two Cognition, Collaboration, Community
disability that have unfolded since the 1960s in the American context. 
More significant, however, the distinction between “mentally dis-
abled” and “mentally ill” is never convincingly or directly explained 
for readers.2
The essay suggests, as evidenced in the above quotation, that “men-
tally disabled” refers only to children or to disabilities that are present 
from birth. One must wonder, are these cognitive disabilities develop-
mental in nature? And if so, why would the authors exclude cognitive 
disabilities that occur after birth from their discussion? Are these natu-
rally to be categorized as illness and not disability? Are they making the 
assumption that a disability lasts for one’s entire life, from birth until 
death, whereas an illness is temporary? This sort of argument, while 
not clearly articulated in the essay, would lead one to the misguided 
notion that there is a “cure” for mental illness but not for mental dis-
ability. Such a misguided logic might assert that, if they are present 
from birth, disabilities can never be cured or treated, whereas illnesses, 
if stemming from events after birth, can be cured, treated, or at the least 
managed. This distinction cannot be convincing either for disability 
studies scholars or for disability activists because it subtly affirms able-
ism as the central norm of human societies.3 Several questions are worth 
asking here: What forms of social power are invested in these discours-
es? Who benefits from the imprecise use of terms such as “mental dis-
ability” and “mental illness”? What interest is served by contrasting 
temporary disabilities with lifelong ones? These are questions that 
Neier and Rothman seem not to have asked.
In the letters section of the subsequent issue of NYRB (26 February 
2015), Dominic Sisti and Emanuel Ezekiel take issue with Neier and 
Rothman. In particular, they question the simplistic judgment that ob-
tains therein, by which all possible forms of the asylum are suspect, and 
from which it seems to follow that all possible states of community-
based support are preferable. As Sisti and Ezekiel rightly point out, this 
is a false dichotomy:
The past horrors of some shuttered institutions are undeniable, but we 
must also recognize the disturbing realities of the present. There are over 
one million individuals who have serious mental illness warehoused in 
our nation’s jails and prisons – many committed nonviolent crimes. A 
quarter-million more are homeless. Some of these individuals – and others 
– cannot care for themselves, they deny or are unaware of the severity of 
their illness, or they present a danger to themselves and others. In the 
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Journal of the American Medical Association, we argued that for some of these 
seriously ill patients psychiatric asylum is warranted. (2016: 41)
The interplay between the perspectives of Neier and Rothman (2015), 
on one side, and Sisti and Ezekiel (2016), on the other, is interesting 
precisely because they are both right, in a sense. If we are willing to see 
the asylum not as a present-day manifestation of past horrors but in-
stead as a space where intensive support can be provided to those 
whose needs cannot be met in the community, and if we are willing to 
admit that community-based programs are not always sufficiently sup-
ported, then there is no reason to have to choose one approach over the 
other. But Neier and Rothman ask us to do just this, asserting that com-
munity support – even if insufficient and plagued by systemic issues 
that have not been addressed – is always preferable to the intensive 
support that an asylum can provide.
Clearly, the two pairs of commentators seem to be focusing on two 
divergent populations while believing they are discussing the same is-
sue. This is a discursive microcosm of how discussions about disability 
tend to unfold. Those with psychiatric health issues are not a homoge-
neous population for whom placement in either “the asylum” or “the 
community” can be recommended wholesale. These terms themselves 
are also constructs. How can one discuss the asylum or the community 
without knowledge of how personnel, resources, support, oversight, 
and methods of operation play into the experience of living in one place 
or the other? The asylum may be a historically questionable institution, 
but that does not mean that community services are sufficient to pro-
vide adequate care to all people living with psychiatric disability, which 
takes various forms and has various degrees of severity. In arguing 
over two polarized options without uncovering the social, spatial, and 
clinical relationships implicit in these terms, popular discourse and 
professional debate both fail to address the material experience of psychi-
atric disability and the social construction of psychiatric disability. 
Assuming that everyone can have their needs met in the community is 
just as problematic as assuming that everyone cannot. Of the popula-
tions who need either community-based or institution-based supports 
centred on psychiatric care, only the most able-minded populations – in 
addition to those with the most family and monetary supports – would 
clearly be able to exercise more of a choice. Not everyone has these 
 advantages. In the current systems, some needs are unlikely to be met 
in the community without sufficient regulation and support through 
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extensive health programming. Neier and Rothman’s argument against 
the asylum is welcome to the extent that the institutional model has 
been forced even on those who would thrive with more autonomy in a 
community-based model. But the exaggerated form this argument 
takes in the article implies that the only populations worth considering 
in the asylum-versus-community debate tend to be more able-minded, 
on one hand, or more socially privileged, on the other.4 From the per-
spective of a social model of disability that admits discussion of impair-
ment as part of explorations of the material reality of cognitive disability 
experiences, there is no need to exclude any populations with psychiat-
ric needs from consideration.
Understanding these general dynamics associated with models of 
both institutional and community-based care is important, for these is-
sues are at the core of Abel García Roure’s documentary film. Beyond 
these large-scale matters, Una cierta verdad also emphasizes the small-
scale interactions between patients and providers. Specifically, the film 
illustrates the inadequacy of the clinical gaze when confronting health 
problems whose cause is not immediately visible. To chart how cogni-
tive disabilities associated with the term madness have been histori-
cally invisible, we must turn to the work of Michel Foucault. There is 
perhaps no work as significant on the general topic as Foucault’s laby-
rinthine History of Madness (2006),5 which – together with The Birth of 
the Clinic (1994 [1972]), of course – traces the distinction between mad-
ness and reason as progressively produced through historical develop-
ments, discursive and material power structures, and both tangible and 
less tangible social institutions. Both The Birth of the Clinic and The 
History of Madness focus on the visibility of illness as well as the role 
played by vision in the modern clinical gaze; both also illustrate how 
this visible model has often ignored cognition completely. This has not 
meant that the experience of cognitive disability has enjoyed relative 
autonomy from ableist frameworks and patterns of medicalization. 
Instead, this transition towards a visible model of clinical practice has 
continued to influence our collective understanding of cognitive differ-
ence. It has done so by encouraging the primacy of the cognitively 
abled gaze and the essentialization of cognitive difference as an indi-
vidual and not a collective problem.
In chapter 7 of The Birth of the Clinic, “Seeing and Knowing,” Foucault 
writes about the historical shift from a linguistic (technical/aural) to a 
sensory (aesthetic/visual) form of clinical practice. This shift dimin-
ished the need for observation through language, through dialogue, 
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through time and understanding, and replaced it with the possibility of 
a more immediate discovery of a truth that lay visible in the material 
world. Dialogue with the patient still had a place in the newer observa-
tional paradigm, but it was the visual that became primary with the 
arrival of the concept of pathological anatomy that came to displace 
dialogue. As Foucault explains, these historical developments
freed medical perception from the play of essence and symptoms, and 
from the less ambiguous play of species and individuals: the figure dis-
appeared by which the visible and invisible were pivoted in accordance 
with the principle that the patient both conceals and reveals the specific-
ity of his disease. A domain of clear visibility was opened up to the gaze. 
(1994: 105)
Before this “domain of clear visibility was opened up to the gaze,” 
 interaction between the clinician and the patient was centred on nar-
rative, exchange, touch, language, and the time needed for the “play of 
essence and symptoms” to unfold. Foucault suggests that this was a 
dialogic relationship where the visible and the invisible provided 
meaning in tandem and over time. The rise of the clinical gaze dis-
cussed and critiqued by Foucault is one where time was flattened into 
space, where sight substituted imperfectly for sound, and where the 
invisible was severed from its visible counterpart. In this paradigm, 
cognition was subjected to a paradigm of direct observation that was 
not favourable either to its nuance or to temporal unfolding.
Foucault elaborates on the questions that originally drove the clinical 
paradigm’s transition from auditory and dialogic narrative towards vi-
sual and spatial observation:
The theoretical and practical problem confronting the clinicians was to 
know whether it would be possible to introduce into a spatially legible 
and conceptually coherent representation that element in the disease that 
belongs to a visible symptomatology and that which belongs to a verbal 
analysis. The problem was revealed in a technical difficulty that was very 
revealing of the demands of clinical thinking: the picture. Is it possible to 
integrate into a picture, that is, into a structure that is at the same time 
visible and legible, spatial and verbal, that which is perceived on the 
 surface of the body by the clinician’s eye, and that which is heard by that 
same clinician in the essential language of the disease? (1994: 112, origi-
nal emphasis)
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As Foucault goes on to remark, however, there was little possibility of 
integrating the spatial and the verbal into a coherent picture. This bal-
ance between the visible and the legible, the spatial and the verbal, is a 
precarious one, for observation will always tip the scale towards what 
can be instantly seen. “The correlative of observation is never the invis-
ible, but always the immediately visible,” he writes (1994: 107). Clinical 
experience thus begins to attune itself more to “the visible and the ex-
pressible” (1994: 196) than to the invisible.6
Note that this historical and clinical shift towards the visible devel-
oped along with a push to make clinical practice more coherent and 
systematized. The portion of History of Madness subtitled “Doctors and 
Patients” (part 2, section IV) in particular engages that persistent, elu-
sive, and ever-so-blurry notion of a “cure” for madness. At the same 
time, it explores the chaos and disorganization that were so central to 
an important prehistory of our modern clinical approaches and institu-
tions. Therein Foucault writes:
Medical thought and practice in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
do not have the unity or at least the coherence that we presently associate 
with them. The world of the cure is organised along principles which are 
in a certain sense peculiar to it, and which medical theory, physiological 
analysis and even the observation of symptoms do not always control per-
fectly. We saw earlier how hospitalisation and internment were indepen-
dent of medicine, but even within medicine itself, theory and therapy only 
communicate in an imperfect reciprocity. (2006: 297) 
Even in this brief quotation there are a number of points of great rele-
vance to contemporary representations of schizophrenia. Foucault high-
lights the inability of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century medicine to 
synthesize observable phenomena with knowledge. Historically speak-
ing, there were gaps between theory and practice, just as “hospitalisa-
tion and internment were independent of medicine.” The communication 
between these pairs was “imperfect,” in Foucault’s wording, and thus, 
one could also say, insufficient. In this context, the notion of a “cure” can 
be seen as a manifestation of the dream of a precision that clinical prac-
tice itself is lacking, the idea of establishing a link between theory and 
therapy. One can argue that, still in contemporary times, the notion of a 
“cure” for madness is a discursive mirror for the inadequacy of the pri-
ority given to the visible world by the clinical gaze to impact treatment 
of less visible cognitive impairments.7 
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The questions posed by aesthetic/cultural representations of schizo-
phrenia in disability cinema resonate with contemporary studies of psy-
chiatric disability and have the potential to reveal just as much about our 
disabling social environment as do other areas of this growing interdis-
ciplinary field. Since 2000, significant work on cognitive disability has 
indeed been published.8 Yet on the whole, the literature on psychiatric 
disability written from a disability studies perspective – that is, under-
standing the latter as a paradigm that prioritizes the disabling character 
of the social environment – has tended to be eclipsed by medical ap-
proaches that essentialize disability and situate it ontologically inside 
the disabled body (and here, simultaneously within the disabled mind). 
At the same time that scholars in Anglophone disability studies have 
been calling for a more global and international approach (Mitchell and 
Snyder 2010; Murray and Barker 2010), studies of disability cinema in 
Spain have been steadily expanding as if in response to that call. With 
regard to disability studies centring on Spain, there is a long-standing 
filmic tradition of disabled characters in cinema, but those films have yet 
to be analysed from a disability studies perspective.9 Una cierta verdad is 
not the only twenty-first-century film to address disability in Spain, of 
course, but since its debut in 2008, its message has yet to be fully appreci-
ated. Notably, though interviews with the director abound and though 
the film is sporadically mentioned in research of a wider scope, not a 
single scholarly article has explored Una cierta verdad in depth.
Before analysing García Roure’s film, let us briefly consider other 
representations of schizophrenia that have received attention in Spain. 
In particular, it will be helpful to think through how schizophrenia was 
presented in an informational documentary in order to understand just 
what Una cierta verdad achieves with greater artistry. In some sense tied 
to the explanatory and didactic impulse prevalent in both documentary 
and fiction films centring on disability (see Mitchell and Snyder 2016: 
22), 1% esquizofrenia (2006) by Ione Hernández was widely screened in 
Spain. Not insignificantly, noted filmmaker Julio Medem is also listed 
as a director, and the film’s production company is Alicia Produce, 
named after Medem’s daughter, who has Down syndrome. I use the 
term informational to describe this film because it is not a narrative 
documentary of the sort that follows one or more characters through 
their everyday activities, but rather a series of interviews strung togeth-
er, all focusing on the topic of schizophrenia. 
Given the relative invisibility of cognitive disability, the general pub-
lic might well benefit from being introduced to people who are faced 
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with it. Claudia Merlo responds precisely to the need to correct for this 
social invisibility when she writes of the documentary that
su merito está en invitar al espectador a un acercamiento hacia un tema, 
velado muchas veces por el misterio y lo desconocido, superando estig-
mas y prejuicios y ofreciendo la posibilidad de compartir las experiencias 
dolorosas y profundamente humanas de las personas que presentan este 
trastorno mental.
Its merit lies in inviting the spectator to move closer toward a theme that 
is many times clouded in mystery and the unknown, overcoming stigmas 
and prejudices, offering the possibility of sharing in the painful and pro-
foundly human experiences of the persons who exhibit this mental disor-
der. (2009: 80)
Over the course of more than an hour, the densely compacted inter-
view segments of 1% esquizofrenia frame the question of schizophrenia 
from biological/genetic, clinical/psychological, and social/environ-
mental perspectives. A number of the interviews bring attention to and 
criticize the social marginality associated with experiences of schizo-
phrenia. Ione Hernández herself has been quoted as saying that if per-
sons with schizophrenia are ill, “entonces yo llamaría enfermos a todos 
los que habitamos en este planeta [I would then call all of us living on 
this planet ill]” (qtd in Quintanilla 2007).10 Clearly, the documentary’s 
intention is to move beyond merely rendering experiences of schizo-
phrenia visible and to advocate strongly for the social acceptance and 
understanding of schizophrenia. In a certain sense, it succeeds. Yet 
what is ultimately lacking in the film is an artistic sensibility that would 
reinforce the trenchant critiques voiced by some of its interviewees and 
render its message with greater coherence. Such an artistic sensibility 
would provide a clear path for viewers seeking to make sense of the 
wide variety of opinions expressed in the film, some of which trend too 
far towards the purely medical/clinical pole and do not acknowledge 
the importance of both defining schizophrenia and supporting experi-
ences of it in societal terms.
The film is structured according to themes rather than an overarch-
ing narrative. This allows the presentation of a wide range of views 
on  interconnected subjects: “miedo [fear]” (6:38); “muros invisibles 
 [invisible walls]” (9:57); “familia [family]” (12:09); “drogas [drugs]” 
(20:20); “delirio [delirium]” (24:00); “fluidos [fluids]” (31:46); “agresión 
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[agression]” (35:32); “ingreso [admission]”; (37:26)” “suicidio [suicide]” 
(41:18); “arte y locura [art and madness]”; “tratamiento [treatment]” 
(49:25); “tiempo [time]” (55:52); “psicoterapia [psychotherapy]” (58:12); 
“esperanza [hope]” (1:01:48); “mañana [tomorrow]” (1:04:33); “el uno 
por ciento [the one percent]” (1:05:57). The basic frame composition of 
1% esquizofrenia sets up a battle of voices in rather stark and binary 
terms: when viewers see segments of interviews with doctors, clini-
cians, therapists, family members, and allies and advocates, these fig-
ures are located on the left side of the screen, while the segments of 
interviews with schizophrenics tend to be screened with those figures 
positioned on the right side of the screen. This simplistic set-up is prob-
lematic for two reasons: first, it tends to visually isolate those with 
schizophrenia from their support systems and allies, thus formally re-
capitulating the social isolation associated with experiences of disabil-
ity in an ableist society; and second, this dichotomy obscures the vast 
differences of opinion reflected in the heterogeneous messages of those 
placed on the left side. This group includes those who talk about “cur-
ing” schizophrenia (see 1:02:00–1:03:00); those who unapologetically 
embrace a strictly biochemical and/or pharmacological approach, in 
the process denigrating the value of psycho/social approaches; those 
who accept that pharmacology has a role in treatment but who criticize 
how it is employed and overemphasized; those who debunk the myth 
that overstates the risk and reality of schizophrenic violence; and those 
who strongly critique patterns of social marginalization as well as the 
lack of social and community supports available to schizophrenic pa-
tients.11 The strong medical standpoint, for example, is expressed by a 
white-robed clinician (50:18) who insists that mental illness will be 
cured biochemically or pharmacologically. But another interviewee po-
sitioned on the left complains that pharmacology only makes symp-
toms go away and critiques society for thinking it is solving a problem 
by merely getting rid of symptoms it sees as undesirable (52:00). Some 
viewers may be disappointed that the distance between these two 
viewpoints is not definitively resolved in the film either through 
the  content of the interviews or by their arrangement during post- 
production editing. In effect, the intent to express a variety of opin-
ions has outweighed the need for a more consistent critique of the 
purely medicalized approach to treating schizophrenia.
While the film is strongly centred on the verbal content and emotive 
expression of interviews conducted during the filmic process, the im-
pact of decisions made regarding artistic images and music during 
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post-production cannot be ignored. It is fair to say that these decisions 
contribute to the film’s lack of a clear point of view regarding the social 
treatment of schizophrenia. The film’s background music, largely con-
sisting of strings and piano, is variously haunting, disturbing, and 
moving – dramatically expressing dark feelings, depression, resigna-
tion, transcendence, and even hope. Early in the film, this music is used 
mostly across interview transitions, but as the film advances, and par-
ticularly as it reaches its conclusion, it is increasingly used during inter-
view segments. With its dynamic crescendos and emotional weight, the 
music contributes to a spectacular image of schizophrenia, exceptional-
izing it and marking it as non-normative rather than underscoring the 
everyday experience of those who live with it. In addition, highly evoc-
ative visual images of questionable relevance are used intermittently 
throughout the film. Though this may not be the director’s intention, 
these images effectively “other” experiences of schizophrenia in that 
they provide loaded visual metaphors for risks and dangers, emotional 
peaks and valleys, mystery and enigma – all of which reflect how the 
ableist imagination typically perceives mental disorder.
For example, the film’s first image is a blurry one of a curtain blow-
ing with the breeze through an open window and featuring this quota-
tion: “Nos hemos dado cuenta de que hay unos muros invisibles, no 
son las tapias del manicomio, pero metafóricamente es un muro más 
sutil y por tanto mucho más difícil de romper [We have realized that 
there are invisible walls, they are not the walls of the mental institution, 
but metaphorically it is a much more subtle wall and therefore it is 
much more difficult to break]” (0:08). Walls, windows, and doors be-
come the film’s key metaphors of isolation. These suggest restricted 
access to another world; they also essentialize the normative distinc-
tion between experiences of schizophrenia and experiences of able-
mindedness, even when their use creates a friction with interview 
content launching a strong critique of clinical practice.
Beginning with the very first image, then, visual and architectural 
references to the space of the mental institution become primary sym-
bols in the aesthetics of 1% esquizofrenia. Through their visual excess 
and recurrent abundance, these images of walls, windows, and doors 
metonymically recall imagined and/or real experiences of the asylum. 
We see a number of shots and zooms involving windows (0:02:40, 3:13, 
4:28, 1:01:48, 1:02:18, 1:03:00, 1:03:29), mobile frames capturing hall-
ways and doors (4:46, 5:06, 6:38, 7:16, 7:53, 24:00), and pans of institu-
tional rooms (37:21, 38:11, 38:56; 40:43), as well as hospital gurneys in 
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movement (42:10, 42:54). Though the film’s images may soon transition 
to exteriors – buildings, playgrounds, and the like (9:16, 9:58, 11:40, 
12:09, 15:54) – it is significant that those exteriors include ambulance 
rides (41:24, 41:48) and dark tunnels (26:40, 27:15, 27:50) or symbols of 
danger or clouded thought – lightning strikes seen at a great distance 
(21:45, 22:57, 23:11), or clouds (55:50, 56:28, 1:05:57). These image selec-
tions convey an impulse to treat the topic dynamically. Given their 
metaphorical weight, however – that is, the sense of isolation conveyed 
by walls and windows, or the danger and enigma implied by lightning, 
clouds, and darkness – they also ground viewer expectations in the 
 architectural logic of the institution, in the imprecision of the clinical 
gaze, in the archaeological symbolism of excavation and discovery, and 
thus also in the transcendent yet mythic finality of light and revelation 
– and thus also of “cure.” When we do see a human figure it is either a 
partial or a fragmented view – as in the close-ups of a person’s forehead 
(29:00, 29:34; 30:58) or of a person’s eye (1:06:04, 1:07:05, 1:07:23, 1:07:47, 
1:07:54, 1:08:13). This fragments the individual visually and subjects his 
or her form to metaphorical violence through cinematic language.12
It is easy to see how these images reaffirm the sort of conclusion that 
Neier and Rothman make all too easily in their NYRB essay. The docu-
mentary film’s haunting music, the stock architectural images that 
symbolize the asylum, the gradual progression from interior to exterior 
worlds, and ultimately the appearance of a street scene teeming with 
people, function together to implicitly launch an aesthetic critique of 
the historical conditions associated with confinement in a mental insti-
tution. Yet just as it is in Neier and Rothman’s article, this argument is 
facile because it grapples only with the issue of confinement and not 
with the issue of social and community supports. This more nuanced 
question regarding the tension between coercive institutional power 
and inadequate community-based support is precisely what takes cen-
tre stage in García Roure’s film, discussed in the next section.
For some viewers of 1% esquizofrenia, there is a risk that the admit-
tedly dramatic aesthetic decisions discussed above may come to ob-
scure issues most worthy of exploration. At stake here is the conflict 
evident in Foucault’s history of clinical practice, where he charts the 
decline of narrative as a primary way of approaching illness. As one of 
the film’s schizophrenic interviewees states matter-of-factly: “Es más 
fácil dar una pastilla y anularte que estar una hora contigo hablando 
intendando saber cuál es el problema que tienes, ¿no? [It is easier to 
give you a pill and knock you out than it is to spend an hour talking 
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with you, trying to find out what the problem is, you know?]” (53:03). 
It is important that early in the film, one of the interviewees delivers a 
concise defence of a patient-centred point of view – “Los que mejor 
conocen nuestra enfermedad somos nosotros mismos [We are the ones 
who best know our illness]” (2:55) – and an advocate affirms a central 
tenet of the social approach – “Más de personas enfermas son personas 
vulnerables [Rather than ill people they are vulnerable people]” (4:42).13 
But these positions are gradually complicated as clinical and medical 
points of view compete for the viewer’s attention with social approach-
es to schizophrenia. The film’s overly conventional and facile critique 
of the horrors of institutions and the ills of forcibly interning schizo-
phrenic patients in hospitals (39:00) have to contend with white-robed 
voices of clinical power who affirm schizophrenia as the “prototipo de 
lo que se llama loco [prototype of what is termed crazy]” (4:00) and 
with those who advocate biochemical and pharmacological “cures” for 
schizophrenia – and all this in a situation where, as one interviewee 
puts it, “no sabemos todavía lo que es [we still do not know what it 
(schizophrenia) is]” (4:58). In the end, even though 1% esquizofrenia is a 
welcome attempt to bring greater social visibility to experiences of 
schizophrenia, its engagement with traditional associations – the tropes 
of mystery and enigma in particular, as highlighted in Claudia Merlo’s 
comment – risks playing into heavily circulated representations of 
schizophrenia in popular culture.14 By contrast, Abel García Roure’s 
film stakes out a much more nuanced position and is thus better able to 
recognize the material reality of cognitive impairment while sustaining 
a focus on cognitive disability as expressing a social relationship.
Representing Schizophrenia in Una cierta verdad  
(A Certain Truth) (2008)
A compelling portrayal of the individual experience of schizophrenia, a 
denunciation of the brutality that systematically accompanies its medi-
cal treatment, and perhaps something of an apology for our collective 
failure to bridge the distance between the cognitively abled and those 
living with this psychiatric disability – Abel García Roure’s Una cierta 
verdad (A Certain Truth) (2008) is all of these things. What García Roure 
does so well in the film – something that was counteracted in 1% es-
quizofrenia by its aesthetic decisions, from music and visuals to editing 
and post-production – is acknowledge the reality of severe cognitive 
impairment without spectacularizing schizophrenia.
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Director Abel García Roure (Barcelona, 1975) studied filmmaking 
with Joaquim Jordà at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra de Barcelona. 
Among his other accomplishments, he was assistant director on the 
films En construcción (Work in Progress) (2000, dir. José Luis Guerín) 
and El cielo gira (The Sky Turns) (2004, dir. Mercedes Álvarez). Una cier-
ta verdad, his first long-form cinematic product, is a highly nuanced 
documentary prioritizing the interplay between the film’s two privi-
leged groups: providers and patients. The battle of voices we watch 
unfold on-screen, then, is not constituted by the medicalized self-talk of 
the person with schizophrenia;15 rather, it is constituted by a social dia-
logue between these two polarized groups of actors.
This dialogue – one that is simultaneously clinical and social – is 
pushed forward by two sets of goals that differ so strongly that con-
flict is unavoidable. To put this into terms that are far too stark to 
match the director’s perspective, but that illustrate the crux of the 
matter nonetheless: providers focus on the disease, abstracting it from 
the patient, who becomes a mere residue or afterthought; whereas 
patients yearn for a quality of life whose elusiveness is frequently 
compounded by the imprecise doses or debilitating effects of the 
medications they are forced to suffer. The potential resolution of this 
conflict seemingly lies outside of the clinical institutions into which 
we are drawn along with these necessarily social actors. The film 
 suggests that the clinical paradigm’s low tolerance for nuance and 
lack of precise tools is what perpetuates this ongoing battle of voices. 
The resulting picture emphasizes that schizophrenia is a psychiatric 
 disability experience involving biological/material elements that 
must be understood simultaneously in social terms. All of this fore-
grounds the need for medical and social models of disability to find a 
common ground.
The release of Una cierta verdad in 2008 is best understood as part of a 
longer history of attempts to draw attention to the needs of people with 
schizophrenia. 1% esquizofrenia was a high-profile attempt to draw at-
tention to this psychiatric disability and to the social dynamics impli-
cated in its post-Transition treatment. But it is equally important to 
acknowledge that contributions to that longer history have also come 
from the psycho-social and clinical-medical spheres. The Transition to-
wards democracy in Spain that followed the death of dictator Francisco 
Franco on 20 November 1975 offered new opportunities to address 
mental health issues through community frameworks, but it also 
 created new hurdles:
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The development of a system of comprehensive community services and 
the deinstitutionalization process started in Barcelona at the beginning of 
the 1980s … Before deinstitutionalization, patients with severe schizo-
phrenia lived in hospitals and most of their basic needs were met by the 
institutions. Nowadays in Spain, with admission to long-stay inpatient 
units very uncommon, patients live in the community. (Ochoa et al. 2003: 
201, 202)
Another highly relevant study from 2001 found that patients in 
Catalonia continued to face insufficient access to community-based 
psychiatric services (Duñó et al. 2001: 688).16 In addition, it must be con-
sidered that people with schizophrenia living in the community have 
needs that are not always seen in the same way by the patients them-
selves and by outpatient program staff. Help with symptoms of psy-
chosis was the most frequent need identified by patients taking part in 
the above study (Ochoa et al. 2003: 206). Yet patients and staff reported 
only the relatively low rating of “fair agreement” on needs regarding 
drugs and psychotic symptoms (Ochoa et al. 2003: 205).17 Another 
Spanish research study validated the concerns expressed by some that 
antipsychotic drugs carry additional health risks that are not fully un-
derstood (Bobes et al. 2007: 171).18 Cultural products have worked to 
bring these interrelated issues concerning treatment for schizophrenia 
to the forefront of public discourse. Such discourse – inclusive of García 
Roure’s film and contrasted with specialized research articles – has the 
benefit of reaching a much wider audience.
Compared to Hernández and Medem’s film, Una cierta verdad is a 
much more challenging cinematic text. This is, in part, because it raises 
important questions regarding the role patients take in directing their 
treatment – the social inequity that compels them, through threat of 
violence and in fact through brute force, to accept medications with 
debilitating side effects whose risks are not completely understood. 
More importantly, given the significance of aesthetics/culture when 
approaching cognitive disabilities, which have tended to be invisible in 
society, Una cierta verdad’s artistic composition and narrative structure 
require more of viewers. Though García Roure’s film is a documentary, 
the shots captured, camera positions, editing and pacing, costuming, 
and prop symbolism all play a role in emphasizing the limitations of 
a contemporary clinical paradigm whose current approach to schizo-
phrenia relies more on power than on knowledge, more on force than 
on precision.
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As a way of underscoring Una cierta verdad’s contribution to a “new 
disability documentary cinema” (Snyder and Mitchell 2010) – a cinema 
whose value, I argue, lies in part in that it focuses through iconic/in-
dexical signification on “real people” as a way of rendering cognitive 
disability visible – I want to spend time introducing readers to its major 
characters and enduring patient–provider conflicts. Along the way, I 
ask readers to keep in mind wider issues already discussed, not merely 
the historical separation between madness and reason but also the 
global turn in disability studies and the representation of cognitive dis-
ability in Iberian film. I emphasize García Roure’s social commitment, 
introduce the documentary’s major protagonists, and continue to assert 
the imprecision of psychiatric clinical practice as a major theme. Next I 
prioritize the visual narrative’s spatial dimensions. The Parc Taulí hos-
pital in Sabadell (Barcelona) is portrayed as the site of an emanating 
material and discursive power that impacts patients far beyond its 
walls. Finally, I return to the film’s title and to its closing sequence, 
which drives home the central insight and social commitment of the 
director’s captivating cinematic essay.
Whether we understand schizophrenia as mental illness, a cognitive 
disability, or both at once, Foucault’s work on madness and the clinic 
(discussed in the previous section) can shed light on Una cierta verdad’s 
critique of contemporary clinical practice. Foucault’s description of 
what readers may want to see as a historical age gone by seems to echo 
visually throughout the documentary. For example, the first set of im-
ages in the film encapsulates its central critique: that the clinical gaze is 
imprecise. From 0:00:02 until 0:00:43 – after a fade-in from black – a 
blurry security-camera monitor displays patients seated in the hospital 
waiting area (see also 0:16:14–0:16:31; 1:05:16–1:05:20; 1:05:35–1:05:43). 
Horizontal two-tone bars obscure their images at the same time that 
they mediate those images for us. Simultaneously, for viewers, this 
 enacts a connection and a distancing. Almost as a reminder of the 
Foucauldian critique of the medical gaze, these and the other monitor-
images that reoccur throughout the documentary become powerful 
symbols of the persisting imprecise nature of contemporary clinical 
thought and practice, which relies all too much on what is immediately 
visible.
García Roure also uses this blurry display monitor as a way of sym-
bolizing the thin line between reason and madness – certainly a hall-
mark theme of cultural production in Spain going back to the Quijote.19 
It can be difficult to distinguish, for example, just who is mad and who 
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is sane when both are caught up in complicating social power strug-
gles. In social reality, as with Cervantes’s protagonists, both the patients 
and the providers in Una cierta verdad are well-matched counterparts: 
though it is possible for patients with severe impairments to suffer in-
frequent episodes of psychosis with consequences for themselves and 
for others, they seek the better quality of life they experience when not 
taking imprecisely dosed meds that force them into slumber.20 Though 
some providers may have the best interests of patients at heart,21 these 
frequently conflict with the best interests of society or of clinical prac-
tice, which prefers patient slumber and turns all too easily towards the 
use of brute force. These options are extreme ones, to be sure, but ad-
mitting that treatment for severe psychiatric illness must extend be-
yond the walls of the institution for those living in the community, 
contemporary clinical practice has struggled to find sustainable social 
solutions outside of this polarized conundrum. Beyond merely symbol-
izing social distance and hazy solutions, then, the decision to draw 
viewer attention to the monitor feed additionally signals that social and 
medical power only moves in one direction: the patient is the object of 
clinical observation, itself an imprecise instrument. 
6.1: Blurry monitor feed from Una cierta verdad (2008), Evohé Films, S.L., 
Corporació Catalana de Mitjans Àudiovisuals, S.A. y Vértice Cine, S.L.
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The inevitable result of imprecise observation is that the provider’s 
intent to arrive at the “truth” of disease leads intermittently to the blunt 
instrument of forced medication (see Valverde 2010: 8). Hovering over 
the patients we see in the documentary is the threat of force, marshalled 
by social institutions and meted out in imprecise doses. One key differ-
ence between the historical context explored by Foucault in History of 
Madness and The Birth of the Clinic, on one hand, and its restaging in 
contemporary form, on the other, seems to be the integration of the hos-
pital and medicine, or rather, the complication regarding or even the 
collapse of their independence. If we follow the director’s suggestion, 
the contemporary hospital as an institution has not brought control, 
unity, or organization to the treatment of madness but instead addi-
tional chaos, confusion, and imperfection. A primary concern of Una 
cierta verdad, then, is to represent this imperfection and the impact it has 
on the lives of the patients García Roure followed for two years while 
making the film.
As viewers should expect, Una cierta verdad functions as a decidedly 
non-spectacular window onto the textures of everyday experience for 
people living with schizophrenia.22 The director has stated that his in-
tention was to provide a more even treatment of the theme of psychosis 
than one usually finds in media representations:
He partido de la idea de que hay un estigma muy fuerte respecto al tema; 
tras analizar la aproximación que se ha hecho desde el cine a la psicosis 
[trastorno mental en el que se incluye la esquizofrenia y la paranoia], o 
bien excesivamente romántica, o bien marcadamente antipsiquiátrica, he 
tratado de iluminar el tema desde la experiencia real del enfermo, de su 
relación con la enfermedad, explicar su sufrimiento, y contar las distintas 
evoluciones que puede tener. (de la Rosa 2007)
I began with the idea that there is a very strong stigma about it; after 
analyzing how cinema has approached psychosis (a type of mental dis-
turbance that includes schizophrenia and paranoia) either from an exces-
sively romanticized or a markedly anti-psychiatric viewpoint, I tried to 
shed light on the topic from the real experience of the patients, of their 
relation with the illness, to explain their suffering, and to portray the dif-
ferent paths it can take.
In another interview, García Roure describes his own perspective as 
“humana [human],” “cotidiana [everyday],” and “íntima [intimate]” 
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(Vázquez 2009: 18). There is, of course, a strong link between the clinical 
paradigm and the cinema – both are grounded in the practice of obser-
vation. The cinematic window provided by the director, however, is 
midway between that of clinical observation and that of patient experi-
ence, regarding which the film remains neither fully committed nor 
fully dismissive.23
Because it presents both aural and visual data, cinema here is a per-
fect vehicle for exploring the superimposition of two historical stages in 
the evolution of the clinical paradigm as captured by Foucault. As men-
tioned earlier, The Birth of the Clinic explores the historical shift from a 
linguistic (technical/aural) to a sensory (aesthetic/visual) form of clini-
cal practice, cataloguing how a “domain of clear visibility was opened 
up to the gaze” (1994: 105). In this new domain the relative importance 
of dialogue with the patient was reduced and the visual became pri-
mary. These historical developments in pathological anatomy dimin-
ished the need for observation through language, through dialogue, 
through time and understanding, and replaced it with the possibility of 
a more immediate discovery of a truth, one that was visible in the mate-
rial world. As a film very much concerned with a psychiatric illness 
whose expression is still not immediately visible, Una cierta verdad 
screens the inadequacies of the modern practice of psychiatry as it 
tries to navigate the superimposed paradigms of linguistic/discursive/ 
temporal and visible/sensory/spatial truth. Unable to ground itself 
purely in the “domain of clear visibility” opened up by the modern 
clinical gaze, its investigation of the relatively invisible realm of the 
mind must rely more on an older model of spoken probing, a question-
ing of the patient through dialogue, rather than on newer forms of clini-
cal practice that potentially unite the visible and the expressible.24 The 
film works to draw attention to and even renew (through film form) 
this central character of psychiatric practice – that it is a narrative and 
dialogic art just as much as it is a science. García Roure draws us into 
the interplay of language and power at the heart of this clinical practice, 
staging for us the sustained and battling voices with which any pro-
vider and patient are familiar. While the providers use the clinical gaze 
to assess their patients, we as viewers of the documentary film are able 
to engage what Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (2009) calls the genera-
tive potential of staring by spending significant time with them.
The film’s setting is a teaching hospital, not a mental institution in the 
classical sense, so unlike the protagonists of Jordà’s Monos como Becky 
(1999), for example, Una cierta verdad’s social actors are community 
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members who require intermittent rather than continual observation. It 
is tempting here, as with many documentaries, to presume that there is 
no point of view – that this documentary film is merely an objective 
window onto human experience.25 But make no mistake: here, too – just 
as in the films of García Roure’s mentor Jordà – we have an expressly 
social commitment on the part of the director.26 One scholar has indi-
cated that the film is implicated in a tradition of cultural production 
dedicated to “elimina[ndo] los tabúes existentes y la imagen siniestra 
de la enfermedad [eliminating the existing taboos and the sinister im-
age of the illness]” (Real-Najarro 2011: 184). This commitment is ex-
pressed through attempts to push viewers to adopt a different subjective 
experience of the world than their own.27 The frequency of camerawork 
that lingers on windows and doorways, combined with footage of se-
curity monitors, reinforces this theme of how we look – of what and 
who we see when we observe (stare at) people with mental illness. 
Together with the persistent appearance of the interstitial institutional 
corridors we traverse with the camera crew and hospital staff, this em-
phasis suggests the importance of positioning and perspective – where 
it is we look from, and how viewers who might tend to be both cogni-
tively abled and relatively unfamiliar with health care institutions will 
access these patient stories, and whether some level of understanding 
can be reached through visual representation.
Perhaps the key protagonist of the film is Javier Sánchez (age fifty-
eight), who lives on his own in the community. Javier receives visits 
from Josep Manel Santos, a psychologist with the hospital’s PSI (Plan 
de Seguimiento Individualizado [Plan of Individualized Support]) 
 outpatient program. Their discussions range over topics of personal, 
artistic, philosophical, intellectual, and medical interest – and over the 
indoor spaces of his apartment and various outdoor spaces presumably 
near his residence – in the course of which a struggle gradually emerges 
as the pair’s opinions increasingly diverge concerning the downside 
of imprecisely prescribed medication and the value of the energy, cre-
ativity, and autonomy Javier enjoys when not on his currently pre-
scribed dosage. Eventually, Javier is forcibly interned for observation. 
Viewers watch as he is abruptly brought by police from his apartment 
to the Parc Taulí, the teaching hospital of the Universitat Autònoma de 
Barcelona. Another key patient, Rosario Hernández Manzano, insists 
that she is bewitched and that she is only able to speak of the voice 
in  her head when receiving prescriptions at her hospital appoint-
ment. Javier’s scenes are dialogic and conversational; Rosario’s filmed 
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appearances tend more towards confessional monologues. In their ap-
pearances in the documentary, Javier and Rosario show clear symp-
toms of schizophrenia and paranoia; a third protagonist, Bernat Pérez 
Acero, is more lucid and thus provides a third, less immediately turbu-
lent model of patient–provider interactions.28
We never learn much about one of the film’s patient-protagonists. 
Alberto is the first to appear after the opening sequences and is system-
atically distanced from viewing audiences beginning with his arrival at 
the emergency clinic at the Taulí. But he is crucial to the film’s message 
nonetheless. He hardly speaks when questioned by Dr Agustín, and 
when he does speak, it is in short phrases delivered in a volume barely 
above a whisper (0:04:31–0:04:58; 0:05:30–0:06:24; 0:06:39–0:07:00).29 We 
never clearly see his face. Instead, the camera shoots him from behind 
when in the same room or from the hallway when outside a room; he 
is  regularly captured shrouded in his hoodie, isolating himself in the 
sounds emanating from his earphones (e.g., in a long shot where passers-
by obstruct our view of him from 0:09:16–0:09:21; see also 0:56:19). In 
one particularly uncomfortable scene, viewers are embedded with five 
hospital staff, who step into what viewers may reasonably presume is 
Alberto’s room to force his meds on him. With hoodie over his head 
and earphones plugged in, he stares out of a window. The event’s effi-
ciency and brutality follow logically from the inadequate dialogue be-
tween the provider and the patient. During the operation, which is over 
as quickly as it begins, the camera hovers in the hallway, peering into 
the room as it captures the interned patient in a long shot that reaffirms 
his simultaneously medical and social marginalization.
The fact that we have no early or sustained access to Alberto’s face30 
is a clear expression of the director’s vision, which is to move gradually 
from a medicalized to a social view of schizophrenia. It has been ob-
served elsewhere that the film’s narrative arc is structured by two mo-
ments: in the first, the doctors are privileged and the patients are 
marginalized; in the second, the focus shifts away from the doctors to-
wards humanizing the patients:
En este primer segmento de la película, los protagonistas son indiscutible-
mente los médicos (o más bien, la institución médica), puesto que Roure 
les confiere un rostro y una presencia definida, mientras que los pacientes 
son presentados como grupo, no con como individuos, desprovistos de un 
rostro que los singularice ... Este primer planteamiento de la película se 
disipa al iniciarse el segundo segmento puesto que Roure empieza a 
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introducirnos en las historias personales de tres pacientes que padecen 
diversos grados de psicosis (esquizofrenia, paranoia, etc.). En esta parte 
los enfermos empiezan a tener rostro, a ser visibles, y a singularizarse del-
ante de la cámara. (Petrus 2009)
In this first segment of the film, the protagonists are unquestioningly the 
doctors (or better said, the medical institution), given that Roure gives 
them a face and a defined presence, while the patients are presented as 
a group, not as individuals, deprived of a face that might individualize 
them … This [character of the] first part of the film evaporates with the 
beginning of the second segment given that Roure begins to introduce us 
to the personal histories of three patients who suffer varying degrees of 
psychosis (schizophrenia, paranoia, etc.). In this part the patients begin 
to have a face, to become visible, and to individualize themselves before 
the camera.
The director clearly prefers to represent each side of this social battle 
through a multiplicity of voices, such that the effect is one of two com-
peting “teams,” each with its own set of messages.31 These teams – of 
doctors on one side and patients on the other – are placed in dialogue 
with each other throughout the film, even up through the beginning of 
the end credits. Interestingly, the editing of the film privileges the cut, 
using cross-cutting as a pervasive technique32 to emphasize the dialogic 
nature of the clinical enterprise and often as a way of breaking these 
dialogues up strategically. In one case, as Javier’s logic becomes recog-
nizably schizophrenic, the film cuts to a psychiatrist’s concise descrip-
tion of the disease; in another case, the cut comes just as Javier has made 
a lucid critique of the forced and imprecise medicalization of people 
with schizophrenia, potentially emphasizing the power of this words.33 
As the film makes clear, there is an inequity in how the distance be-
tween patients and providers is resolved socially.
Note that Una cierta verdad’s gradual shift towards privileging patient 
experiences (the progression towards patient narration identified 
above) occurs along with a clear shift in the spatial exposition of the 
film. The primary anchor for the film’s often competing and certainly 
overlapping perspectives is the physical and clinical environment of 
the Taulí. The hospital appears as an exterior in Una cierta verdad’s first 
scene, one that is echoed throughout the film as we repeatedly cross the 
building’s threshold (e.g. 0:55:44; 1:41:32); it is captured from within 
in the first of the two cinematic movements identified above; and it is 
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progressively overshadowed as the director spends more time with pa-
tients in the community during the second half of the film.
The disparity in how patients and providers enter the Taulí becomes 
a metaphor for access to power. Patients are brought in by ambulance, 
or they enter through the emergency waiting room, where the camera 
and editing repeatedly frame them as outsiders with little access to the 
power structure represented by the inner core of the hospital. As pa-
tients wait in the entry area, we routinely observe them from inside the 
provider area; we peer out at them through automated glass doorways 
and glass walls via long shots that identify them with the outside and 
ensure that their figures are small on the screen, as if a metaphor for 
their lack of both clinical and social power. Also significant is how both 
doctors and patients are shot in the film in relation to the hospital space. 
While the film’s main patient-protagonists are shot both inside and out-
side the hospital (Rosario, walking during the day, riding the bus, walk-
ing at dusk; Javier at a variety of times and in numerous settings), its 
doctors are shot purely inside the walls of the Taulí. Thus they appear 
to us as manifestations of its material environment or internal architec-
ture, and become synonymous with the clinical gaze. They are unable 
to observe the patients in their own environments, and by implication 
they may be less likely to imagine the patients as autonomous human 
beings. The exception is the liminal figure Josep Manel, whom we see 
both inside and outside the hospital. At around the 0:22:11-minute 
mark, a figure that appears to be Josep enters the Taulí through what 
comes off as a secret passage into the very heart of the hospital. The use 
of a tracking shot for this method of entry is in marked contrast to the 
cut-based transitions from exterior to interior scenes usually employed 
in the documentary. That is, we never visually accompany protagonists 
such as the patients Javier and Rosario as they enter or exit the hospital; 
in this way, the film effects a separation between the treatment they are 
able to receive in the community and what goes on inside the Taulí.
Javier’s story is by far the most compelling in Una cierta verdad, and 
the considerable time he spends in or near his own apartment speak-
ing with Josep is the film’s emotional and critical core. Their conversa-
tions form a thin connecting thread linking the discursive and material 
power of the hospital with the lives of people with schizophrenia liv-
ing in the community. As the film traces that thread, it illustrates both 
the reach of clinical power and the limits of its reasoning. At one cru-
cial point, an interesting use of editing connects the extramural inter-
actions between Javier and Josep with a cinematic metaphor. After 
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Javier expounds his “ideas sobre la cohesión de la material [ideas 
on  the cohesion of matter]” (0:37:21), showing Josep two pieces of 
art he has made that illustrate vectors emanating from a cube and a 
sphere, the editing cuts from interactions in Javier’s home to shots 
of  information travelling through a pneumatic tube in the hospital 
(0:38:27–0:38:43). These shots are static, and capture the parcel at vari-
ous moments during its passage through the pneumatic tubing. The 
editing between the cuts is such that the relationship between each 
static shot and the next obscures any sense of directionality or of the 
totality of the tubing system. As viewers we cannot connect one sec-
tion of tubing with any of the others.
There is a dual meaning to the cut that takes us from this patient’s 
home to the hospital. The criss-crossing sections of pneumatic tubing 
can be seen as a clear clinical metaphor for signals in the brain of a 
schizophrenic patient that are disrupted and prone to crisis.34 But this 
sequence is also a clear metaphor for the imprecision of clinical obser-
vation – the information of the pneumatic tube system that viewers 
glean visually from these shots is necessarily incomplete. One cannot 
form an impression of how the complete system works solely from 
 vision. Both these possible interpretations exist simultaneously, rein-
forcing the theme of polarized actors who appear as battling voices. 
The dual message is this: Javier’s psychiatric disability creates symp-
toms that need to be addressed, and the imprecision of clinical observa-
tion and the blunt instrument of medication cannot take the place of 
more sustainable social solutions.
What the extramural conversations between Josep and Javier reveal 
most, as they take up a greater part of the film’s duration in the second 
half, is the ineffectiveness of the communication between the two. 
Within a concise period of time, Javier makes a number of important 
declarations to his assigned outreach psychiatry contact that are, in re-
ality, repetitions of previous conversations. Javier expresses the impor-
tance of his attempt to get better and says that his life would be more 
meaningful if he only had time to do some drawings (1:15:20). He wor-
ries about the side effects of medications, stating the possibility that 
patients can be prescribed meds that can cause a stroke (1:15:50). Josep 
crafts and sustains clunky metaphors for Javier’s need to submit to in-
ternment despite the fact that he has not done anything (e.g., to para-
phrase Josep’s comments: a car needs to be fixed routinely or they take 
it away), to which Javier responds either with reluctant and resigned 
loud sighs or with attempts at playful banter that address the car 
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metaphor but return to the issue of his quality of life. Javier puts it most 
accurately and lucidly when he admits there is a distance between the 
pair’s divergent goals: “Tú tienes tu idea, yo tengo la mía [You have 
your idea, and I have mine]” (1:14:50). Josep’s sole concern throughout 
seems to be to underscore the power the hospital has to intern Javier, 
not to address his concerns. The link between the hospital and the com-
munity liaison program ends up being characterized by control, not by 
communication.35 The conversation between Javier and Josep is similar 
to those the former has with psychiatrists in the Taulí: he has the same 
concerns, the providers have the same answers, and he is not being 
heard. Whether inside or outside the hospital, the social battle is always 
tilted towards the side of clinical power.
Returning to the historical insights discussed by Foucault, it can be 
said that psychiatry perpetuates a much older clinical paradigm than 
does pathological anatomy, one that lacks precise instruments for diag-
nosis, treatment, and cure, and one in which the lack of meaningful dia-
logue between provider and patient recapitulates the irreconcilable gap 
between what is observed and what is known, between spoken and 
observed truths. The only middle ground that can be inhabited, one 
6.2: Tubing from Una cierta verdad (2008), Evohé Films, S.L., Corporació Catalana 
de Mitjans Àudiovisuals, S.A. y Vértice Cine, S.L.
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that García Roure’s film presents for all to see, is clothed in the half-
light of necessarily partial truths. Exploring this murky terrain, with-
out the ability to establish and sustain effective resources for patients 
living in the community, contemporary psychiatry inevitably fails in 
its goal to cleanly isolate elements of schizophrenia and abstract them 
from the total person. The only options available to this confused and 
still primitive practice are clinical imprecision and the ever-present 
threat of violence.
Abel García Roure’s documentary resolves the questions that origi-
nally drove the clinical paradigm’s transition from audio and dialogic 
narrative towards visual and spatial observation as identified by 
Foucault (1994: 112). The film accomplishes this through the nuances of 
artistic form, expanding the concerns of the clinical paradigm to impli-
cate the whole of social practice. We must keep in mind Foucault’s sug-
gestion that any balance between the visible and the legible, the spatial 
and the verbal, is more of a dream than a reality.36 Facing the difficulty 
of observing psychiatric disability visually/spatially, and with little 
time and resources to put into language, narrative, and listening to pa-
tients on their own terms, the Taulí is forced into a poor solution. The 
result is a disproportionate emphasis on the quick fix of forced facility 
admission and of forced medication in imprecise doses. It may be a 
dream for clinical practice to balance the visible and the legible, but it 
seems that in a sense García Roure’s cinematic essay has been able to 
make this an artistic reality.
The last words of the film – voiced by Javier, who in the final se-
quence becomes unquestioningly its central character – are a punctuat-
ing call to arms. A psychiatrist inquires more than once into the origins 
of Javier’s schizophrenia – which he connects with a time during which 
he is beginning to think that his children are not his own – and when 
she suggests to him that this “es una inquietud, ¿no? [that is an anxi-
ety],” he responds tellingly, “o, una cierta verdad [a certain truth].” The 
privileged positioning of this sequence as the very last dialogue in the 
film, which in fact unfolds on the screen after the first end titles and 
corresponding music have begun, is clearly intended to give Javier the 
last word. His statement is ultimately a condensation of both the clini-
cal and the social approaches to disability: Javier simultaneously dis-
plays the cognitive impairment accompanying severe psychiatric 
disability and gives voice to the social autonomy that is still lacking in 
clinical dialogue. Remembering the “cathartic function” of many dis-
ability representations noted by Ato Quayson (2007: 25), it is important 
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to recognize that here there is no such catharsis for the audience of Una 
cierta verdad. More than that, however, we see in this conversation the 
distilled kernel of conflict between providers and patients, or put an-
other way, the distance between a clinical paradigm and a social para-
digm of psychiatric disability.
Dialogue between two polarized social actors is propelled forward 
through time by the clinical view of schizophrenia as a problem to be 
solved, on one hand, and by the first-person acceptance of this per-
ceived problem as a situation to be lived with, endured, and experi-
enced, on the other. As staged by the director, this is a battle between 
forced medication and its effects on the body on one hand, and creativ-
ity, energy, and quality of life, on the other. Questions of individual 
autonomy and rights are brought into contact with social and discur-
sive force, employed in the name of society against a disruption that 
can never be cured, only marginalized – all against the background 
where institutional and rhetorical claims to truth are inequitably dis-
tributed in society. 
Conclusion
As a contribution to disability studies approaches in the humanities, 
Cognitive Disability Aesthetics has explored historical, theoretical, and 
cultural issues associated with cognitive disability representations in the 
introduction and chapters 1, 2, and 3. In chapters 4, 5, and 6, it has also 
analysed specific representations of intellectual, developmental, and 
psychiatric disabilities in examples taken from twenty-first-century cul-
tural production in Spain. At a more basic level, it has asserted and re-
flected upon the relative invisibility of cognitive disabilities in both 
scholarship and society. In focusing on the nuances particular to spe-
cific visual texts, it has also corrected for that invisibility. In doing so it 
has reinvested in the hallmark elements of humanities scholarship – the 
value of close readings of visual texts, the acknowledgment of strong 
connections between cultural production and the larger social environ-
ment, and the relative autonomy and potentially radical relevance of 
art and aesthetics to political commitments.
As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, the iconic and indexical modes of 
signification so prominent in visual media have not been sufficiently 
explored in disability studies scholarship in the humanities. Scholarship 
in traditionally literary fields has launched a welcome and trenchant 
critique of how disability functions in literature as a foil for normative 
social relationships, exposing the way disability functions as a meta-
phorical and narrative device in prose. This tradition has since been 
transposed to the realm of cinema, delivering what are certainly valu-
able analyses. In the process, however, a literary mode of analysis has 
cast aside the material links that visual media offer for drawing connec-
tions between bodies and minds as represented aesthetically/culturally 
and the bodies and minds of real people who live, love, and work 
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off-screen or off-page in ableist social environments. I have called for 
a disability studies criticism that attends to visual media precisely on 
account of their power to render the material experiences of cognitive 
disabilities visible in both art and society. I believe that this is par-
ticularly important when it comes to those cases of severe cognitive 
impairment that the able-minded public encounters most infrequently, 
whether as social or cultural representations. At present, visual media 
– and particularly the visual media circulated in marginal circuits of 
capital accumulation, such as the low-budget film in the style of the 
new disability documentary cinema that underscores the everydayness 
or non-spectacular nature of cognitive disability; and also the auteur 
graphic novel/comic intended for a niche market of consumers – argu-
ably present an opportunity for viewers to do some important “visual 
work.” This understands the connection between vision and knowl-
edge outlined by Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, a connection that just 
does not operate in the same way in prose literature, given its reliance 
on arbitrary forms of signification and on the normative social conven-
tion that pervades linguistic signs, semiotically speaking. The iconic/
indexical aspects of painting/photography, film, and graphic novels 
are more immediate links to an embodied material experience of dis-
ability, and to experience that does not exist as such in prose literary 
representations.
The focus on intellectual, developmental, and psychiatric disabilities 
changes how we view the relationship between text and world. This 
book has argued that it is particularly through visual culture that issues 
of cognition can be made more visible in society. This means attending 
to both concrete manifestations of cultural production and more diffuse 
cultural forces. In particular, the notion of the seam that I have bor-
rowed from an essay by Mark Jeffreys and develop in relation to cogni-
tive disabilities specifically proves to be an apt concept not just for 
negotiating the distance between biology and culture but also for not-
ing how humanities approaches to visual disability representations ne-
gotiate the porous and friable border between text and world. If it was 
ever possible to talk about the existence of a purely literary humanities 
criticism, that moment has clearly passed. With the disciplinary rup-
ture represented by cultural studies methods over the twentieth centu-
ry, and with their spread to language and literature fields other than 
English, even the most traditional literary criticism now maintains a 
dialogue with the wider social world. Today only the most impover-
ished approach would seek to hermetically seal off the humanities text 
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from the extra-textual reality in which it is immersed – in which it is 
created, published, distributed, and received. Attending to cognitive 
disability, whether in visual culture or in other cultural products, can 
further induce us to reconsider how representation operates to connect 
the aesthetic and social realms. It can allow us to see how the emphasis, 
in disability studies, on physical disability, has tended to reinforce 
mind/body dualism in the study of disability representations, even 
while simultaneously launching an effective critique of the normate.
Given the unresolved contradiction between the field’s historical fo-
cus on physical bodies and its tendency to sidestep productive discus-
sions regarding the issue of impairment – cognitive impairment in 
particular – I join disability theorists such as David Mitchell, Sharon 
Snyder, and Michael Bérubé in asking whether the time has come to 
reintroduce this issue to the academic field of disability studies. Doing 
so might create a more capacious approach that from the outset values 
issues of cognitive difference. In the end, humanities approaches focus-
ing on individual visual cultural products could bring attention to the 
material experience of cognitive disability precisely because they have 
always been adept at bridging the dialectical distance between matter 
and theory, body and mind, and text and extra-textual world.
Specifically, I believe that the discussion of collaboration and com-
munity carried out in chapters 4, 5, and 6 of this book emphasizes the 
value of what humanities work does and the potential value of what it 
might still do. The case of the Trazos Singulares exhibit suggests the 
need for further – and more sustainable, more politically committed, 
more radical – large-scale attempts to correct for the social invisibility 
and urban marginalization of cognitive disabilities. The case of the 
comics text María cumple 20 años raises the question of how art, culture, 
and visual representation can be a prioritized area through which to 
encourage collaboration. The graphic novel Arrugas – and in particular 
the role of the necessarily collaborative practice of re-minding, taken in 
the context of Alzheimer’s-related dementia – reaffirm the notion that 
interdependence is the foundation of human societies. The questions 
left unresolved in the documentary Una cierta verdad foreground the 
need for a more equal, collaborative solution to the problem of how to 
treat schizophrenia in the context of community-based care. These 
 cultural products and these analyses articulate the mundane and per-
vasive everydayness of collaboration and interdependence, both as 
themes of artistic production and as social realities. They also necessar-
ily pose somewhat provocative questions regarding the relationship of 
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the health and medical sciences to the social sciences and the humani-
ties in the wider context of the interdisciplinary field of disability 
studies.
Rather than trace these arguments as they have been made through-
out the book, however, here I want to close by returning to the matters 
of scholarly discipline that reared their heads earlier. It is a common-
place that humanities scholars are trained to work, and are largely ex-
pected to work, in solitude. Our historical focus on individual literary 
authors, our traditional focus on the publication of single-authored 
monographs and articles, and the entrenched individualism of tenure 
and promotion at academic institutions all confirm the truth of this 
characterization. We can certainly provide more incentive for scholars 
to do collaborative work, and we have the responsibility to do so. But 
statements equating humanities scholars with intellectual loners – 
many of which I have heard from humanities scholars themselves – 
have always struck me as an overstatement, if not as inauthentic. 
However fragmented our disciplines may be, they are no less the prod-
uct of academic communities. These communities are always created 
from granular relationships among individuals who share common in-
terests. Academically speaking, these communities draw their endur-
ing strength from the close collaborative professional relationships 
forged during graduate study and expanded in the academic depart-
ment and wider field. Make no mistake: these communities are, from 
the smallest to the largest scale, riven through with more contradictions 
than consensus. Such is the nature of community, which is an abstrac-
tion that only holds meaning if we allow for it to ebb and flow, coalesce 
and disperse, fracture and reform.
No humanities scholar is an island, even if the popular imagination 
would encourage us to think so. Our programs, departments, associa-
tions, conferences, academic journals, and book series are academic 
communities of a sort. They also make such communities possible. In 
none of these contexts can it be said that humanities scholars work 
alone. It may be worth asking, why do we believe that humanities 
scholars are solitary workers when all the evidence points to the con-
trary? The myth of individualism that has proven so important for con-
temporary neoliberal capitalism – and that has been critiqued heavily 
by disability studies work focusing on interdependence – may play a 
role here. We must also consider the instrumentalizing and reifying vi-
sion that severs a single academic product – a lecture, an article, a book 
– from its wider context. We are all part of an interdependent network 
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of other humanities scholars, though this is easily forgotten. Can we, as 
humanities scholars, assert that we are interdependent? And once we 
have done so, can we not also do even more to encourage further col-
laboration? I intend these questions as a transposition of the insights 
deployed in this book’s chapters from the realm of cognitive disability 
aesthetics to the realm of disciplinary matters. Disability studies as an 
interdisciplinary field has demonstrated a remarkable ability to connect 
discourses that have traditionally been seen as separate. Here I am ref-
erencing not only the origin of the field in women’s and gender studies 
programs but also its progressive fusion of humanities and social sci-
ence, even health science perspectives. Humanities fields, in particular, 
and Hispanic studies among them, tend to be strongly interdisciplinary 
in approach and method. I assert that they derive their relevance, 
strength, and potentially transformative power from this fact.
Yet there is still much work to be done to recognize the relevance of 
disability studies in the Anglophone world to the study of disability 
experiences in non–English-speaking countries. Even having complet-
ed this book, I imagine a response similar to those I have received in the 
past. Speaking generally, I have frequently been asked to show what is 
“unique” about disability experiences in Spain. It has sometimes been 
suggested that I avoid analysing disability representations in Spain in 
light of Anglophone disability theory and debates. These responses ig-
nore the historical and continuing influence of disability scholarship 
from the English-speaking world on Spanish scholarship; they also es-
sentially tropicalize non-Anglophone contexts. Beyond this, one must 
consider the historical and global resonance of disability movements; 
the international precedent set by American legislation such as the 1990 
Americans with Disabilities Act and the 2006 UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities; the influence of Anglophone mod-
els of clinical disability practice on non-Anglophone contexts; and 
cross-cultural similarities regarding the social construction, definition, 
scope, and support of disability. I would read books on these subjects 
with interest, but I have not sought to write them.
This book is not a monad – no book is. It is necessarily incomplete 
and partial. Above all else it has been an attempt to engage disability 
studies across area studies disciplines – in the end, an attempt to fash-
ion a liminal terrain. This terrain is located betwixt and between differ-
ent scholarly traditions. Its advantage is that this cross-disciplinary 
landscape is the one in which it is most likely that a truly global dis-
ability studies community might take root. If some readers seek out this 
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book only for the introduction and the first three chapters, or if others 
are only interested in the final three chapters focusing on Spanish cul-
tural production, then so be it. Even this in itself would be the start of a 
wonderful conversation.
I began Cognitive Disability Aesthetics with the idea that a second-
wave disability studies focused on cognitive difference is necessary if 
we are to move beyond a first-wave disability studies focused above all 
else on the physical body. Finding ways to incorporate the notions of 
impairment and biology – and even health and medicine – into disabil-
ity studies practice is crucial if we are to address the material experi-
ences of severe cognitive disability. This second wave of scholarship 
must simultaneously pursue both prose literature and visual culture. It 
must explore the differential textures of both what are arguably the 
Anglophone roots of disability studies and the experiences of disability 
in a full range of global contexts. The obstacles to sustaining these con-
versations were mentioned in the introduction to this book and built 
upon throughout its chapters. There may be working frictions between 
a social critique based on bodily difference and one grounded in cogni-
tive difference; between the expectation for social groups in representa-
tional democracy to employ self-representation and self-narration and 
practical understandings of the material experiences of cognitive dis-
ability; between the short-term goal of increasing inclusion, access, and 
participation and the long-term goal of effecting a radical shift in ableist 
neoliberalism; between the potential gains of identity politics and the 
collective aspirations of intersectional approaches; and between the 
universality and the particularity of disability experience. The degree 
to which we can become more interdisciplinary and collaborative in 
our scholarly thinking will surely determine how effectively we navi-
gate these choppy waters of disability studies’ second wave.
Notes
Preface
 1  The quotation continues: “The expectations for a disabled presenter 
talking about their own experiences are very different than what the 
audience expects from a nondisabled professional ally. Each location 
offers useful information and adds to the pool of disability community 
knowledge ... Contrast this approach with Disability Studies where dis-
closure of one’s relationship to disability is often considered to be private 
information.”
Introduction
 1  Importantly, Michael Bérubé’s book The Secret Life of Stories (2016) – 
which I read as I finalized this book for publication in fall 2016 – notes 
“the general reluctance, in disability studies as in the disability rights 
movement, to talk about disability in terms of function” (2016: 56). The 
quotation continues: “Inevitably it seems, any discussion of functionality 
with regard to disability will involve some normative ideas about how 
bodies and minds should function (eyes should see, ears should hear, 
legs should walk, brains should be able to decode facial expressions and 
distinguish reality from fantasy), and thus any admission that disability 
involves a reduction or loss of function threatens not only to return us to 
the idea of disability as lack, but to give up on the foundational distinc-
tion between disability (as a social phenomenon) and impairment (as a 
somatic phenomenon). All disability thereby becomes impairment, and 
the idea that disability studies examines disability as the social organiza-
tion and administration of impairment.”
206 Notes to pages 6–8
 2  Impairment is arguably more visible as an issue in the Routledge Handbook 
of Disability Studies (Watson, Roulstone, and Thomas 2014; first published 
in 2012) than it is in The Disability Studies Reader (Davis 2013; first pub-
lished in 1997), a fact that may indicate a distinction between UK and 
North American trends in disability studies research as well as a gap 
between humanities and social science approaches to disability. The for-
mer text’s Part Two features six essays under the heading “Disablement, 
Disablism, and Impairment Effects” (2014: vi), for instance, and Part Three 
features another six under the heading “Social Policy and Disability: 
Health, Personal Assistance, Employment, and Education” (Ibid.). My 
point is not that impairment is not discussed in the literature, but that 
impairment (and cognitive impairment more than physical impairment) 
tends not to be discussed in humanities approaches to disability and that 
it is particularly absent from the North American disability studies tradi-
tion in which I have written this book.
 3  Mitchell and Snyder’s introduction to their pioneering edited volume 
The Body and Physical Difference: Discourses of Disability uses this argument 
to call attention to physical disability in the humanities: “The predomi-
nance of disability in the biological, social, and cognitive sciences paral-
lels an equally ominous silence within the humanities. Perhaps because 
disabilities are exclusively narrated as debilitating phenomena in need of 
medical intervention and correction, the humanities have not privileged 
disability as a foundational category of social experience or social invest-
ment” (1997: 1).
 4  Indeed medical language is highly suspect in many strains of disability 
studies research in the humanities, as is language that is judged to recog-
nize and thus purportedly essentialize impairment. Mitchell and Snyder 
share the interesting example of a new policy on impairment language 
adopted by the journal Disability and Society (2015: 158).
 5  An example, as I mentioned in the preface of this book, concerns the case 
for a strong Deaf identity in the US context and elsewhere, which has been 
made through arguments for the capital-d Deaf as a linguistic and cultural 
minority.
 6  Jasbir Puar’s critique of minority model approaches, “homonormativity,” 
is discussed in Mitchel and Snyder’s book in terms of rights-based assimi-
lation, where the authors define ablenationalism: “We refer to this tactic of 
integrating a privileged minority at the expense of the further abjection of 
the many as ablenationalism” (2015: 45).
 7  Mitchell and Snyder write that “the social model is itself a creature of late 
liberalism’s strategic embrace of devalued identities and its corrective 
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efforts to include rather than exclude what Nicole Markotić and Sally 
Chivers refer to as ‘the problem body’” (2015: 37).
 8  Mitchell and Snyder explore in detail the “weak strain of accommodation” 
(2015: 36) and the “weakened strain of inclusionism extant in neoliberal-
ism” (2015: 38), and detail the hidden costs of what should be considered 
gains, for example when discussing the contradiction that support for 
community living may rise as the social services supporting that com-
munity living are eroded. “Neoliberalism continues to oversee greater 
and more pressing exclusions with respect to the terms undergirding 
opportunities for integration that then go unfunded or receive drastic cuts 
at a later point in time” (2015: 37). Chapter 6 of this book mentions the 
inadequate support for people living with schizophrenia by exploring the 
argument over institutional versus community living in a broad sense and 
by delving into case studies at the Taulí hospital in Sabadell (Barcelona, 
Spain). See also Prendergast (2013).
 9  Mitchell and Snyder’s wording in The Biopolitics of Disability is not always 
as inclusive of matters of cognition, as when they write that “the social 
and minority models stress revision of tangible barriers such as accessible 
architecture and the modification of public transportation systems, to name 
just two sites of political intervention identified as critical to disability 
integration. To revise the environment for greater accessibility for all bodies 
represents the most tangible pathway to disability inclusion” (2015: 62).
 10  For their part, the authors of The Biopolitics of Disability ask a most per-
tinent question that reaffirms the need to attend to the specific material 
forms that the disability experience takes in an ableist society: “If we are 
all effectively ‘disabled,’ then what is to mark disability as a nuanced ex-
periential condition?” (Mitchell with Snyder 2015: 30). I read this question 
as a call to recognize that not all experiences of disability are the same, 
even if they do share a common origin in ableist social environments. 
Through recognizing the reality of impairment, these works advocate a re-
turn to the specificity of individual experience that has either been ignored 
or else taken for granted in previous approaches.
 11  On the concept of the “the terrain of the biocultural,” Davis writes: “I use 
that term, coined by David Morris (with whom I cowrote chapter 9) and 
promulgated by a number of people including myself, to describe the in-
tersection among the cultural, social, political, technological, medical and 
biological. The well of this book resides in issues around the body and the 
mind in the context of disability and disability studies. I explore sexual-
ity, emotion, psychology, genetics, death, narrative, performance, and a 
host of other issues through a complex interdisciplinary lens” (2013: vii). 
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I am much less interested in exploring Davis’s argument that diversity is 
the new normal, one that – while fundamental to his book – is somewhat 
more complex than my discussion here will allow. This is in part because 
I do not easily accept his argument – drawing on Georgio Agamben and 
distinguishing between bios and zoe – that some populations are “at base 
not consumers and most likely never will be” (2013: 5). My belief is that 
even understood as zoe, the group in which Davis would list “homeless 
people, impoverished people, end-stage cancer patients, the comatose, 
heroin, crack or methamphetamine addicts” (2013: 4) are in fact deeply 
connected to patterns of consumption in late capitalism involving not 
merely consumer goods but also consumer choices in health care treat-
ment, rent, and so on – whether they are made autonomously or made for 
such populations by other providers, agencies, the conditioning of avail-
ability, and so on. Both FDA-approved pharmaceuticals in general and 
disease treatments specifically – as well as non-regulated drugs outside of 
treatment contexts – are a huge part of capital accumulation strategies and 
in fact depend upon the abject bodies that are never fully able to separate 
themselves from these strategies. Mitchell with Snyder here in fact also 
agree with Davis in the sense that they imply that disabled persons, as 
what they call non-workers, are not impacted by or implicit in the capital 
accumulation strategies of advanced capitalist states or their correspond-
ing consumer cultures. “Many of the disabled people we know,” they 
write, “prove to be some of the worst consumers on the planet because 
they have neither the means nor the interest of mistaking meaning with 
the market. For instance, disabled artists and activists in Chicago and 
London with whom we have worked live sparing, nonconsumptive lives 
and, yet, this is what we admire about them” (2015: 217). I assert that it 
is not possible, in Chicago or London, to fully separate from consumer 
markets that involve food, clothing, housing, health care, and so on. The 
implication in the text may be that consumption and consumerism are 
about leisure, but leisure is merely one aspect of the process of capitalist 
accumulation, not its totality.
 12  One could say that in the process of underscoring materialist concerns he 
unfortunately turns performance and social constructedness into an arena 
that is purely immaterial. This goes against his own stated attempt, devel-
oped more fully in chapter 2 of his book, to move beyond the simplistic 
perspective he associates with post-positivist realists or PPRs. It is difficult 
to read the book’s first two chapters from a perspective that does not get 
caught oscillating between the stark polarities of realism and idealism – 
the writing on his page 25 is an excellent example of this.
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 13  Although Davis addresses this issue directly in the text (see his chapters 
1 and 2), The End of Normal is nevertheless, in part, a book pulled thin 
between the extremes of pure idealism and pure materiality. Catering to 
these extremes (or better said, these philosophical abstractions) does not, 
in my view, move us any closer to understanding the material experience 
of severe cognitive impairment in contemporary society.
 14  Clearly, as Davis’s argument illustrates, intellectual and developmental 
disabilities can be marketed to, just as can physical disabilities. Here 
Mitchell and Snyder’s exploration of the uncomfortable, objectionable 
social reality that some health treatments for disabling conditions are not 
pursued because no market has been identified, while others are pursued 
specifically because there is a potential market, is also relevant (2015: 157).
 15  The authors respond to the claim attributed to Davis – one he refutes 
directly, in fact – that he believes disability to be universally shared, a  
part of the human experience. “As explained earlier, we disagree with 
positions advanced by Davis, Watson, Shakespeare, and others that argue 
for a more general recognition that ‘we are all disabled’ as a substantive 
solution to the marginalization of people with disabilities” (Mitchell with 
Snyder 2015: 164). The full quotation from the body text reads: “If we all 
share inefficient, discordant, and non-normative bodies, then ‘the end of 
normalcy’ seems to result in a flattening of the social/biological playing 
field of difference (Davis, End of Normal 29–30). Isn’t this a form of inter-
pretation that ultimately ‘negate(s) disability as meaning in its own right’ 
… If we are all effectively ‘disabled,’ then what is to mark disability as a 
nuanced experiential condition?” (Mitchell with Snyder 2015: 30).
 16  I regard the entire quotation as significant: “new materialist approaches 
offer an enrichment of the way alternative cognitions/corporealities allow 
us to inhabit the world as vulnerable, constrained, yet innovative embod-
ied beings rather than merely as devalued social constructs or victims of 
oppression” (2015: 7).
 17  Readers may be interested in the full quotations I have abbreviated in the 
body text: “Where contemporary scholarship discusses reappropriation of 
the terms of oppression, or trades in artful means for evading pervasive 
structures of stigma, some disability studies ‘body talk’ (including our 
own work in this mix) dares to name diagnoses or conditions as some-
thing other than forms of medical false consciousness. One key goal of 
critical materialist analyses is to research the histories and experiences 
that attend diagnostic etiologies in order to create pragmatic knowledge 
in methods that often arrive at one’s bedside under emergency conditions, 
much akin to psychiatric survivor movements from the sixties” (Mitchell 
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with Snyder 2015: 160); “Perhaps it is time to return to the scholarly sup-
pressed topic of impairment in parallel to what Robert McRuer pointedly 
asks of the limits of disability identity models” (2015: 160; see McRuer 
2010: 172).
 18  See Mitchell and Snyder 2015: 205, understanding that Davis treats 
disability somewhat apart from the matter of diversity. Also: “While 
rehabilitation often refers to a productive process of recovery leading to 
a return to approximations of normative embodiment (and, ultimately, 
employability), here the term suggests something less optimum. Cultural 
rehabilitation refers to normalization practices at work within the 
neoliberal era through which nonnormative (i.e., nonproductive) bodies 
become culturally docile. This process accomplishes its task of adjust-
ment through a gradual ceding of democratic state power and the duty 
to govern on behalf of the people to corporate interests both benign and 
disciplinary. Such practices jettison the value of the commons (literally 
selling off the collectively held riches of the commonwealth) while enlist-
ing nonnormative bodies in service of inclusionism as a further fetishiza-
tion of the accomplishments of the neoliberal state’s normalcy. Claims to 
neoliberal exceptionality rely on a largely rhetorical celebration of this 
accomplishment of inclusion long before any such utopian realizations 
could be justifiably demonstrated. Or, rather, such arrivals at inclusion-
ist goals prove successful only because their application to marginalized 
lives is so meager. Throughout this book we have referenced this imple-
mentation of neoliberal diversity as the ‘weakened stain’ of inclusionism 
akin to inoculations from disease that introduce a small amount of virus 
into a system in order to ward off greater degrees of infection in the 
future” (2015: 205).
 19  Michael Bérubé puts this in similar terms (2016: 57).
 20  This slippage is implied and addressed by the work of Michael Bérubé, 
who focuses on intellectual disability and who notes “the hierarchy within 
disability studies itself, which has been challenged in recent years (chiefly 
by people working on autism and mental illness) but which remains very 
much in effect, whereby physical disability stands in for disability in toto” 
(2016: 27).
 21  In addition, as I highlight in the introduction to Cultures of Representation 
(Fraser 2016a), and as evident in Olga María Alegre de la Rosa’s La discapa-
cidad en el cine (2003), Spanish-language work on disability in film within 
Spain has been itself very focused on anglophone products, even as social 
and cultural awareness of disability increases, as evident in the documen-
tary Capacitados, for example.
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 22  A recent review of my book Disability Studies and Spanish Culture in Journal 
of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies 10(1) (2016), for example, does not 
mention at all the artistic dimensions of any of the texts I study, nor does it 
address the aesthetic dimensions of my analysis of those cultural texts.
1 On the (In)Visibility of Cognitive Disability
 1  On the relationship of this philosophical question to intellectual disabili-
ties see the work of feminist philosopher Licia Carlson, in particular her 
book The Faces of Intellectual Disability: Philosophical Reflections (2010). See 
also the volume edited by Licia Carlson and Eva Feder Kittay, Cognitive 
Disability and Its Challenge to Moral Philosophy (2010) and the chapter by 
Leslie Francis (2009).
 2  See, for example, Mad Matters: A Critical Reader in Canadian Mad Studies 
[2013], edited by Brenda A. LeFrancois, Robert J. Menzies, and Geoffrey 
Reaume, as well as the contribution to Disability and Society 30(2) (2015) by 
Brigit McWade, Damian Milton and Peter Beresford titled “Mad Studies 
and Neurodiversity: A Dialogue.” Félix Guattari’s work is also a point of 
reference here, perhaps in particular the work Chaosophy (1995). This is not 
to say that the medical model is not itself being received ambivalently by 
those in health disciplines (see for example Brosco 2010).
 3  Consider Charles A. Riley’s comments: “Legislation defining disability 
rights began with deafness, blindness, and various mobility impairments 
such as spinal cord injury and amputation, the so-called physical disabili-
ties, and rapidly expanded to include AIDS and ‘mental’ disabilities from 
the most serious, such as bipolar disorder, to such controversial conditions 
as recovery from drug and alcohol addiction, attention deficit disorder 
(ADD), and Asperger’s syndrome, an autism-like condition that makes 
children react strongly to any change in their routine” (2005: 10) – one 
might ask why the word “mental” appears in quotes here. See also the 
emphasis on physical disability by disability rights activist Marsha Saxton 
(quoted extensively in Norden 1994: 11; on advocacy, human rights, and 
disability rights more generally see Carey 2009; Charlton 1998; Herr, 
Gostin, and Hongju Koh 2003; Pardeck 2005; Shapiro 1994; Sulmasy 2010; 
and Williams and Shoultz 1984).
 4  See my review of Minich’s Accessible Citizenships in Arizona Journal of Hispanic 
Cultural Studies for a closer look into this fascinating text (Fraser 2015).
 5  The book follows from her chapter titled “The Politics of Staring: Visual 
Rhetorics of Disability in Popular Photography” in the MLA volume 
Disability Studies: Enabling the Humanities (Garland-Thomson 2002b).
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 6  In addition to Mitchell and Snyder, Murray here mentions work by 
Lennard J. Davis, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, and Mairian Corker/ 
Tom Shakespeare.
 7  Photography became commercially viable in 1839. Similarly, the freak 
show in its modern and popular form, as discussed below in this section, 
can be traced to the 1830s shows by P.T. Barnum. Significantly, disabil-
ity photography features in Lee Fontanella’s La historia de la fotografía en 
España (1981).
 8  I draw here from Hevey’s essay “The Enfreakment of Photography,” 
reprinted from his 1992 book for the first edition of The Disability Studies 
Reader. The full quotation reads: “The social absence of disabled people 
creates a vacuum in which the visual meanings attributable (symboli-
cally, metaphorically, psychically, etc.) to impairment and disablement 
appear free-floating and devoid of any actual people. In the absence of 
disabled people, the meaning in the disabled person and their body is 
made by those who survey. They attempt to shift the disablement on to 
the impairment, and the impairment into a flaw. The very absence of dis-
abled people in positions of power and representation deepens the use 
of this ‘flaw’ in their images. The repression of disabled people makes it 
more likely that the symbolic use of disablement by non-disabled people 
is a sinister or mythologist one. Disablement re-enters the social world 
through photographic representation, but in the re-entry its meaning 
is tied not by the observed, disabled people, but by the non-disabled 
observers” (1997: 345; see also Millet-Gallant 2004; Garland-Thomson 
2002b; Haller 2010).
 9  What is most relevant about Stiker’s book is the way he folds physical and 
developmental disabilities together even in the examples appearing in his 
introduction (“the Down’s syndrome child, the woman without arms, the 
worker in a wheelchair,” [1982]1997: 10; “the parents of autistic children 
[...] persons confined to a wheelchair or crippled by traumatic after- 
effects,” [1982]1997: 2).
 10  McDonagh’s book includes a quite relevant quotation: “Of course, from 
the early decades of the twentieth century the physical separation and iso-
lation in institutions of those people who wore the ‘idiocy’ label made the 
historical processes shaping the concept even more invisible. That the his-
tory of ideas of idiocy and its flip side, intelligence, has been ignored as an 
appropriate subject of investigations and analysis, and that the relations 
of this history to other streams of thought, other realms of discussion, sug-
gests just how effectively the idea has been absorbed within frameworks 
that shape its meaning” (2008: 9).
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 11  See Norden (1994: ch. 1) for how associations between begging and dis-
ability were a staple of much early film.
 12  Stiker’s work ties into but diverges from that of Foucault, whose critique 
of prisons and hospitals remains relevant to the topic and in particular to 
the topic of mental illness as discussed in chapter 6 of this book. See also 
Mitchell with Snyder (2015: 215) on feeblemindedness, Foucault, and the 
nineteenth-century institution.
 13  The issue of madness and its connection to more contemporary discus-
sions of psychiatric disability is an interesting one in itself and is cov-
ered extensively in chapter 6 of this book (“Screening Schizophrenia”). 
Winzer writes that “before the advent of widespread literacy, when 
pushing the plow was more important than pushing the pen, mildly 
intellectually disabled people – those labelled today as learning disabled 
and those at the upper end of the spectrum of mental retardation, for 
 example – would simply have merged into the general populace. In 
early times it seems probable that only the grossest examples of mental 
defect would have been considered remarkable … However, those far  
down the continuum, affected perhaps with multiple disabilities or 
medically fragile conditions, could not have been expected to survive” 
(1997: 80).
 14  “Our ability to assess the scope of the problem in earlier societies is fur-
ther obscured by the lack of a consistent, sound means of discriminating 
between people who had physical disabilities (i.e. were crippled, dwarfed, 
epileptic, or deaf) and those who were intellectually impaired or mentally 
ill. All were considered to form one, all-encompassing category. The lack 
of clear definitions means that the history of disability tends to focus on 
particular disabilities, those that were more clearly distinguished from the 
others” (Winzer 1997: 80). The lumping together of madness and physi-
cal disability in this account should not surprise, particularly given the 
historical view that madness and mental disorders were produced by 
physical causes (Winzer 1997: 85).
 15  Accounts of specific physical disabilities are much easier to trace back into 
history than cognitive disabilities, as I found when editing and translat-
ing the anthology Deaf History and Culture in Spain: A Reader of Primary 
Documents (Gallaudet UP, 2009). See also Fraser (2007, 2009, 2010b, 2012; 
made possible by Plann 1997).
 16  While not a book-length study, Paul K. Longmore’s “Screening 
Stereotypes: Images of Disability” (1985), republished in Screening 
Disability (2001, eds. Enns and Smit), was an earlier forerunner of 
Norden’s general approach, “claiming that Hollywood films were 
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essentially ableist in their depiction of people with disabilities” (Enns 
and Smit 2001b: xi).
 17  Even late in the book he continues to emphasize this central point – for ex-
ample, “the history of physical disability images in the movies has mostly 
been a history of distortion in the name of maintaining an ableist society” 
(Norden 1994: 314)
 18  Norden here follows a line of thinking established by Paul K. Longmore in 
his 1985 essay “Screening Stereotypes” where the scholar noted: “Positive 
images in commercials and other programs reflect the growing socio-political 
perception of disabled people as a minority group and the increasing im-
pact of the disability civil rights movement. Whether these new depictions 
will become an important trend depends partly on the response from the 
disability community itself” (Longmore 2001: 15).
 19  This productively ambivalent perspective is conveyed also in Snyder and 
Mitchell (2010), for example, who comment on film as a critical arena 
in their book chapter. Mitchell and Snyder (2015, 2016) also address the 
potential of cinematic disability representations.
 20  Even the volume’s third section, “Disability as Trauma, Mental Illness, and 
Dysfunction in Post-Vietnam Cinema,” emphasizes physical disability in 
all but a single essay, which deals with the representation of depression, 
family dysfunction, and suicide.
 21  For example, their extremely brief reading of Peter Bogdonavich’s film 
Mask (1985) illustrates how understanding the cinematic tradition of the 
melodrama genre potentially leads to a more robust understanding of the 
film’s portrayal of disability (2001: 39).
 22  See chapter three of Chivers’s monograph The Silvering Screen (2011), 
titled “Grey Matters: Dementia, Cognitive Difference, and the ‘Guilty 
Demographic’ on Screen,” for a discussion of cognitive disability.
 23  By design, my own edited volume Cultures of Representation: Disability in 
World Cinema Contexts (2016) included discussion of representations of 
a mix of both physical and cognitive disabilities. But of course it should 
be noted that this collection was published more than twenty years after 
Norden’s book, a fact that only reconfirms the pioneering value of that 
first-wave disability studies work (Fraser 2016a).
2 Signification and Staring
 1  In a sense, this recapitulates the distinction between syntagmatic and 
paradigmatic relationships in structural linguistics, but this knowledge is 
not required for appreciation of its role in the present context.
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 2  I have explored Antonio López García’s painting, its spatial context, and 
its related philosophy in the monographs Encounters with Bergson(ism) in 
Spain (2010c) and Antonio López García’s Everyday Urban Worlds (2014).
 3  For work on the ontological qualities of photography, see work by Roland 
Barthes and Susan Sontag; on the cinema’s relationship to physical reality, 
see work by Béla Balázs and Siegfried Kracauer (1968).
 4  Érice’s debt to Japanese filmmakers makes this an appropriate compari-
son. See the work by Linda Ehrlich (1995, 2000).
 5  Stephen Prince (1999) continues and updates Wollen’s line of thought on the 
indexical and iconic modes of the filmic sign, which are also important for 
the geographical film criticism of Hopkins (1994). See also Fraser (2010c).
 6  Note that these arguments bemoan the legacy of twentieth-century film 
theory that has been overly influenced by Saussure: “In its analysis of im-
ages, film theory since the 1970s has been deeply indebted to structuralist 
and Saussurean-derived linguistic models. Indeed, it would be difficult 
to overstate the depth and importance of this relationship”; “Film theory 
since the 1970s has tended to place great emphasis upon what is regarded 
as the arbitrary nature of the signifier-signified relationship, that is, upon 
the purely conventional and symbolic aspect of signs. What this focus has 
tended to displace is an appreciation of the iconic and mimetic aspect of 
certain categories of signs, namely pictorial signs, those most relevant to 
an understanding of the cinema. This stress upon the arbitrary nature of 
semiotic coding has had enormous consequences for the way film studies 
as a discipline has tended to frame questions about visual meaning and 
communication” (Prince 1999: 99).
 7  A relevant example would be the Society for Cinema and Media Studies 
conference for work on film, or the American Association of Geographers 
for work using spatial approaches. In truth, and despite the overwhelm-
ing preponderance of Hispanic studies scholars in comparison to those 
in other language and culture areas, there is currently only a single jour-
nal in Hispanic studies expressly devoted to film scholarship (Studies in 
Spanish and Latin American Cinemas, formerly Studies in Hispanic Cinemas). 
Regarding disability studies in the humanities specifically, the publication 
of several important single-authored and edited volumes mentioned in 
previous chapters of this book stands as a challenge to such traditionally 
literary thinking (see texts by Norden 1994; Enns and Smit 2001a; Chivers 
and Markotić 2010; Mogk 2013; Marr 2013; and Fraser 2013a, 2016a).
 8  Indeed of the contributions to that volume, only Darke’s chapter, part of 
the first chapter (2010: 31–2), and brief moments of chapters by Cheu and 
Diehl, can be considered relevant to the present argument.
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 9  See also Snyder and Mitchell (2010: 202–3). As examples of what “many 
contend even in disability studies,” the authors give the following brief 
list in parentheses in the text: “(Finkelstein 30–36; Shakespeare 293–300; 
Barnes 577–80)” (2015: 199).
 10  Bérubé makes reference to “the Rob Spirko-induced insights that disability 
in literary texts need not be located in, or tied to, a specific character with 
an identifiable disability” and “the Phyllis Eisenson-induced insight that 
disability in the relation between text and reader need not involve any char-
acter with disabilities at all. It can involve ideas about disability, regardless of 
whether any specific character can be pegged with a specific diagnosis. This 
opens the field of criticism considerably; and I am going to suggest that this 
is a good thing, not least because I am determined to cure disability studies 
of its habit of diagnosing fictional characters” (2016: 19, original emphasis).
 11  At the time of this book’s publication, the film can also be viewed online at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cXz_TNZAVFk.
 12  “Film spectators arrive at the screen prepared to glimpse the extraordinary 
body displayed for moments of uninterrupted visual access – a practice 
shared by clinical assessment rituals associated with the medical gaze” 
(Snyder and Mitchell 2006: 158).
 13  On sexuality and disability see Robert McRuer and Anna Mollow’s Sex 
and Disability (2012) as well as Michael Gill’s Already Doing It: Intellectual 
Disability and Sexual Agency (2015). Many of the contributions to the book 
Cultures of Representation: Disability in World Cinema Contexts (Gill 2016), 
including Gill’s own chapter therein, in fact deal with these very points, 
points that have shaped important strata of disability studies criticism.
 14  Remember, too, the role arguably played by Down syndrome in Lennard 
J. Davis’s discussion of the materiality of disability in his 2013 book, dis-
cussed in the introduction of the present book.
 15  This is precisely to consider the uniqueness of visual representations 
when compared with prose narrative. Here Garland-Thomson writes: “Her 
likeness emerges from the sharp line her stately features form against 
the background; her nose and chin lift imperially; her eyes gaze impas-
sively down on the world beneath her. Her head is turbaned with a richly 
colored and ornately patterned aristocratic headdress, and her shoulders 
reveal a simple but elegant gown. On first glance she looks like a mod-
ern Florentine lady. On second glance, however, we recognize a face we 
have never seen in a portrait. We see the distinct features of a person with 
Down syndrome, her hair wrapped in a bright beach towel, her face in a 
faraway reverie, and a simple heart tattooed on her shoulder below her 
bathing suit strap” (2009: 83).
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 16  See Prince (1999: 99), also: “But, as we will see, the spectator’s understand-
ing of cinematic images seems more immediately explicable in terms of 
mimetic, referential coding rather than via the chains of displaced, arbi-
trary, and relational meaning in prevailing theories. In other words, this is 
understanding is more of a matter of recognition than translation” (1999: 
102); “Thus, with respect to pictures, film theory might ask if there is a 
nonlinguistic, even biological, basis on which visual communication might 
exist” (1999: 105).
 17  To use semiotic terms developed in the study of naturally occurring 
language, the selection of the im-sign for a given film is equivalent to the 
paradigmatic relationship of the linguistic sign, while the embedding of 
that im-sign within a grammatical structure of film is equivalent to the 
syntagmatic relationship of the linguistic sign (see work by Saussure, 
Jakobson 1960). In this sense film possesses a two-layered structure that 
is complementary to the double articulation of natural languages. But in 
general film theory has traditionally privileged the syntagmatic relation-
ships of the cinema over, and in isolation from, its paradigmatic relation-
ships. The same can be said for disability studies scholarship involving the 
cinema, which has privileged the syntagmatic relationships of disability 
narrative over the paradigmatic relationships of the disability im-sign. The 
point is that through the layering of pre-grammatical and grammatical 
levels of disability representation, the temporal dimension of film allows 
viewers to see how disability representations are linked to a social context.
 18  I have discussed Judith Scott and her representation in greater depth in an 
article in Cultural Studies (2010a) and also in Disability Studies and Spanish 
Culture (2013a). Here I refer to Scott as a way of making a much more 
general point.
 19  Consider, for example, Norden 1994; Chivers and Markotić 2010; Mogk 
2013; and Fraser 2016a.
 20  In this respect see chapters by Victoria L. Garrett and Nicola Gavioli in the 
book edited by Antebi and Jörgensen (2016).
 21  See essays on Yo, también in Fraser (2011a, 2013a) and especially Gill 
(2016).
 22  This tradition is arguably alive and well in Hispanic studies. In Disability 
Studies and Spanish Culture (2013) I explored the value of representing 
disabled characters as embedded in relationships in analyses of disability 
representations in films such as ¿Qué tienes debajo del sombrero? (What’s 
under Your Hat?) (2006) and Yo también (Me, Too) (2009). I also explored 
director Joaquim Jordà’s move to include himself in his documentary on 
agnosia/alexia titled Más allá del espejo (2006).
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 23  As a sidenote, it is interesting that Snyder and Mitchell use cerebral pa-
ralysis as an example where the boundary between cognitive and physical 
disability becomes significant as well as partly discursive in nature: “As a 
result, people with physical disabilities find themselves refuting cognitive 
‘involvements’ (such as in the case of CP); and, in turn, people with cogni-
tive disabilities find themselves having to charge those with physical dis-
abilities with a further sedimenting of their own socially derived stigma. 
However, in either case the effort finds itself impossible because the fates 
of both groups are historically tethered to each other” (2010: 198–9).
3 Disability Sholarship at the Seam
 1  See the Preface to the present book, where I disclose my relationship with 
disability as suggested by O’Toole (2013) and stress why my research 
focuses on severe cognitive disability.
 2  As indicated in this book’s introduction, a decade after Jeffreys (2002) 
published his insights, books by Davis (2013) and by Mitchell with Snyder 
(2015) have illustrated that disability studies has never fully resolved the 
matter of whether impairment is a defining aspect of disability construc-
tions or if disability itself is just another manifestation of the more hetero-
geneous notion of social difference, defined by its opposition to the 
normate (Garland-Thomson 1997).
 3  The authors continue: “he is the bearer of an entrenched identity (pathetic 
or vengeful); he is the literal embodiment of the evidence of the fall of 
man; he personifies the fiendish specter of war; he is singular and excep-
tional rather than common and ordinary; he can be viewed as the most 
interior to a social order (the most human in suffering) or the most exiled 
(lacking in natural human affections); his physical excesses provide a 
ready source material for caricature. Finally a scapegoat patterning to the 
play reiterates exile as a culturally sanctioned historical solution to the 
social disruption that disabled people are perceived to present” (Mitchell 
and Snyder 1997: 14).
 4  In Spanish literature, one could look in a similar way at the spectacular 
representation of cognitive difference in Juan Benet’s novel Volverás a 
Región (Return to Region, trans. Gregory Rabassa), in which disordered 
cognitive process serves as a metaphor for the destructive impact of the 
Spanish Civil War, a theme of warring brothers with biblical resonance 
that pervades Benet’s work. Interestingly, Benet was heavily influenced by 
Faulkner. Readers can consult my book on Juan Benet for more informa-
tion, though I do not engage a disability studies approach there.
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 5  She quotes Michael Bérubé’s suggestion that “Faulkner based his portrait 
of Benjy Compson [in The Sound and the Fury] on a local Mississippi man 
with Down syndrome” (1996: xv; cited in Hall 2016: 109–10). Discussion 
there also addresses Mark Haddon’s The Curious Incident of the Dog in the 
Night-Time and Naoki Higashida’s The Reason I Jump. Hall brings up issues 
of self-representation in narrative art that are arguably more nuanced and 
perhaps even problematic for populations with cognitive disabilities than 
they are for able-minded populations with physical disabilities, citing 
Bérubé and Straus as I also do, following her lead. These issues are dis-
cussed later in this chapter. Bérubé comments on The Curious Incident and 
autism somewhat extensively in The Secret Life of Stories (2016).
 6  Disability drag, as discussed by Tobin Siebers (2008: 114–19) is an interest-
ing point in its own right that I do not discuss here.
 7  See my discussion of this in Fraser (2010c).
 8  Both genres of cultural production – prose narrative and film – are artistic 
or textual representations that are intimately connected to extra-textual 
worlds. They both mediate and restage experience, involving real-world 
referents. What is of interest, however, is that this process happens differ-
ently in prose literature disability representations than it does in the more 
expressly visual representations such as film, painting, and sculpture, or 
the graphic novel, for that matter.
 9  This does not mean there can be no transgressive literary representations 
of disability, it only explains why ableist literary disability representations 
are so common. Similarly, as discussed in the later parts of this chapter, it 
is not that visual disability representations are by their nature transgres-
sive, only that the visual materiality of their connections with disability 
constitutes a factor non-existent in literary disability representations, one 
whose potential can be harnessed by artistic creators and attended to by 
scholarship working “at the seam.”
 10  This model is also explainable in terms of Saussurean linguistics by the 
chain model of arbitrary signification whereby a sign (signifier/signified) 
relates to another sign, which relates to another, and another ... Due to the 
fact that Saussurean linguistics heavily weights arbitrary signification over 
iconic/indexical signification (both of which exist in spoken language), 
the chain of signifiers can be imagined to hover over reality. Another 
investigation might explore more substantially the impact of Saussurean 
linguistics on literary scholarship and on disability scholarship in particu-
lar, accomplishing what Peter Wollen and Stephen Prince, for example, 
have accomplished in film theory. The notion of form is equally intriguing. 
This is not the form of the novel, its structure or prose organization, nor 
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the form of a linguistic sign (the written word itself, whose connection to 
meaning is largely constituted through arbitrary signification and social 
convention), but rather the surface of a representation.
 11  It is important to understand that although prose literature representa-
tions seem to deal with bodies, at a semiotic level they deal only with 
the symbolism of bodies. This is significant because in visual media it is 
possible to deal more directly – via icon/index – with bodies. And as we 
will see, the representation of bodies in visual narrative evades the routine 
literary presentation of disembodied cognition and is able to actually 
embody cognition, presenting it through movement and action in a way 
impossible in literary narrative.
 12  For example, other attempts to bridge the literary text and the world in-
clude the various techniques of realism as well as metafictional techniques 
that turn the act of reading inside out and problematize the division 
between literature and non-literary life.
 13  Also: “Literature does not merely reflect any already socially interpreted 
reality, but adds another tier of interpretation that is comprehensible 
within the terms set by the literary-aesthetic domain” (Quayson 2007: 
14).
 14  Readers might consider whether there are echoes here of the argument 
from Lennard J. Davis (2013) discussed in the introduction to this book (in 
the section titled The Universality / Specificity of Disability) and concisely 
expressed in his phrase “kicking the rock.”
 15  The quotation’s last sentence may be of interest to comics scholars. It 
reads, in full: “It is only conspicuous when it is a matter of a story in images, 
spread over the multiframe in a situation of co-occurence” (Groensteen 
2007: 115). I do not assume a readership conversant in comics theory in 
this book and thus prefer not to address the concept of the multiframe, al-
though I do so in a work in progress about a graphic artist from Mallorca, 
Spain. At the level of the multiframe, iconic redundancy can be general-
ized to intersect with what Groensteen defines as the principle of iconic 
solidarity: “interdependent images that, participating in a series, present 
the double characteristic of being separated – this specification dismisses 
unique enclosed images within a profusion of patterns or anecdotes – and 
which are plastically and semantically over-determined by the fact of their 
coexistence in praesentia” (2007: 18). See also Postema (2013: 55) on the 
 “co-presence of images,” where her discussion cites Groensteen.
 16  “It seems to me that comics (and the visual story in general) are not apt 
to produce, by itself, an equivalent of the operation known in the literary 
domain as a description” (Groensteen 2007: 124).
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 17  As Groensteen explains, “once the same motif is represented several times 
it transports all of its attributes (its predicates) along with it. If we want 
to provide recognition to the descriptive properties of the drawing, we 
must therefore admit that it is a description that is infinitely restarted, to 
which we cannot assign a particular site. Contrarily, in a text, the descrip-
tions are generally given ‘once and for all’; once described, a character, for 
example, can thereafter be designated simply by his name, by a pronoun 
or a deictic. The description cedes the place to the designation, where it 
can therefore be considered a form of extension” (2007: 124).
 18  A reviewer of my work once commented that it was colonializing of me 
to be writing about disability as an able-bodied scholar, or even about dis-
ability in literary/filmic texts produced by ablebodied authors and that, 
citing Spivak’s foundational essay directly, subalterns should speak for 
themselves, a statement that struck me as particularly indicative of how 
cognitive ableism cloaks itself in the identity politics of disability studies 
scholarship. That is, arguments that populations with severe cognitive dis-
abilities need to engage in the self-narration and self-representation that 
inform identity politics at the national scale seem quite false to me in that 
they map a physical disability model of the requirements of engaging with 
representational democracy to a cognitive disability model for which this 
argument is naive at best and perhaps even inappropriate.
 19  Bérubé writes of prose literature that “thus, be cause the textual repre-
sentation of cognitive disability requires the depiction of minds that do 
not have this capacity for self-reflection, it can be read without too much 
difficulty as a device with which to explore and reflect on the cognitive 
capacities necessary for textual self-representation” (2005: 572–3).
 20  The full quotation reads: “One of the tasks undertaken by disability stud-
ies so far has been to point out these tropes and these characters, and to 
critique them for their failure to do justice to the actual lived experiences 
of people with disabilities. That project is long overdue and still needed; 
yet it sometimes proceeds as if characters in literary texts could be read 
simply as representations of real people” (2005: 570). Also consider: 
“As for my emphasis on the ‘fictional’ nature of the intellectual disabilities 
I  examine here: I am relying on the ancient – and yet always critical – 
 insight that literary characters are not real people” (2016: 29).
 21  In fact, a reader offering suggestions about the material that was eventual-
ly included in this book manuscript asserted that people with Alzheimer’s 
were only frustrated when not receiving proper care ... I will only say that 
I think this perspective overapplies the social model of disability by ignor-
ing the material experience of cognitive impairment.
222 Notes to pages 98–104
4 Visualizing Down Syndrome and Autism 
 1  See the brief discussion of this point in chapter 2 related to the case of 
Judith Scott, and the article by Joseph N. Straus, “Autism as Culture” 
(2013), that I discuss both in the introduction and chapter 3.
 2  Ann Millett-Gallant’s comments on the installation of Alison Lapper Pregnant 
by British artist Marc Quinn in London’s Trafalgar Square are also some-
what relevant to this topic: “Public art raises issues of social and artistic 
representation and the visibility and invisibility of certain members of 
society” (2013: 399).
 3  This is thus quite a different endeavour when compared with the tradition 
of looking at canonical works of literature and culture in light of disability 
– as evidenced in Snyder’s essay “Infinities of Forms: Disability Figures in 
Artistic Traditions” (2002).
 4  María y yo (Gallardo and Gallardo 2007) as well as the eponymous film 
based on that graphic novel (Fernández de Castro 2010) were both anal-
ysed extensively in chapter 2 of my previous monograph Disability Studies 
and Spanish Culture (2013).
 5  Brief clips of this appear in the online video “Inauguración.” See also a 
previous version of the present argument in Fraser 2013b.
 6  As he admits in Disability Aesthetics, “neither disabled artists nor disabled 
subjects are central to my argument” (2010: 3).
 7  Here Johnston cites work by Barnes and Mercer; Barnes, Oliver, and 
Barton; and Riddell and Watson.
 8  In addition, the recent Spanish feature-length film Yo, también (Me, Too) 
(2009), which includes key scenes filmed in Madrid, makes an effective 
case for these specific articles of the Convention; the lead role, played by 
Pablo Pineda, depicts a university-degree holding thirty-four-year-old 
man with Down syndrome who struggles to exercise autonomy in the 
spheres of work and love (see Fraser 2011a; Gill 2016).
 9  In the DVD Capacitados, three well-known Spanish people (questionably/
problematically) experience a full working day under conditions intended 
to replicate a physical/sensory disability experience – chef Ferran Adrià; 
the president of Coca-Cola Iberia, Marcos de Quinto; and María Garaña, 
the able-bodied president of Microsoft Ibérica (see the booklet accompany-
ing Capacitados, 2010: 7). Journalist Amparo Mendo points out the lack of 
engagement with intellectual disability as an important flaw in the project 
(same booklet, 2010: 43).
 10  On unemployment rates see Boeltzig, Sulewski, and Hasnain (2009: 
753), also Titchkosky (2009: 76); on work integration in Spain specifically 
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see Vilà, Pallisera, and Fullana (2007); see also Pallisera, Vilà, and Valls 
(2003).
 11  See Fraser (2011a, 2010a); see also Fraser (2013c, 2012, 2010b, ed. 2009, 2007).
 12  Hevey continues (original emphases): “In addition, we could say that the 
general history of disability representation is one of oppressive or ‘nega-
tive’ forms. And this has happened precisely because disabled people are 
excluded from the production of impairment-based disability culture and 
excluded from the dominant ‘disability’ discourses” (1993: 423). Also, 
“disabled people have been the subject of various constructions and repre-
sentations throughout history but disabled people have not controlled the 
object – that is, the means of producing or positioning our own construc-
tions or representations” (1993: 423).
 13  Among them are Don Mitchell (2003) and Kirsten Simonsen (2005), who has 
pointed to the relevance of Lefebvrian thought for feminist approaches.
 14  See the discussion in Fraser (2011b: 9–14).
 15  See Fraser (2008: 340).
 16  See Lefebvre (1991b: 249; Fraser 2011b: 23–8).
 17  Significantly, the notion of “access” might refer also to access to the dis-
course and production of art. Taylor (2005: 325) asks how some “disabled 
young people post 16” might gain better access to existing art curricula.
 18  Although it is inappropriate to engage this idea in depth here, interested 
readers can turn to Peter Hall’s Cities of Tomorrow and – highlighting plan-
ning history in (Barcelona) Spain – even my own “Ildefons Cerdà’s Scalpel” 
(Fraser 2011c) as well as works by Tim Marshall and Joan Ramon Resina.
 19  On the culture of the Movida in Spain, see the volume edited by Nichols 
and Song (2014).
 20  On Gallardo, see Alary (2000: 56, 60), Beaty (2007: 116, 119), Cuadrado 
(2000: 510–12), Dopico (2005: 318–34), Fraser (2013a: 34–74), García (2010: 
165), and Vilarós (1998: 211–13).
 21  One of Miguel Gallardo’s own characterizations of this shift appears in the 
2010 documentary film by Fernández de Castro (2010: 24:26–25:12).
 22  “I propose that the autobiographies are forging a language in which to 
talk about autism and in terms of which autistic people can think out their 
experiences. Biographies, in many cases written by a mother or father 
of an autistic child, are often of great interest in this respect. They tell us 
much about families with autistic children. Some of them are good repre-
sentations of the child growing up. Some tell more about the parent and 
her attempts to make sense of what has happened” (Hacking 2010: 261).
 23  Fraser (2013a). See also the chapter on the HBO film Temple Grandin au-
thored by K. Lashley published in Cultures of Representation (2016).
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 24  Note that Grandin’s book bylines testify to this form of collaborative 
authorship. As a sidenote, it should not be forgotten that there was a time 
when widespread autism narrative was virtually non-existent; nor should 
it be forgotten that the publishing industry as a rule only publishes what it 
believes is marketable. See also another publication by Hacking where he 
writes: “It does not matter for the present purposes who contributed what 
to the final print form of the text” (2009: 1468).
 25  Beyond reading her books and following her rise to ever-greater celebrity, 
I was fortunate enough to hear Temple Grandin speak at the College of 
Charleston during my time as a faculty member there.
 26  Ian Hacking brings up both Grandin and the question of whether autis-
tic “autobiographers are speaking only for the high-functioning end of 
the spectrum” (2009: 1468), but he does not engage this issue at length. I 
argue that this issue deserves our close attention precisely because of the 
nuances given to experiences of severe disabilities where impairment is a 
factor.
 27  The pages are unnumbered, but for practicality of analysis I use a number-
ing system that begins with page 1 corresponding to the dedication page. 
This page features an image of María walking away; the back of her shirt 
reads “Be water my friend” in English, and the Spanish dedication below 
the image reads “Dedicado a May [Dedicated to May]” – May is María’s 
mother.
 28  Andy Bondy and Lori Frost’s book A Picture’s Worth: PCES and Other 
Visual Communication Strategies in Autism (2002) charts how pictograms 
impact effective communication for people with autism (2002: 53–5). They 
also developed the Picture Exchange Communication System (PCES) 
(2002: 67–94). Note that other similar systems have been developed (2002: 
131, 135; Boutot and Smith Myles 2011: 125–7).
 29  See the prose description suggesting that María changes from song to song 
after hearing its first three seconds (2015: 20).
 30  See also another page featuring a full-page panel illustrating María listen-
ing to music (2015: 24).
 31  See Fraser (2013a: 70–1).
 32  Remembering the thesis of Martin Norden’s Cinema of Isolation, that 
disabled characters in film have tended to be portrayed as isolated loners, 
I point out that portraying María by herself listening to music or draw-
ing is not the same thing as portraying her as isolated and alone – these 
are social activities that involve her in a social world: they bring a social 
world to her and prepare her for further social interactions. María cumple 
20 años is, in fact, a consistent portrayal of the fact that María is embedded 
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in social relationships. Note too, that the previous graphic novel María y 
yo did include some metaphors of isolation – in particular the depiction 
of María on an island – whose impact was purposely heightened in the 
documentary film, I think, to its detriment.
 33  I previously noted that the medical model of disability was much more 
prevalent in the documentary film than in the graphic novel version of 
María y yo (Fraser 2013a: 71).
 34  This quality of the sequence can be explained by the qualities of back-
ground and comics composition analysed by McCloud (1994).
 35  Frustrations with communication are also visible in the graphic novel’s 
treatment of María’s screaming (on 2015: 20, 25 –6, 28; see also 51).
 36  As a way of saying thank you to the people in this network, another page 
attempts a listing that runs from the top to the bottom margin of the page, 
with not a single image (2015: 57).
 37  I was fortunate, while at the College of Charleston, to attend a lecture 
given by Michael Bérubé where his adult son with Down syndrome also 
gave a speech.
5 Sequencing Alzheimer’s Dementia
 1  See Dopico (2005: 317–34); Compitello 2014; Vilarós 1998. The second tome 
of Jesús Cuadrado’s encyclopedia of Spanish comics and comics artists 
notes that he joined the “pornographic and Barcelonan” publication Comix 
Kiss Comix in 1994, and by 1995 was working alongside the scriptwriter and 
narrator Juan Miguel Aguilera (at times under the collective name Trazo) 
as well as in the alternative press (BEM) or guild publications (Ganadería 
Trashumante) (2000: 1083; the Paco Roca entry is of course relatively brief).
 2  See Nichols and Song (2014), as well as volume 14 of the Arizona Journal of 
Hispanic Cultural Studies, and Triana Toribio.
 3  On the recent attempt to move disability studies beyond the confines of 
Anglo-American contexts see the journal issues edited by Murray and 
Barker (2010) and Mitchell and Snyder (2010).
 4  Disability in Spanish film has also been addressed by Conway (2000, 
2001); Marr (2009, 2013); Minich (2010, 2014); and Prout (2008); see also 
Discapacidades humanas (2010); Ferreira (2008); Fraser (2013a); Gámez 
Fuentes (2005); and Hirtz (2009). See also the articles related to Spain in 
the special section of the Arizona Journal of Hispanic Cultural Studies edited 
by Encarnación Juárez-Almendros. The anglophone focus of Alegre de la 
Rosa’s La discapacidad en el cine (2003) reveals how much work is still to be 
done in Spain on disability and film.
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 5  Given its melodramatic tenor, I regard the film ¿Y tú quién eres? as a 
textbook example of the way in which this dependency anxiety tends to 
be screened. By contrast, Arrugas in both graphic novel and film form is a 
welcome correction to this trend. On the film, see Fraser 2016b.
 6  Part of my reason for saying this has to do with the distinction between 
the audiences who consume graphic novels on one hand and those who 
consume films on the other. As the product of a very personal and individ-
ually produced artistic genre, sequential art – especially good sequential 
art – demands more of the reader than do most films, which are designed 
to appeal to wide audiences and whose production costs are wagered to 
bring a substantial economic return. But more than demonstrating this 
general principle, Arrugas is moreover a good example of how sophisti-
cated even popular sequential art can be.
 7  While the graphic novel in Europe has received some significant atten-
tion (e.g., Beaty’s Unpopular Culture: Transforming the European Comic Book 
in the 1990s), graphic novels and comics on the Iberian peninsula have 
not enjoyed the attention in English publications that has been given to, 
for example, the French context. Nevertheless, comics and graphic nov-
els published in Spain have figured into an increasing number of works 
published in Spanish (on the graphic novel in Spain see Alary 2000; Dopico 
2005; Fraser 2013a; on adaptations of graphic novels to film see Hight 2007; 
Lefèvre 2007; on disability in the graphic novel outside of Spain see Alaniz 
2014; Fink Berman 2010; and for relevant sources on the graphic novel in 
Europe see Beaty 2007; García 2010; Gasca and Gubern 2001; Merino 2002). 
 8  This trend is not unrelated to the social shifts prompted by a larger aging 
population that will see the total number of people living with AD in 
Spain rise to 1.5 million by 2050 (Medina 2013: 1689). Cultural scholar 
Raquel Medina writes of Alzheimer’s that “in 2011, approximately 
600,000 people in Spain had been diagnosed with AD, and another 200,000 
were believed to be suffering from the disease without having had a medi-
cal diagnosis ... This staggering number, when taken in combination with 
the documented scarcity of nursing home places, diminishes the chances 
for a person with AD securing an adequate place to live in and to receive 
appropriate care. Apart from class and gender implications, what emerges 
from these figures is that the family replaces public health and social care 
as the main actor in providing care for older people and AD patients. 
Furthermore, the family can be left with the entire financial burden and 
responsibility for care regarding AD” (2013: 1689)
 9  That is, whether we are speaking of senescent adults or younger persons 
with intellectual disabilities, of life inside of or outside of institutional 
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contexts, quality of life issues such as the lack of meaningful work and 
limitations to one’s autonomy can take a toll (on disability and work see 
Chima 2005; Citron et al. 2008; Contardi 2002; Hartnett et al. 2008; Migliori 
et al. 2007; Morris 2002; Pardeck 2005; Parmenter 1991, 1996; Ping-Ying Li, 
Sing-Fai Tam, and Wai-Kwong Man 2006; Vilà, Pallisera, and Fullana 2007; 
Wehman, 1995, 2006; on autonomy and Spanish film see Fraser 2010a, 
2011a, 2013a). Suzanne Abbott and Roy McConkey’s article “The Barriers 
to Social Inclusion as Perceived by People with Intellectual Disabilities” is 
particularly relevant (see 2006: 276).
 10  Similarly, the use of the subjective in Arrugas – both in graphic novel 
and film – squares with Naomi Feil’s 1960s notion of Validation Therapy, 
discussed by Kitwood, which affirmed that “the experience of people with 
dementia should be taken with the utmost seriousness” (in Kitwood 2011: 
56).
 11  These citations are from Lucy Burke, who, while she does not work on 
Spanish cultural production, has produced analyses of textual explora-
tions of Alzheimer’s that are quite relevant here (see also Burke 2007, 
2008b).
 12  This notion is supplemented where advantageous to do so by pub-
lished work on dementia by Annette Leibing and Lawrence Cohen, 
Tom Kitwood, Jaber Gubrium, Lucy Burke, Bruce Jennings, and Hilde 
Lindemann. Aagje Swinnen and Mark Schweda’s volume Popularizing 
Dementia (2015) is another obligatory reference.
 13  Jennings stresses that it is not a matter of coming to terms “with a dimin-
ished thing” and that instead “we should seek to attain a re-placed pleni-
tude” (Jennings 2010: 171). “Moreover, it is not necessary to draw a sharp 
distinction between personal and social mind when dealing with demen-
tia, just as it is not requisite to draw a sharp line between minding in the 
past and minding in the present (remembering and intending)” (2010: 173; 
see also the chapter in the same book by James Lindemann Nelson (2010) 
titled “Alzheimer’s Disease and Socially Extended Mentation”).
 14  Generally speaking, this hedonic approach, rooted in a somewhat simplis-
tic notion of satisfaction and of a necessarily social nature, is not yet the 
palliative care that might be carried out on the second floor of the facil-
ity. Opposed to a hedonic understanding of care that is linked to social 
satisfaction, palliative care is, of course, a practice rooted in comfort with 
necessarily social dimensions.
 15  For a visual example of this linkage as seen in Spanish cinema see the 
documentary Monos como Becky (1999) by Joaquim Jordà, a director who 
is discussed in Fraser (2013a).
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 16  Jaber Gubrium (1986) looks at the importance of narrative and storytelling 
for the human experience in general and specifically at how significant 
these become for families and friends of loved ones with Alzheimer’s 
disease (see also Gubrium 2003).
 17  See Roy (2009: 41), who argues that individuals are narratives in a sense.
 18  This intriguing article discusses a creative storytelling project carried out 
in multiple locations beginning in 1998 with Alzheimer’s disease and 
related dementia (ADRD) patients (see also Basting 2001: 78; 2006).
 19  This is explained well by Scott McCloud, whose important work 
Understanding Comics (1994) has been translated into Spanish by Astiberri 
in Bilbao.
 20  At one moment Emilio repeats himself three times at dinner without 
realizing it (2008: 54). There is one character who seems unable to express 
himself but who repeats whatever he hears (2008: 12), and another who 
repeatedly shows off his bronze medal from 1953 (based on a real-life 
resident Roca met). Some of these behaviours are more serious or more 
emotionally heavy, such when Félix’s roommate hits him on the head with 
a wrench out of frustration with his snoring, accidentally killing him; or 
when a woman who is no longer able to remember her husband takes up 
with another resident of the home, right in front of her husband during 
his visits (2008: 36–7). The closing scene at the end of the graphic novel de-
picts a story where an elderly man still allowed to live with family on the 
weekends, almost kills his leashed dog Milú in an elevator accident (2008: 
100).
 21  There is an incident Miguel finds humorous where Emilio defecates in the 
character Pellicer’s collection bag of memories (2008: 88).
 22  There is an extended depiction of motor skill exercises in the graphic 
novel, led by a younger woman who catches the eyes of the elderly men 
in the residence (2008: 25–31). Of great interest is that at a certain moment 
Emilio forgets the word that corresponds to the “pelota [ball]” that is be-
ing passed around (2008: 31). More than once the word is pronounced as 
“talope,” a nonsense word that changes the syllable positioning within the 
word. It is not clear whether the physical trainer’s repetition of this word 
is playing along or is on the other hand a semi-subjective portrayal of the 
fact that Emilio – or other Alzheimer’s patients – are “losing” language 
(on motor skills and dementia see Masumoto et al. 2004).
 23  The shock of sudden appearance at the beginning of the graphic novel 
will of course be replaced by the disappearance that tends to characterize 
ADRD toward the end of the Arrugas – most concretely the misplacement 
of Emilio’s wallet and watch.
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 24  Kitwood mentions seven access routes through which “we can gain 
insight into the subjective world of dementia” (2011: 73–9). Arrugas, I 
argue here – which is based on some of the above, given the author’s own 
experiences with people with dementia – would constitute a route 8 (or 
perhaps a modified route 6), in that there is value in approaching demen-
tia through the poetic imagination of another. See also Burke (2007).
 25  Research into Alzheimer’s has looked into dissociation between proper 
name and common name production (Brennen et al. 1996: 96). A basic 
premise is that if you can name something you can give further informa-
tion, but you may have further information without being able to recall 
the name: “Considerable evidence from many paradigms has shown that 
naming a person is more arduous than categorising them semantically” 
(1996: 94).
 26  Consider what Ramanathan writes: “Thus, from this point of view, the 
Alzheimer patient’s silences and broken speech are only degrees removed 
from what is in any case a vanishing spiral of smoke or vapour, with trace 
leading to trace” (2008: 15).
 27  Hamilton recognizes the collective resonance of narratives in the context 
of Alzheimer’s research specifically, noting “the multiple ways in which 
audience members contribute linguistically and non-linguistically to the 
emergence of the narrative” (2008: 54). She also allows for the fact that 
these narratives can be comprised of fragments: “In closing, short nar-
ratives told by individuals living with Alzheimer’s disease may indeed 
not function well as ‘self-portraits,’ but even a narrative as ‘snapshot’ can 
provide clues that can help interlocutors reconstruct aspects of the indi-
vidual’s identity” (2008: 79–80). See also Ramanathan 2008.
 28  See Peón Sánchez (2004) on caregiver syndrome as it relates to 
Alzheimer’s.
6 Screening Schizophrenia
 1  The last paragraph of the essay, which reflects I think a poor choice of 
words, ends with what the authors surely take to be a hopeful vision of 
the future, made possible by the ACA and by President Obama: “President 
Obama has recently made reducing prison populations a political priority 
… States that have declined to take federal funds for Medicaid expansion 
may recognize that their own expenditures on correctional institutions 
will remain high unless they find ways to reduce the number of mentally 
ill in jails and prisons. The community services that Medicaid helps to 
support would go a long way to accomplish this goal. The policies that 
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would emerge – such as expanded programs to integrate offenders back 
into the community – could also prove highly beneficial for the disabled. 
In the end, it is in everyone’s interest – offenders, disabled and the general 
public – to have fewer people under lock and key” (2015: 72).
 2  Certainly these are terms that have a legal resonance and that appear in 
Medicaid documents. Thus at the same time that I question their use in the 
NYRB essay, I also question their more popular and pervasive legalistic 
use. This is not the place, however, to engage this point more extensively. 
I merely want to draw attention to the inadequacy of such terms and their 
role in reaffirming a normative position on cognitive disability.
 3  It is useful to know that just such a problematic distinction resonates 
through a Medicaid community handbook posted by the US Department 
of Health and Human Services, where the terms are similarly defined 
only vaguely. There, “mental illness” is itself considered a cause of dis-
ability and is presumed to be curable; “mental retardation” is contrasted 
with “mental disorder”; and somewhat paradoxically, “mental disorders 
include mental retardation, organic brain disorders and mental illnesses, 
among others.” See “USING MEDICAID TO SUPPORT WORKING AGE 
ADULTS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESSES IN THE COMMUNITY: 
A HANDBOOK” (https://aspe.hhs.gov/pdf-report/using-medicaid- 
support-working-age-adults-serious-mental-illnesses-community- 
handbook). “We envision a future when everyone with a mental illness will 
recover, a future when mental illnesses can be prevented or cured, a future when 
mental illnesses are detected early, and a future when everyone with a mental 
illness at any stage of life has access to effective treatment and supports –  
essentials for living, working, learning, and participating fully in the community”; 
“Mental illness is the leading cause of disability in the United States”; 
“Mental disorders include mental retardation, organic brain disorders  
and mental illnesses, among others.”
 4  There is also an interesting comment made regarding the developmentally 
disabled (Neier and Rothman 2015: 42).
 5  In truth, this title is reserved for Foucault’s second French edition of the 
book in 1972 (Foucault 2006: xxiii), the English translation of which was 
not available until 2006. See also Foucault (1973, 1994, 1995, and 2006).
 6  “For clinical experience to become possible as a form of knowledge, a reor-
ganization of the hospital field, a new definition of the status of the patient 
in society, and the establishment of a certain relationship between public 
assistance and medical experience, between help and knowledge, became 
necessary; the patient has to be enveloped in a collective, homogeneous 
space. It was also necessary to open up language to a whole new domain: 
Notes to pages 178–80 231
that of a perpetual and objectively based correlation of the visible and the 
expressible” (Foucault 1994: 196).
 7  The relatively recent coining of the term Mad Studies, which arises out of 
the long history of anti-psychiatry movements, provides reason to connect 
Foucault’s critique with present-day struggles. In their introduction, the 
editors of the volume Mad Matters: A Critical Reader in Canadian Mad Studies 
(2013) encourage “the radical reclaiming of psychic spaces of resistance 
against the psychiatric domination of Mad people as a collection of chemi-
cal imbalances needing to be corrected in a capitalist system that prizes 
bourgeois conformity and medical model ‘fixes’ above all” (LeFrancois, 
Menzies and Reaume 2013: 2). As I discuss it below, Abel García Roure’s 
film cannot be said to fit neatly into the spirit of this newly forming 
academic discipline of Mad Studies. That is, by not dismissing the value 
of mental health supports wholesale and by instead acknowledging the 
potential life benefits of such support when provided to certain individu-
als, it poses a somewhat more complicated question. On one hand, the film 
affirms, in my view, that in some markedly severe cases where medication 
is desired, patients and providers may need to collaborate on plans of care. 
On the other, it affirms and critiques the fact that patients and providers do 
not enter into this collaboration with an equal degree of social power.
 8  I have addressed this throughout the present book. While not the sole 
example of this trend, feminist philosopher Licia Carlson has been particu-
larly important in this regard (see Carlson 2001, 2010; Carlson and Kittay 
2010). In addition, a growing body of anglophone work has explored 
the representation of both physical and cognitive disabilities in film and 
media (see Chivers 2011; Chivers and Markotić 2010; Enns and Smit 2001a; 
Mogk 2013; Pointon and Davies 2008; Riley 2005), going beyond the pri-
marily physical focus of Martin Norden’s foundational title The Cinema of 
Isolation: A History of Physical Disability in the Movies (1994).
 9  Important touchstone representations of schizophrenia in Iberian film and 
literature include Joaquim Jordà’s Monos como Becky (1999) as well as the 
documentary 1% Esquizofrenia (2006), directed by Ione Hernández and 
produced by the noted Spanish filmmaker Julio Medem, and the bestsell-
ing novel Los renglones torcidos de Dios (1979) published by Torcuato Luca 
de Tena. One must consider that Tobin Siebers’s lucid remarks about the 
fundamental role of disability in modern aesthetics may warrant explora-
tion in the medium of filmic representation specifically (2010: 4-5; see also 
Siebers 2008).
 10  The film’s producer, noted director Julio Medem, commented at a film 
festival where 1% esquizofrenia was screened that “siempre me interesó 
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mucho el tema de la esquizofrenia … Me hice médico para ser psiquiatra, 
aunque no lo soy, por suerte; porque cuando descubrí la esquizofrenia, me 
di cuenta de que nunca sería capaz de ayudar a estas personas ... y mira, 
ni siquiera he sido capaz de dirigir esta película, una película que, aviso, 
remueve muchas cosas, y eso es fundamental” (The topic of schizophrenia 
has always interested me ... I pursued medicine to be a psychiatrist, even 
though I am not one, luckily; because when I discovered schizophrenia, 
I realized that I would never be able to help these people ... and look, I 
haven’t even been able to direct this film, a film that, I warn you, changes 
many things, and this is fundamental) (Hermoso 2006: 37).
 11  Regarding the issue of violence: “Las estadísticas demuestran que …  
tomados como muestra general, los enfermos con esquizofrenia son menos 
agresivos que la población general, curiosamente” (Statistics show that … 
taken as a general sample, those sick with schizophrenia are less aggres-
sive than the general population, curiously) (35:53); “Es al revés, es decir 
que ellos son mucho más agredidos que agresores” (It is the opposite, that 
is, they are much more likely to be the victims of violence than the aggres-
sors) (36:06). Regarding the theme of social marginalization, see 10:07.
 12  The image of a crowd is a welcome shift, but occurs very late in the film 
(1:04:33, 1:05:19). We also see symbols of the pharmaceutical industry such 
as lab equipment and pills (respectively, 51:33, 52:53; 54:00, 54:44).
 13  Another interview outlines the importance of social understanding and 
acceptance (11:20).
 14  I am thinking here particularly of Torcuato Luca de Tena’s bestselling 
Spanish novel Los renglones torcidos de Dios (The Twisted Lines of God) 
(1979), which presents themes restaged to a certain extent also in the more 
recent Hollywood film Shutter Island (2010).
 15  In popular culture and discourse, schizophrenia is traditionally misun-
derstood as a split within a person’s psyche, a point that the documentary 
itself attempts to correct (see discussion of “el mito de que eszuizofrénicos 
tienen dos personalidades o son dos personas diferentes en un solo cu-
erpo” (the myth that schizophrenics have two personalities, or are two dif-
ferent people in a single body) (0:48:56). See also de la Rosa (2007), where 
this splitting is appropriately framed as between the patient and reality. 
Una cierta verdad goes a step further by showing viewers that this split has 
a social as well as a clinical dimension, as discussed later on in this article.
 16  Regarding “the particular characteristics of the Catalan context,” this 
study noted that “in our country, no community-based psychiatric and 
social services were established after the deinstitutionalization national 
policy, and National Health Service resources for psychiatric patients 
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living in the community are limited to outpatient psychiatric visits for 
medication control. Only recently and very slowly are some additional 
psychological and social programs being provided” (Duñó et al. 2001: 
688). Of great interest is the fact that Dr Roser Guillamat – who appears in 
Una cierta verdad – is a co-author of this study, whose authors are all based 
at the Parc Taulí in Sabadell (Barcelona). See also Pousa et al. (2008).
 17  In that study, “fair agreement” was the lowest rating regarding items from 
the category of met needs, ranking below “almost perfect,” “substantial,” 
and “moderate” but above levels of agreement between staff and patients 
regarding unmet needs, which were lower still (Ochoa et al. 2003: 205).
 18  “In conclusion, the CLAMORS study has shown that the prevalence of MS 
in Spanish patients with schizophrenic, schizophreniform and schizoaffec-
tive disorders receiving antipsychotic therapy, while lower than in North 
America or Scandinavia, seems considerably higher than in the reference 
general and clinical populations, presenting values that these latter popu-
lations reach only when 10 to 15 years older. This situation in an already 
excessively stigmatized patient population group should be a source of 
concern for public health care and society as a whole” (Bobes et al. 2007: 
171). Note that Julio Bobes is one of those interviewed on screen during 
the 1% esquizofrenia (2006) documentary film (see 1:08–1:09 for his image).
 19  A reference to the Quijote appears in the film, spoken by Javier, who says 
that because he was acting like Cervantes’s protagonist with the wind-
mills, he took his medication (1:31:43). Notably a reference to the Quijote 
also appears in 1% esquizofrenia (11:25).
 20  At one moment, Javier, discussed below, tells a psychiatrist that now that 
he isn’t on Risperdal he sleeps much better, approximately 7½ hours per 
night (0:53:00; also 1:01:53). Earlier in the film, he also complains that the 
medications he is taking at times leave him without strength to take care of 
himself: “Sí, si tengo ... un poquito de fuerza, porque ... las medicaciones te 
dejan demasiado chafado y no te da para hacer ... lavar la ropa por ejem-
plo” (Yes, if I have … a bit of energy, because … the medications leave you 
too flattened and don’t leave you able … to wash your clothes for example) 
(0:32:25). Later on, Javier repeats that Risperdal leaves him in a coma-like 
state (1:31:49); and points directly to the consequences of how relaxing 
patients generally means rendering them inactive: “relaja pero mata los 
sistemas eléctricos; o los mata o los reduce” (it relaxes [a person], but it kills 
one’s electrical systems: either it kills them or it reduces them) (1:27:15).
 21  Importantly, two of the privileged psychiatrists portrayed in the documen-
tary go on record explicitly about wanting the best for patients, and even 
about wanting to minimize the impact of side effects on patients (1:21:22).
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 22  To describe this non-spectacular aspect of the film in other terms, it is use-
ful to gauge student reactions to the documentary. I included this film in a 
disability series for students interested in the Hispanic world, and a room 
packed with some one hundred students let out a collective groan when 
the credits started. Other films in the series were not met with such a clear 
collective reaction. After also teaching the film in another class featuring 
undergraduate students interested in health care careers and even to a 
select number of graduate students, I am tempted to explain the reaction 
as a comment on the way in which spectators are not prepared to consume 
non-spectacular (everyday, slow, careful, contemplative) visual narrative 
regarding psychiatric illness.
 23  Olga Real-Najarro has written of narratives that relate the patient experi-
ence of schizophrenia as either “desde dentro [from within/emic]” or 
“desde fuera [from without/etic]” (2011: 171), neither of which fully ap-
plies in this case.
 24  This reliance of psychiatry providers on narrative is thus potentially 
combatted by patient narrative itself, as when, in Una cierta verdad, Bernat 
shares the story that he successfully changed a judge’s opinion in order to 
avoid being interned against the wishes of his doctor.
 25  One film reviewer has gone so far as to say this explicitly – “Es quizás por 
esta ausencia de punto de vista que en la película de Roure es difícil saber 
quién es el protagonista o si tan siquiera lo hay. Aunque es probable que 
ésa no sea una cuestión importante en un film que en realidad pretende 
cuestionar los límites de la cordura y la locura así como los códigos socia-
les sobre los cuales se asienta la concepción contemporánea de la normali-
dad [It is perhaps because of this absence of viewpoint that in Roure’s film 
it is difficult to know who is the protagonist or if there even is one. Even 
though it is possible that this isn’t an important question in a film that in 
truth seeks to question the limits of sanity and madness just as it does the 
social codes upon which the contemporary conception of normality rests]” 
(Petrus 2009). The point of view, of course, is precisely one that views the 
limits between madness and reason with an appropriate scepticism, as the 
second statement above makes clear.
 26  One in-depth review piece does well in suggesting that “al contrario de 
Mones com la Becky, aquí no se trata de cuestionar el uso institucional de 
la locura, sino que se encuadra en un compromiso ético al querer dester-
rar los prejuicios sociales que envuelven a estos pacientes” (in contrast to 
Monos como Becky, here it is not a matter of questioning the institutional 
idea of madness, but instead of framing it within an ethical commitment 
by seeking to get rid of the social prejudices that envelop these patients) 
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(Montoya 2009). Another scholar characterizes the film as “un ejemplo de 
cine comprometido y necesario” (an example of committed and necessary 
cinema) (Rodríguez Chico 2009).
 27  Abel García Roure has said that “no hay percepción posible sobre el 
mundo que nos rodea que no esté siempre teñida de la subjetividad (con 
sus innumerables matices y facetas) de quien percibe; toda percepción de 
la realidad está siempre sujeta a una infinitud incalculable de interpreta-
ciones y puntos de vista subjetivos, tantos como sujetos existen e, incluso, 
multiplicados por tantos como los instantes que se suceden uno detrás de 
otro, en cada momento” (there is no possible perception of the world sur-
rounding us that is not shaped by the subjectivity [with its innumerable 
nuances and facets] of the person doing the perceiving: every perception 
of reality is always subject to an incalculable infinity of interpretations 
and subjective points of view, as many as there are people and, even, 
multiplied by the number of instants that each follow the others, in every 
moment) (quoted in Rodríguez Herrero 2012: no pag.).
 28  Javier, for example, was originally interned for stabbing a young boy 
while having an episode, and more recently for wanting to attack someone 
with a hammer (1:14:29); Rosario admits to having previously attempted 
suicide, by trying to throw herself from a balcony.
 29  During this effective sequence, the film’s editing uses cross-cutting to 
contrast Alberto with another patient who is quite verbal but strapped to a 
gurney, thus portraying the range of experiences of those receiving help at 
the Taulí.
 30  Neither do we have significant access to the faces of a number of other 
relatively minor characters in the film’s narrative, including Jordi D.A., 
Rosa M.S., Xavier Piñol, and F.J.P., who are credited at the film’s close.
 31  To put it somewhat crudely, if there are three or four main patient char-
acters on the side of madness, there are three or four doctor characters 
on the side of reason. Among those physicians listed in the film’s credits 
are Dr Josep Moya, Dra Gabriela Severino, Dra Roser Guillamat, Dr Jesús 
Cobo, Dr Esteve Bonet, Dra Raise Agustín, Dra Isabel Parra, and Dr Isreal 
Álvarez.
 32  In one effective example of cross-cutting, there is a schizophrenic patient 
talking to camera crew at his house, which is then cross-cut with the same 
patient delivering a lecture on his experience to a group of providers, 
presumably at the Taulí (0:16:31–0:17:51). 
 33  In the first case, the cut separates Javier’s question of what happens if 
a doctor decides she wants to make people into hamburgers (0:59:07–
0:59:13) and Dr Guillamat’s explanation of what happens to a patient 
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when a crisis starts (0:59:14–0:59:49); in the second case, Javier first com-
plains about not understanding why he is being interned – “no capto la 
razón (... de eso, ingresarme al Taulí ...), no he cometido ningún delito, no 
he hecho nada, ninguna cosa, no entiendo, no entiendo” (I don’t get the 
reason […for this, for being interned in the Taulí], I have committed no 
crime, I haven’t done anything, nothing, I don’t understand, I don’t under-
stand” (0:58:16) – and then points to the risks of the medication he is being 
forced to take, saying “no tiene efectos secundarios por el momento. Hace 
ya veinticinco años que medico, y yo creo que ya es demasiado tiempo 
largo, tanta medicación, oye” (there are no secondary effects [known] at 
this time. I’ve been on medicine for twenty-five years, and I think that this 
is too long, too much medication, you know) (0:58:32). Another example 
is when the editing cuts away after Javier expresses how meaningful it 
is to be able to be creative and draw, something he cannot do when on 
Risperdal (1:31:57).
 34  In fact at a later moment in the film, Josep attempts to use cellular/neu-
ronal vocabulary and other metaphors to explain the operation of schizo-
phrenia to Javier in the latter’s apartment (starting at 1:08:25).
 35  When Javier speaks with a psychiatrist at the film’s approximate midway 
point about the issue of medication (1:01:57–1:03:31), the camera switches 
from having the pair share the frame to framing each separately, thus illus-
trating their disagreement. Speaking with Josep in his apartment, Javier 
complains that the providers won’t spend time talking with him anymore: 
“Bueno es que los psiquiatras no te dicen nada, ni hablas con ellos. Nada 
más la inyección … te dicen pues ‘te voy a internar.’ Total que, yo, que 
¿quién está más loco?” (Well it is that the psychiatrists don’t tell you any-
thing, nor do you talk to them. Just the injection … They just tell you ‘I’m 
going to intern you.’ So that, I wonder who is more crazy) (1:11:26).
 36  “A hearing gaze and a speaking gaze: clinical experience represents a mo-
ment of balance between speech and spectacle. A precarious balance, for 
it rests on a formidable postulate: that all that is visible is expressible, and 
that it is wholly visible because it is wholly expressible. A postulate of such 
scope could permit a coherent science only if it was developed in a logic 
that was its rigorous outcome. But the reversibility, without residue, of the 
visible in the expressible remained in the clinic a requirement and a limit 
rather than an original principle. Total description is a present and ever-
withdrawing horizon; it is much more the dream of a thought than a basic 
conceptual structure” (1994: 115, original emphasis).
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